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Abstract
Conley, Gregory Dean. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. August 2013. “Alien
Evolutions: Darwinian Influence on the History and Transformation of the AngloAmerican Science Fiction Alien, 1885 to 1936.” Major Professor: Dr. Stephen
Tabachnick.
This dissertation argues that the alien as a literary figure gained meaning through
writers’ use of evolutionary theory and the literary grotesque as they created alien
monsters. The alien pointed to foreigners, people from other countries, religions, or other
social groups – strange but not totally unfamiliar. Evolutionary theory alienated many
people from each other, their surroundings, and even abstract constructs that shaped their
world such as Nature and Time. This alienation anxiety found its way into the literature
of monsters, which used the grotesque to represent and discuss this anxiety. The alien had
been human, and people as grotesque evolutionary aliens appear as the tension between
worldviews increased – but alien monsters, such as William Hope Hodgson’s squid
people or H. G. Wells’ Martians separated the alien further and further from the familiar.
It could contain literary creatures different than human beings, so strange as to be
unrecognizable and impossible to deal with using human standards. The alien could still
be foreign and also somewhat familiar, but it had been estranged from common
experience. The extraterrestrial as an alien came from the widening estrangement
between the familiar and the alien, “us” and “them” – them being ever-stranger creatures
and literary images. This literary image, the evolutionarily grotesque, baffling alien
startled readers but allowed for more and more strange beings to pool together in one
image. The alien became something that could simultaneously represent the strange and
the familiar at once. It answered to the same laws of biology, through its evolutionary
heritage, but could emerge from under the sea or outer space. This development was
iii

integral to the history of the science fiction alien, which could be an allegorical image of
anything from Communists to conformists, all through the same origin as an entity
evolved differently from “us,” from humans. The grotesque alien that comes from
evolutionary theory used in literary horror stories allowed for the creation of an empty
“Other,” an entity, image, or life defined by being not human, not “us.” It is one of the
purest expressions of “Othering,” the human tendency to create images of things we are
not, in order to firm up our own identities.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter

Page

1

Introduction

1

2

The Human Alien: Savages as Animals and Children

78

3

Survivals, Remnants, and Evolutionary Fossils

161

4

Naturalization: Horrifying Animals

224

5

Final Transformation: the Fully SF Works of Wells and Lovecraft

276

6

Conclusion

319

Works Cited

335

v

Introduction: A Gulf between Life and Life
In Algernon Blackwood’s story “The Man Whom the Trees Loved” (1912) one
can find a startling image of the alien in the back woods of rural England. Mr. Bittacy, a
retired forester, and his wife learn that trees have their own particular intelligence and
that they want Mr. Bittacy to join them in the woods, since he loves them and can keep
them healthy. Mrs. Bittacy tries to keep her husband with her and keep his humanity
intact, but she fails. The rest of the story chronicles Mrs. Bittacy’s horror and loneliness,
as well as her futile attempts to remind her husband of his humanity. She tries to rely on
God and her faith to help against the trees, but they do not help. The trees take Mr.
Bittacy anyway.
Mrs. Bittacy struggles to understand why her religion is powerless – she feels sure
the trees are evil, blasphemous even, and that their hold on her husband is evil. Her faith
assures her that God helps the righteous against evil. But, to her own horror, she realizes
she is wrong shortly after she follows her husband into the forest. Barred by the trees
from catching him, she returns home and prays for help; she understands finally that the
trees are not evil, but merely something that usually stands away from humankind,
something alien and not commonly recognized. She realizes there is “a gulf fixed
between the two [trees and humankind]. . .” and it has been bridged (265). Her religion
fails her in this contest because it is not one between good and evil, but between different
forms of life. No human morality can apply to the trees, who are not human. The gulf
fixed between life and life, the space that separates humans and trees, is not uncrossable
in this story, but it is wide, and it does make strangers of the two life forms. They can
meet, they can interact, but doing so is risky: the identity of one or the other will change
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due to the interaction. Mr. Bittacy becomes tree-like, while, out in the yard, an old
favorite tree of the family, used for picnic shade, is more human-like than before, until
the trees of the forest batter it down with the force of their incomprehensible willpower.
Blackwood uses the word “alien” to describe the trees, their life and their
intelligence. And that word is the key to the story, as well as a cultural and literary change
that was taking place in the decades surrounding the publication of “The Man Whom the
Trees Loved.” In the story, the trees are creatures just like humans, tigers, or bacteria.
They simply have a kind of intelligence that, in the real, “zero” world, they do not appear
to have. The story wonders what needs trees could have, and how they might satisfy
them, if they had evolved intelligence and willpower. It finds they would seek
sympathetic people to help them in a symbiotic relationship, in the same way humans
have bacteria colonizing their stomachs that help digest food. Mr. Bittacy, to the trees, is
nothing more than a useful caretaker.
In the culture around the story, the alien was being defined and redefined, with
new and old meanings twining together. For the readers of Blackwood’s story, “alien”
could mean many things: it could mean a foreigner or “savage,” incomprehensible
because of cultural differences and normative assumptions that used “savage” as an
opposing force to help define “civilized”; it could mean a world, an animal, or person
made suddenly natural, and not supernatural, by scientific theory; or it could mean a
being or entity that, from a human point of view, was entirely amoral – outside
anthropocentric moral structures. Blackwood’s trees are like that, actually outside the
religious structure Mrs. Bittacy uses for support as her husband is alienated from her. For
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more and more readers it could and did mean something like the creatures from The War
of the Worlds (1898), aliens as extraterrestrial.
Each alien was something supposedly familiar that was no longer so. They were
alienated from Victorian readers through political and scientific anxieties. Each type of
literary alien expressed an anxiety growing or already strong in Victorian society, from
the threat of the “savage” to the feeling of strangeness in the pre-historic past or nature
itself. Each theory or discovery related to these types of alien made people feel more
alone, more estranged, and more abject. Eventually the proliferation of new “aliens” in
fiction led to the creation of the extraterrestrial, an alien capable of emblematizing any
anxiety, because it already had – from fear of colonization to fear of sexuality, the literary
alien had used evolutionary theory to become grotesque figures of fear and fright. They
were creatures explained by evolution and not by the supernatural. The extraterrestrial
was the logical conclusion to such a literary pattern – they could evolve on a completely
different world. The gulf could, conceptually at least, be entirely uncrossable, unlike the
gap between trees and humans in Blackwood’s story.
Both readers and texts today still bear the influence of these “alien” stories from
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Strange, monstrous, grotesque aliens
hail from a literary world quite close to that inhabited by these creatures. But that world
was also inhabited by people, trees, animals of all sorts, as well as monsters and creatures
from outer space.
That world was shaped by evolutionary theories, particularly those of Darwin and
the writers who followed him. Evolution affected nearly every aspect of Victorian
culture, from criminology to newspaper cartoons. What started as an attempt to improve
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classifications of species became a far-reaching cultural phenomenon that made its way
into nearly all of the literature of the time. Critics like Gillian Beer have successfully
demonstrated Darwin’s influence on varied texts like Middlemarch (1874) and Tess of the
D’Urbervilles (1891). Books like Wells’ War of the Worlds are even more obviously
influenced by Darwin, with their direct dialogue with evolutionary ideas in the text itself.
For instance, Wells’ narrator describes the evolutionary history that would have made the
Martians vulnerable to Earthly-organisms like bacteria and viruses (2238). But all these
works draw from the same cultural influence, even as they interpret it differently and use
it for different purposes.
Evolutionary theory helped define and redefine the ways people thought of the
“alien,” be it from another planet or merely from another country. But so, too, did the
literary traditions that authors manipulated while writing on evolution. Hardy’s Tess is
very different from Wells’ Martian. Gothic horror fiction was popular in the middle and
late nineteenth century, and many Gothic horror stories and stories that borrowed Gothic
conventions contemplated evolutionary themes and anxieties. Some Gothic conventions
were useful to authors who were dealing with evolution, such as the supernatural
monster; the oppressive site, like a castle or forest; and the sublime and grotesque. Those
conventions also helped to shape the way many people thought, and might still think, of
the alien and the world as seen in evolutionary theory. Many people felt alienated from
the world around them when they encountered Darwin’s theories, so the figurative aliens
from traditional Gothic fiction made excellent surrogates to examine evolution, but in
turn they lent their faces, their rubbery skin and tentacled arms, to the visions of the alien,
both representing the strange new Darwinian world and shaping future representations of
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it. And ultimately they helped shape the image of the alien and make it a literary tool for
symbolizing and imaging any type of cultural anxiety, from Communists to conformity.
The alien had always been a useful literary trope for dealing with anxiety – the layering
of evolution and the grotesque onto the alien made extraterrestrials, and those
extraterrestrial aliens became the perfect empty “Other” images, the perfect symbol for
any and all anxieties, because they were by nature neutral but came from literary
monsters.

5

I.

The Gothic Monster

Gothic fiction already had a long tradition of horrors, both human and inhuman.
Gothic fiction began with mostly human figures doing horrifying things. Manfred
dominates the first Gothic novel, Castle of Otranto (1764). His son dies at the altar,
crushed by an enormous helmet that falls from the sky, and Manfred becomes obsessed
with continuing his line, trying to imprison and rape the woman who was to marry his
son. He is wholly human and the novel’s protagonist, even if he sounds like a typical
villain. He imprisons priests, young men from the countryside, and the woman he wants
to sleep with – as well as pushing his wife aside for the younger woman. Several other
novels developed this convention, and one of those was Vathek (1786). In it the caliph
Vathek follows a spiritual demon on a cross-country journey that consists of doing the
worst things he can imagine, culminating in selling his soul to the devil for a glimpse of
the splendors of Satan’s storehouses. Along the way he menaces virgins, steals, kills, and
squanders the authority given him by his position, all while his mother’s witchcraft
supports and aids him. She, too, is damned to hell in the final chapter of the novel.
Ann Radcliffe popularized the explained supernatural trend in Gothic fiction, with
novels such as Mysteries of Udolpho (1794) and The Italian (1797). That latter novel was
a response to Matthew Lewis’ The Monk (1796), which had a protagonist, Ambrosio, who
murders his long-lost mother, and rapes and murders his sister, all while using witchcraft
to further his ends. The devil comes in the end to claim Ambrosio, and casts him from a
mountain to crash against the rocks below.
The tendency, Ann Radcliffe’s popular “explained supernatural” aside, was for
novels to move the supernatural agencies from the background to the foreground.

6

Manfred is entirely quotidian; Vathek is quotidian, but is led by two supernatural figures
– the giaour and his mother; Ambrosio makes use of some mystical devices directly, such
as a wand that will put everyone in a house to sleep, and a magic scrying mirror, but is
still without powers of his own. He gets these devices from the witch who was his first
illicit lover.
Melmoth the Wanderer (1820), by Charles Maturin, moved its protagonist further
toward the supernatural. He too made a deal with the devil, but had powers of his own
afterwards, not just talismans given him by another. Melmoth wandered the Earth trying
to find someone to switch places with him, so he could escape his contract. He is finally
is taken by the devil. Byron reinvented the character of Manfred in his poem of the same
name; Manfred becomes a Byronic hero, dark and aloof, with powers over the spirits of
nature that do not make up for the loss of his loved one. Byron’s Manfred is a spell caster
in his own right, owing allegiance to no other power, infernal or divine.
In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries Gothic works made their horrible
characters – still mostly protagonists – less and less human. The final development was
the monster itself. In talking about Gothic villains, Devendra Varma wrote that
We can distinguish three types of Gothic villain : the character of Manfred
fashioned by Walpole in 1764, a type composed of ambitious tyranny and
unbridled passion, [. . .] ; the early villains of Mrs. Radcliffe, culminating
in Count Montorio of Maturin and the character of Guzman in Melmoth
the Wanderer [. . .] The third type of Gothic villain is the terrible
“superman” whose ways lie in darkness and whose strength originates far
beyond mortal thought. He is a new mintage of the Satan portrayed by
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Milton in Paradise Lost -- the immortal outcast, a masterful, vaunting
villain, his spirit unbroken even in defeat. (215-16)
For Varma, the villain of the Gothic begins in passion and ends in a kind of Satanic,
superhuman energy. It is questionable whether Manfred is a villain, but he is villainous
enough for Varma’s definition. Either way, Varma highlights the progression that Gothic
fiction appears to have followed: from powerful human figures to extraordinarily
powerful non-humans. For Varma the “superman” is figurative – vaunting and unbroken.
However, as more writers came to Gothic fiction, the figure became less and less
figurative, more literal and alien from its origins in passionate humans.
Frankenstein (1818) tipped the balance. Even though the creature is certainly not
monstrous like Dracula or Mr. Hyde, he is still physically grotesque and preternaturally
powerful. He survives harsh climates that would kill others – and the arctic waste he
escapes to at last does kill his creator, Victor. The creature is not evil, but he is monstrous
in that he is powerful, unnatural, and an outcast from society, just like Byron’s Manfred.
The creature becomes misanthropic because he is unaccepted; his misanthropy makes it
harder for him to be accepted by anyone else. Meanwhile, Victor is aghast with the
creature, horrified by him whenever he thinks of the body he made and the person he met
in the mountains. He calls the creature, when describing its awakening, a “wretch” and
goes on to say that “breathless horror and disgust filled [Victor’s] heart” (934-5). The
creature horrifies Victor, and reminds him of what he thought impossible or unlikely,
though he is the person who created the creature.
That grotesqueness is the convention that Gothic literature lent the authors who
were working with aliens and evolution. That sort of grotesque creature reminds readers
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and characters of the world outside their mundane perceptions and that their perceptions
do not take in the entire world. Gothic grotesques frightened, in part, through violating
the order of nature. These new, evolutionary grotesques frightened by appearing to
violate nature and reminding readers that the monsters are no more a violation of nature
than the readers themselves. Upon reading The Origin of Species, a zealous American
abolitionist named Asa Gray was forced to admit “he could not help wincing at the
thought that he was unmistakably related to the Hottentot and Negro” (Victorian Minds
321). That wince of Asa Gray’s happened when he was convinced that people of African
extraction were the same, evolutionarily, as him. He had been trying to free slaves and
win civil rights for them, but had still felt he was more human, or more highly developed
as a human, than they. Gray did not think Africans violated nature, but that they violated
the definition of human – so he felt they were not human. When he was proven wrong he
winced, a reaction similar to the horrified abjectness these grotesque alien stories
engender.
II.

Terror, Horror, Dread, and their Relation to the Grotesque

Terror, horror, and dread are the three words that help define different sorts of
fear, and they are all kinds of fear that the Gothic grotesque played upon to function, both
traditionally and in the stories of evolutionary aliens. Ann Radcliffe stated her position on
how Gothic fiction worked, and should work, in her essay “On the Supernatural in
Poetry” (1826). The most famous distinction she makes in this essay is the difference
between terror and horror. She defines terror as threatening fright of something unknown,
and horror as revulsion from disgusting and somewhat frightening things directly beheld.
“Terror and horror are so far opposite, that the first expands the soul, and awakens the
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faculties to a high degree of life; the other contracts, freezes, and nearly annihilates them
(6). She uses Milton as an example, claiming that he rarely describes “horrors” in his
poetry, instead allowing the vague outlines of description to terrify readers – indeed, she
repudiates a possible counterargument by saying Milton's use of the word “horror” is in
itself poetic, and actually a delineation of terror.
Scholars have long used Radcliffe's distinction between terror and horror to
categorize Gothic fiction. Radcliffe's own fiction is “terror Gothic”; it uses vague outlines
and hints to forgo description whenever possible, allowing the reader to fill in what is
frightening and thus experience a kind of sublime terror at the soul-lifting thought of
death. Fiction such as Lewis's The Monk, then, is horror fiction, stultifying the mind with
images of rotting bodies and other disgusting things lying around in dungeons, doing
nothing but providing cheap thrills for readers. Really horror provides a reminder of
one’s own mortality and the nature of the fleshly body one must use to interact with the
world and other people. Steven Bruhm highlights this reminder of the physical body in
his study Gothic Bodies: the Politics of Pain in Romantic Fiction. He says that
[t]he pained body’s privileging of itself over the mind helps to explain our
culture’s antagonism to our own inescapable corporeality [. . .] In our
thinking, pain is not “natural”; it is adversarial. Our English word “pain”
comes from the Latin poena, meaning penalty or punishment. The body in
pain attacks the self that recognizes that pain [. . .] Pain evokes an
antagonistic relationship between the body and the self at the same time
that it allows no distinction between body and self [. . .] Thus what pain
effects is a return of the body to a pre-Cartesian body – where mind and

10

body are inseparable – at the same time as it pits the mind firmly against
the body. Pain confounds one aspect of dualism (the primacy of mind over
body) by evoking another aspect of dualism (the body’s perceived
estrangement from the self). (9 italics Bruhm’s)
Horror functions in a similar way. Bruhm argues that pain, particularly pain in Romantic
fiction, reminds sufferers of the body at a time when they think only of their minds.
People often efface their bodies from their self-image, and pain is terrible because it leads
the mind back to the primacy of the body. Pain reminds the sufferer that there is a body,
that he or she is a body, and that it can suffer.
The next component of Gothic fear, after terror and horror, is dread. G. R.
Thompson, in “Romanticism and the Gothic Tradition,” says dread is a combination of
terror, horror, and mystery – he differs from Radcliffe’s view that terror and horror are
almost mutually exclusive. He relies on her dichotomy and says that terror “suggests the
frenzy of physical and mental fear of pain, dismemberment, and death” while horror
“suggests the perception of something incredibly evil or morally repellent” (3). He adds
mystery to this schema, defining it as “something beyond this, the perception of a world
that stretches away beyond the range of human intelligence – often morally
incomprehensible – and thereby productive of a nameless apprehension that may be
called religious dread in the face of the wholly other” (3). Terror and horror are
“complementary poles” according to Thompson (3). Taken together with mysterious
origins or circumstances, they make something dreadful.
According to Thompson, if something is dreadful in traditional Gothic fiction, it
produces apprehension of a religious sort because the dreadful thing is “wholly other.” In
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this case, the alien figures are “other” because they exist outside the experience of the
characters. But these characters are not just any people – they are “positive” as described
by Noël Carroll. He claims that “humans regard the monsters they meet [in a horror
story] as abnormal, as disturbances in the natural order,” and that these monsters “breach
the norms of ontological propriety presumed by the positive human characters in the
story” (16). So the characters of these stories – usually the protagonists – stand in for the
readers in some way, because they are “positive” representatives of the assumptions and
virtues of the society from which the author, characters, and reader spring. They are
“normal” in a way the alien figures are not. They represent that “ontological propriety”
that the monsters of Carroll’s work – and the aliens of this study – disrupt and violate.
They do so through abjection. Kelly Hurley posited a strong connection between
Gothic works of the late nineteenth century and the work of Julia Kristeva in her study
The Gothic Body. Hurley devoted that work to studying the breakdown of the human
body in fin-de-siècle Gothic literature, but the connection is sound for this study as well.
Hurley’s term for the thing that breaches the ontological propriety of the positive
characters is the “abhuman,” a term she pulls from the work of William Hope Hodgson.
The abhuman is “characterized by its morphic variability” (3). The abhuman’s body can
and does change, horrifying the positive characters when it does so. The changing
reminds the characters of their own morphic body, which they assume from day to day is
static. The horror wells up from the reminder that one’s own body does not work the way
one assumes it does, and that it could work the way the horrible body of the abhuman
does.
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The abhuman is just one example of the things in the literature of the time that
borrowed Gothic conventions to scare characters and readers. But all the things – natives,
abhuman creatures, trees, squids, and aliens – had one thing in common. They made
readers abject, and they did so through literary grotesque. The first thing Kristeva says on
abjection is that there “looms, within abjection, one of those violent, dark revolts of
being, directed against a threat that seems to emanate from an exorbitant outside or
inside, ejected beyond the scope of the possible, the tolerable, the thinkable. It lies there,
quite close, but it cannot be assimilated” (1). The feeling of abjection is a feeling against
an apparent threat, and a threat that seems to be outside “the scope of the possible, the
tolerable, the thinkable.” It is close – it is being observed – but cannot be comprehended
as easily as a traffic jam or a red blouse.
Fred Botting points out that
[r]omance [. . .] provided the matrix in which gothic and science fiction
gestated. Monstrous in form, romance bred monstrosities: on the one hand,
idealised figures drawn from chivalric or fairy tales were so impossibly
unrealistic as to be 'monsters of perfection'; on the other hand, grotesque
and deformed, were characters “out of nature,” alien to the familiar
models of social virtue and reality. (132)
Botting's word is important there: “alien.” The monsters continued to be alien in the sense
that they were estranged from normative society. They were both abject in themselves –
rejected from society – and caused abjectness in others, reminding them of things they
would rather not think of, such as mortality, biology, or sin. Abject “aliens” are not just
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estranged from society, as their predecessors were; they are separate from it, apparently
or literally things completely outside the orders of society, nature, or even reality.
Frankenstein’s creature is cast out of society and his creator sees him as a being
outside nature, but in the end some sort of natural law was manipulated to create him,
even though Victor never describes it to his interlocutor, Walton. But he is so far outside
the typical experience of nature that Victor still sees him as unnatural, even though, of all
people, he should know exactly how the creature functions and how natural he is.
It is the grotesqueness of the creature that makes him seem unnatural. He lies
outside the realm of typical human experience, with his huge frame and strangely-moving
muscles; at least he is outside the experience of the white, rural, typically well-to-do
families Victor knows.
The creature is terrifying because he reminds Victor of his danger, and his
family’s danger. He is horrifying because he is grotesque – apparently something that
cannot be in the rubric used by the people he meets. He is mysterious in his origins, and
thus, finally, dreadful in his proportions. The dread he inspires makes readers abject, by
reminding them as well as Victor of upturned earth, opened graves, and body parts
moving together in a way no one has experienced before.
The evolutionary aliens of this study – human, animal, and otherwise – appear
grotesque to the characters of their stories. That grotesqueness is what inspires the abject
dread the stories use to deal with anxieties fostered by the impact evolutionary theories
had on society and culture.
III.

The Grotesque and its Power in Preternatural Creatures.
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The grotesque has a complicated history. It began as a very specific term in the
visual arts, and gradually fell into use describing literature as well. Many writers and
critics have disdained it, implying without saying that authors who use traditional
grotesque are using a crutch. It did not help that the term grotesque was often confused
with other terms. Walter Scott wrote on the grotesque, but also the Gothic and the
arabesque; Poe used Scott’s writing as a theoretical source, and often mentioned
grotesque in direct conjunction with arabeseque, tying the words together for a long while
and making it difficult for those who followed to disentangle them (Thompson Poe’s
Fiction 113). But the history of the term before Ruskin is often so confusing that it does
not help define the term for scholars today.
Ruskin claimed that the grotesque is the result of “healthful but irrational play of
the imagination in times of rest,” and that the grotesqueness of the resulting work rested
in part on the baseline healthfulness of the author or artist (qtd. in Steig 254). Ruskin also
claimed that the grotesque was of two kinds, “sportive” and “terrible,” but that they were
usually combined in some way rather than separated into two distinct types (Steig 254).
Certainly many of the examples in this study are at least a bit ridiculous – Hodgson wrote
about giant squid-snail-men in Boats of the “Glen Carrig” (1907); Blackwood wrote
about menacing willow trees. They still frighten somehow; they still make one feel
abject. They do so in part because of their ridiculousness, but that, by the end of many of
these stories, often disappears, and only the dread remains. The willow trees in “The
Willows” may seem ridiculous at first – the narrator thinks they are so. A native woman
warns him of the danger, and his response is to laugh and wonder if she believed in
fairies, demons, and elementals (26). Ruskin does not dwell on the frightening elements
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of the grotesque. He does say the only grotesque that can frighten is the “noble
grotesque” and that any other kind is merely “disgusting” (Clayborough 36). He is
making a similar distinction to Radcliffe’s; he points out a “noble” or uplifting grotesque,
which can frighten. That sounds like the sublime terror Radcliffe advocated. He
denigrated the supposedly lowering grotesques that used disgust as an element.
One of the first critics to try to deal seriously with the grotesque in the twentieth
century was Wolfgang Kayser. He says the work of Bosch and Brueghel modeled “the
experience of the estranged world,” which is grotesque (35). His fuller list of elements
making up the grotesque includes “the mixture of heterogeneous elements, the confusion,
the fantastic quality, and even a kind of alienation of the world” (51). These are all
elements he identifies in the work of Schlegel, but he claims one grotesque element is
missing: “the abysmal quality, the insecurity, the terror inspired by the disintegration of
the world” (52). Early in the study, while dealing with different artistic and literary
works, Kayser defines the grotesque organically. He attributes to it an estranged,
alienated, disintegrating world; it contains confusion, fantasy, and heterogeneous
mixtures of elements. When he talks about Lear and Carroll, Kayser says a “mysterious
and terrifying connection between the fantastic and the real world” is “essential for the
grotesque” (122). The fantastic, in traditional Gothic stories, was typically supernatural,
and the terrifying connection entered the narratives as the supernatural brushed up against
the normal and natural worlds of the characters. Even in Frankenstein the names of
ancient alchemists appear, coloring the scientific achievement of Victor Frankenstein in
the shades of fantasy.
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In the final chapter of his study, Kayser sets about entirely defining and delimiting
the grotesque. He tries to show that it is an “esthetic category” of its own (180). In doing
so he says that “the grotesque is experienced only in the act of reception” (181). It
happens in the interplay of the monstrous literary thing and the normative assumptions of
the reader. Monsters are always already grotesque, as are certain animals, like bats, the
“grotesque animal incarnate” (181-3). He makes this point by reminding readers of its
name – the text was originally written in German – Fledermaus: flying mouse. He says
that the name itself indicates a fusion of differing worlds, that of flying and of scurrying
creatures. Frankenstein’s creature fuses the living and the dead, as does Dracula the undead vampire. Both creatures are members of two peoples, part of two worlds. They
bridge the gulf between what the characters, and perhaps readers, are used to and what
they cannot imagine.
Kayser sets down the defining characteristic of the grotesque firmly in his final
chapter: “THE GROTESQUE IS THE ESTRANGED WORLD [. . .] It is our world
which has to be transformed” (184, caps Kayser’s). There is, then, a contiguity between
the world of a grotesque work and the zero world – the real world we inhabit as readers –
but in the end readers and characters will come to find that the grotesque world was
really an estranged one after all. This shift may imply that our world, too, is estranged in
the same way, at least in the experience of the readers. The grotesque, then, acts to
estrange the world from the reader, and the reader from the world – or at least to create
that feeling while it is read.
Kayser says that the grotesque creates an estranged world in some way contiguous
with ours, and that it mixes things up, often blurring boundaries of definition and
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categorization. Monsters are nearly always grotesque, but because they blur some kind of
boundary – as Frankenstein’s creature and Dracula do. But Kayser clarifies some of the
ways in which these evolutionary horror stories can frighten. It seems as though they
could not, given that any evil in these evolutionary monsters should have been drained
away by the scientific explanations for their monstrosity – they could not be evil any
longer, as they had the same status as animals or humans, “monstrous” because they
evolved that way. If they are not intelligent enough to exercise free will they are no more
evil than an animal. If they can exercise free will, they are evil because they have chosen
to be, just as a human could choose. But they are still grotesque – they are monstrous
physically, because they are not human. They are trees, or squid-creatures, or space aliens
with enormous heads. They are grotesque not because they “violate” nature in the way
Gothic monsters did, but because they estrange nature in the way Kayser describes.
Arthur Clayborough provides more of an in-depth explanation of how monsters
qualify as grotesque. He attributes the grotesque’s frightening, disorienting power almost
entirely to alienation, to the creation of an incongruity that introduces “strangeness” and
puts it into “conflict with existing standards” (70-1). He builds on Kayser’s work,
focusing in on and honing Kayser’s phrase “the alienated world.” Specifically
Clayborough points out that the grotesque in art and literature is opposed to natural
conditions, or assumed natural conditions, and will make of the world an alien place (71).
If a creature appears to violate natural conditions it will strike the audience as grotesque,
even if, in the end, it turns out to be just as natural as the reader or the characters within
the piece.
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Clayborough points out that Kayser says one would not wish to live in an alien
world, and agrees, though he points out that “it would clearly be going too far to say that
we do not wish to experience a world which upsets natural standards” (72). The simplest
form of attraction is curiosity, he says; he points out that freak shows were grotesqueries
and were quite popular (72). The grotesque draws audiences, even as it repels them in
some way.
He explains that by adding something to the definition of the grotesque in general.
He says there is a “psychological tendency to seek a relationship between contiguous
objects” (73). He uses the examples of Dada collage, of the centaur, and of Lear’s “The
Owl and the Pussycat.” The centaur, for example, is the simple fusion of two types of
creature: horse and man, “placed in an impossible relationship to each other” through that
fusion (72). The fusion makes no sense, and it will never make sense. Clayborough
brings up Ann Radcliffe’s work in explaining what is necessary to make sense of the
work that contains such impossibilities. One sort of mind, practical, would reject such
combinations as pointless, while another aspect of mind “luxuriates” in them. “To the
first frame of mind the novels of Mrs. Ann Radcliffe, with their ultimate explanation of
the mysterious occurrences, are satisfying; to the second frame of mind they are
ultimately disappointing” (73). Then he brings up Keats’s concept of “negative
capability,” which Keats defined as the capability “of being in uncertainties, mysteries,
doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason” (qtd. in Clayborough 73).
Clayborough insists that both tendencies exist in everyone, rather than claiming, as Keats
seems to, that people match one or the other tendency. Clayborough adds to Kayser’s
alienated world the sense of disunion, the need of the mind to tie together unassociated
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things when united in the grotesque figures of art, while simultaneously enjoying in an
artistic sense the impossibility of putting them firmly together with logical connections or
familiar images.
In an article written as a precursor to a longer book-length work, Geoffrey
Harpham reiterates Kayser’s estrangement, saying “the familiar and commonplace must
be suddenly subverted or undermined by the uncanny or alien” (“Principles” 462). He
says only lines later that the suddenness is not required. His point is that “grotesque must
begin with, or contain within it, certain aesthetic conventions which the reader feels are
representative of reality as he knows it” (462). Clayborough also insisted on this
contiguity between the world of the reader and the setting in which the literary grotesque
grows. The grotesque must emerge from a world apparently like the reader’s. Noël
Carroll claimed that horror and monstrosity are difficult to find in fairy tales, as the world
typically contains such creatures as ogres or witches. They do not surprise the characters
and are not grotesque. That is perhaps a bit too simple, but Harpham says something
similar: the world of the grotesque work must contain or begin with conventions that
represent the reader’s reality. The grotesque disrupts one’s sense of reality, so there must
necessarily be a reality or a nature like one’s own in the fiction to be disrupted.
Harpham’s next important claim is that “[e]ach age redefines the grotesque in
terms of what threatens its sense of essential humanity” (463). The passage is about how
grotesque changes over time – Harpham points out that gargoyles on churches were once
grotesque, but people pass them every day and do not spare a glance at them; they
certainly do not gaze at them in shock. Harpham identifies one of the fundamental
qualifications of grotesquerie: it threatens one’s sense of humanity. The grotesque either
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threatens some aspect of human identity or threatens the entire idea that there could be an
essential human identity. Those assumptions of identity have changed over time, and so
the grotesque must necessarily have changed to keep pace with it. The evolutionary
horror of this study, while still broadly present in literature up to the current day, was in
the nineteenth century an iteration of the latest grotesque. In Blackwood’s stories the risk
to the human characters is not physical and the most grotesque image is, as in “The Man
Whom the Trees Loved,” one of a human walking, moving, and behaving somehow treelike. His personality has been consumed by the trees that love him. He is no longer really
human.
Harpham’s article also makes sense of a traditional claim – echoed in Scott,
Ruskin, and most critics since – that the grotesque is funny. Many critics have talked
about that aspect of it, but Harpham comes nearest to describing how the grotesque
makes one laugh in a way that is not the same as a joke. He says, first, that the grotesque
“must arouse three responses.” “Laughter and astonishment” are the first two and the
third is “either disgust or horror” (463). Then he points out that grotesque laughter might
be “innocent” for the artist or creator of it, but that for the audience “it is never
innocuous” (463). The laughter helps the audience member accept the horrible things in
the work, making them more palatable but not pulling their teeth, as it were. They are
still terrible, they just do not seem quite as bad as they had before the laughter (464).
Harpham builds on the work of other critics and suggests categories of grotesque, broadly
broken in two: “comic” and “terrible”; eventually he suggests four categories:
“caricature,” “comic grotesque (ludicrous or satiric),” “fantastic grotesque (terrible),” and
“Gothic-macabre” (464). The best fit for evolutionary horror is the fantastic grotesque, as
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the Gothic macabre would deal mostly with memento mori, reminders of death and
bodily dissolution such as skeletons in dungeons. The focus of the grotesque in
evolutionary horror stories is to terrify and inspire dread, to remind characters and
readers alike of the only truths about human identity – whatever those might be in each
individual story. They strip away assumptions about humanity, usually to do with their
place in a supposed natural hierarchy. The grotesque creatures prove that hierarchy does
not exist or was not shaped the way the humans assumed. The grotesqueness of William
Hope Hodgson’s snail-squid-people serves to remind viewers that they were made by the
same nature, but also that nature has no rubric for the forms it creates – it could create
anything given the right ecological niche.
Harpham also points out that the monsters’ monstrosity can be linked to the
tradition in western culture of ugliness, and that sin “was commonly portrayed in
grotesque images [. . .] Misshaped form can be read forward to indicated spiritual or
intellectual perversity” (465). The monster is visually monstrous because of the long
tradition of monsters. Medieval monsters were grotesque because they were evil. That is
how Frankenstein’s creature is monstrous despite the novel’s insight into his motives – he
frightens all he meets by his looks alone. None of the characters care about his internal
life or his hope to become peaceful and happy, because he looks so horrible they assume
he is evil. Even Victor, who speaks to the creature at length, cannot get over his
assumption that the creature is inherently evil because of its looks. Machen toys with this
idea as well, with his grotesque survivals who are visually “backward” because they look
like Neanderthals or ancient taboo art.
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Harpham develops all these ideas in detail in his book, On the Grotesque. He
adds the connection between the grotesque and the taboo. He says “’grotesque’ is another
word for non-thing,” and proceeds to outline the idea of taboo based out of
anthropological studies. He describes the way children work out a socially-informed
“discriminatory grid” that allows them to deal with things, label them, and interact with
them. They do so by separating one thing from another and naming them. This grid never
accounts for everything, and so there are always certain things in cultures that are
actually non-things, items and ideas in between the spaces of the grid. One finds
“incarnate deities, virgin mothers, supernatural monsters that are half-man and half
beast” in the spaces between. He quotes Susan Stewart’s distinctions between different
sorts of non-thing, and one of those forms is “[t]he ambivalent [. . .] which belongs to
more than one domain at a time” (4). Harpham goes on to remind readers that “modern
secular adults are so indebted to and dependent upon their discriminatory grids that they
find the taboo mostly a source of anxiety, horror, astonishment, laughter, or revulsion”
(4). Grotesque things are things that do not exist in one’s discriminatory grid. So, for the
bulk of one’s life, they simply do not exist at all. If one never experiences the thing, the
thing effectively is invisible, non-existent. But when a person or a character encounters
these things directly – when he or she is forced to see something that, in their minds,
absolutely did not exist – the discriminatory grid wavers. They appear to violate nature
because they violate the picture of nature that made up the character’s discriminatory
grid.
Monsters seem to be grotesque because they are hybrids of impossible forms, men
and horses mashed together, squid and snails and humans roiling together in one body.
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The grotesque even serves the purpose of disrupting the assumptions readers and
characters make about the world and their own humanity, “alienating” people from their
own experience. Harpham’s inclusion of taboo shows quite directly how the grotesque is
frightening. Grotesque figures emerge from taboo; they remind readers of things
supposedly impossible, and at the same time of the impossibility of containing everything
within one’s “discriminatory grid,” one’s worldview. Dracula is frightening not only
because he is dangerous, but because his combination of elements (living/dead) sets him
outside a person’s discriminatory grid. He effectively cannot exist in the world most
people live in.
The natural order is not violated as in traditional Gothic monsters, but one’s
assumptions about it are. Taboo grotesques violate the belief that one understands the
entire world. Readers and characters both are reminded that they understand only that
which is inside their grid, their worldview, and that they have excluded many things that
make as much sense as any other. How else could actual, real world creatures be
grotesque, like the bat or the snake, insects and sea creatures? They are grotesque
because of the audience, not their own attributes. Kayser’s reminder that traditionally the
bat is one of the most grotesque animals reminds one of that: it is grotesque simply
because it does not match a traditional classification. It is a mammal that flies. Mammals
are creatures that do not fly, at least according to traditional classifications and world
views. Snakes are reptiles that move like worms, violating again an assumption about
what it will mean to see a reptile. It has fangs and scales but no legs. The evolutionary
monsters of this study are grotesque in precisely this way: they do not violate the natural
order, they reveal, within the proto-Science Fictional setting around them, that nature has
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more things than humans think it does. Classification systems are examples of
discriminatory grids, with no direct connection to the real world, only a model of the
world people have constructed. Grotesques, particularly evolutionary grotesques, frighten
because they remind people that they do not experience or understand nature, only their
idea of it. Squid-snail-people probably do not exist, but they could, there is nothing in
nature stopping such an awful – from the human point of view – thing from evolving.
A squid-snail man, like the other evolutionary monsters in this study, is certainly
ugly enough to summon up memories of the Gothic monsters that represented sin and
evil. But they do more than simply remind readers of monsters they may or may not have
read about before. They use similar mechanisms to take the frightening places of the old
monsters. The reaction goes something like this: a monster appears, and seems to be just
like any traditional monster, because of its dreadfulness and abjectness; the characters try
to deal with the monster, through escape, violence, or anything else; the characters learn
the monsters are not evil, because they are really just animals, even intelligent animals at
times; the monstrous traits of the creature are products of an evolutionary history the
characters are not familiar with; the characters have to face the idea that the monsters are
not evil, and that their conceptions about nature and the world were wrong; this makes
the creature more frightening, in that it destabilizes the ideas the characters had about
themselves, for how different are the characters from the thing they have loathed the
entire story?
This summary applies even to the stories of other people who are abject – stories
of “savages” at the frontiers of the British Empire. To the point of view characters they,
too, seem monstrous, unable or unwilling to adhere to the social standards that are “best”
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– the character’s own, of course. But the events of the stories, along with the overt or
implied evolutionary discourse, eventually prove to the characters that there is no
difference in kind between the “savages” and themselves. Marlow pities the African
natives, but does not want to admit they are as human as he is. He describes the moment
he realized they were as a sort of horror story revelation. The grotesqueness of the natives
serves to make them appear alien at first, and in some ways they are. Socially and
culturally they are alien to the discriminatory grids that characters such as Marlow or
Alan Quatermain bring with them. The destabilizing of a character’s world view
contributes to the sense of dread surrounding the person, creature, or monster. It violates
not nature but the characters’ assumptions about nature, and that, in turn, makes them
appear preternatural when they are as biologically natural, in the world of the story, as the
characters themselves.
Gothic monsters of all sorts create this kind of dread. Supernatural creatures do so
by violating nature itself. Evolutionary creatures, on the other hand, have no moral
compass to point to them and label them as “evil.” They seem to violate nature but do
not. They have only the effect they create in the reader and the characters of the story.
Kayser and Clayborough took pains to locate the grotesque in the reader or audience –
not the grotesque thing itself. The total feeling created by the grotesque and the Gothic
underpinnings of biological horror is dread. Radcliffe and Thompson’s “horror” can
easily be replaced by the grotesque, it provides the same revulsion. But it can also edge
readers into terror and mystery as well. As the horror narrative progresses the monsters
do not immediately appear to be natural, they seem to be supernatural. They indeed do
what Ann Radcliffe’s explained supernatural stories do, but in a way more satisfying for

26

Keats’ negative capable minds. After the explanation – that these creatures evolved – the
terror and mystery remain; they are terrifying because they could rip the characters apart,
even eat them. They are mysterious because they hint at biological conundrums, secrets
of nature still to be discovered. Evolutionary horror stories drain the morality and religion
from Gothic dread just as they did the Gothic monster itself.
The final element missing from the use of the grotesque in evolutionary creatures
is exactly what that grotesqueness does to the characters and the reader. The word
“abject” has already appeared to help describe that feeling. A closer look at abjectness in
evolutionary horror will clarify how evolutionary grotesques summon up feelings of
horror. They interact with the taboo, and Julia Kristeva interacts with the same sensation,
the same category, with her concept of the abject.
Kristeva defines the abject as something that “cannot be assimilated.” She also
defines it as something that is not subject and not object (1), neither a thing that feels or a
thing that one feels about. The abject is really just something that forces a response in
oneself. Usually it nauseates. Like the taboo, the abject “disturbs identity, system, order [.
. . and] does not respect borders, positions, rules” (4). Given that it is nauseating, because
it breaks the rules one perceives to be true at all times, it makes one want to expel it, get
rid of it. Kristeva’s simplest example is a sickening skin on milk – “since the food is not
an ‘other’ for ‘me,’ [. . .] I expel myself, I spit myself out, I abject myself within the same
motion through which ‘I’ claim to establish myself” (3 italics Kristeva’s). Many
evolutionary grotesques make readers and characters abject. Anything slimy and wiggly
evokes the same response as the milk skin in most people, quite viscerally. Most people
are disgusted by octopodes and squids, which Hodgson and Lovecraft both take

27

advantage of. Wells created Martians with no bodies, all head, who suck blood through
IVs in order to feed. That mixture of eating and bloodletting disgusts and nauseates the
reader; it reminds them, at a time when they are thinking of food, of their own blood
pumping through them. It reminds them how that can be food for something else. The
aliens might not exist, but a lion would happily consume their blood, their flesh, in the
right circumstances.
These responses, in turn, evoke Kristeva’s point about expelling. In expelling
these horrible things we expel ourselves. We do nothing to the octopus tentacle or the
blood IV. We react only on ourselves. In literature these images violate the pictures
readers create of how one works, reminding one of bodily functions, reminding that there
are body types on Earth other than mammalian, that the mammal is not necessarily the
norm. The abject, then, functions in a way similar to Bruhm’s conception of pain, through
the horror of the image that makes the reader or character abject. But when the character
or reader tries to expel the abject thing, there is nothing to expel. One is made sick by an
idea, the taboo returned, and in that case one cannot get rid of it. One can only degrade
himself or herself by trying to act as though the disgusting things are unnatural when they
are as natural as he or she is.
This uncertainty that leads to abjectness, this attempt to be certain about
something that is not true about the natural world – the human-centric construction of
nature – shows up often in SF literature. Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, Jr., in writing on the
twentieth century author Stanislaw Lem, has defined a term: “carousel reasoning.” It is
reasoning that “consists of carrying reflection within a logical system to the point where
premises and conclusions exchange places. [. . . T]he reasoner discovers that her
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premises depend upon her conclusions, that her thinking consists of combining and
recombining elements and operations until proving and assuming are indistinguishable”
(Csicsery-Ronay “Chaosphere” 244). Csicsery-Ronay is writing on a very different sort
of author here, but his concept applies to evolutionary horror works as well. The
grotesque creatures of evolutionary horror do not just violate the ideas of natural order
and causation that characters and readers have – they force characters to restructure their
ideas, they reveal the essential arbitrariness of their worldview. They reveal the
chaosphere – Csicsery-Ronay’s term for the headspace that results from carousel
reasoning – that supported those ideas of natural hierarchy and planning. In the fictional
worlds where monsters can and have evolved into being, natural order is an illusion
supported by a dearth of data. The characters simply have not seen enough of the world
to accurately gauge the truthfulness of their world models, and much of the abjectness
they feel comes from their models being destroyed by the taboo, abject creatures they
encounter.
The taboo, abject creatures bridge gulfs. The gulfs exist between positive
characters and horrible things that seem unnatural. They exist between Carroll’s
description of horror and this study’s focus on evolutionary creatures. Carroll points out
that monsters violate the perceived order of nature. The grotesque appears to violate
nature. In some stories it actually does, as in Dracula. But in evolutionary horror stories
the creatures do not violate nature. When a story uses evolution to define a creature, that
creature is natural within the confines of the fictional space it dwells in. If it evolved into
being, it is as natural as the horrified humans who see it, or the trees surrounding it.
Indeed, in the case of Blackwood’s stories, the creatures are trees. They violate one’s
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sense of nature through their grotesqueness, even while being perfectly natural
themselves.
Authors wove the Gothic grotesque together with evolution. In their stories, that
interweaving made creatures that functioned as commentary on morality, perhaps
puncturing hypocrisy or claiming that morality is entirely subjective and arbitrary –
depending on the author and the import of the story. That weaving together also layered
Gothic assumptions onto evolutionary ideas. Evolution was not grotesque in itself. It was
an explanatory model. Darwin wrote On the Origin of Species in order to clarify and
improve classification systems in biology, not to comment on society, religion, or
anything else. The cultural connection between the grotesque and evolutionary theory
came, in a large part, from the phenomenon of so much fiction of the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries incorporating Gothic conventions into stories investigating evolution.
The following sections define and illustrate evolutionary theory, particularly in the
nineteenth century. They define it as its theorists did, and also show how readers,
scientists, religious figures, and the public viewed the theories and their effects on life.
Later chapters will investigate groups of authors, each group focused on an individual
sort of evolutionary grotesque story. Even the texts that dwelt on evolution pointedly
differ widely from the careful, scientific theories advanced in their times. That difference,
which will be clear in the contrast of the following sections and the texts in the rest of this
study, is due to the influence of the grotesque on narratives and fictional grotesque
creations.
That influence led, finally, to the creation of the extraterrestrial as we might
identify it today, as a cultural and literary image that typically features some anxiety in
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culture as the point of its creation. Authors used images of aliens to discuss and
sometimes exorcize their anxieties, as well as their culture’s; the extraterrestrial alien
grew from evolutionary theory’s impact on those previous stories and left it totally
separate from humanity, ripe for use as the focal image of any or every fear imaginable.
IV.

The Historical Environment; the Cultural and Scientific Milieu
Before Darwin

Darwin’s theories might have changed the way many people thought about the
world, but he published The Origin of Species in a time of change. The nineteenth
century and the Victorian period saw great changes in British culture and evolutionary
theory was only one of them. Arguments were already rising because of geology’s
explanations of the fossil record. Many people did not want to accept that species could
die out and go extinct. They did not think of the world as changing drastically over time.
Instead, they viewed it as a largely static construct, made by God, in which minor, local
changes never altered the whole. As the fossil record became more clear, some theorists
began to suspect that fossilized creatures were ancestors to living animals, and that many
ancient creatures did not die out entirely so much as evolve into new, familiar forms.
The typical picture of Darwin’s fight over evolutionary theory portrays Darwin
and many scientists around him fighting the public, the gossip columns, and particularly
the church. That is accurate, but there is more to the picture. The opposition to Darwin’s
evolutionary ideas might have been stiffer within the scientific and academic
communities than without. Some scientists, such as Samuel Wilberforce, insisted that
Darwin claimed “living species like man originated from other living species” (Hodge
10), which was untrue. Adam Sedgwick at Cambridge and the famed geologist Charles
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Lyell both condemned Origin on scientific grounds, though Lyell eventually changed his
position (Clark 65). The scientific community was hardly monolithic in its adoption of
evolution and natural selection.
Darwin’s was not the only evolutionary theory in scientific circles at the time.
Thomas Malthus’s Essay on the Principle of Population (1798) was influential. Darwin
admitted it affected and strengthened his theories of natural population growth and
natural selection (Origin 14). Malthus quotes Godwin who says there “is a principle in
human society, by which population is perpetually kept down to the level of the means of
subsistence” (175-6). He goes on to say directly it is not a mystical or heavenly influence,
as Godwin implied, but instead the mathematical, necessary connection between the
needs of a population and the resources available to meet those needs. He calls attention
to Godwin’s belief in a mysterious, occult cause; Malthus claims it is, instead, “the
grinding law of necessity; misery, and the fear of misery” (176). Malthus makes clear the
mathematical necessities underlying society, implying that human nature is subject to
external forces such as food scarcity, and that when food is plentiful people actually
breed more – behavior people would have said was static, up to a person’s decision and
otherwise unaffected. It was in fact due to pressures they were unaware of. This
resistance was common throughout the history of the evolutionary debate – many people
were uncomfortable with what evolution implied about the motives, or lack of motives,
for much of human behavior. Malthus’s ideas were not directly evolutionary, though they
influenced Darwin. They illustrated the pressures governing biology – the need for food
and shelter most important among them. Malthus made no distinction between animals
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and humans in his theory, focusing entirely on the mathematical consequences of food
shortage and population growth.
Malthus prescribed ideas for society directly in a way Darwin, later in the century,
would not. He impugned the poor laws for making the problems of need and want worse
by altering the way population responds to need (Ruse 19). Even though Malthus’s theory
was not evolutionary itself, it illustrates the willingness of people to apply this nest of
theories to social problems.
Jean-Baptiste Lamarck was one of the first influential evolutionary theorists. At
the beginning of the nineteenth century, when he was in his fifties, he changed his
opinion from his position, with most others, that organisms did not change or evolve, to a
position that creatures evolved and new forms of life were always spontaneously
generating (Ruse 5). Lamarck was the “professor of ‘insects, worms, and microscopic
animals’” at the Museum of Natural History in Paris (Ruse 5). He studied the vast array
of fossils and shells available at the museum, and that is what appears to have changed
his mind.
His theory of evolution might seem strange now, but it is a remarkable product of
the culture Lamarck emerged from. Organisms, according to Lamarck, would experience
a need that would pressure them until fluid moved in the body to create or enlarge organs,
allowing the organism to satisfy its new needs. This would move it “up” a chain of life.
That is the oddity of his theory: it retains the great chain of being in evolutionist terms
(Ruse 7). Sometimes Lamarck argued movement on his chain was a response to need
stimulus, but at other times he claimed the chain would be regular at all times, thus
arguing everything progressed on the scale at the same rate, implying a progress upward

33

for everything (Ruse 8). While Lamarck did not sweep the field before him, convincing
everyone his evolutionary explanation was the right one, he retained his position and preeminence. His amalgamation of evolution with traditional Christian descriptions of the
world made the idea more palatable, and possibly began the widespread belief, prevalent
later in the century, that evolution implied a progression forward toward some goal or
ideal state. Machen often made use of such an idea, that evolution progressed its subjects
forward and made them better – in terms of morality as well as adaptability.
One of the more famous examples of evolutionary theory before Darwin’s work
was Darwin – Erasmus Darwin. Charles’ grandfather was a well-known evolutionist,
apparently fond of telling guests at dinner that “eat or be eaten” was the way of nature
(Clark 46). More seriously, he went on in writings to claim that this law of nature implied
that nature and its organisms would consistently improve as the weaker members of
groups would be destroyed by disease, hunger, or fighting (46). It is likely that Charles
Darwin first heard the theory of evolution from his grandfather, though he did not seem
to take evolution too seriously until after his voyage on the Beagle (Levine 87). So
Darwin had a pedigree, but not an intense childhood training, to accept evolution as an
explanation for biology.
The last example of pre-Darwinian evolution important for setting the scene that
Origin entered into is Robert Chambers’ Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation
(1844). This book was explicitly evolutionary, but also very Christian. It attributed the
order and evolution of organisms directly to God, even as it considered humans in the
same light as animals and plants. It removed humans from a special place in nature, but
still claimed God ordered everything (Clark 47). Chambers even included the law of
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recapitulation – the idea that higher order organisms recapitulate their evolutionary
histories in embryo, and in some cases early life – and included humans as one of the
organisms that restaged its evolutionary history through fish, reptile, bird, mammalia,
then thoroughly human (47). The book was hotly debated. Some thought it perfectly
devout but poorly scientific, and others that it removed God too much from life (Clark
48). Ruse goes so far as to say Vestiges was less a scientific work than a philosophical
(99). Sir David Brewster said of the book that it was “[p]rophetic of infidel times, and
[indicated] the unsoundness of our general education [. . . it has] a fair chance of
poisoning the fountains of science, and sapping the foundations of religion” (qtd. in Ruse
106). Religious authorities, in responding to Chambers, claimed that an evolutionary
viewpoint necessitated believing either that all organisms had souls or that humans did
not (Ruse 114). Scientists rooted in natural theology criticized the book for failing to
account for God’s direct influence on the world, and all scientists proceeded to lambaste
him for failing to explain or deal with adaptation in any meaningful way (115). It is
significant that Vestiges drew so much ire, as it was published in the 1840s, a hard time
for most people in England. The 1850s, which saw Origin’s publication, was more
optimistic overall. So it is possible that Vestiges drew fire that could have been aimed at
Origin. Darwin’s work certainly caused a stir and controversy, but in some ways
significant portions of society seemed tired of the debate and more accepting, because the
arguments were already old, already familiar because of Vestiges. It would likely be
difficult to sustain a feeling of outrage for a decade.
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V.

The Evolutionary Work of Charles Darwin

So Darwin’s work was not quite as reviled as it might have been. Darwin was and
is the figurehead for evolutionary theory in the nineteenth century. He was not the only,
or even the first, theorist to posit evolution, but certainly his work solidified the theory in
the sciences – though when he published many scientists, including friends, claimed he
was wrong or misled.
On the Origin of Species was meant to be an abstract of a longer work, but still
managed to be an even-handed and prepared defense of evolution, adaptation, and natural
selection. The work is mostly deductive; Darwin outlined his theories and gathered
evidence to prove them right – and in many cases, the ideas of others wrong. The driving
question of the book may be found in the beginning of chapter three, when he asks
“[h]ow have all those exquisite adaptations of one part of the organisation to another part,
and to the conditions of life, and of one distinct organic being to another being, been
perfected?” (63). The book is concerned with trying to explain how animals and plants
have varied so much, sometimes from other members of the same species. Eventually the
book illustrates that natural selection explains variation. Organisms adapt to their
conditions, and the best adapted organisms will flourish in the struggle for life.
T. H. Huxley sums it up admirably in his Evolution and Ethics (1893) when he
defines “the struggle for existence” as “the competition of each with all, the result of
which is the selection, that is to say, the survival of those forms which, on the whole, are
best adapted, to the conditions which at any period obtain; and which are, therefore, in
that respect, and only in that respect, the fittest” (35). Darwin’s explanation of natural
selection, in the chapter titled the same, is that “individuals having any advantage,
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however slight, over others, would have the best chance of surviving and of procreating
their kind [. . .] any variation in the least degree injurious would be rigidly destroyed [by
competition]. This preservation of favourable variations and the rejection of injurious
variations, I call Natural Selection” (Origin 81). Both Darwin and Huxley point out here
that competition is what drives adaptation – something Lamarck and Chambers could not
adequately account for. This explanation seems innocuous on its own, but British
society’s religious standards were conflicting with scientific advances and theories much
of the time and this explanation of adaptation appeared to make things worrse. The theory
of natural selection implied that organisms came to be as they were because adaptations
changed and altered the life forms until they filled ecological niches better than other life
forms, which died out or adapted in turn. This explanation mostly leaves no room for
God to order nature in a perfect chain – something Lamarck pointedly left in his
explanation of evolution. Darwin’s ideas led him “away from the idea of the chain of
being or the ladder, with its hierarchical ordering of rungs, towards the ecological image
of the ‘inextricable web of affinities’” (Beer 19). His natural selection negated any sense
of intention in making of new organisms, and in fact undermined the use of the word
“create” to describe the evolutionary history of an organism.
Gillian Beer attributes the phrase “natural selection” to Darwin’s attempt to “find
a language to think in [. . .] The key concepts for natural theologians [. . .] were design
and creation. Darwin [. . .] was trying to precipitate a theory based on production and
mutation” (xviii). She goes on to comment that this makes of the future an “unpredictable
welter” (xviii). Darwin did not seem to intend much more than adequately dealing with a
problem in the study of biology in his time: the explanation for the diversity of species.
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The title The Origin of Species is short for The Origin of Species by Means of Natural
Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life. The work tried
to explicate how different species came to be, given that evidence seemed to show there
was no order to species distribution.
Origin implied certain things about life that it refused to say outright: that humans
were animals; that humans evolved just like animals and other organisms; that humans
had no special place in nature because of their position as another evolved creature; and
that animal instincts might still operate in humans despite their socialization and
civilization. Darwin finally elucidated most of these ideas in The Descent of Man (1871).
This book was Darwin’s attempt to deal with humans in evolutionary theory and explain
some of the peculiarities that, otherwise, might have seemed to disprove his idea.
Very early in the book the most famous passage from Descent declares his
position on human’s special place in nature aggressively: “He who rejects with scorn the
belief that the shape of his own canines, and their occasional great development in other
men, are due to our early forefathers having been provided with these formidable
weapons, will probably reveal, by sneering, the line of his descent” (274). Darwin
manages to imply in this passage not only that humans are descended from ancestors who
had animal-like defenses – sharp canines – but also that the human emotional reaction of
sneering, of scorn, likely has an evolutionary cause. It is an instinct like any other,
preserved in humans because of how useful it was to reveal one’s weapons when annoyed
with another who could become a threat.
In Descent Darwin made many claims that the physical human body was a
product of evolution, like any organism’s distinctive traits – “man bears in his bodily
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structure clear traces of his descent from some lower form” he says at one point (287) –
but possibly the most disconcerting claims, for contemporary readers, were those that
leveled the minds of humans with those of animals. Darwin’s claims for instincts
remaining in humans after civilized cultivation fill the book: “[i]f [humanity’s mental]
powers had been of a wholly different nature from those of the lower animals, then we
should never have been able to convince ourselves that our high faculties had been
gradually developed” (287). A human’s mental powers are not wholly different from an
animal’s – something many people of the time would have disagreed with. Darwin’s
rhetoric here is careful: given what has come before, he takes it as an assumption that it
has already been shown our mental powers are no different from animals in any
significant way, and proceeds to reason from there. And his previous two chapters were
devoted to illustrating this point. He moves from that, in this passage, to claiming that our
higher faculties, the intelligence that does mark us as different in degree, if not in kind
(Descent 319-20), from animal minds, was gradually developed. The only thing left that
makes humans distinct from the rest of nature was a result of evolution!
Darwin claims the most important difference between humans and “lower
animals” is “the moral sense or conscience” (304). He attributes human moral sense to
our social nature, saying it is summed up in the one word “ought” (304). He does not feel
the moral faculty is acquired, as someone like John Stuart Mill might, through societal
training. It was acquired through a history of evolution, building up “social instincts”
over time, so any creature with such feelings “would inevitably acquire a moral sense or
conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well, or nearly as well
developed, as in man” (304). In leveling the “best” faculties of humankind with animal
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instincts, and by implying it is a matter of development that humankind is “higher” on the
moral scale than animals, Darwin is knocking away the last of natural theology’s support
for claiming humans as special creatures separate from or above nature on a higher rung
of the chain of being. “Darwin for the first time divorced evolution from the idea of
progress, breaking the Great Chain of Being. In the new evolution there was no ‘higher’
or ‘lower’ or inexorable progress toward divine ‘perfection.’ Instead, there was only
‘change’” (Colavito 68).
Darwin even spent a little time speculating on the sort of evolutionary morals that
this study is most interested in. In the same chapter he says that
I do not wish to maintain that any strictly social animal, if its intellectual
faculties were to become as active and as highly developed as in man,
would acquire exactly the same moral sense as ours [. . .] If, for instances,
to take an extreme case, men were reared under precisely the same
conditions as hive-bees, there can hardly be a doubt that our unmarried
females would, like the worker bees, think it a sacred duty to kill their
brothers, and mothers would strive to kill their fertile daughters; and no
one would think of interfering. (Descent 305)
This directly applies to the monsters later in this study. Darwin reminds readers here that
evolution has affected, and indeed probably caused, most of the things one might think of
as human or innate to humans – from our body shape to our societal structures and moral
feelings. Many of these things were in some way beneficial to us, he claims, and we
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retained them long enough for them to become instincts at some level, like the moral urge
to shun a thief because he or she is injuring others and the community as a whole.1
These artifacts of our evolutionary history were not static. They changed and
could continue to change. That created unease among Darwin’s contemporaries. But it
also points out, as Darwin does with his hive bee example, that our ideas of morals
themselves, along with our personal attachment to them, are indebted in some way to our
evolutionary history. Practices one would think of as terrible and immoral – killing one’s
own brothers and children – are practiced every day by other animals, and if humans had
developed in the way they did we would practice them as well. There is no innate
humanness separate from evolutionary facts, Darwin claims, and our very sense of right
and wrong most likely came to be what it is because we came from social primates who
were territorial and good with tools and problem-solving.
Darwin, at one point in Descent, goes into a technical discussion of why humans
are necessarily in the same biological grouping as apes and other primates. He points out
that one cannot group organisms based only on one organ. Many people tried to separate
humans and other primates by studying the brain and little else. A truly functional
classification system, instead, “must be, as far as possible, genealogical in arrangement [.
. .] The amount of difference between the several groups [. . .] is expressed by such terms
as genera, families, orders, and classes” (332). For technical classificatory reasons
humans are in the same species as primates. Darwin, in this book, consistently batters at
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Many objections have been raised to Darwin’s placement of morality entirely in the biological
realm. It is interesting to note that more recent scholars have agreed with him overall, incorporating
advances in the study of biology into their revised Darwinian theories. Soshichi Uchii has done precisely
that in several books and papers, the most widely available in English probably being “Darwin on the
Evolution of Morality,” first presented in 1996 at the University of Pittsburgh’s session in 19th century
biology at the International Fellows Conference.
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the idea that humans are separate from the rest of nature and separate from primates, our
closest biological relations.
Much of the proof that humans are related to apes came from examining sexual
selection. Darwin differentiates sexual selection from natural selection by saying it
“depends on the success of certain individuals over others of the same sex, in relation to
the propagation of the species,” while natural selection is about both sexes, the entire
species, succeeding against conditions of life (594). Over the course of the book Darwin
points to many different kinds of sexual differences, primarily related to mating,
including bird plumage and song, to illustrate the tendency of selection to prefer males –
in rare cases, he admits, the female of the species is the wooer, so then sexual selection
would prefer certain females – that have more impressive sexual characteristics, because
they will pass on their lineage more often and with healthier mates.
When he speaks on differences between men and women directly, he attributes to
biology many things one might more readily attribute to cultural training today: “[m]an is
more courageous, pugnacious, and energetic than woman, and has a more inventive
genius” (562) he claims quite early in the section on human sexual differences. Despite
the fact that some evolutionary horror fiction questioned or problematized gender roles,
Darwin was quite traditional in that portion of his work.
Much of his evidence is meant simply to show that humans are as subject to
sexual selection as other organisms. He points out that the male beard appears much like
mating plumage in birds, and “if emasculated [it would] never appear,” despite the
presence of hair elsewhere on the head (562). He points out that women tend to mature
earlier than men (563). He goes into the details of sexual difference in humans “because
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they are curiously like those of the Quadrumana” (563). This maneuver levels the field
between humans and animals directly, making humans as much a part of nature as any
other organism. That, in turn, allows the biologist access to human traits once considered
separate from scientific studies. Darwin is still careful in this book even though he is
more directly attacking prevalent worldviews. However, this tricky leveling of human
traits with animal traits removed one of the final blocks to evolutionary theory: its
inability to explain humanity. Human characteristics, even down to attitudes such as
pugnaciousness, can be explained through biological history. Humans are as highly
developed as we are because of our history of selected changes. A smarter brain was
clearly more beneficial than not, so it was retained and developed over time.
Darwin's original intent, with Origin of the Species, was to explain a puzzle in the
study of biology: how different species came to be, where that diversification came from.
However, his theory of natural selection had clear implications for worldviews outside
the purely scientific, and in Descent of Man he dealt with much of the speculation. This
theory placed humans among the animals, insisting human behaviors and human
physiology came to be through adaptation. Many people were uncomfortable because of
that, since it explained through biology many things people thought of as individual
choice, such as aesthetics – if we were subject to sexual selection, then chances were we
developed our idea of what is beautiful in a mate because of biological necessities, and
not through an appreciation of the individual. Darwin insisted animals had highly
developed aesthetic feelings as well, which informed their mating decisions. Many
writers developed what Darwin wrote, and managed to say very different things using the
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same source material. The debate about evolutionary theory wasn't settled with Darwin's
work.
VI.

“Darwin’s Bulldog”: Huxley’s Development of Darwin’s Work in New
Fields

Thomas Henry Huxley was a Victorian success story, as compared to the
relatively rich and connected Darwin. Huxley supported his schooling through
scholarships and became a respected anatomist in his own right (Ruse 138-9). However,
he, the most famous proselyte of Darwin’s, was not an evolutionist. He decried Vestiges
in print in 1853, though he appeared to be approaching an evolutionary standpoint
through his comparative anatomy work (141). Through his acquaintance with Darwin he
was won over – so much so that he is most famous today for his defenses of evolution,
particularly his debate with Bishop Wilberforce in 1860.
Bishop Samuel Wilberforce was not known for his scientific credentials, but for
his rhetorical skills, and it seems Richard Owen, incensed at Huxley, trained the bishop
well enough to debate the anti-evolutionary side of a public debate against speakers like
Huxley and Joseph Hooker. The usually small audience was so large this time that they
had to move to a larger room, and Wilberforce delivered a charming but pointed attack on
evolution that left most of the audience pleased and turned against the evolutionists.
Among his amusing but very wrong comments were claims that Darwin believed men
evolved from fungus and that turnips were slowly evolving into men (Clark 67-69).
Huxley’s son, Leonard, reconstructed the debate in his The Life and Letters of Thomas
Henry Huxley (1900). Wilberforce’s parting words were reported differently in different
accounts. Leonard quotes Professor Farrar, who claimed that Wilberforce said, “If any
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one were to be willing to trace his descent through an ape as his GRANDFATHER,
would he be willing to trace his descent similarly on the side of his GRANDMOTHER?”
However, the most famous version, which has and will likely continue to figure in
Huxley’s legend, is that Wilberforce, “turning to his antagonist with a smiling insolence [.
. .], begged to know, was it through his grandfather or his grandmother that he claimed
his descent from a monkey?”
Before rising to speak, Huxley spoke to Sir Benjamin Brodie, saying “[t]he Lord
hath delivered him into mine hands” (Ruse 242). His public response was more scathing
still. Apparently the rumor, afterwards, was that Huxley said “he would rather be
descended from a monkey than from a bishop of the Church of England” (Ruse 242). But
the response most likely the true one was “‘would I rather have a miserable ape for a
grandfather, or a man highly endowed by nature and possessed of great means and
influence, and yet who employs these faculties and that influence for the mere purpose of
introducing ridicule into a grave scientific discussion’ – I unhesitatingly affirm my
preference for the ape” (Ruse 242).
The differing accounts, so varied they forced Huxley’s son to stitch them together,
as a transcript of the debate was not extant, say at least one thing about the debate: it was
widely reported. People wanted to know how the debate turned out. It was a powerful
moment in the public discourse on evolution. Women in the audience supposedly fainted
during Huxley’s speech (Clark 69). While a lot of the public might have tired of the
evolutionary debates while everyone discussed Vestiges, it was still clearly in the cultural
mind. Scientists and religious leaders debated it in meeting after meeting, and wrote
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reviews and essays back and forth. Huxley eventually wrote an essay repudiating Owen’s
views as expressed in these meetings.
Huxley did more than defend Darwin’s work. He made his own contributions to
the debate. Where Darwin attacked traditional ideas quietly when he did at all, Huxley
was outspoken in his criticism of traditional values, especially religious beliefs. He
invented the term “agnostic” to describe his religious opinion, and did not keep it to
himself. Not only did he describe himself as such in his essays, he wrote essays
defending the agnostic point of view (Essays 2582). He would accept no reconciliation
between science and religious claims that contradicted them. Even in Darwin and
Huxley’s time people claimed that the Biblical account of creation was simply a version
of evolution, with the succession of life in Genesis representing the evolution from
simple to complex organisms. Huxley would have none of that, and pointed out that the
“first chapter of Genesis teaches the supernatural creation of the present forms of life;
modern science teaches that they have come about by evolution [. . .] far from confirming
the account in Genesis, the results of modern science [. . . are] hopelessly discordant with
it” (Essays 385). He goes on to say that “Nature [. . .] recks little about consolation”
(416). He was quite clear on the difference between religious and scientific explanations;
his confidence in the factual basis of science and the superstitious basis of religion; and
the indifference nature shows both to the debate itself – as it carries on with evolution –
and the moral dilemmas faced by its creations, humans.
Huxley did not agree entirely with Darwin’s views, interestingly. He never quite
accepted natural selection as the absolute explanation for evolution. He says “[t]hat the
doctrine of natural selection presupposed evolution is quite true; but it is not true that
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evolution necessarily implies natural selection” (457). As Ruse puts it, Huxley “accepted
that natural selection probably played a significant part in evolutionary changes. But
because breeders never achieve full-blown physiological reproductive separation [. . .]
Huxley always felt that natural selection as the ultimate cause of evolution and speciation
must remain in part hypothetical” (203-4). Among other things, then, Huxley complicated
the view of evolution by insisting there could be other explanations than the one slowly
gaining ground as the assumed explanation.
Huxley did two important things in the evolutionary debate. One was to insist,
more than even Darwin had, on humankind’s contiguity with other organisms,
particularly primates. His background as a comparative anatomist helped there. His essay
“Evidence as to Man's Place in Nature” (1863) does very little but describe and compare
the anatomies of different primates. Huxley spends more time talking about historical
accounts of primates, their human-like behavior, and their physical structure than he does
talking about humans, despite the essay's title. He identifies Purchas His Pilgrimage
(1613) as the work with the first reliable account of a man-like ape, and sums up its story
of a soldier who lived in the woods of the Congo for nine months and saw apes “of the
height of a man, but twice as bigge in feature of their limmes, with strength
proportionable, hairie all over, otherwise altogether like men and women in their whole
bodily shape” (qtd. in “Man's Place” 56). Huxley spends a good deal of time tracing the
history of the name of an ape, with variants such as “pongo,” “engeco,” and “boggoe.”
His point in examining these old traveler tales and the various words picked up for types
of apes along the way is to illustrate the human-like nature of these apes. The natives of
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the area tended to think of them as other humans because of their behavior and shape.
Their names for the creatures reflected that.
A clever machination underlies the essay. Later Huxley details the history of some
specimens captured and shipped to France, continuing directly from the traveler accounts
to the skeletons of apes of unlabeled species. Cuvier got hold of one, it turns out, and
Huxley points out that eventually Cuvier claimed that the “pongo” was really an adult
orangutan, and what was then called an orangutan was the young of the animal, not the
adult form. Later, in 1824, Rudolphi proved that was true using the teeth of the animal
(264). The “trap,” the machination of the essay, is the slippery nature of these
classifications. That was the problem Darwin originally set out to address in Origin:
classifications, because they relied on the idea of a special creation for each organism,
were arbitrary. Genealogical classifications based on recognizing selected modifications
made more sense. Here Huxley turns that classificatory difficulty against those who
would argue humans are exceptions in nature. If scientists were unable to tell the
differences or similarities between apes – doing so badly for a while as to classify the
young and adult form of the same animal in different groups entirely – where must one
classify humans, who show so many similarities to apes?
Huxley's final component of this argument is the direct comparison of apes and
humans. He points out that the least human-like ape in his grouping, the gibbon, often
walks on its back legs only (381), and proceeds to illustrate the same for the
progressively more human-like apes. Eventually he comes to a conclusion of what links
all these primates. The classificatory details of physiology and behavior that group them
together, and separate from other primates, are that a member
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[m]ay readily move along the ground in the erect, or the semi-erect
position, and without direct support from its arms [. . .] it may possess an
extremely loud voice, so loud as to be readily heard one or two miles [. . .]
it may be capable of great viciousness and violence when irritated: and
this is especially true of adult males [. . .] it may build a nest to sleep in.
(558)
He never mentions humans after the title, but the implication is clear. These classificatory
details apply to humans as well as apes. Everyone agrees on the classification of these
apes together in one group – including orangutans, gibbons, and chimpanzees – but they
can only be grouped together using details that apply to humans as well as the other
primates. Huxley's goal here is to make it impossible to admit the usefulness and
correctness of the systematic classification of organisms while simultaneously excluding
humans from the same systems as other organisms.
He also speculated on what evolution might mean, directly, for conceptions of
ethics and morality – a natural leap for someone who spent as much time as Huxley did
on arguing against religious viewpoints, since religion was one of the major wellsprings
of civil ethics of the day. In “Evolution and Ethics” (1893) Huxley tries to build a
complete picture of the impact evolutionary theory had on ethics and how to move
forward from that progression. His strategy is primarily to contrast ethics with nature –
ethics are not natural phenomena, but are desirable. Evolution, being a natural process,
“excludes creation and all other kinds of supernatural intervention,” as well as chance,
from the development of organisms (36). He then insists that “man, physical, intellectual,
and moral, is as much a part of nature, as purely a product of the cosmic process, as the
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humblest weed” (39). These statements prepare the ground for his main argument. They
remove any religious grounds for the development of nature and humankind. The
question then is, whence come morality and ethics if not from God? He claims they are
social in nature, and that our social habits formed from necessity. “I see no reason to
doubt that, at its origin, human society was as much a product of organic necessity as that
of the bees” (48). But because of our need to dominate in dangerous situations, to fight
and seek food and shelter, humans share an
innate desire to enjoy the pleasures and to escape the pains of life; and, in
short, to do nothing but that which it pleases them to do, without the least
reference to the welfare of the society into which they are born. That is
their inheritance [. . .] from the long series of ancestors, human and semihuman and brutal, in whom the strength of this innate tendency to selfassertion was the condition of victory in the struggle for existence. (49)
Before society reached the stage he described it as – something similar to a bee hive –
humans required aggression, selfishness, and other qualities considered unsocial, in order
to survive. Those are natural tendencies, and thus to better society people will need to go
against these natural tendencies.
Huxley’s driving metaphor in the piece is that of a garden. Most gardens,
particularly decorative gardens, consist of non-native plants. The gardener’s task is to
destroy, hold back, or otherwise interfere with the natural ecosystem surrounding the
garden. If the gardener were to stop maintaining the garden, eventually most or all of the
non-native plants would be choked out by the incursion of the native plants, which are
better adapted for the conditions around them. The garden works as a metaphor for
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society, in that the natural “native plants” of humans are survival and competition
instincts, while the desirable “non-native plants” are societal good feeling, working
together, and other more recent social adaptations. He decries attempts to use this
evolutionary rhetoric to change the way society is administered directly – recalling the
metaphor, he says the human race cannot provide its own gardener in the same way
plants cannot provide their own. In the next chapter of this study a similar sentiment will
appear in the work of Joseph Conrad. Huxley says that
[o]f the more thoroughgoing of the multitudinous attempts to apply the
principles of cosmic evolution [. . .] to social and political problems [. . .] a
considerable proportion appear to me to be based upon the notion that
human society is competent to furnish, from its own resources, an
administrator [. . .] The pigeons, in short, are to be their own Sir John
Sebright. (45-6)2
The remaining question would seem to be, what is one to do in the face of the naturalness
of what people might often term “sin” and the difficulty in cultivating the more desirable
social feelings and behaviors? Huxley points out that “[e]very forward step of social
progress brings men into closer relations with their fellows, and increases the importance
of the pleasures and pains derived from sympathy” (50). “We come to think in the
acquired dialect of morals” (51). He draws here from Adam Smith’s work on sympathy,
and names the evolutionary process of building greater and greater sympathy and social
feeling, which develops simultaneously as the aggressive processes in people, “the ethical
process” (51). However, he opposes the typical struggle for survival with this ethical
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Sir John Seabright was a well-known pigeon fancier. Darwin responded to and used some of
Seabright’s work in The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication (1868).
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process. He says “since law and morals are restraints upon the struggle for existence
between men in society, the ethical process is in opposition to the principle of the cosmic
process, and tends to the suppression of the qualities best fitted for success in that
struggle” (51). The ethical and survival processes are opposed, and the former betters
society at the cost of the betterment of the individual over his or her competitors.
He goes on to complicate the role of the ethical process in society. He claims that
no society can function entirely on the “golden rule,” on sympathy, for then we would let
murderers go free – to sympathize with them would be to see what they want most in life
is to be free, and we would have to free them. Bringing up his structuring metaphor
again, he asks “[w]hat would become of the garden if the gardener treated all the weeds
and slugs, and birds and trespassers as he would like to be treated, if he were in their
place” (52). Society is not served by blind sympathy alone. Huxley is presenting a
question – what, exactly, will help us improve society?
When he sums up this problem, he claims that, once the ethical process has gained
for each member of a society the needs of existence, the struggle for survival would stop
functioning in those societies, and that means of adaptation would stop functioning, stop
selecting in society. He goes on to say that attempts to directly select among members of
a society using survival as a guide would not work, as he does not
. . .see how such selection could be practised without a serious weakening,
it may be the destruction, of the bonds which hold society together. It
strikes [him] that men who are accustomed to contemplate the active or
passive extirpation of the weak [. . . and] who justify that conduct on the
ground that it has the sanction of the cosmic process must rank medicine
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among the black arts and count the physician a mischievous preserver of
the unfit” (54-5).
These comments, along with some others in the work, appear to be a refutation of
eugenicists and other social Darwinists such as Spencer. Huxley states outright that
evolutionary methods cannot be used to improve society, as society is built along lines
not directly related, but only indirectly connected, to selection and adaptation. The
society itself is the adaptation, not the behaviors within them. Since no person could be
the gardener of the human garden, it is impossible to take society’s evolution in hand and
clear out everything unnecessary. Instead one must rely on the accumulation and building
up of the ethical process over time. So purportedly Darwinian selection schemes are not
the solution, not the thing that will solve the problem Huxley has introduced.
The problem is actually one of terms. Huxley admitted that he had even used the
terms “too loosely” in the past, but that “[w]hat is often called the struggle for existence
in society [. . .] is a contest, not of the means of existence, but for the means of
enjoyment” (57). He says that the “ethics of evolution” invoked by others, that the
advancement in organization of other organisms proves that humans should trust to the
evolutionary pressure to improve them as well, is a fallacy hinging on the confusion of
the term “survival of the fittest.” He says people assume that “fittest” means “best” when
in fact, in that phrase, it means only best adapted to surrounding conditions (81).
Huxley tries to illustrate the uselessness of direct evolutionary adaptation by
claiming that only a small part of any society really struggles for existence, and working
out what that means. He claims that no more than five percent of the population could
live in poverty dire enough to warrant describing their lives as a struggle for existence,
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and extrapolates from there that it is not possible for their struggle for existence to affect
the rest of the population, not in any way meaningful for the progression of the species of
the society. Contrasted to that is the struggle for enjoyment, something he claims all
people fight for. He says the traits that help in that struggle are not aggression, physical
power, or cunning, but “energy, industry, intellectual capacity, tenacity of purpose, and, at
least, as much sympathy as is necessary to make a man understand the feelings of his
fellows” (58). This tendency in the struggle for enjoyment fits people to run a society by
training them to be smart and industrious – inevitably, he says, making them rich and
putting them in a position to run the society.
This particular claim is odd, but perhaps not surprising. It amounts to saying the
rich are fitter to run a country because they are rich, as they are rich because they were
fitter to become rich. He is trying to remove or negate the influence of evolution on what
one might value in society and in future attempts to improve that society. Relying on
evolutionary habits will, he says, lead us towards competition and aggression and destroy
the social connections we already rely on – the connections we already rely on more than
competition. In essence, he is claiming that society already uses “the ethical process”
more than survival competition, and any attempt to use competition as a standard will
destroy society as it is already, and certainly will not improve it.
That is a problem, he admits, people will always face: “[e]ven should the whole
human race be absorbed in one vast polity, within which ‘absolute political justice’
reigns, the struggle for existence with the state of nature outside it, and the tendency to
return to the struggle within, in consequence of over-multiplication, will remain” (59).
“That which lies before the human race is a constant struggle to maintain and improve, in
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opposition to the State of Nature, the State of Art of an organized polity” (60). It is the
task of reformers and improvers to actually fight against the state of nature in humankind,
since the state of nature is one of competition.
Huxley’s conclusion is that “the ethical progress of society depends, not on
imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it” (82).
Huxley's final statement on ethics is that their relationship to evolution is antagonistic. To
be ethical in a way most people would recognize, to help the society as well as the
individual, is to go against the ingrained evolutionary habits of competition and
aggression. He was flatly contradicting many of his contemporaries, who either allowed
ethics no connection at all to nature or claimed that nature held the answer to ethical
problems. Malthusian social direction was declining by the time Darwin and Huxley
published on evolution, but remnants of the idea that the weak and poor must fend for
themselves in order to strengthen society showed up in social theory. Huxley argued
against that, claiming that the “ethical process” was one of bringing people into closer
collusion against a shared pressure or threat, and that in society as he and his
contemporaries knew it there was little struggle for survival, only for improvement,
enjoyment, and other, mostly non-essential desires. Thus, strengthening social ties, not
weakening them through competition, would be the best way to improve the ethics of a
culture, society, or group.
Darwin, in Origin and Descent at least, only hinted at the social ramifications of
his theories, dropping muted references here and there to Malthusian methods of
organization and management. Huxley dealt with the idea more directly in several of his
works, building his theory of the “ethical process” that was an indirect result of biological
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evolution but not directly related to it. It was Herbert Spencer that posited a direct
causative connection between biological evolution and the social state – and the social
state’s improvement.
VII.

Spencer, Lombroso, and Nordau: Applying Evolution to Different
Problems

Spencer was at work on the “development hypothesis” before Origin was
published, and so he spent a great deal of time in his work defining evolution just as
Darwin and Huxley did. His simplest statement of what evolution is came in First
Principles (1862), in which he claims that “[e]volution is definable as a change from an
incoherent homogeneity to a coherent heterogeneity, accompanying the dissipation of
motion and integration of matter” (291). He goes on to complicate the definition –
particularly because diseases, cancerous growths, and other debilitating things could be
included in that definition, but this statement remained the core of his definition
throughout several works. The “integration of matter” is very important to understanding
Spencer’s definition, as it implies that gravitational agglomeration is an evolutionary
progression. Spencer argued for the nebular model of galaxy and planetary building – that
gravity brings together particles that bring more particles to them by virtue of their
increased mass and gravity until a celestial body is formed, be it a star, a planet, or a
galaxy. But he did not simply advocate for that theory in astronomy. Spencer defined that
combinatory growth as evolution and often used it as the first example in a passage,
slowly drilling down from it to examples of organisms developing.
But Spencer’s biggest contributions to the public perception of evolutionary
theory were the phrase “survival of the fittest” and his application of evolution to ethics

56

and social problems. He coined the phrase “survival of the fittest” in Principles of
Biology (1871). He says it is merely a mechanical terminology redescribing Darwin’s
“natural selection.” However, he says that
this survival of the fittest, implies multiplication of the fittest. Out of the
fittest thus multiplied, there will [. . .] be an overthrowing of the moving
equilibrium wherever it presents the least opposing force to the new
incident force. And by the continual destruction of the individuals that are
the least capable of maintaining their equilibria in presence of this new
incident force, there must eventually be arrived at an altered type
completely in equilibrium with the altered conditions. (530-1)
As Huxley hinted, the rhetorical change from “natural selection” to “survival of the
fittest” has deep implications for evolution’s application to a social order. That
implication can be seen in Spencer’s introduction of the term. Here he claims not only
that a better adapted group of organisms will thrive where others would not, he implicitly
associates that success with a violent overthrow of the older group of organisms. The
“continual destruction” of the “least capable” must be perpetuated by something or
someone, and Spencer here locates the action in the fittest individuals rather than the
impersonal vision of nature Darwin used to avoid such language.3 Gillian Beer, writing
on the “survival of the fittest,” claims “its tautological structure makes of it a satire on
organicism [. . .] The survival of the fittest means simply the survival of those most fitted

3

Darwin’s language was violent enough at times. He used military metaphors to describe the
struggle for existence among organisms, to great effect when describing the struggle of plants. But his
attempt to center his rhetoric on “selection” rather than competition provides a clue that his model was one
of adaption more than of competition. Competition enters into the struggle for life, certainly, and Darwin
used charged language to describe those aspects of his theory. But adaptation and niche-filling were the
explanatory drives behind natural selection.
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to survive; this implies not distinction, nor fullest development, but aptness to the current
demands of their environment [. . .] chance reenters” the evolutionary model (109). Even
the evolutionary theorists could not avoid a sense of randomness to evolutionary change,
even if they would not have agreed that their models implied random causation.
“Survival of the fittest” is the best known phrase from Spencer’s work, but his
most important contribution to the evolutionary discourse of his time was his application
of the evolutionary model to society. His model of evolution incorporated nebulae and
planets as well as organisms. It also incorporated societies, as they too were
agglomerations that built up from homogeneity to heterogeneity. He claims at one point
that “social progress consists in those changes of structure in the social organism which
have entailed” the spread of freedom, intelligence, and other improvements (Essays 9). In
this passage specifically he is opposing the idea that societies progress by making those
improvements. He claims, instead, that societies progress by changing internally, as an
organism might adapt to changed conditions, and that freedom, intelligence, and so on are
consequences of the internal change. He posits here that society is not figuratively like an
organism, but that it functions in precisely the same way.
Spencer was a Lamarckian; he believed that use and exercise of a trait or feature
could not only change an organism over time – like building muscle mass through
exercise – but that the increased muscle mass would be inheritable (Weinstein). A weight
lifter would endow his or her children with larger muscles. That is the mechanism
Spencer believed passed on adaptations – that one organism would adapt to changed
circumstances and pass on their improvement to later generations. Society works in this
way as well in Spencer’s model. In nebulae, organisms, and societies Spencer found
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progression from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous (Essays 10; 14). He claims that
the earliest societies were made of people who all performed the same tasks – hunting,
weaving mats, et cetera – and that, over time, societies developed and still develop
toward diversification (19). Spencer grounds these speculations in a kind of physics. He
says that “[e]very active force produces more than one change – every cause produces
more than one effect” (37). This statement summons to mind Newton’s laws of motion.
Spencer attributes multiple effects to each cause in nature, which supports his statement
that everything progresses toward greater complexity or “heterogeneity.” If every cause
produces more than one effect, over time the increase in results will simply lead to more
and more complex conditions.
In Social Statics Spencer used these grounds to work out his ethical first principle.
He draws a comparison: bodies need food for sustenance, and we do not eat simply
because we need to. Nature adapted bodies to enjoy eating, to want to do it. So, too, he
claims, did nature fit humans with “kindred instrumentalities prompting the conduct
called moral” (16). Since we are social organisms, he reasons, we have an instinct for
valuing truth and fairness in social dealings, along with other beneficial traits. He
explains that by making an analogy to the need to eat and all other regulatory functions,
claiming nearly everything we do has been found to be rooted in an instinct, so all things
must be.
Later he claims that “[a]ll evil results from the non-adaptation of constitution to
conditions” (28). Spencer here locates good and evil themselves in the adaptive natures of
intelligent beings; he claims that everything we need to build a social morality emerges
from our evolutionary history. We are adapted to be certain ways, and we must allow
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those ways to flourish. He goes on to hypothesize based on this idea. He says, “[l]et a
race of beings be so constituted that each may be able to obtain full satisfaction for all his
desires, without deducting from the satisfactions obtainable by others, and we have a
state of things in which the amount of isolated happiness is the greatest conceivable” (35,
italics Spencer’s).
He goes on to say that this determination allows one to figure out how to limit
citizens as well. Since everyone must have the right to exercise their faculties, no one can
infringe anyone else’s right. So anything that would infringe those rights must be
stopped. So Spencer’s final statement of his first principle is that “every man may claim
the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties compatible with the possession of like liberty
by every other man” (36).
That sounds a good deal like utilitarianism, and Spencer does reference that
philosophy at times, though he disagrees with portions of it. However, Spencer locates
the truth of his principle in biology, claiming that people have an inborn sense of what is
right.
Spencer did a few things in his evolutionary writing that would be important for
the societal image of nature and biology. Just as Darwin and Huxley did, he also
undermined the traditional, mostly-Christian view of nature as ordered and species as
specially created. But he also added two elements to the discourse that are not to be found
in Darwin or Huxley. Spencer applied evolution to everything, from nebulae and planets
to people and societies. He made of evolution a totalizing model that explained
everything, at least according to him. That would be important to anyone trying to create
a fictional creature or monster using evolution – access to a model that applies to
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everything equally. Spencer also claimed that our moral sense derives from an instinct,
leveling what some considered the highest attainment of humans – morality and empathy
– with the supposedly baser desires, instincts, and drives. Certainly Darwin had hinted in
Descent that human instincts might include the tendency to socialize, but he never went
quite so far as to claim morality came directly from a developed instinct. Spencer
credited God with the products of evolution, but his theory was wholly biological and
could function with or without a divine origin.
Anyone concerned about the position of the human in nature, faced with Darwin
and Huxley's work, could at least comfort themselves with the idea of developing their
own will, their morality, or even just their desires. Spencer attributes all these things to
evolution as well, taking away almost the last refuge from fear that human nature was
only a development “more heterogeneous” than that of an ape or a dog.
Will and morality both suffered a blow from another evolutionary model
advanced in the Victorian period. Cesare Lombroso was a criminologist from Italy that
advanced a theory of criminality that attributed immoral behavior to atavisms falling back
into an older form of human evolution.
The criminal is an atavistic being, a relic of a vanished race. This is by no
means an uncommon occurrence in nature. Atavism, the reversion to a
former state, is the first feeble indication of the reaction opposed by nature
to the perturbing causes which seek to alter her delicate mechanism.
Under certain unfavourable conditions, cold or poor soil, the common oak
will develop characteristics of the oak of the Quaternary period. The dog
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left to run wild in the forest will in a few generations revert to the type of
his original wolf-like progenitor. . .” (Criminal Man 135)
Here again human behavior is equated with plant or animal behavior and attributed to
instinctive drives. The human is like the oak or the dog, liable at any out of the ordinary
pressure to revert to an older type bred out of the current stock. Darwin described such
reversions as well – indeed, used them as evidence in Origin for his theory. But
Lombroso based his entire model on the idea of atavism, that the criminal “type” was
really a reversion to an older state of mind, physical structure, or both at once. Older
types of humans, to Lombroso, were marked by their propensity for violence – a
necessity in a world with less cooperation among people, where competition would have
been a daily truth. Throughout the historical record “we find traces of criminal actions [. .
.] we find that many acts that are now considered criminal by civilised nations were
legitimate in former times, and are to-day reputed such among primitive races” (125).
This idea extends to children with the then-common theory that the fetus and the child
recapitulate the history of human evolution. So children are like “primitive races” in their
behavior. “The germs of moral insanity and criminality are found normally in mankind in
the first stages of his existence” (130); “[t]he criminal instincts common to primitive
savages would be found proportionally in nearly all children, if they were not influenced
by moral training and example” (130). This passage goes on to assure us that it is not
necessarily true that all children would grow up to be criminals unless they were taught.
He gives an example of homeless children in the Sardinian capital” who are thieves and
criminals until they hit puberty, when they “spontaneously correct themselves” (130).
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What Lombroso does here is place a criminal tendency in the hardwiring of some
or all people. Some groups, the criminal types, are inherently criminal because of
developmental throwbacks they inherited from insane or substance-abusing family
members. They are actually in some way different from the rest of the populous in this
model. But they are merely falling back into older human patterns of behavior, and this
pointedly reminds readers that humans are in some way animal-like and retain these
instincts to a greater or lesser degree. “Anger is an elementary instinct innate in human
beings. It should be guided and restrained, but can never be extirpated” (132-3). This
model explains criminal behavior as an accident of heritage and birth. If the fetus is an
atavism, if it has some inherent quality from its recapitulation of human evolution that it
does not rid itself of by birth, then the resulting person will be a criminal. Lombroso also
detailed a “criminaloid” type, less inherently “insane” than the fully criminal type. That
allowed him some room to maneuver, so he could maintain that not all actual criminals
were criminal types, while all criminal types were certainly criminals.
There are a few repercussions stemming from this theory. It implies that there is
nothing we can do about our evolutionary heritage; in some way humans – all organisms
– are trapped inside the box evolution led us to. Criminal types cannot be reformed in any
significant way, since they are inherently criminal. Lombroso had ideas for reforming
prisons as well, and part of his idea was to require longer sentences and stricter paroles
for anyone identified by a qualified examiner as a criminal type. His theory also removes
human will from one of the decisions defined by human will: breaking the law. One
would have assumed that a law – a product of human decision-making – could only be
broken through someone's will and decision-making. At least in so far as they decided to
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perform the action society had labeled as criminal. Lombroso's schema removes the
criminal's willpower, making them victims of their own heritage. The “criminally insane”
could no more decide to break the law than they could decide to be upstanding members
of their communities. They were malformed in utero, paused in their evolutionary
development, and unable to move past the inherent violence of our “savage” ancestors,
for whom violence and competition was a way of life. Biology determines everything,
including one's own status as a good or bad citizen.
Max Nordau extended this theory to entire societies and their artistic outputs. He
dedicated Degeneration (1893) to Lombroso, Nordau's “Dear and Honoured Master,”
whose “notion of degeneracy [. . .] has [. . .] already shown itself extremely fertile in the
most diverse directions” such as law and psychology (vii). Nordau wanted to extend the
theory into the study of arts and literature, and claimed that “pressures of society
produced artists who exhibited the same degenerative characteristics as criminals” (Maik
607). Nordau draws examples from every conceivable direction, including novels, poetry,
and women's dress. Early in his work he complains of the wild variation in women's
hairstyles, pointing out that “[m]any have their hair dyed, and in such a fashion as to be
startling in its revolt against the law of organic harmony” (8). He retains an assumption
of what an organic harmony is or might be, and conflates it with evolution's current
progressive status in society. Therefore, deviations from the norm are atavisms, wild
evolutionary throwbacks converting society to “the Dusk of the Nations” (7). Nordau's
rhetoric threatens a looming societal collapse, and the rot extends through nearly every
aspect of culture, including art and literature. There is a kind of medicinal rhetoric as
well. Not only in Nordau's claim to evolutionary truth, and thus biological facticity, but
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also a kind of ministering tone, as though pointing out these degenerate authors and
artists for what they are will be the first step in curing the ills of society. He holds up
Goethe as the preeminent “healthy genius,” and wonders at the differences between a
healthy and a degenerate author using the same “popular tradition or history” (193).
Like Lombroso's model of criminality, Nordau's model of the arts takes away
more active, willing volition from people and locates it instead in evolutionary patterns.
These authors did not produce distasteful literature, these artists did not produce
distasteful sculptures or paintings, because they chose to, but because something in their
development – or the development of the society in which they live – caused them to.
These theories of Lombroso’s and Nordau’s removed free will from the arts as well,
implying that the fruits of society – law, criminality, and finally literature itself.
VIII.

Reactions to Evolutionary Ideas in Victorian Culture

One of the reasons evolutionary theory made some people so uncomfortable was
that it appeared to take away some or all volition. Some evolutionary theorists tried to
explain human behaviors as well as the behaviors of animals, plants, and other
organisms. More and more human behaviors and activities, as the century went on, could
be and were attributed to instincts and developmental drives, even when further research
attributed them instead to social training and pressure – such as men being more
“pugnacious” than women. Eventually even the criminal and the artist had apparently
been explained by evolution. Things apparently based entirely on choice, such as
committing a crime, were being attributed to evolutionary forces. Darwin and Spencer
can figure as two heads of different but linked ideas rising up in Victorian society.4 The

4

Ruse points out that they were similar, and indeed shared roots in the work of Malthus, but were
very different in their other sources and their applications – Darwin, for instance, thought competition did
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body would be the bulk of evolutionary concepts in Victorian culture, like Lombroso’s
and Nordau’s, for instance.
Many scientists had problems with these theories on scientific grounds, not
religious grounds. Some argued that there was no functional analogy between artificial
selection – breeding traits in animal stock – and the way species originated in nature
(Ruse Revolution 203-4). Some of Darwin’s critics accused him of having no evidence –
they were unhappy that he had deviated from the Baconian ideal of theory emerging from
evidence. Instead, Darwin’s rhetoric presupposes the theory and seeks for confirmation or
denial in the evidence (Ruse 207). However, others less polemic than Huxley adopted the
Darwinian version of evolution quite complacently, finding in it a ready-made
explanation for problems they had been wrestling with, like the mimicry of butterflies.
That was the scientific response, within the burgeoning scientific community
itself. One is inclined to wonder what the response was outside circles directly affected
by Darwin’s theories. What did the general public think of the theory? Did they even
know much about it? As always, one cannot say everyone knew or did not know,
everyone hated it or loved it, but there are indications that at least some knowledge of it
was widespread and that opinions were strong, be they positive or negative.
Gertrude Himmelfarb describes that famous scene at the debate, when Huxley and
Wilbeforce butted heads. She says,
An Oxford don disputed the idea of evolution by pointing out that Homer
had lived three thousand years ago and his like had not been seen since; a
young naturalist accused Darwin’s critics of resorting to fraud to discredit

not help unite a species together into a society, while Spencer saw it as a form of progression that
functioned by culling the less fit (“Social Darwinism” 1; 30).
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him (he himself has been sent a specimen of wheat ostensibly from an
Egyptian mummy, which turned out to be made of French chocolate);
Darwin’s old commander on the Beagle, holding up an immense Bible,
adjured the audience to follow divine revelation rather than human
conjecture; and a distinguished botanist explained why he himself had
been converted to the new theory. During most of these proceedings the
students in the audience, with a nice impartiality, shouted down speakers
on both sides, while a crowd of women waved their handkerchiefs in
support of the bishop. (“Victorian Trinity” 53)
It is an odd scene for a scientific debate, as Himmelfarb goes on to point out. What was
an Oxford don doing there? A ship captain? Honestly, given the time, women?
Himmelfarb even reminds us that it was a school break, and wonders why students were
even anywhere nearby (53). She points out that this bedlam in the audience was a result
of the “social status of science in Victorian England [when it] was widely diffused and
heatedly engaged, and when it was so accessible to laymen that it could be readily
exposed to popular judgment and dispute” (54). So it was the case that most people
would have had an opinion on evolution, accurate or not.
David Hull claims that, by 1869, 75% of “intellectuals” accepted evolutionary
theory in some guise, but some among them, and many among the population at large,
did not at first equate evolution with what Darwin actually said – but what they thought
he said (149). Many people argued with a sort of straw man – depictions of Darwinism
often had nothing to do with Darwin’s theories. Constance Areson Clark illustrated that
with a study on evolutionary cartoons, from newspapers and periodicals. She points out
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that “[c]artoons about evolution repeated, reﬂected, and perpetuated teleological views of
evolution, and they also drew on visual traditions resonant with associations and
references to human social hierarchies” (572). They were not really about Darwin, or
Darwinian theories of evolution, at all. Clark also reminds readers that cartoons use
“visual shorthand,” and that makes the subjects of such shorthand “seem like something
that just goes without question: common sense” (572-3). Many ideas about evolution,
then, were fixed in the minds of most people through means other than scientific debates
and monographs. It was a popular topic, and many errors crept into the picture people had
of the ideas themselves. People were not exposed to Darwin through the Origin directly,
but rather through what people said about it. Indeed, many misperceptions people hold
today about evolution stem from the tradition of evolutionary cartoons, as Clark goes on
to argue.
Most of the public debate about Darwinian evolution took place not at virulent
speechifying events, but in the “weekly, monthly, and quarterly Reviews” (Ellegard 19).
These reviews, as well as newspapers, would change their editorial opinion on the theory,
as with much else, when it became clear the bulk of their constant readers disagreed with
the first iteration. That is, they would change to reflect what their readers agreed with –
but they also exerted some influence back on their readers, making it difficult to find the
source of who thought what (19). But it remains true that the regular popular publications
of the day are a good source of what everyone else – not scientists, politicians, or the
clergy – thought.
With that in mind, it is significant that the popular press rarely discussed natural
selection itself (24). It spent most of its time on general evolutionary thought. In the first
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days of Origin’s release, very few daily papers reviewed it (25), but as the year wore on it
became more popular as a topic, and the periodicals and newspapers kept their readers
fully abreast of the debate with original articles and reviews of all the books on the
subject (27). And their opinions did indeed differ according to readership. The Daily
News railed against the Origin soon after its release, but The Times actually asked Huxley
to write its review of the work – The Times was the most widely-circulated and possibly
most important newspaper at the time (29). A good many people, then, saw a very
positive review as their notice that the book existed at all. Even though not every paper
reviewed the Origin or notified their readers of it, eventually many did.
By 1868 the topic had become so commonplace in magazines, newspapers, and
discussion that the Saturday Review claimed that “the language incident to the
explanation of the ‘struggle for life’ and the gradual evolution of new forms consequent
thereon, has passed into the phraseology of everyday conversation” (qtd. in Ellegard 434). One of Ellegard’s main points is that the diffusion of knowledge about Darwin
sometimes supplanted direct interaction with the texts; for instance, many gleaned their
opinion from their papers or magazines. Indeed, some respectable scholars got some of
the facts wrong.
John Stuart Mill disliked Darwin’s theories, and disagreed so strongly with his
inductive method – so different from Bacon’s deductive ideal – that he incorrectly
claimed that Darwin “never pretended that his doctrine was proved” (qtd. in Ruse 236).
But Darwin of course had. Mill finally admitted the theory was not ridiculous, but his
religious convictions kept him from admitting it was true (Ruse 236). So in the scientific
and philosophical realms the dissent from Darwin’s opinion was quiet but often forceful.
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As the century wore on more people would accept these ideas, which allowed the spread
of related ideas such as Spencer’s or Lombroso’s.
People were not as angry at Origin as they were Vestiges, but still many were
unhappy with the implications a well-argued evolutionary text posed. There was “an
intense preoccupation with the new doctrines' supposed implications for human interests
and institutions (Hodge 9). Evolution was discriminated against just as much as any other
theory that conflicted with scripture, such as the polygenist accounts of humankind's
origin offered by John Crawfurd at the same meeting in 1863 where Huxley offered his
version of Darwinism. Crawfurd's account incorporated special creation, but still
conflicted with scripture's exact wording (Hodge 9). Traditional Christianity gained
strength in the Victorian period, even as it became less totalizing, less universal, across
society – its revivification in certain quarters of Victorian culture might have been a
conservative response to the rapid reforms and changes in society (Houghton 8-9). One
of those changes was evolutionary explanations of the world, which were taken to
conflict with traditional Christian views.
Darwin never spoke, in his major works, on cosmology, but his works were
readily used in debates about religion, God, and the creation of the cosmos as well as that
of human beings and other organisms. It might be due to Spencer's influence –Spencer
readily escalated his discussion of the development hypothesis to the cosmos, and some
of his work came out before Origin (Hodge 19). Spencer worked to overturn Platonist
idealism and intuitive ethics, though he drew from ideas of intuitive morality at times
(Hodge 19). His placement of the moral sense in the development of humankind naturally
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led readers and thinkers to associate the moral sense with Darwin's claims about
biological development.
But Darwin did not intend to deal with such issues, especially at first, in the
Origin. Indeed, A. R. Wallace, a colleague of Darwin's and Spencer's, who believed
natural selection could one day lead to equality for all people – a large claim on its own –
saw in his review of Descent that when selection tended to increase the “competitive
survival chances of a tribe” it would not necessarily enhance its “moral sense” (Hodge
18). It would be possible for people to get more and more aggressive without a
corresponding increase in their sympathy, their compassion, or their willingness to help
others instead of themselves. That troubled Wallace, who thought natural selection would
eventually cull all but the most superior race of humankind and lead to a utopian future
where everyone worked toward a common good (Hodge 18). Evolution simultaneously
allowed and threatened those social designs. The complex state of evolution in Victorian
culture is expressed there: it both allowed and threatened models of improvement during
a period of widespread reform.
It seemed as though everyone wanted to improve themselves and their society.
Writers such as Carlyle and Mill were actively campaigning to shape the mindset of the
times to look for and make progress in their situation (Houghton 31). People felt they
could directly get rid of “physical suffering through medicine, and even of moral evil
through the new science of sociology” (34). Reforms such as the repeal of the Corn Laws
and the opening of free trade were viewed as the key to “the unity of mankind” (43).
Evolutionary models contributed to this pursuit of perfection as well. Spencer
contributed to that directly, and many others thought the key to fixing everything lay in
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the biology and the biological history of humankind as organism. However, just as
Wallace pointed out, the same explanation that seemed to offer the key to everything
threatened its destruction as well. It “carried within it threats against traditions of stability
and value that the society was eager to contain” (Levine 12). Huxley was vocal in his
claims that adherence to the strict biological laws governing evolution and development
would shatter society by setting each person against all others in a struggle for existence.
Hence his elaboration of the “ethical process” as detailed above. Even evolutionary
theorists saw the threat to the social order evolution could pose if framed in certain ways.
It highlighted the animal nature of humans, forcing Victorians to rethink assumptions
about what their culture was based on – apparently a mutually beneficial collusion rather
than a moral stand against the outside world – and what humanity and morality meant.
This rethinking went on at a number of levels. A feeling grew up in many circles,
religious and scientific among them, that evolution devalued human experience. It could
disrupt one’s belief in the traditional Christian worldview. It also posed a threat to the
traditional Christian view of the human. Human no longer meant a volitional agent with
free will to choose between good and evil. Lombroso directly undermined this idea with
his conception of the born criminal. These models diminished the role of free will in
decision-making, particularly moral decision-making, though Lombroso never claimed it
was effaced entirely. This push in evolutionary models to explain everything led to
everything losing traditional meanings.
That is not to say everything changed for everyone, but within these models
everything, from biology to cosmology to literature, could be explained in a new way,
through adaptation and selection, atavism and mutation. Morality might be nothing more
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than a set of instinctive responses ingrained in humanity over time because a social body
would be “fitter” to thrive against competition than a lone body. Morality changed value
in culture, even as most people living in the culture continued to hold traditional moral
views. Evolutionary psychology became an option, evolutionary biology was present in
discussions even if it did not convince all the conversant. Darwin and Huxley did not
convert everyone in Britain to positivists, but they presented the positivists with sound
explanations and theories with which they could defend themselves and, in turn, attack
the religious.
Define, then, traditional morality in Victorian culture as heavily influenced by
Christianity, with a dash of Platonism. Evolution’s impact on that morality, or on people
who felt the need to choose between one model and the other, was twofold. It
complicated the older system by insinuating its need for better proofs. That was
happening already as the result of the German criticism of Biblical documents caught on
in Britain, but grew stronger as evolution provided answers to questions thought
unanswerable. Some, like Spencer, incorporated the old ideas of morality and cosmology
into the new models, crediting the Christian God as the first mover behind the process of
evolution. But it was difficult to maintain the same beliefs, in the same way, before and
after the spread of evolutionary models in Victorian culture.
Evolution’s second impact affected morality independent of religion. It not only
made people question the origin of their morality, it made them question the efficacy of
it. If morality was not divinely inspired, where did it come from? If it comes from
anywhere else, can it be as universal as once thought? Evolutionary theorists, while
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possibly still as judgmental as the average Victorian, had to admit that the morals of other
countries, including those of “savage” tribes, might have a use and a valid reason.
That is what led many authors to bring evolution directly into their stories.
Morality was divorced from the traditional wellsprings and, under evolutionary models,
found to emerge from the adaptive history of the social group as well as from the
biological imperatives driving the human animal. The Gothic authors in the rest of this
study all created monsters using evolutionary models, making big, scary creatures once
they had an explanation for how the creature came to be – it evolved, just like we did.
But evolutionary fiction spread through more than the late Gothic or early horror fictions.
According to George Levine, Darwin specifically – and evolutionary models
generally – allowed authors to deal with “questions about the sources of authority
(religious, political, and epistemological), about the relations of the personal and the
social to the natural, about origins, about progress, about endings, about biological and
social organicism” (2). Levine reminds us, too, of how Darwin was press-ganged into
political discussions because “a nature that worked gradually was sanction for a society
that rejected revolutionary change” (11).
Levine’s project does not dwell on authors who willfully incorporated Darwinian
or evolutionary ideas into their works, but instead draws out evolutionary influences in
works not meant to intertext with science narratives. He says that is because he is
concerned with “the absorption and testing of Darwinian ideas and attitudes [. . .] in the
imagination of Victorian novelists” (3). His very point is that evolutionary ideas filtered
into society until eventually they had affected everyone in some way, large or small.
Many writers, in dealing with their culture, found it necessary to deal with Darwin, even
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if they never intended to directly. Writers as diverse as Dickens, Eliot, and Arthur Conan
Doyle all worked on evolution in a variety of ways because it was a source of anxiety for
them and their society.
These sources of anxiety were expressed through the image of the alien. These
images had been traditional figures, from supernatural entities to foreign peoples, such as
the Catholics of much early Gothic literature. As evolutionary theory changed the alien,
adding to it over time, more and more things in the world were capable of alienating the
reader, including time and nature itself. By the time of the literary extraterrestrial’s
invention, the combination of grotesque and evolutionary theory had made of the alien a
capable symbol for anything that alienated or estranged the reader from him- or herself,
given the abjection of the grotesqueness. These traits carried on into the early protoscience fiction depiction of extraterrestrials.
Extraterrestrials had appeared in literature before, such as the moon people of
Godwin’s Man in the Moone (1638). But while they were strange, they were perfected
humanity, with fewer of the needs and evil thoughts of humans. The alien extraterrestrial
– the grotesque, abject, estranging extraterrestrial – came from the accumulation of those
traits in the history of the evolutionary alien in literature. It made of the extraterrestrial
the perfect “Other,” the absolute outsider, capable of symbolizing any and all worries or
anxieties. This study breaks into groups the history of the evolutionary alien and
illustrates how it led to the creation of the truly alien extraterrestrial, the entirely alien
being capable of estranging anyone, no matter their beliefs or origins. The alien had been
defined by its estranging nature, but as in the example above of early Gothic fiction,
Catholics certainly would be as estranged or alienated from the characters and their
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actions as Protestant readers. But Catholic or Protestant, rich or poor, the extraterrestrial
was, in the evolutionary grotesque tradition, alien from all humans, even as they made
points close to home – such as Wells’ anti-imperial arguments in War of the Worlds.
Chapter two of this study starts with the human aliens, the foreign and “savage”
humans that were apparently alien because of their separate social evolution. However, in
nearly every case, the authors find that Darwinian evolution insists people have more in
common than they have separating them. Chapter three deals with “survivals,” alien
creatures that survive from a past time – creatures believed extinct, such as Neanderthals
or cave bears. They expressed the growing anxiety over time itself, slowly alienated from
many readers and thinkers in the Victorian period by evolutionary and geological
theories. Chapter four discusses animal (and plant) life that becomes more alien the more
one thinks about evolutionary theory. Animals and trees have their own evolutionary
history and their own needs, and they are limited only by their available resources.
Nature becomes the alien insofar as it can and will create terribly grotesque life so long
as it stands up to evolutionary pressures and adequately fills an ecological niche. The
final chapter discusses extraterrestrials and how they fully represent the entities outside
the range of human experience. They adhere to no human standards, moral, aesthetic, or
otherwise; they have goals that are often beyond human understanding; and they can
evoke sympathy from human characters even as they do inhuman things – such as kill the
narrator’s entire team – because they cannot be expected to think in the same way, never
mind behave in the same way, as humans. The history of the evolutionary alien is one of
increased alienation from all that is familiar; familiar things become stranger and

76

stranger, until beloved familiar objects like trees can express the sort of alienation Kayser
pointed to when he defined the grotesque as the world estranged from the subject.
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Chapter 2: The Human Alien: Savages as Animals and Children
The bulk of the following chapters are devoted to examining a series of stories
and novels that use the Gothic grotesque on evolutionary monsters. In doing so, they
create the evolutionary alien: an evolved, monstrous creature that is not a monster. The
grotesque, as argued in the previous chapter, is something that appears to break the rules
of nature for the purposes of estranging and making abject the reader and any characters
that closely represent the reader. Evolutionary aliens appear to be impossible, but only
because the discriminatory grid of the subject – the reader or character – does not contain
a place to accept the evolutionary alien. They are natural by virtue of their evolutionary
history; they are explained by the same scientific apparatus that explains things within the
discriminatory grid, such as dogs, hothouse flowers, or humans themselves. But they bear
some kind of oblique relationship to the fears and anxieties of the culture that produced
them. Many times they undermine the safe assumptions of the reader, though sometimes
they work to reinforce them, even while the logic underlying their grotesque creation still
creates frisson. These aliens always retain some sort of link to the reader – they could not
make the reader abject otherwise. But they move toward a feeling of the wholly alien, the
entity separate from the reader and his or her culture and world.
All the stories considered in this chapter are narratives of invasion, in one way or
another. The alien of this chapter is the human foreigner and savage. Obviously the same
as the reader, given both are humans, the “savage” foreigner estranges the reader by
dwelling on the scientific and pseudo-scientific explanations of human difference.
Cultural differences were considered in some part biological, particularly after the spread
of Spencer’s brand of evolutionary theory. These aliens come directly from the tradition
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of the foreign grotesque found in the previous chapter. They estrange readers from their
sense of normality; they estrange readers from their belief in humans as the most highlyevolved creatures on the planet, closest to perfection as they are highest on the food
chain. The invasion story complements this sense of alienness by reminding readers at
every turn that the perceived differences between people are being exploited for
commercial and military gain. This reminder contrasts with the belief that work with
“savage” people was for the benefit of the “savage.” Like any other behavior with an
evolutionary explanation, this missionary work was self-beneficial first.
Joseph Conrad’s Marlow novels, Heart of Darkness (1899) and Lord Jim (1899)
investigate the invasion of the whites into their colonial realms and the animal-like
behavior that results. Conrad consciously used the theories of both Darwin and Spencer
to prove that there are fewer differences and more similarities between “civilized” and
“savage” humanity than his contemporaries believed. He uses the Dickensian tradition to
claim that no matter the truth value of Spencerian claims about “primitive” people they
must still be treated as humans rather than animals. He used the grotesque as a tool to
reveal the points of view of his characters. H. Rider Haggard’s novels King Solomon’s
Mines (1885), Allan Quatermain (1887), and She (1886) are, for the most part, more
traditional narratives, in which virtuous English people invade foreign lands to hunt and
accumulate wealth, and lead the good but childlike natives toward improvement. But
oddities in both books, such as She’s origins and magical powers, undermine such easy
assumptions about the superiority of the British whites.
Dracula (1897) reverses the invasion, with the foreigner, described at times using
the language of Lombroso’s criminaloid, coming to England instead. He threatens to do
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to the English what countless generations have done to his people, and what the English
were currently doing to many other nations, but in Stoker’s traditionalist world, the
virtuous English defeat him and drive him out, ultimately killing him. In all these stories
people are turned into aliens by the actions of imperialism – evolution is used as an
excuse to exclude certain kinds of people from humanity, or from its upper echelons. The
alien here is the foreigner and “primitive,” described in evolutionary terms as different in
some real, inherent biological and sociological way from the white, European, usually
British characters who encounter them. But in each case the novel also says something
about those white, European, usually British characters that they would rarely admit to
themselves or others. Particularly given Britain’s imperial assets.
I.

The problem of foreigners in Victorian England

The alien, for many people, meant foreigners first. The alien was an “Other” used
to define oneself against. The foreigners of this chapter were alien simply because they
were foreigners – the OED’s first entry on “alien” defines the word entirely as describing
something or someone from a foreign country. That was the typical use of the word – to
describe a foreign entity. This chapter deals with works that began the process of adding
new layers to the word and the concept resulting from the feeling of alienation that rose
up around nature as evolutionary theories became more prevalent.
Again referring to the OED, the word “alien” was first used to describe an
extraterrestrial in 1929. The marriage of the concepts of grotesque and foreign obviously
came earlier, but was not a very traditional combination. Slusser and Rabkin claim that
“[n]either the classical nor the Christian mind thinks in terms of aliens” because
everything had a place on a “chain of being” in which everything connects (7). They go
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on to say that “man could ‘communicate’ with animal and angel alike” and that even in
the Renaissance essay writers could claim that “there are no grotesques in nature” (7). In
a very traditional point of view this idea makes sense: as chapter one illustrated, Kaiser
identified an estrangement from the world as an important element of the grotesque.
Views of nature had been changing slowly ever since the “great chain of being” had
currency, but still some people were shocked by the idea that it was no longer true, even
if they were not convinced. Sir Edmund Gosse described his father’s reaction in this way:
“through my Father’s brain, in that year of scientific crisis, 1857, there rushed two kinds
of thought, each absorbing, each convincing, yet totally irreconcilable. There is a peculiar
agony in the paradox that truth has two forms, each of them indisputable, yet each
antagonistic to the other” (1694). Philip Henry Gosse felt that agony because, in 1857, he
felt that the Biblical account of nature’s history and the origin of life was absolutely true
– but he found the scientific evidence for the theory of evolution equally convincing.
Gosse’s agony was shared by many others at the time.
The new theories of nature and the origin of life allowed nature to become
grotesque in literature and art. When one believes humans are intimately bound to nature
through a chain of being, nature cannot estrange the subject from the natural world? But
it can do so once the human subject and the natural world are no longer as intimately
connected. By the Victorian period, even before the spread of evolutionary theory, many
people no longer felt as intimately connected. The “great chain of being” remained an
image in their culture, but it was no longer the only image describing the human’s
relationship with nature. By extension, one human’s relationship to another, and one
culture’s relationship with another, had changed as well. Evolutionary theory helped to
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cement the belief that people were different because of an inherent difference, rather
than, for instance, a willful ignorance of God’s commandments. Other cultures were
foreign on a nearly-biological level, rather than merely a political or nationalistic level.
These foreigners could be grotesque not because they violated nature, but because their
nature made them violate ideas of what it meant to be human.
That is, they were not “cultured.”1 Arnold’s fight with Huxley about the
importance of a scientific education – though not as acerbic or binary as many believe,
given Huxley’s apparent synchronicity with Arnold’s ideas of “the creedless religion”
(Somervell 132) – does illustrate the currency that “culture” as a force in society had.
“Culture” was what defined humans, or at least the best – and most highly evolved –
humans. “Savages” lacked culture as defined by Victorian thinkers and as such violated
Victorian sensibilities of what it meant to be human at all. That is the paradox at the
center of the evolutionarily alien human: evolutionary theory claims that all humans are
the same biologically, and their behavior is due to universal tendencies and biological
needs. However, evolutionary theory, particularly brands like Spencer’s, claimed that
culture was a product of the social instinct in humans. If some humans had culture and
some did not have any, then they had not achieved the same level of evolutionary
humanity as other humans, despite their shared biological origins and tendencies.
Aliens as foreign savages were used to define the writer and his or her culture. In
general the literary alien became an Other that was defined, first, by its total strangeness

1

According to Francis O’Gorman, “the Victorians designed a powerful meaning for ‘culture [. . .
and] argued about who had, or should have, access to it [. . .] the Victorians regarded the matter of access to
Arnoldian culture as inseparable from the sustainability of a civilized life” (5).The Victorian, then, defined
him- or herself as a product of “culture” – not as one might define it now as the entire mass of
interconnected influences in a place and time, but instead a confluence of the great things in civilized life,
such as a classical education or access to high society and high art.
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and its supposed inability to be like the reader or the writer. Michael Beehler claims that
“the story of the alien is always the story of borders” (34) and that “man’s borders are
secured by giving the alien a clearly defined role to play or job to do” (34). That job is
typically to help define and document humankind. The alien had been used as an Other
used to define a small group – a clan, social class, or country. As the authors in this study
explored evolution’s impact on what it meant to be human and what else evolution could
produce, they learned to use the Other to define what is or is not human. That action of
defining did not necessarily always include all homo sapiens in the literary definition of
human, but it always acted to present an ideology of what was human, what was good,
and what was grotesque for a human to do or be – because an alien did or was those
things.
One cannot discuss the Other without referring to Edward Said. In Orientalism he
points out that “[t]he Orient is [. . .] one of [Europe’s] deepest and most recurring images
of the Other. In addition, the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its
contrasting image, idea, personality, experience” (1-2). While a real thing, the Oriental
was also an imagined, hypothetical thing or place that was defined by all the traits that
were not Occidental or Western. So, for instance, when the West chose to see itself as
hard-working and industrious, the East became lazy and incompetent, independent of the
actual status of hard work among Eastern people. That is the important point: a
description of an Other could be true or false. What matters to its use as a definitional
Other is not the truth value of the statement but its status as an opposed trait.
The alien is, then, the Other heightened by reference to geology and biology
rather than tradition and culture (though usually generously informed by both). Victorian
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England, as a colonial power, had a complicated relationship to the idea of the foreign
and the alien. Foreign countries were necessary to their economic growth even as they
threatened the traditional sense of British identity. The idea of the alien was held in
suspension in Victorian culture by the British Empire. They were foreign and thus many
things, often negative – but some foreigners were less foreign than others. Even
purported savages were linked inextricably to England because of the Empire – somehow
less foreign than other foreigners even while more “savage.” But rhetoric of the time
described them as the children of England, connected like a family member to those at
“home” in England itself. This sense of connection belied the rhetoric of alienness that
was often necessary for colonial and commercial activity.
In 1872 Disraeli gave a speech at the Crystal Palace on his party’s position for
fixing the country’s imperial holdings. He claimed one of the main objects of the Tory
party was “to uphold the empire of England” (Disraeli 529-30). He goes on to say they
were unable to dissolve the Empire because of “the sympathy of the colonies with the
mother country. They have decided that the empire shall not be destroyed. . .” (531). For
Disraeli, the maintenance of the Empire is something the colonies want, and something
Englishmen should want; he claims it is a moral duty to maintain the connections
between the colonies and their “mother country.”
Several complicated matters show themselves in Disraeli’s speech. Disraeli thinks
of the colonies as offspring of England, children who are capable of self-government but
only under strict guidelines. He agrees with self-government for colonies, but says it
should not have been in an attempt to sever connections (530). Instead, self-government
should have been accompanied by “imperial consolidation” and it should have included
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a military code which should have precisely defined the means and the
responsibilities by which the colonies should be defended, and by which,
if necessary, this country should call for aid from the colonies themselves.
It ought, further, to have been accompanied by the institution of some
representative council in the metropolis, which would have brought the
colonies into constant and continuous relations with the home government.
(530)
Disraeli accepts self-government, but in much the same way that a parent might give an
unruly teenager more freedom than a toddler. They still need strong overseeing, councils
in London, tariffs, and agreements to support the mother country. That signals a familial
connection, patriarchal but still intimate, between England and the British colonies. D. C.
Somervell points out that the lower classes of England felt a very strong bond between
their country and the distant colonies, at least in part because most of the emigrants
working in those countries came from their class, and likely their families (183). So the
average Victorian had a good reason to feel connected to their colonies, to feel as though
they were simply England, just far away.
Alleyne Ireland, writing in 1901 and trying to objectively deal with Victoria’s
imperial legacy, insists on the good will of the colonists toward the “Mother Country.” He
says that “[a]ll that could be done to cast off the Colonies, short of absolute repudiation
of the contract, had been done” and goes on to blame Gladstone’s policies. He goes on to
say that “[t]he joyous acclamations of the Imperial millions in 1887 showed British
statesmen that the Colonies were possessed of a deeper affection for the flag, a warmer
devotion to the person of their sovereign, than” previously thought (562). He quotes
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Chamberlain who said that “[t]he sense of possession [. . .] has now given place to the
sentiment of kinship” (563). That “sentiment of kinship” is one of the issues in Victorian
society – people viewed their distant colonies, in the abstract, as part of themselves and
their “mother country.” However, there was a dissonance there. The colonies were not
that familiar, were not that easy to relate to. One of the problems, one of the things
keeping people from retaining Disraeli’s belief in colonies as children was the perception
of different countries as different races. Gertrude Himmelfarb, in the course of writing on
Darwin, points out that many people, including many scientists, conflated races and
nations, particularly if they spoke of the “triumph of the ‘higher civilized races’”
(Victorian Minds 320). Foreigners were somehow not the same sort of human as an
English person – at least, so some could think.
At the same time, much of the British public appears to have paid little attention
to international affairs – or, at least, enough people believed they did not care that it was a
consistent theme in Victorian rhetoric. Duncan S. A. Bell highlights that belief: he quotes
J. R. Seeley, John Stuart Mill, and J. A. Froude, who all claim that the British public did
not care about international affairs. He says that the “trope of ‘indifference’ reflected both
an authentic concern with the parochialism of much British intellectual exchange and a
case of special pleading by those heavily involved in colonial affairs” (282). Deirdre
David, on the other hand, claims that there was a “growing significance of Britain’s
geopolitical power in the lives of ordinary Victorian people” (86). This growth came at
the same time as improved technology in manufacturing, leading many to believe English
superiority came from their work ethic and ingenuity. Before that it was religious
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superiority that made England great. Together, then, these ideas implied England was the
best in every field.
If the world can be separated into groups like that – bad, good, worst, best,
inferior, superior – that implies there are privileges and responsibilities for the “best”
race, the best people. Bell calls attention to the Victorian tendency to divide “the world
into ‘civilized’ and ‘non-civilized’ (‘barbarian’ or ‘savage’) spheres. Levels of civilization
could be assessed in relation to theology, technological superiority, ascribed racial
characteristics, economic success, political institutions, individual moral and intellectual
capacity, or (as was typically the case) some combination of these” (283). He goes on to
recall Edmund Burke’s claims that the English applied “geographical morality” to other
peoples and other countries, and that was the cause of “the frequent abuse of power that
followed in the wake of empire” (283). It was also hard to tell where to put people in this
binary that became more of a sliding scale: there were “difficulties faced incorporating
liminal societies” such as “China, Japan, Russia, the Ottoman empire, the newly
independent republics of Latin American, even the countries of southern Europe” (283).
The foreign alien was hard enough to deal with when it was simply a few groups – it
became more complicated when Britain’s far-reaching imperial actions led the country to
interface with many nations and peoples, all different from Britain and one another.
These divisions helped foster ideas such as Robert Knox’s, that “all historical
change [was due] to racial inequality” and that the Europeans, and particularly the
English, were the superior race altogether (David 88). Knox’s book, The Races of Men,
was published in 1850; it was firmly in the Victorian period but it predated the explosion
of evolutionary theories in the popular mind. That meant evolutionary theory was the
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perfect explanatory tool for what people already believed when it came to be accepted,
slowly, in the following decades.
These divisions needed an excuse because they may not have already had one – at
least, imperialism, ethnicism, and commercialism were intertwined in such a way that it
is often difficult to see which was the more important driving force – or if any of them
were more important than another. David writes that, “for some the ever-broadening span
of Britain’s empire was evidence of the divinely sanctioned superiority of the AngloSaxon race, and that for others the empire was first, foremost, and always a place to make
money [. . .] Victorian attitudes to race must be seen as developing adjacently to
expansion of the empire, and that they are always shifting in their relationship to
imperialist hegemony” (89). And with events such as “the Indian Rebellion in 1857 [. . .]
and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 [. . .] the ordinary Victorian found much
evidence of ‘native’ barbarism and Anglo-Saxon success in ‘civilizing’ once ‘savage’
peoples” (89). David goes on to remind readers of the sense of the inevitable in the
disappearance of cultures – something, in evolutionary context, that was clearly
influenced by the work of Darwin and of Lyell, who convinced many that the fossil
record was broken and that many species had existed that no longer lived. If a culture
diminished and died out as well – being stamped out or incorporated into the larger whole
of the Empire – that was nature taking its course. If another culture were to die out at the
hands of the English colonizers, it was simply nature’s way, and the English were taking
their role as the apex predator at the top of the food chain. Alternately, anyone who did
not conform to religious standards was irreligious; that is obvious, but it meant they were
anathema. As some critics have pointed out in reference to Conrad’s work, that could be
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enough to mark the natives for death. And for commercial-minded English people the
native did not work in the same way – not in a work force, not for wages – and thus were
adding nothing to civilization. There were myriad reasons why it was necessary for a
colonizer to view a native as less than human or different than human.
Wendy Roberta Katz states this necessity succinctly when she says that “racism,
sometimes understood as a cause of imperialism, ought instead to be seen as a
consequence, a necessary means of developing and maintaining power, a natural
‘conclusion’ to Empire” (131). Racism was not always the cause of the imperialist
impulse, despite the attempts of writers such as Kipling to claim that the disparity
between cultures was the reason for colonizing. According to Katz, the colonizing
impulse comes first. She says
[t]he dictatorial stance of the British towards the Africans or Asians could
be justified only by racist arguments. Most of these boiled down to two
types: either the imperialized peoples were so vastly inferior that they
needed enlightened direction or they were so uncivilized that they
constituted a threat to the well-being of others, specifically whites, and
thus needed enlightened supervision. (131)
Given the mindset Katz describes, in which the resources of the African or the Asian are
what the British want, the racism comes as an afterthought, an excuse to allow the British
to colonize and “manage” the wealth of the people who had it first. Evolutionary theory
became the excuse for the excuse – it “proved” the racism that went on to “prove” the
need for colonization.
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That is not to say people did not believe the theories were true. Katz’s ideas
simply illustrate the way in which evolutionary theory and imperialism were intertwined
in the Victorian period. Many in Britain did assume that white, European, and British was
the end result of evolutionary effort – that is, they were the goal of evolution and the
standard from which others deviated. Darwin, in his A Naturalist’s Voyage Around the
World (1860), detailed many meetings with natives in the South Seas when he worked on
the H.M.S. Beagle. Sometimes he liked the natives that he met, and sometimes he did not.
Even when he did, the language of his culture inevitably creeps in. He writes about his
trip to Tahiti that he “was pleased with nothing so much as with the inhabitants. There is a
mildness in the expression of their countenances which at once banishes the idea of a
savage; and an intelligence which shows that they are advancing in civilization” (italics
mine). Darwin liked the Tahitians very much; he goes so far as to say that “[a] white man
bathing by the side of a Tahitian was like a plant bleached by the gardener's art compared
with a fine dark green one growing vigorously in the open fields.” However, he could not
help claiming that the Tahitians were lower down on the scale of civilizations, compared
presumably to Darwin’s own Britain, or more generally to Europe. He does go on to
contrast the aesthetics of the Tahitian to the white, reinforcing the assumption that
throughout the passage Darwin has the white in mind as he describes and compares the
Tahitian.
It is not so odd that Darwin would use the white as his baseline for comparison, of
course, as he was white and from a white culture. His specific language is what is at issue
here. While dwelling on the pleasant time he had in Tahiti, and describing the natives
favorably, he still had to say their good points were evidence they were “advancing in
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civilisation.” When writing on Tahitian tattoos, he compares the body of a person thus
adorned with a “noble tree embraced by a delicate creeper.” Darwin here compares both
black and white bodies to plants, and indeed the black bodies come out ahead,
aesthetically. But despite that, and despite their kindness, good cheer, and plethora of
other good qualities, they still somehow lag behind the country from which Darwin has
come.
They lag behind because the missionaries have a tough job ahead of them. Nearly
all the good points of the Tahitians are attributed, in a later passage, to the work of the
missionaries. They are not equal to the European powers yet because of
the power of an idolatrous priesthood—a system of profligacy
unparalleled in any other part of the world—infanticide a consequence of
that system—bloody wars, where the conquerors spared neither women
nor children—that all these have been abolished; and that dishonesty,
intemperance, and licentiousness have been greatly reduced by the
introduction of Christianity. In a voyager to forget these things is base
ingratitude; for should he chance to be at the point of shipwreck on some
unknown coast, he will most devoutly pray that the lesson of the
missionary may have extended thus far.
That is the portrait Darwin paints of the Tahitians, the natives he enjoyed his time with.
Without colonial power guiding them they kill children, fight wars, lie, and even a lost
voyager must hope the locals will have been touched by the power of the missionaries, or
else he or she will probably be killed and eaten.
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Why is it important that Europeans felt that “savages” lagged behind their own
development? Particularly, why is it important Darwin bought into the cultural narrative?
Darwin did more work in the nineteenth century than many others to prove that there was
no material difference between different races or cultures; biologically they are all the
same, a claim that took some proving in his time. Asa Gray appeared in the previous
chapter of this study – he, too, worked to liberate and set on equal footing the slaves in
America, but still he shuddered when Darwin’s work proved to him that there was no
biological difference between him and the slaves he sought to free. The alien at the time
had a grotesque power to make people shudder if ever they were reminded of the
similarities between it and themselves. Darwin’s work did not immediately change the
minds of everyone who read it. In fact, he generally tried to stay out of such arguments as
the nature of race, at least when he first published On the Origin of Species. He was an
abolitionist (Charles Galton Darwin 611), but for a time kept that separate from his work
in biology. People had a great deal of leeway when dealing with evolution and their
cultural assumptions. Thinkers such as Spencer claimed that evolution supported
traditional views of other races, other cultures, and the development forward of the world
and the people in it toward some kind of goal or ideal. Spencer is the thinker primarily
responsible for the popular “notion that the relation between childhood and adulthood
corresponds to that between savagery and civilization” (Shaffer 49). That helped support
the view of people like Disraeli and Ireland who claimed that colonies were the children
of the mother country.
They were “children,” which is how evolutionary rhetoric could explain
assumptions that people were somehow less human than other humans – they were not

92

actually different from humans, but merely less advanced. They were biologically human
but socially they were children, which meant they would require fewer rights and
privileges – as well as a steady hadn from an “adult” like the British Empire.
Herbert Spencer, in “Progress: Its Law and Cause,” claims that the evolution of
the “child into the man” is analogous to the progress of “the savage into the philosopher”
(8). In Principles of Psychology he groups together “the child, the savage, and the
peasant. . .” and contrasts them with “men of science” (340) who reason clearly and
deliberately. He implies there that children, savages, and peasants do not reason clearly
and deliberately. Specifically, he “believed that from original chaos order gradually
emerged – an idea he carried over to the child’s mind in his belief that children’s
cognition is initially indefinite, chaotic, and vague and gradually becomes more definite,
ordered, and clear” (Egan 18). In talking of educating children, Spencer claimed a child’s
education must fall in line with the historical education of all humankind, as he “believed
that the child’s experience was like that of our distant ancestors” as they struggled to
make sense of the world around them (18). Given Spencer’s conflation of the “savage”
mind with the child’s mind, and Spencer’s claims that a child’s mind is “indefinite,
chaotic, and vague” as Egan puts it, then it follows that a “savage’s” mind would also be
“indefinite, chaotic, and vague.” This idea makes sense of the apparent problem in
Victorian assumptions of colonial relationships – the assumption that colonial holdings
are like members of the family. In the Victorian mind, one that, according to writers such
as Mill, does not pay over much attention to international concerns, the savage colony is
a member of the family: the child of the family.
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But for children they were certainly strange to the parent. The relationship of the
average Englishperson to the colonies acts here as a center from which ideas of alienness
emerge. Foreigners who were colonial subjects or settlers were nominally English, but
still strange and alien in some way to native English people. They could be friendly,
useful, and intelligent, like Kipling’s Kim, but still somehow not quite English, despite
their purported familial connection to the mother country. That could lead to uncanny
feelings brought about by the dissonance. The subject could believe the foreigner to be
familiar, English, and that feeling of dissonance, and even grotesqueness, could arise
from seeing they are not like the subject. But strong emotional response could, in turn,
cloud the judgment and make the foreigners seem entirely alien, rather than just culturally
different. They are as human as the English “subject,” but seem so alien, because of the
abject response of the subject to their difference. Even Darwin could not discard his
emotional response enough to avoid shuddering at the idea of being cast away with South
Sea natives who had not been changed by European missionaries.2
And these were the beliefs people had about their colonial subjects, who were like
children according to Spencer – and recall, Spencer was so widely read and so wellrespected at the time that Arnold Bennett could seriously claim that First Principles was
“the greatest [book] in the world” (qtd. in Egan 12). Spencer, then, was very influential
on the way people viewed foreign aliens.
The natives were supposed to be like children – or children were like the natives.
Either way, both had minds that were not totally formed yet, not totally ready to deal with
2

To contrast Darwin’s response, consider Herman Melville’s. Less than a decade after Darwin first
helped put together the chronicle of his time on the Beagle, Melville’s Typee (1846) included excoriating
passages telling missionaries to leave the natives alone. This was still nearly a decade before Origin, but a
popular American novel, first published in Britain, could still vocally criticize the missionary work in the
South Seas.
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the world. They were less intelligent and less capable of being intelligent until they were
taught. And as an adult must teach a child, so must a more educated, more refined people
teach the less evolved, child-like people. That was, on a simplified level, much of the
justification for imperial efforts in places like Africa. The people there were like children
and needed guidance. That implies needs on both sides: the whites need to teach them –
no one would allow children to go completely unsupervised and uneducated – and the
blacks needed to be taught and given the social constructions they did not come up with
on their own. There was little concern on the part of the imperialists about the alreadyexisting social structures, as they simply presumed there were none – or very few. As the
following section on Heart of Darkness will show, people assumed that everything, from
different customs to vacated villages, were evidence that native culture was not on the
same level as European or British culture – even when the emptied villages were the
responsibility of the white imperialists kidnapping and bombing across the countryside.
Perhaps one of the most telling literary descriptions of this feeling is Rudyard
Kipling’s “White Man’s Burden” (1899). In response to American actions in the
Philippines, it applies admirably to any imperialists’ sense of why his or her actions are
necessary. In the first stanza the poem exhorts readers to go and help those who cannot
help themselves – those who are “[h]alf devil and half-child” (8). It assures those who
decide to do good that the beneficiaries will be sick, war-like, starving, and lazy, but it is
one’s duty to work at it anyway (19-24). Like a schoolteacher working with sullen
students who would rather be playing, the civilizer of Kipling’s poem will be
unappreciated and hated for imparting valuable lessons and improvements. Spencer’s
ideas of “primitive” cultures being the children as compared to the adults of civilized
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nations spread throughout imperial thought and rhetoric. To many the native aliens were
children in thought, as when Haggard’s noble savage Ingnosi says he is a child compared
to his white friends (Haggard Mines 180) and Van Helsing says Dracula has a child-like
brain (Stoker 296). As mentioned above, this idea excuses and justifies actions taken to
“teach” the savage how to live. Among other things, one would not give a child a great
deal of wealth, one would hold it in trust; it would be morally right, then, to take the
riches of Africa.
This ability to assume other cultures are more primitive, and thus more childlike,
led to many of the problems dealt with in the stories in this chapter. Haggard’s and
Stoker’s work directly discuss the idea of primitive people as children, through Spencer’s
theories of savage children and military culture and Lombroso’s theories of the criminal
brain. Conrad’s work is focused on people as animals, but in the assumption that people
cannot overcome their animal-like impulses the blacks of Heart of Darkness – for
example – are thought of and treated like children at times, when they are not treated
exactly like an animal.
Broadly speaking that is where the grotesque enters these narratives – though all
certainly have traditional descriptions of grotesque things, such as people dying,
cannibalism, and witchcraft. But the “alien” foreigners are grotesque because the British
character and reader have firmly entrenched discriminatory grids – as do most people. At
that time, those grids often placed “savages” in the same slot as a child or an animal,
because of imperial interpretations of evolutionary theory, which led to the character and
reader being disoriented and horrified, as apparent humans behaved in ways more
appropriate to animals.
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In Darwin’s time every islander native was perceived to be a cannibal, because
that was the most frightening, most taboo element of any of the island cultures –
according to the Europeans. It is not necessary here to rehearse all the racial assumptions
Victorians made of other countries and peoples, particularly “savage” peoples. Victorians
simply assumed “savages” were not as human, or as civilized, as they themselves were.
These particular taboos come up directly, in this light, in the fiction of Joseph Conrad.
II.

Taboo Aliens and their Humanity in Heart of Darkness and Lord Jim

This study begins with Heart of Darkness partly because it is so often considered
in histories of imperialism, but also because it defines the tension of England’s specific
imperialism – one predicated on the above assumptions of racial superiority and the
supposed intent to better the “inferior” inhabitants. It also deeply involves evolutionary
theory and The novel interrogates the scientific rhetoric of the time and finds it
insufficient, even while admitting some of it – not all of it – might be true. It uses its own
novelistic form to claim that a different method of dealing with people is necessary, even
if the scientific ideas were accurate. Heart of Darkness considers the idea that Africans
are less than human, or less “cultured” than Europeans at least, and claims that whether
they are or not is unimportant: treating everyone as though they could be as human as
oneself is the more expedient – and more “cultured” – way to behave.
In Heart of Darkness, Joseph Conrad illustrates the effects of thinking about
people in terms of evolutionary biology. He does not necessarily argue that most
evolutionary theories are wrong, but he does claim that it is not very helpful, and is very
detrimental, to use evolutionary theory as a structure for thinking about other people
when not directly studying their biology. In this case he takes issue with Spencer more
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than he does Darwin. Conrad is concerned with people who use evolution to determine
social theory and practice – particularly people who think of other humans as something
else, something alien to them rather than simply different, and use that divide to justify
cruelty and exploitation.
Even though Marlow, the narrator of the novel, pities the blacks he encounters in
Africa, and dislikes nearly all the whites, his portrayal of Africans is less than charitable.
China Achebe has famously claimed that Heart of Darkness makes Africa “a place of
negations at once remote and vaguely familiar, in comparison with which Europe’s own
state of spiritual grace will be manifest” (337). Hunt Hawkins points out that the
portrayals of Africans in Conrad’s other novels are fuller and more robust, implying one
must take their exclusion in Heart of Darkness as intentional and not the result of
Conrad’s racism (366). He also reminds one that Conrad was a “staunch, if complicated,
opponent of European expansion” and that Kurtz is described as a product of all Europe,
not just one country or one trading company (368). Hawkins goes on to agree that the
“temporal evolutionary trope” does permeate Heart of Darkness.
However, he focuses on his claim that the novel argues the civilizing ideals of
missionary trade missions are “a sham” and that the ideals themselves may be suspect
(369). He points out Marlow’s bad feelings upon reading the beginning of Kurtz’s essay –
the beginning, and not the disturbing ending about extermination. Hawkins claims he
feels that because of the “hubristic arrogance” of the thought and the undertaking itself
(369-70). Marlow has begun to feel that the assumptions underlying the essay are
suspect, even though he still feels the full force of the emotional reasons that support it –
that is, he has difficulty viewing the Africans as anything but children or animals, but his
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exposure to them has changed him just enough to feel that perhaps that is unjust, or at
least cruel and needless. Africa does become a place of “negations,” but in this case the
negation of Marlow’s own cultural assumptions. His belief that there is a biological
difference between himself and the Africans cannot stand up to the proofs to the contrary
that he sees throughout the book – both Africans acting “cultured” and Europeans acting
“savage.”
According to Hawkins’s point of view, the novel attacks the same problems
Achebe outlines,3 with a character, Marlow, who has an uneasy relationship with the
assumptions about Africans in his culture, though he is not a staunch abolitionist or a
proponent of equal rights. He is an out-of-work sailor who pities abused people. Marlow
pities the Africans, but he still does not dwell on them in his narrative, which is about
steaming upriver in Africa. Marlow feels that the blacks surrounding him are alien to him
in a real sense – they are more like animals than humans. His assumptions are challenged
over the course of the book and that leads to his fascination and horror at his own story,
as well as his inability to forget it or move past it.
Achebe says the “most interesting and revealing passages of Heart of Darkness
are [. . .] about people” (339) and points out Marlow’s shuddering claim that the worst
thing about dealing with the African natives was “this suspicion of their not being
inhuman. It would come slowly to one. They howled and leaped and spun and made
horrid faces, but what thrilled you was just the thought of their humanity – like yours –
the thought of your remote kinship with this wild and passionate uproar. Ugly. Yes, it was

3

Janice Ho calls attention to the pointless blasting and other useless work the Outer Station
engages in and claims: “Conrad’s representation of these colonizing activities as absurdly ineffectual is an
attempt to expose the hypocrisy of the civilizing mission, the chasm between a rhetoric that claims to bring
‘light’ to the ‘dark continent’ and a reality that showcases only the corruption and ineptitude” (8).
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ugly enough. . .” (Heart of Darkness 36). This speech is ugly enough. It reveals the same
force of emotion lying behind Asa Gray’s shudder; the civilized white encounters the
black, supposedly different being, and finds them to be human no matter the difference.
Marlow is the “purveyor of comforting myths” (Achebe 339) that Achebe claims Conrad
himself was. Those myths insist that the African is as but a child – or at worst an animal –
to the European, because of the differences in their apparent cultural “advancement”
along the social evolutionary scale.
Critic Ella Ophir has called attention to Marlow’s “self-deceptions” (347).
Marlow may serve as Conrad’s mouthpiece at times, but it is difficult to view one as an
analogue for the other. He deceives himself regarding his cultural assumptions, which
provide the platform for the novel’s criticism of the imperial project as it affects one’s
conception of the alien and what is appropriate regarding the alien.
Those assumptions are, in this case, that Africans are either less than human or
more child than adult in their advancement along the scale of human evolution. They
need the guiding hand of the European trading and religious missions, just as Darwin said
the islanders did. One of the novel’s central conflicts – that of Marlow struggling to
understand Kurtz, and particularly Kurtz’s genocidal post-script to his essay – emerges
from Marlow’s uneasy, but not entirely antagonistic, relationship with these cultural
assumptions.
Michael Lackey claims that Kurtz’s essay on missionary work is entirely
consistent – the moral beginning anticipates the scrawled postscript to “[e]xterminate all
the brutes!” (Conrad Heart 50). Lackey calls attention to Conrad’s friend R B.
Cunningham Graham, who claimed the Biblical stance used by missionaries and traders
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in imperial holdings might very well end in extermination, as non-Christians, according
to certain interpretations of the Bible, are not human, or at least not subject to the same
rules and protections as Christians the Bible promises – such as the prohibition against
killing (25; 27). Heart of Darkness portrays what happens when this belief bleeds over
into the biological realm. Kurtz’s essay makes sense even with the postscript because it
enunciates the belief, founded on cultural and evolutionary assumptions, that the Africans
are not really human. Few at the time would consider with horror the destruction of an
animal species in the way of progress – Kurtz merely connects the dots and says that the
Africans should get the same consideration as the dodo or the passenger pigeon.
For Lackey, Marlow’s horrified response to Kurtz’s essay comes from his
unwillingness to admit the sub-human, animal view of Africans (and any “other” people)
lies at the center of his own cultural assumptions. He points out that “when Marlow’s
helmsman dies later in the text, Marlow does not mourn the loss of a full-fledged human
being; he laments the death of a deficient tool” (32). And he reminds readers of Marlow’s
astonishment that the cannibals on his ship would show restraint when they were halfstarved, because, for him, “hungry animals do not forgo a feast in the name of a higher
principle; in fact, their most basic needs determine their behavior” while humans can
“cultivate values and principles that transcend animal needs” (32-3). Marlow thinks of
the Africans as animals just as Kurtz appears to when he insists they are brutes and must
be eliminated.
Ian Watt claims that Marlow is one of the first Modernist characters, completely
divorced from the point of view of the author (164). According to Watt, the whole point
of Marlow is that he is a character – a consciousness like a person, not a mouthpiece –
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registering impressions and reporting not only what happened, but his thoughts and
feelings. Both lenses of reporting are equally important to Marlow, his listeners, and
readers of the novel. Indeed, the novel cares so much about Marlow’s impressions that,
upon reading it, Henry James “objected to the narrator mixing himself up with the
narrative” and felt that “we didn’t really get hold of Kurtz after all the talk about him” (
qtd. in Watt 165).
Why does the novel concern itself so much with the self-deceptive impressions of
a character such as Marlow? What allows Marlow to pity the Africans while still
forgetting they are human? What allows Kurtz to think it is an excellent and moral idea to
exterminate all of them? Evolutionary rhetoric has so deeply affected their worldviews
that they cannot perceive the Africans as anything other than human-like lives lower
down the scale of social evolution.
III.

Conrad’s refutation of Spencer

Lackey has already pointed out that Marlow and Kurtz do not think of the
Africans as human, mostly from a Biblical standpoint – the Africans are not Christian and
therefore do not deserve the same rights as Christians deserve, since the Africans pose a
threat to Christians. They can undermine the faith of a Christian person because they
themselves do not understand or practice within the faith. Lackey claims Kurtz’s adoption
of native ways is an example of such undermining (34-5). That means Kurtz has become
an animal, Lackey says.
Hawkins points out that Heart of Darkness was published the same year as “The
White Man’s Burden” and reminds readers of its use of savagery and childishness to
characterize the “savage” (368). Hawkins goes on to link this trope to Darwin,
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specifically Descent of Man, in which Darwin claimed to feel astonished when he met
Fuegians and found they could speak good English and had “faculties” similar to a
European’s – as they were the same as the ancestors of the Europeans (Darwin Descent
287). Hawkins goes on to say that Conrad wanted to expose the hypocrisy of such
thinking when it came to the imperialistic missions and trade organizations that went into
Africa to exploit the people and the resources.
That sort of adult/child dichotomy does appear in Darwin’s language from time to
time, but it is not one of the points he argued in his work. As detailed above, it was
Spencer who argued that the primitive mind was like a civilized child’s mind, as the
primitive culture was like the early versions of cultures that came to be civilized – by
analogy, if African culture is like early European culture, then the African must be like
the early European, which meant a child to Spencer (rather than, perhaps, a European
from the past). Brian Shaffer points out an argument in Spencer related to and founded on
this dichotomy: the savage mind is militaristic while the civilized mind is democratic and
industrial (47). Since the primitive mind cannot deal with abstraction it also cannot deal
with technological and government advancements, and so it must needs fall back on
violence and rule by warfare.
That means that “civilized” minds are peaceful while “primitive” or “savage”
minds are violent and militaristic. In the novel, then, instances of violence can be coded
as instances of savagery, while peace-keeping is the signal of the civilized culture or
individual. Shaffer points out Spencer’s idea that “industrial societies depend on trade”
(48). That is contrasted with the way Kurtz runs things, according to Shaffer. Spencer’s
idea of a military society’s organization featured despotism wherein civil and military
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authority rested in the same person, the chief of a tribe. “Kurtz’s society is associated
with the ‘savage clamour’ of ‘dances ending with unspeakable rites’ [. . .] Kurtz’s men are
depicted as implicitly trusting the authority of the civil and military leader who directs
their raids on other tribes” (48-9). So it is Kurtz’s society, and not African society itself,
that shows signs of savagery.
The novel sets up the Spencerian dichotomy between civilization and savagery in
order to wonder whether there is any use in the distinction, given what people such as
Kurtz are capable of. Conrad’s world was one in which slavery and military re-arming
appeared to signify, for Spencerians, a return to barbarism. Shaffer points out Ian Watt’s
claim that Conrad had an uneasy relationship with Darwinism, and says that in turn
Conrad was “both ‘Spencerian and anti-Spencerian’” (52). So he saw in European
behavior all the markers of savagery that were, supposedly, confined to the “primitive”
races such as the Africans.
It may be going too far to say that, in Heart of Darkness, the Africans are more
animal-like because the Europeans have made them that way, but the Europeans’
assumption that the Africans will behave that way leaves them no other options. They do
not lie dying in a pit out of preference, but because no other options are available to them.
The novel represents force applied to people who are thought to live one way – savage,
child-like, superstitious – and how that force makes the Africans conform to those ideas
by leaving them no other options. Kurtz is the most obvious example: he believes the
natives will only respond to a forceful, despotic leader, and so he becomes that leader.
Once he begins to execute people and put their heads on spikes everyone else follows
him, but not because they were inclined to – simply because he has become a despot.
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Kurtz did what he did because of a Spencerian assumption that African culture could not
learn and was inherently violent – but the most violent characters in Heart of Darkness
are always white, like Kurtz or the men on Marlow’s boat who want to shoot the Africans
for sport.
Marlow touches on sensitive ground when he says British people would behave
the same way if the Africans did to them what they did to the Africans. When he wonders
at the empty towns, he hears that savages do not need towns or cities in the way
Europeans do. Again there is the assumption: Africans live this terrible way because they
are more primitive. A lion does not need a village, neither does an African. But Marlow
realizes that “[t]he population had cleared out a long time ago. Well, if a lot of mysterious
niggers armed with all kinds of fearful weapons suddenly took to travelling on the road
between Deal and Gravesend, catching the yokels right and left to carry heavy loads for
them, I fancy every farm and cottage thereabouts would get empty very soon” (19-20).
The Europeans have driven the natives out of their villages by kidnapping them and
forcing them to labor for the trading camps. Buried within this novel of terrible things in
Africa is an image that sounds like the work of H. G. Wells. Conrad was familiar with
Wells – they were good friends for many years, before their literary differences drove
them apart (Karl 1051). Conrad had certainly read War of the Worlds and thought it good
– though he thought The Invisible Man better; he wrote to Wells about the latter’s quality
as compared to the former in December 1898, while Heart of Darkness was published in
1899 (1054). This odd image, of Africans invading England in the way England invaded
Africa, illustrates one of the problems the novel interrogates: the assumption that the
pitiable, homeless, violent condition of the natives is something inherent with them,
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rather than a product of their circumstances – circumstances often caused by the invading
whites. That assumption derives, at least in part, from the evolutionary rhetoric current at
the time. Kurtz and most of the other whites in Africa believe the assumption. Even the
doctor who examines Marlow in preparation for his trip to Africa is an alienist, who
studies Marlow’s skull to see if his theory of certain personalities being drawn to Africa is
true (Conrad Heart 11-2). He is excited to finally have a chance to examine an
Englishman, implying he believes there is a fundamental difference even between himself
and English people – and, in turn, that there is likely a vast difference between the
English and Europeans on one side and the Africans on the other. The doctor assures
Marlow he will not need to examine his skull again when he comes back, since “the
changes take place inside” (11). So the doctor is aware of some kind of change that
Europeans undergo, but it is internal, an alteration of one’s personality or worldview,
rather than physiological changes and difference, which is what interests him. The doctor
is the first sign that Marlow is entering a sphere where a sort of evolutionary worldview
affects and influences every decision. Even the doctor, interested in research and money,
cannot escape assumptions that there are levels of humanity, reminiscent of Lombroso’s,
that one can read on the human skull.
The novel is full of examples of animals and Africans being treated like animals
by whites who appear to believe theories like the alienist’s, the European is the norm and
the African is not. While still stuck waiting for rivets to come so he can repair the
steamer, Marlow hears the story of a hippo that lives near the station and sometimes
wandered in – “[t]he pilgrims used to turn out in a body and empty every rifle they could
lay hands on at him. Some even had sat up o’ nights for him. All this energy was wasted
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though. ‘That animal has a charmed life,’ he said, ‘but you can say this only of brutes in
this country. No man – you apprehend me? – no man here bears a charmed life’” (28).
This narrative is from the man who has worked his way into the graces of the manager;
they both hate Kurtz, so it is likely this claim of no man bearing a charmed life points to
Kurtz and the Africans he leads. Kurtz has apparently led a charmed life since coming to
Africa; he is the favorite of the European bosses and turns in vast quantities of ivory,
more than everyone else together. The speaker implies Kurtz is like the hippo – charmed
but no longer human, merely an animal. He also implies Africa is a place for animals, not
humans.
Marlow affirms Kurtz’s condition to some degree when finally he meets the man.
Lackey points to the moment when Marlow sees Kurtz “crawling on all-fours” (Conrad
Heart 64) and says his crawling “suggests that Kurtz has become ‘a veriest savage,’ a
brute that cannot see or experience the higher realities of the spiritual life” (Lackey 34).
That makes him in Marlow’s eyes akin to his starving cannibal workers whom he
compares to hyenas (Conrad Heart 42). Cannibals, to Marlow, are not really human,
because humans do not eat human flesh. Kurtz has become one of these less-than-people,
or appears to have come close.
Marlow’s reaction to Kurtz and his essay settle where Marlow stands in the novel;
he suffers the same assumptions everyone else suffers, but somehow reacts differently.
From Marlow’s point of view the postscript to Kurtz’s essay must have been written after
his devolution, while the essay itself was written beforehand. So for Marlow, the urge to
destroy that which is alien is a devolved, animal-like behavior; he is still not comfortable
with the alien, and may be perpetuating the cultural assumptions underlying Kurtz’s
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exclamation, but he wants the Africans to be treated with kindness and fairness, even if
he still has trouble remembering they are as human as he. The evolutionary rhetoric of the
time, particularly Spencer’s, said they were not as human as he; they were lower on the
sliding scale between primitivism and civilization, and for many people civilization is
what separated human from animal – hence Marlow’s descriptions of the Africans as
animals even as he criticizes people who treat them like animals. So the question is, what
does Marlow’s position in the novel say about those theories that legitimize treating
people like animals? He does not agree with the action while he does appear to agree with
the theory. The form of the novel itself offers the final clue.
IV.

Dickens as the Answer to Evolutionary Assumptions

Marlow’s repeated estrangement from the reader – the moments in which it
becomes clear that he cannot serve as a surrogate for either the author or the reader
because he is a character, and indeed the most carefully-realized character – reminds one
that the issues at stake are observed, but not quite understood, by the narrator. The form
of this novel reflects its relationship to its subjects and contents. It criticizes where it
seems only to record. Robert L. Caserio has taken issue with Ian Watt’s reading, and in
doing so reminds readers of an important detail: in his memoirs, Conrad claimed Dickens
was the writer most important to him. Caserio points particularly to Conrad’s late memoir
A Personal Record and the passage that calls Dickens Conrad’s literary patron (338).
Caserio goes on to claim that both Conrad and Dickens tried to do similar things in their
novels, and to leave out Dickens in the study of Conrad is an oversight. Specifically, he
claims they were both “committed to the identity of novels with truth” (338). Their
shared assumption is that fiction enjoys a “pride of art that that employs the novel form to
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criticize other intellectual endeavors – indeed to put most nonnovelistic modes of
reflection to shame” (339). What results is that “Conrad deliberately resists
approximation to alternative intellectual spheres” (339). So Conrad’s method, like
Dickens’s, assumes the novel is the highest form of truth telling, and that other forms of
intellectual discourse cannot approximate life so well. This claim helps clarify the
relationship of Heart of Darkness with Spencerian scientific and sociological ideas –
specifically, what, in the end, it says about them. The novelistic mode, it claims, offers a
better method of dealing with people than the Spencerian.
Caserio says one of the reasons the works of Conrad and Dickens cannot be
approximated by other ways of thinking is that they challenge those forms directly (339)
by becoming what he calls a “spectral mirror”; this mirror reflects reality but also
“spectral emanations” that are truths such as “the very meaning of experience” (340).
They reflect not only the world, but some sort of truth almost spiritual in its ineffability.
That truth is one that only the novel can record. Science, philosophy, and all other forms
of thinking will and do fail to see that truth because of its spectral nature. Caserio ties this
ineffable thing, this spectral thought, to the meaning of experience itself. So in both
Dickens and Conrad experience and meaning are tied together, and the resulting synthesis
is something only a novel can capture.
Heart of Darkness offers a glimpse into the workings of purportedly altruistic
imperialism in Africa, and claims that those impulses are not altruistic but selfish and
driven by evolutionary assumptions. Independent of the novel’s possible use of the
Dickensian literary mode as method and solution, the novel certainly sets up assumptions
based on biological distinctions as faulty. Nearly every one of Marlow’s assumptions are
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questioned or directly proven wrong, as when he encounters the natives willing to wait to
eat rather than eat their friend. He finds that the methods of dealing with the world that
rely on Darwin and Spencer serve only to alienate people from one another. Given
Marlow’s obsession with and pity for the suffering Africans, he appears to believe that
people should work to reduce suffering; alienating and estranging people from one
another only increases suffering.
Marlow has the same discriminatory grid as Kurtz or the examining doctor near
the novel’s beginning who is fascinated by Africa and the study of phrenology: he
believes the Africans are not quite human – they may be biologically, but he accepts the
other part of the paradox, he accepts that they do not behave like humans. Those
assumptions do not serve to improve either Marlow’s position or the treatment of the
Africans.
Heart of Darkness introduces a problem: the scientific discourse of evolution as it
pertains to the human race permits and sometimes encourages ill treatment, carelessness,
cruelty, and racism – particularly when grouped together with religious and commercial
reasoning. Conrad has taken up a viewpoint similar to Huxley’s. Evolutionary theory,
particularly competition, is not a sound basis for social engineering. In Conrad
competition is certainly a problem, but evolutionary hierarchy is worse – people who
believe the Africans are no better than animals treat them like animals. The novel’s
depiction of its characters’ racism can make a reader uncomfortable, because it does not
explicitly refute their racism. Partly of course this is because of Conrad’s relatively newfound appreciation for the Jamesian impressionistic portrayal of characters’ feelings. But
also this refusal to refute the characters shows how fruitless using evolutionary theory to
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deal with people It is likely wrong, but the possibility exists that in some way Africans
are behind, even if only a little, in social evolution. But, even if they are, when the white
merchants treat them like animals they ruin any good they could do, and hurt themselves
spiritually as well, as Kurtz surely has. What the novel does is say that, regardless of the
truthfulness of evolutionary theory, particularly the social evolution of Spencer, it is still a
bad idea to treat people like animals. It makes as much sense as the pointless blasting in
the camp when Marlow first arrives. They both miss the point entirely. Missionary efforts
must treat people like people, no matter how different they are. Marlow’s journey teaches
him that the Africans are far more human than he thought – and years later, when he is
telling his story, he is still disturbed by the revelation. The science of his time taught that
the Africans were less than human, in some way, because they were still in the state of the
primitive ancestors of the whites. That apparently leads to a “white man’s burden” to
educate and civilize them, but that is impossible while believing they are truly less than
human (rather than thinking they simply have a different culture), because one cannot
civilize or educate a hyena – the animal Marlow compares his crew members to at one
point. Humans cannot be treated like some other species without ill consequences. To do
so creates an alien where none was before. People become aliens, capable of the most
grotesque actions, merely through the alteration of one’s world view. This classification
of people as non-human erodes, rather than reinforces, the sense of the human as social
animal according to Heart of Darkness. That is because the people who believe that
become more like animals in the novel’s estimation, as Kurtz had. Alienating humans
from humans is like gagging at the skin on a cup of milk – it makes abject the subject as
well as the object. It makes both subject and object alien and estranged.
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Conrad’s Lord Jim touches on the same theme at times. People become alien in
Lord Jim because they are treated like animals. The only way to assert the sort of cultured
response that is necessary for one’s image of being human is to die for one’s ideals – like
the crew members who nearly starve rather than defile a friend’s body, Jim just prove he
is not an animal by risking (and achieving) death to prove he is not a simple animal
responding to nothing but his survival instincts. The alien in this novel is the person with
no personal ideals to drive them.
People are animals in this novel – there are nearly a dozen moments in the novel
when people are compared to, referred to, or described as having aspects of animals.
From bull-throats to houndish ways, people are animals throughout Lord Jim. The most
significant example is a misunderstanding – when Marlow sees a sad, pitiful dog in the
court, after Jim’s case is heard, he says “[l]ook at that wretched cur” (51). Jim, who is
being tried for abandoning a shipful of pilgrims, takes offense, thinking the comment
meant for him. Marlow meant nothing of the sort, and the strange, uneasy friendship that
drives the rest of the novel begins. Jim tells Marlow that day that he wanted to go to sea
because of the romantic stories he read, and that he eagerly waited for a chance to prove
himself, to rescue someone or save the ship. Always he hesitated though, because he over
thought things. His jump from his supposedly sinking ship, the Patna, abandoning the
pilgrims in the hold to die, was the one moment in which he did not think of what he was
doing. He says “I had jumped [. . .] it seems [. . .] I knew nothing about it till I looked up”
(81). The implication being that he jumped instinctively, without thinking at all.
The novel consistently contrasts willpower and instinct. Several times, such as
when Marlow says a person’s soul is basically the state of their liver (41), biology is
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given precedence over mind, over the supposedly more human qualities. Jim’s attempt to
run from his past, to flee at any reminder of his jumping ship, is an attempt to run from
reminders his biology overruled his romanticism. Dr. Stein diagnoses him – pointedly, in
medical language – as a romantic, and says that the only cure is to figure out how to live
(153). That begins the “destructive element passage,” in which Stein compares life to
swimming in deep water that is like a dream. Again Conrad’s Dickensian point of view
intervenes between the apparent binary of human and animal. Jim responds to his animal
instincts and feels guilt and shame for years. Marlow, meanwhile, blames everything on
biology even while seeking out some other, more spiritual, explanation. Stein is the
doctor, the man who apparently has all the answers, and he warns Marlow not to think
too little of dreams, even dreams lost. When Marlow says the difference between Jim and
Stein is that Stein grasped his dreams when he saw a chance, Stein says “do you know
how many opportunities I let escape; how many dreams I had lost that had come in my
way [. . .] It seems to me that some would have been very fine – if I had made them come
true. Do you know how many? Perhaps I myself don’t know” (Conrad Jim 156). Marlow
responds by reminding Stein there is a dream Jim recalls vividly having missed, and Stein
reminds him everyone has a few dreams like that. Marlow wants to circumvent the
importance the doctor and Jim places on dreams by removing them to the sphere of
action, of physicality and of doing. Dreams matter if they are caught; if allowed to escape
they must be forgotten. Stein insists otherwise, that they are important no matter what the
status of them – failed or successful – and they may be what makes humans human.
Stein is the repository of wisdom in the novel, particularly well-placed, since he
was cast out of Europe and came to live alongside natives in many distant lands. His
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connections are what lead to Jim’s placement in Patusan as Stein’s trade representative.
And Stein is the center around which the novel’s two grotesqueries revolve. They are the
German captain of the Patna and Cornelius, the trade agent Jim replaces in Patusan.
Stein and the captain are related, as Peter Firchow points out, through their shared
geography. Firchow claims they are representatives of a cliché that Germans are either
good or bad, and for Conrad personally, either Prussian or Bavarian (68). The sea captain
is Prussian, and a “monstrous grotesquerie of such proportions” that Marlow can only
suggest he is “the work of diabolic forces” (68). Meanwhile Stein is Bavarian, a “man of
science and art” who contrasts strongly with the sea captain, who only knows force and
“a loud voice” (68). Firchow goes on to suggest these figures can suggest Goethe’s Faust
(69). The sea captain is the violent, animal-like brute who pulls Jim down from his lofty
ideals into dishonorable survival. He stands, then, as a visceral reminder of how Jim and
other idealists must feel about the human body and human instinct as animal-like. He
wins arguments through force and competition, not through cooperation and sociability.
Cornelius is less forceful, but a similar sort of reminder. Marlow says
he was fundamentally and outwardly abject, as other men are markedly of
a generous, distinguished, or venerable appearance. It was the element of
his nature which permeated all his acts and passions and emotions; he
raged abjectly, smiled abjectly, was abjectly sad; his civilities and his
indignations were alike abject. . . (206-7)
When Marlow describes the fit Cornelius has upon being assured Jim will never leave
Patusan, he says “[i]t was an inexpressibly grotesque and vile performance, and I
hastened away” (239). Cornelius’s actions later contribute to Jim’s death. He leads the
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pirates to the chief’s son’s camp and helps them sneak up to kill as many as they can, as
vengeance for their poor treatment. The chief’s son dies, and Jim offers his life in return.
The chief shoots him dead. Cornelius, like the German sea captain who is the other
grotesque in the novel, acts as a diabolical force. He creeps “in full view with an
inexpressible effect of stealthiness, of dark and secret slinking” (206). The strong
language Marlow uses to describe him forces attention to him and his abject behavior
even before he causes several people to be killed.
What makes him abject? He is apparently grotesque enough to make Marlow
want to reject him, but being unable to, as he is so different, he rejects part of himself.
What in Cornelius causes that response, and what could Marlow reject of himself? Like
Kurtz, Cornelius has in some way “gone native.” He hates Jim for taking away his stepdaughter and his business, even though he seems to hate the young woman and never
conducted any business. He is the only other white man in residence in Patusan but
behaves with less moral uprightness and earnestness than the native chief, Marlow, Jim,
or the pirate captain. He sneaks and slinks, like an animal rather than a person. Marlow
responds to him, as he did to Kurtz, with the sort of abject disgust that implies the object
of his revulsion seems inhuman – but Marlow cannot convince himself that either person
is anything but human like him. Marlow responds by feeling abjectness; he is disgusted
but reminded that it could be him instead of Cornelius behaving that way. If Cornelius
can behave that way, any human could.
Jim, too, must find ways to respond and react to these affronts on his moral sense,
shaped as it was by romantic novels rather than evolutionary theories. The answer to
Jim’s problem comes, as it does in Heart of Darkness, through the novel’s literary hints.
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The full title of the novel is Lord Jim: a Romance. Tracy Seeley, in the article “Conrad’s
Modernist Romance: Lord Jim,” says that “[t]o both Conrad and his audience, ‘romance’
suggested the exploits of an exemplary protragonist – who, after heroic difficulty, reaps
enviable and predictable rewards: fame, glory, retribution, wealth or power – perhaps all
of the above. Conrad’s Jim, the novel’s ostensible focus, clearly meets such popular
expectations” (496). Seeley goes on to point out that critics have, by and large, ignored
the subtitle or relegated it to the ending of the novel only, while he believes the whole
work engages in the making of romance. It is simply a “modernist romance,” as the title
of the article says.
The grotesqueness around Jim is one of the hurdles Jim must learn to deal with.
He tries to ignore it at first, as when he refuses to speak to his ship captain after they
abandon the Patna. But the captain’s grotesqueness serves to remind Jim that he wants to
live, that he has survival instincts, that he is in some way an animal. That is why he is so
offended at the suggestion that Marlow could have called him “a cur,” because he fears
and thinks in some way it is true. And, given evolutionary theory, of course it is: he is a
human animal. But characters like the ship captain suggest that being like an animal is to
be like the savages Marlow expects to see when he goes to Africa in Heart of Darkness.
They will not really be human, even though they are human-shaped. They will be
incapable of pursuing the ideals Jim wants for himself. But Marlow learns in Africa they
are human, and Jim must learn exactly how to know that any human – every human – is
an animal and be able to sustain idealism. That is something Stein appears to have
accomplished. He can view romanticism like it is an illness, a bodily infection, but still
insist it is one of the ways to live, and no more wrong than others.
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Cornelius provides the narrative with its answer. In Dickensian fashion, Conrad
provides a mirror for Jim, an opposite in precisely the same position, to show the real
difference between two people with the same instincts, the same desires, and the same
job. Cornelius is Jim’s predecessor in Patusan, and he fails in every way, because he is
needlessly cruel, greedy, and abject. He disgusts natives and white visitors alike. They do
not like to be reminded that they want the same things he wants, even though they might
use different methods to get their desires. Jim replaces him and improves everything – the
business turns a profit, he is respected by the natives, and fights like a soldier and
tactician where Cornelius can only slink and sneak.
Their final doubling is their indirect involvement in the death of the chief’s son.
But while Cornelius leads the pirates to the camp specifically to kill – to satiate his
feelings of vengeance, hurt pride, and bloodlust – Jim ordered the natives there to prevent
bloodshed by offering the pirates one unguarded means of retreat. Jim treats everyone
around him as a human, rather than an animal there to satisfy his own pleasures. He treats
people with the sort of literary, Dickensian consideration that Heart of Darkness
suggested was the answer to the problem of considering people as animals. Do not do it,
both books say. It is important that Lord Jim is a romance, because it shows someone
conquering over all the odds to be rewarded.
That can seem very odd, as Jim is shot and killed at the end for his involvement in
the death of the chief’s son. But for the first time since he jumped from the Patna he is
satisfied. He gave in to animal desires once – and while readers might not blame him
much for wanting to survive, there are enough voices in the novel decrying a sailor
abandoning ship that readers can understand it is not the same as a passenger simply
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trying to survive – and he has a chance to satisfy himself as to his humanity through
giving himself over for execution calmly. That is still a selfish action in many ways; the
novel does not end with Jim’s death, but with Marlow’s account of meeting Jewel, his
native wife who left after his death, and who is bereaved and comforted by Stein. So in
the way of a modernist Jim might have simply abandoned ship again to satisfy himself –
but he is no longer concerned with the animal part of his personality.
Lord Jim offers the solution to the problem posed by Heart of Darkness. To be
human is not to ascribe to a certain set of predefined values; it is to live by a set of ideals
that one values more than one’s life – no matter what those values are. Stein defines
being human as pursuing dreams, even if one can never achieve or catch those dreams.
He lived his life according to his ideals and they cost him his family. Jim learns that
lesson and finds his own values and ideals, which cost him his life. Marlow is left
confused by the exchanges, even after being the person to decry any sailor abandoning
his post – that is Marlow’s ideal, that of the profession. People may be animals, but they
are not alien so long as they live according to some kind of ideal. This novel defines what
the human is, according to Conrad, and touches on the alien only at times, in the image of
the angry German captain and Cornelius the abject merchant. They have nothing in their
heads but preservation and accumulation – like Kurtz they have lost what made them
human. The human is defined against the animal through ideas, not behavior. The alien,
then, is reserved for the human with no ideal, no code of conduct or aspirations.
Heart of Darkness and, to a lesser extent, Lord Jim, are about the struggle to deal
with people once the scientific idea that they are animals proliferated. In Lord Jim the
animal theme is everywhere; people are referred to as animals, Jim fears being called an
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animal – and that allows the novel to question what it means to be human, and find it is to
have some sort of idea or ideal to live by, and to keep trying to chase that ideal. In Heart
of Darkness the evolutionary theme is stronger still, with Africans and Europeans
appearing to slide between animal and human. The phrenologist opens the work in order
to make clear what lens the Europeans are using to deal with Marlow, Kurtz, and the
Africans. Both works imply that viewing people as scientific constructs – animals subject
to evolutionary pressures – may be accurate, but will only lead to suffering. People must
be treated like people, no matter their evolutionary drives or differences. They are not
aliens, only foreigners. The truly alien is the human with no measure of idealism to drive
him- or herself.
V.

H. Rider Haggard and the Evolution of Culture

The work of H. Rider Haggard fits more comfortably the rubric of romance.
Indeed, after the publication of She Haggard was known in the press as “King Romance”
(Haining 26). His characters are adventurers who get in fights and win treasures while
helping those in need – and, usually, those in need are primitives who cannot solve
problems for themselves. But Haggard’s work, too, investigates the role of evolution in
imperialist expansion. King Solomon’s Mines (1885), Allan Quatermain (1887), and She:
A History of Adventure (1887) all feature strong, passionately English protagonists – but
all the protagonists socialize better within the “primitive” cultures than their native lands.
As in Heart of Darkness Africa is the place in which European men learn about
themselves and the control nature and biology exert on the human. Haggard dwells
specifically on the contiguity between black and white, calling attention repeatedly to
how similar the two groups really are, even as characters in the novels espouse
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Spencerian ideologies about the differences between races making them so different they
cannot understand each other. Haggard’s use of Spencer anticipates works such as
Oswald Spengler’s Decline of the West (1922) in that it posits that cultural and social
evolution works in cycles –civilizations can decay and be replaced by stronger groups, in
the way better-adapted organisms push less-adapted organisms to extinction.
Haggard’s life was shaped by British imperialism. His boarding school teacher
would tell stories of his friend who found corpses sitting upright around a table in an
Egyptian ruin (Haining 11). Haggard willfully borrowed the story for the climactic
tableau of Mines. Later, as Haggard began to wonder what to do with his life – and his
father continued to berate him for being useless (12; 14) – the hostilities between the
Boers and the British were growing, and when Lord Carnarvon sent a man named
Shepstone to investigate the possibility of wholly annexing the Boer area, Haggard went
along as Shepstone’s aide (Katz 8). He was nineteen, and skirmishes were just beginning
along the borders of the Transvaal (7-8). When the British invaded Zululand, nominally
in the name of the Boers, Haggard joined a mounted defense unit (9-10) but left the
service soon after.
The early portions of Haggard’s life were intimately bound up with the struggles
in South Africa even if he did not serve on the battle-lines directly. It is no surprise that
he would mine his experiences for his greatest fictions. But more than that, his
experiences matched the interests of his culture – the eyes of all England were turned
toward Africa. Like with Conrad, Haggard had personal experience in an area people
wanted to know about, and he was in an excellent position to write about his experiences,
fictionalized or not, and tap into an important vein of interest in the Victorian world.
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Haggard wrote some while still in Africa. His essay “A Visit to the Chief
Secocoeni” was published in 1887 while he was Master and Registrar of the High Court
of the Transvaal (9). Later, Haggard’s fiction spread through Britain, often by way of
young men who dreamed of continuing the imperial adventure of their country. A
reviewer called Hutchinson said of Haggard’s autobiography that “it is not to be doubted
that [Haggard’s] South African romances filled many a young fellow with longing to go
into the wide spaces of those lands and see their marvels for himself, and have thus aided
far more than we can ever know in bringing British settlers and influence into the new
country” (qtd. in Katz 1). Haggard was widely read for his non-fiction as well (2).
Clearly Haggard’s work – and particularly the character of Allan Quatermain, who
entered the public consciousness as Sherlock Holmes did – captured the attention of
Britain. Haggard’s work is perceived by many today in the way Hutchinson perceived it
in the 1920s, as adventure fiction that called the youths of Britain to exploit other cultures
under the banner of their country and their desire for glory. But the fiction itself
complicates that call to adventure by questioning the real nature of the difference between
“us” and the alien, between Britain, Europe and the far-flung exotic lands they explored.
Tim Murray points out that Haggard was “[d]eeply influenced by evolutionism,
archaeology, and ethnology” (181). His theses in these novels, then, would be deeply
enmeshed in evolutionary theory and its implications for white men adventuring in black
countries. The numerous references in the Quatermain novels to blacks as children as
compared to whites recalls Spencer’s rhetoric. Ayesha’s speeches in She summon images
of civilizations and ideologies evolving and competing in a panoramic sort of Social
Darwinism.
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King Solomon’s Mines and Allan Quatermain both follow the adventures of
Quatermain and his friends through Africa, usually in search of treasure. They are all
“stock European types: [. . .] Quatermain is a grizzled old colonial with colonial
prejudices” while Curtis is a “gentleman of no African experience but [. . .] inclined to
treat Africans as equals” and Good is obsessed with decorum and “English dress and
manners” (Etherington 76). These stock types encounter Africans of all kinds, including
some that are imperialist caricatures and some that, according to Etherington, are not. He
points to the “[b]ig game and diamonds” as part of the imperial project in Africa, as well
as the presumption that Africans could not have built the magnificent ruins, and that
ancient whites instead built them; both novels include examples of the childish native
tyrant (75). However, the rightful king, working as Quatermain’s servant, is a “proud and
intelligent aristocrat” who refuses to be “subservient” in the way Quatermain insists.
Etherington goes on to say of Mines that it “ends on a strongly anti-imperialist note as the
Kukuana king vows to keep Europeans out of his domain [. . .] As imperialist
indoctrination this is distinctly weak” (75-6).
There are notes of an imperialist worldview that Etherington does not mention:
the most important is that despite their foibles the white heroes are unable to be anything
but good and honorable and that they are necessary for the good African king to gain and
keep his kingdom. In Allan Quatermain the good ruler is a queen, whose dark-haired,
sullen sister is cruel and tries to take over the country. The heroes once again side with
the moral ruler and expel the immoral usurper, restructuring or repairing the governing
bodies of Africa through their grit and determination.
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They are, though, in their actions imperial rapists like any other. Rebecca Stott
claims that “the novels express repressed sexual anxieties [. . .] about the sexuality of
white women. The anxieties are peculiar to the late nineteenth century, fed by
evolutionary theory and by late nineteenth century ‘scientific’ discourses on the nature of
black and white female sexuality” (71). Stott goes on to point out that Africa is figured
throughout the book as a female body to be explored (77). The treasure map sends the
men between two mountains called Sheba’s Breasts and eventually “to a triangle of
mountains, called the Three Witches, where they must descend into the earth, into a pit, to
find the treasure” (77). Heidi Kaufman says that “when we read the mines as African
female space, these men perform a figurative rape of Sheba’s body, symbolized in part by
the pigeon egg diamonds they carry out with them which effectively places female
generative power into the hands of men” (535). However, Kaufman goes on to say the
landscape can also be seen as Solomon himself – the men must travel Solomon’s road
down toward the Three Witches. “If we see these men penetrating the body of King
Solomon, as opposed to the body of Sheba, then the maternal figure doesn’t disappear,
but is transformed into the body of another man. Solomon is not quite feminized as he is
emasculated because of his Jewish body and his deviant sexuality” which “necessitates
(according to the novel) the act of disciplining him in this way [emasculation through
robbery] for his crimes of lust and miscegenation” (535). The founder of the De Beers
diamond conglomerate, Barney Barnato, was Jewish and much hated among British
imperialists of the 1800s (518).
Solomon is made an alien through his grotesque lusts and greed, and the African
countryside tainted to some degree by the grotesqueness that follows, as well as the rites
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of sacrifice the natives practice in the shadow of Solomon’s mines. The estranged entity
in Haggard’s fiction is the primitive entity, but Haggard goes on to claim that all people
are, at least in part, primitive, estranging his readers from their pictures of themselves
even as he draws black and white closer together.
All these things are the mechanisms through which the novel justifies the
imperialist actions of its protagonists. They are the nearest Christian successors to the
traditions of Solomon, and have more of a right to the diamonds than the African natives,
who never go to the mine anyway. They are able to explore the mine because they helped
the noble but powerless heir to the throne back into ruling the country, fighting in the
civil war they helped to instigate.
Katz reminds her readers of Haggard’s condescension – no matter what else is
true about his fiction, “his insistence on the similarities between white and black [. . .]
had little to do with national or political rights and freedoms” (139). He is clearly stating
the case for the imperial impulse. Katz also says that “[t]o accuse Haggard, who probably
knew more about and had more sympathy for African society than most of his
contemporaries, of having been a racist is to grant that he was very much a man of his
time and his class” (148). Haggard absorbed both his views and his methods from his
culture, including the quietly evolutionary, Spencerian views he used to explain the
racism in his novels.
The cultural divide – “us and them” – is figured in Spencerian terms throughout
the book. Haggard makes use of some ideas found in and propagated by Spencer when he
compares the natives to children. Ignosi himself, the true king of Kukuanaland and the
white men’s good friend, says he is “but a child in wisdom beside [his white
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companions]” (180). Ignosi is, throughout the book, noble, honorable, strong, honest, and
earnest. He has the respect of his white companions and wins, with their help, his nation
back. He is set up to be the greatest ruler in his people’s history, at least from the reader’s
point of view, as he promises to end the human sacrifices that his usurper brother
delighted in and that serves as the marker of difference between Quatermain and Ignosi’s
people. However, at the novel’s end, when all these things are true and Ignosi has come
as close as he can be in this novel to sympathetic and relatable, he repeats the Spencerian
doctrine that he is a child compared to his white friends.
What is it the one people could be learning from the other in these books, then?
Katz claims that in Haggard’s fiction “[t]he African is the common denominator in
humankind, the primitive, savage state” (137). She goes on, rightly, to question whether it
is fair to say the African is the emblem of the core of human nature given that they were
“subject to a foreign power [. . .] whites ruled and blacks served, whites employed and
blacks were employed, and whites were educated and skilled and blacks uneducated and
unskilled” (139). But Haggard does so. He assumes that there is a difference and that it is
one of civilization. But the difference is not so vast as it might seem. One of the most
quoted passages from Allan Quatermain come near the beginning, when Quatermain says
in all essentials the savage and the child of civilization are identical. I dare
say that the highly civilized lady reading this will smile at an old fool of a
hunter's simplicity when she thinks of her black bead-bedecked sister; and
so will the superfine cultured idler scientifically eating a dinner at his club,
the cost of which would keep a starving family for a week. And yet, my
dear young lady, what are those pretty things round your own neck?—they
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have a strong family resemblance, especially when you wear that very low
dress, to the savage woman's beads. Your habit of turning round and round
to the sound of horns and tom-toms, your fondness for pigments and
powders, the way in which you love to subjugate yourself to the rich
warrior who has captured you in marriage, and the quickness with which
your taste in feathered head-dresses varies—all these things suggest
touches of kinship; and you remember that in the fundamental principles
of your nature you are quite identical. As for you, sir, who also laugh, let
some man come and strike you in the face whilst you are enjoying that
marvellous-looking dish, and we shall soon see how much of the savage
there is in you. (4-5)
Haggard uses the Spencerian, evolutionary assumption that Africans and other “savages”
are simply less evolved – like children compared to the mature adult cultures of Europe.
They are the simple, undiluted picture of natural humanity – in competition and almost
animal-like in their savagery. However, Haggard tries to follow out the implications of
the “truth” of evolutionary theory. His protagonists may go among savages, but they
become savage themselves. They are able to do so because savagery is not strange to
them. The reader may delight in stories of adventure, but why? Quatermain, in addressing
the reader in the passage above, reminds him or her that the delight comes from tales of
violence and savagery. There is still something wild and “savage” in the reader, no matter
how “advanced” they believe they are. Women bedeck themselves, only with different
methods, and men will still grow heated and angry, offering to fight, if affronted. These
ideas are Haggard’s version of Darwin and Spencer’s ideas: women “bedeck” themselves
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as Darwin described in his passages on sexual selection, while men everywhere are
willing to fight when angered because of their instinct to compete in order to survive that
Spencer pointed to with his phrase “survival of the fittest.” In the Quatermain novels
considered here Haggard never pointedly calls attention to evolutionary rhetoric; Allan
certainly would know little enough about it, leaving Haggard no real room to include it
through more than passing assumptions and speeches characters make. But the point is
still clear: savagery is still something innate to the human individual. Civilization is not a
state of being but a layer overtop the competitive “true” nature of humanity, as judged
from Quatermain’s experience with Africans and Europeans.
Stott uses the passage that claims identity between civilized and savage to discuss
the “barbarism beneath the façade of civilization which could be released at any point, a
barbarism constituting primitive impulses and primitive sexuality, a barbarism identified
in evolutionary theory with blackness” (75). Stott identifies the sense of underlying
identity between the two groups, black and white – and particularly between black and
white females. She claims that Haggard expresses his time’s anxiety about female
sexuality by portraying white women as veneered black women, who were “[t]he lowest
point on the ladder of the evolutionary hierarchy” because they were “sexually and
physically primitive” (75). The novel has a clear tendency, then, to relate white to black,
civilized to primitive, as both the men and women are connected in it. Stott figures those
relations in specifically evolutionary terms, calling attention to medical theories of female
sexuality that equated it with primitive desires and behavior.
The men, too, are equated in Haggard’s work. Etherington points out the
comparison in Mines between the Africans, who show themselves to be principled and

127

civilized when they refuse to kill any wounded, and the protagonists: “Good longs for a
Gatling Gun with which to mow down the enemy and Quatermain wants to kill without
sparing anyone” (76-7). Etherington finally points to a passage out of the novel which
speaks of Henry Curtis, the learned man of noble heritage, the most civilized among the
adventurers.
There he stood, the great Dane, for he was nothing else, his hands, his axe,
and his armour all red with blood, and none could live before his stroke.
Time after time I saw it sweeping down, as some great warrior ventured to
give him battle, and as he struck he shouted “O-hoy! O-hoy” like his
Berserkir forefathers, and the blow went crashing through shield and
spear, through head-dress, hair, and skull, till at last none would of their
own will come near the great white "umtagati," the wizard, who killed and
failed not. (Haggard Mines 193)
R. D. Mullen has said of Mines that “[t]he story is essentially one of a hard journey that
develops from a mere treasure hunt into a voyage of the spirit” (287). The voyage is one
into the supposed past of the white men’s own ancestry. They pass through countryside
that calls to mind the Queen of Sheba and King Solomon, which presents a voyage into
both the female and male body as well as one into the past of their own culture and
treasure-hunting heritage. What they find is that there is very little difference between
themselves and the Africans they meet. Both they and the Africans themselves believe in
the Spencerian difference between the two groups: Ignosi, the king finally on his rightful
throne, says as they leave his country “that which flies in the air loves not to run along
the ground; the white man loves not to live on the level of the black or to house among
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his kraals” (263). Ignosi himself perceives the difference to be one in nature – as the bird
has an appropriate place, the sky, so the white man has an appropriate place as well, and
it is not “on the level of the black.” The division is supposedly natural, one supported by
biological and sociological differences. And it is one, at least implicitly, of quality. The
bird has its place, true, but the white would be on a different “level,” not just a different
place, were he to live with the black. Ignosi here articulates the clearest picture of
Spencerian civilization as separations of kind due to evolutionary advancement in the
white races. He implies they, too, are animals and each has its own ecological niche,
social as much as biological, but still firmly bounded. That claim cannot ring as true after
the reader has witnessed the devolution of the white men in war as compared to Ignosi’s
still-racist but overtly noble behavior.
It is left up to Quatermain to explain what is happening in another novel. In the
introduction to Allan Quatermain, which is the manuscript Quatermain writes on his
deathbed, he says
. . .supposing for the sake of argument we divide ourselves into twenty
parts, nineteen savage and one civilized, we must look to the nineteen
savage portions of our nature, if we would really understand ourselves,
and not to the twentieth, which, though so insignificant in reality, is spread
all over the other nineteen, making them appear quite different from what
they really are, as the blacking does a boot, or the veneer a table. It is on
the nineteen rough serviceable savage portions that we fall back on
emergencies, not on the polished but unsubstantial twentieth. Civilization
should wipe away our tears, and yet we weep and cannot be comforted.
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Warfare is abhorrent to her, and yet we strike out for hearth and home, for
honour and fair fame, and can glory in the blow. And so on, through
everything. (6)
The passage reveals the failings of the civilized world: it cannot comfort the weeping; it
causes war even as it decries it –honor and fame are products of social groups, not
individual survival instincts. Quatermain believes in the theories that said people were
naturally violent, naturally competitive in the struggle for survival, and he insists that
civilization is a “veneer” over these instincts. It can ameliorate things he finds distasteful
in “human nature,” but it rarely does and does so weakly. More often people give in to
the “nineteen parts” of themselves that are savage. He himself has several times in his
life, as the novel goes on to prove.
Before leaving these two Quatermain novels one must consider Quatermain’s
motives for his adventures. He does indeed love adventure and hunting and, despite his
racist protests, the continent of Africa. But he goes on these particular adventures for his
son. Curtis originally goes to Africa to find his brother. Both Quatermain novels
considered here focus on imperialism as driven by family issues. Given Disraeli’s claims
about the familial connections between colonizer and colonized, and the generally
grotesque way in which these family issues are developed in these stories, Quatermain
and Curtis’s family concerns imply that there is something wrong in the family system.
In Mines Quatermain seeks treasures to spend on his son, who will be educated
and married on them. In Quatermain he goes back to Africa to die because his son is
dead.
The novel opens with his journal entry right after his son’s funeral. It reads

130

'I have just buried my boy, my poor handsome boy of whom I was so
proud, and my heart is broken. [. . .]
'Poor Harry to go so soon! just when his life was opening to him. He was
doing so well at the hospital, he had passed his last examination with
honours [. . .] And then he must needs go to that smallpox hospital. He
wrote to me that he was not afraid of smallpox and wanted to gain the
experience; and now the disease has killed him, and I, old and grey and
withered, am left to mourn over him, without a chick or child to comfort
me. I might have saved him, too—I have money enough for both of us,
and much more than enough—King Solomon's Mines provided me with
that; but I said, "No, let the boy earn his living, let him labour that he may
enjoy rest." But the rest has come to him before the labour.
(1-2)
Quatermain in this novel is first a grieving father before he is anything else. He alludes to
the wealth of his adventure to the mines and how his earnest English belief in work kept
him from giving his son the money to live on. He tells the reader that his son is killed by
smallpox because he felt he had to work in the smallpox hospital. He would have been
ministering mostly to the poor. So Henry Quatermain appeared to want to work with the
poor, volunteering, rather than using his education to pursue a well-paying practitioner’s
job ministering to more well-to-do families. Which means Henry had diverged from his
father’s way of life – as Allan plundered the African countryside his son became
convinced it was his duty to help those less fortunate than him.
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In Mines Quatermain initially refuses to go on the adventure because of his son.
He says “I have a son dependent on me, so I cannot afford to risk my life foolishly” and
only agrees when Sir Curtis promises to settle some money on Quatermain’s son if
anything happens to them in Africa (24). So Quatermain’s entire involvement in the first
adventure is due to his desire to help his son in his career – and in the second novel that
career actually helped to get his son killed.
Family relationships drive the plots of both novels as well. Ignosi, the long lost
true heir of the hidden kingdom in Mines, is forced to lead a civil war uprising against his
younger brother who has usurped the throne in his absence. In Quatermain two sisters
fight over Sir Curtis and this argument brings their differences to a head – their already
tenuous twinned rule over their people ends and another civil war breaks out. In both
novels Quatermain becomes embroiled in civil wars centered on family differences. All
throughout both books imperialism and violence are intertwined with familial matters.
But just as the characters insist that blacks are children while whites are adults, the novel
insists that family relationships cannot bear imperial action. Only one sibling survives in
each of the two civil wars Quatermain participates in; his son dies and, by the end of
Quatermain, so does he, after becoming a father figure to his friends and the natives.
Quatermain’s son, meanwhile, had no imperialistic drive and, without his family’s
support, dies. The imperial drive cannot be excused by family ties as Disraeli tries to do
because family ties go away from imperialism, not toward it. Any attempt to say that
imperialism is for family leads to the sort of fighting engaged in by the pair of siblings
these novels: people die for ownership of land and not for any family connection at all.
Ignosi might feel as though he is a child to the white men’s fatherly wisdom, but he still
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decrees that no more white men will ever be allowed into his kingdom. He laments never
seeing his friends again – his figurative family – but he has just slain his real family to get
his kingdom and means to keep it. The evolutionary family – the civilized European as
parent and the primitive African as child – is a grotesque image that leads to violence and
the destruction of actual family feeling on all sides. If one is willing to subjugate and
possibly kill a figurative child, one might, as Allan does, leave the real family to die of
sickness.
The two Quatermain novels considered here complicate their image of
imperialism more than first glances would indicate. They certainly seem, at first, to be
uncomplicated “boys’ adventure” stories of plundering Africa and helping the natives
because they cannot help themselves. At one point in Mines the adventurers stay alive by
convincing their friend’s usurping brother that they are wizards, and they do so by telling
him they will make the moon go away – on the day their handy almanac says there will
be an eclipse. So the novels are not necessarily complimentary of the learning and
intelligence of the natives. But the natives have the sort of “noble savage” quality,
borrowed from writers such as Rousseau, which would become a cliché both in
Haggard’s work and the work of other authors. Spencerian social evolution claimed that
“savages” were akin to children in morality and mental power, but in these novels they
could also be nobler than their “advanced” European and British brethren because they
lacked the greed that characterized so much of “civilized” culture. And in Quatermain the
narrator makes clear his assertion, quieter in the previous book, that civilized people are
just as savage as the African natives he adventured among. He turns marks of civilization
(honor, glory, fine jewelry) into marks of savagery and implicates everyone in the
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devolution he and his companions undergo when they go to war in Africa. If calm Henry
Curtis could become a “berserkir” then anyone could. King Solomon’s Mines and Allan
Quatermain claim that there is little material difference between European and African
people; their social evolution is simply a “varnish” over a true, savage human nature bred
from a history of competition. The overt connection of civilization and femininity –
which becomes clear in places such as the “family resemblance” passage, in which
Quatermain asks his female reader, if the Africans are so primitive for their beads and
baubles, “what are those pretty things round your own neck?” – implies in the malecentric story that civilization is a weakening influence, possibly because the civilization
is declining. It was in some way reassuring for those who worried about the weakening of
the British Empire to see, in African fiction, a reminder of the primitive strength of the
savage in the novel’s picture of the reader. Given Haggard’s views of the decline of
civilization as revealed in She, this primitive strength was the greatest boon an old
civilization could ask for, so long as the civilization did not spend that strength on futile
commercial struggles – as he believed England was doing.
VI.

Civilization’s Recapitulation and Decline

Declining civilization is one of the driving themes of She: A History of Adventure.
In it a 2,000 year old woman pronounces the death of the British empire and Christianity
by claiming they will do what all others have done: go extinct in their own time as all
things do. R. D. Mullen’s summary gets at many of the salient points of the plot. The
“[f]antasy elements include some archeological and anthropological speculations, psychic
powers, a flame of perpetual youth, and reincarnation with a recurring triangle” (287).
Mullen also points out that the novel, and particularly its titular character Ayesha – She-
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who-must-be-obeyed – “continues to be the principal subject in most of the discussion of
Haggard’s fiction” (287). She begins with Holly, an Oxford mathematician, and his
friend. The friend tasks Holly on his deathbed with caring for his son Leo. Holly agrees,
and raises him until he gives Leo his inheritance, which reveals he is the descendent of an
ancient Greek named Kallikrates. Kallikrates was killed by his jealous lover, and his
inheritance is a pot shard with clues to find her and a letter asking Leo to seek vengeance.
The country in Africa they must go to is “ruled over by a beautiful white woman” and
“the people there speak a dialect of Arabic” (28 italics Haggard’s). In fact, Ayesha has
lived there for over two millennia and awaits Leo’s coming, for he is Kallikrates
reincarnated. She wants to allow him to bathe in a mystical fire she has stayed near that
gives immortality and eternal youth to those who do so. Leo falls in love with her over
the body of his first, black love, Ustane, whom Ayesha kills to have Leo to herself.
The family theme is already strong in the narrative – the whole adventure begins
with a legacy from a dead father. But that friend, Holly, complicates matters further. He
introduces the evolutionary themes into the novel before race issues and social evolution
enter into the narrative. Holly is apparently a grotesque himself. He says in the first
chapter that
[l]ike Cain I was branded – branded by Nature with the stamp of abnormal
ugliness, as I was gifted by Nature with iron and abnormal strength and
considerable intellectual powers. [. . .] I was set apart by Nature to live
alone, and draw comfort from her breast, and hers only. Women hated the
sight of me. Only a week before I had heard one call me a “monster” when
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she thought I was out of hearing, and say that I had converted her to the
monkey theory. (8)
That “monkey theory” is of course the theory of evolution and the popular idea that
humans evolved from apes. Visually Holly is a kind of atavism, a recapitulation of the
ancestors of humanity. He frightens passersby and his own students, who do not want to
be seen in public with him – and this despite the renown he wins their college through his
physical strength that allows him to win sporting contests every year. He describes
himself as a misogynist (88), all because of a woman who left him because of his looks –
she had anticipated a rich inheritance he did not actually receive. Yet he is the most
intelligent character in the novel besides Ayesha herself, who has spent thousands of
years studying the natural sciences – particularly chemistry.
Holly is a mathematician by trade. He is also physically strong and very capable
of violence. He is well known in his college for his physical feats. Upon realizing his
native hosts, the Amahagger, mean to kill him and his friends, he shoots the woman who
instigated the attack and her co-conspirator with a single bullet, fired “by a sort of
instinct” (100). After firing all his rounds and helping to kill at least five natives, he fights
bare-handed. He says “for the first time in my life the great physical power with which
Nature has endowed me stood me in good stead. I had hacked at the head of one man
with my hunting-knife [. . .] with such vigour, that the sharp steel had split his skull down
to the eyes” (102). Then he says “I was mad with rage, and that awful lust for slaughter
which will creep into the hearts of the most civilised of us when blows are flying [. . .]
My arms were round the two swarthy demons, and I hugged them till I heard their ribs
crack and crunch up beneath my gripe” (103). The grotesque descriptions belie his claims
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that he is “the most civilised of us.” He, at least in retrospect, revels at least a little in his
exploits. Given that, like any Haggard protagonist, he is in the right in this situation –
having been tricked by his hosts, or some of them at any rate – few could blame him for
being proud. But juxtaposed as these thoughts are – his pride, his assumption of
civilization, his power, his chagrin, and his blood lust – one must deal with them all
together. Holly is, after all, the apelike professor of mathematics. He is a representation of
what Quatermain described: a savage with a one-twentieth veneer of civilization covering
his greater part. It takes only his trip into Africa to release it. And his excuse for going to
Africa with Leo to search for Ayesha is a hunting expedition anyway. He is a
recapitulation of his ancestors’ physical strength and violence who finds the outlet for
those urges in Africa, where, according to Haggard, the natives live the life of Holly’s
ancestors every day.
Holly’s story has indicated several times already that he is a recapitulation of past
eras of humankind. His apparent atavism and recapitulation comes from Ernst Haeckel’s
evolutionary theories. Ernst Haeckel argued for something he called the “biogenetic law,”
but which is more commonly referred to as the recapitulation theory. It claims that an
individual
repeats during the quick and short course of its individual development the
most important of those changes in form that its ancestors had gone
through during the slow and long course of their paleontological
development according to the laws of inheritance and adaptation. (qtd. in
Richards 148).
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In short, “[o]ntogeny is nothing other than a short recapitulation of phylogeny” (qtd. in
Richards 148), or an organism passes through stages of development that mirror the
development of its species historically. For example, a human fetus goes through stages
that closely mirror fish, amphibian, and ape before becoming recognizably human.
According to Robert J. Richards, Darwin adopted this idea for a period of time as he
worked on his notebooks (151), and worked a general version into later editions of
Origin. Richard Owen denounced recapitulation theory immediately (150-1), but the idea
took hold and was very popular at the time. Recapitulation theory is very important to
most ideas of atavism or devolution, as it is the mechanism through which such
regressions happen. If a human goes through all the stages of the species’ evolution in the
fetus, if something went wrong during development it would be conceivable for a human
to be born with the characteristics of an ape or a fish. Lombroso’s theories implied a
similar sort of arresting action in one’s development, so a “criminal brain” simply failed
to develop past the primitive state of its ancestors’ brains. So Holly is a recapitulation of
earlier forms of humanity, figuratively and perhaps literally – he is apelike in appearance
and stumbles into a story about a woman who experiments with eugenics, so perhaps he
actually is, biologically, a past version of a human. Certainly he is stronger than the
average human. That does not impede his intelligence but it does put him in an odd
position relative to the other players in the story. Ayesha is a survival, having not
regressed but existed through millennia of human history; Leo is a two millennia old
Greek hero reborn; Holly, then, is simply the biological version of his companions the
figurative survivals. He is both the return of the more powerful, more violent type of
human and a reminder of the possibility of the human when confronted with the
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supposedly true nature of the world and of humanity – the universal truths expounded by
figures such as Quatermain.
Holly’s status matters partly because he is the narrator but also because he is the
person who spends the book debating morality with Ayesha. She insists on going to
England once Leo has been bathed in the life-giving fire – Holly fears that from there she
will take Victoria’s place and rule the world. Bruce Mazlish points out that when dealing
with Ayesha “[w]e are in the presence of a grandiosity that is, in fact, a mirror image of
part of the actual British imperial rule and its claim to world dominion. The white Queen
who, in fact, rules over savages is Queen Victoria” (736-7). Ayesha, then, is a fantastical
version of Victoria. Her empire, once built, could not only stretch across the entire world
but go on forever. And that is a risky proposition, as Holly makes clear.
Holly is the man who is an apparent atavism; he crushes men’s ribcages with his
bare hands and arms, but sits up late at night solving math problems. He is also the man
who spends his time in Ayesha’s kingdom of Kôr lusting after her and debating morality
and history with her. Upon hearing about Christianity and Islam from Holly, Ayesha
exclaims
I see—two new religions! I have known so many, and doubtless there have
been many more since I knew aught beyond these caves of Kôr. Mankind
asks ever of the skies to vision out what lies behind them. It is terror for
the end, and but a subtler form of selfishness—this it is that breeds
religions [. . .] The religions come and the religions pass, and the
civilisations come and pass, and naught endures but the world and human
nature. Ah! if man would but see that hope is from within and not from
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without—that he himself must work out his own salvation! He is there,
and within him is the breath of life and a knowledge of good and evil as
good and evil is to him. Thereon let him build and stand erect, and not cast
himself before the image of some unknown God, modelled like his poor
self, but with a bigger brain to think the evil thing, and a longer arm to do
it. (Haggard She 192)
Holly refuses to carry on the debate, because he is very tired and “[i]t is weary work
enough to argue with an ordinary materialist, who hurls statistics and whole strata of
geological facts at your head, whilst you can only buffet him with deductions and
instincts and the snowflakes of faith, that are, alas! so apt to melt in the hot embers of our
troubles” (193). Holly assumes Ayesha is a typical materialist because she believes more
in the strength of people than in God, but her speech sounds more like a humanist’s than a
materialist’s – though it could certainly be both. The disconnection, however slight,
between Ayesha’s words and Holly’s assumptions carries the weight of the problem of
civilization in She. Holly cannot listen to, and will not speak to, anyone who disagrees
with his point of view. Just before this conversation Ayesha gives in and unveils herself.4
Holly admits to being enraptured by her even though he has claimed to have no interest in
women. He says “I could bear it no longer. I am but a man, and she was more than a
woman. Heaven knows what she was – I do not! But then and there I fell upon my knees
before her, and told her in a sad mixture of languages [. . .] that I worshipped her as never
woman was worshipped, and that I would give my immortal soul to marry her” (190). His
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Mazlish points out the connection between Ayesha’s veiled body and, among other things, the
story of Eve. He reminds readers that she always goes veiled, unless she “chooses to reveal her beauty” as
she has done to Holly in this scene, and Holly complains of the urge that ever drove man to unveil woman
(734).
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protestations of piety in the face of Ayesha’s “materialism” sound somewhat like guilt
manifesting itself – Holly shifted his worship, in that moment, from God to Ayesha, just
as the Amahagger and other native tribes worshipped her. Ayesha responds by reminding
him she wants only Leo, and Holly should try to recover, as ‘in a way [he is] wise” (190).
Holly admits, in recounting their theological discussion later, that he stopped arguing
because “she would be more likely to convert me than I should to convert her” (193)
though his silence is a regret to him, as he never learns what she really believed or
thought about these matters.
Ayesha’s assertion in her impassioned speech to Holly is that “[t]he religions
come and the religions pass, and the civilisations come and pass, and naught endures but
the world and human nature.” She is, in the end, about the decline of civilizations –
particularly as represented by two individuals, Holly and Ayesha – and Ayesha recognizes
that all civilizations decline, falter, grow old, and die. Her plan to avoid such decline is
lost when she dies – or, given her appearance in Haggard’s sequel Ayesha (1905), appears
to die – in her second trip into the fire, in which she appears to go through all the stages
of evolutionary change, reversed, before she withers and dies. She declines backward,
going in reverse through the recapitulation of her species. Job, Holly’s servant, screams
that “she’s turning into a monkey” and Holly agrees, saying that
she was shrivelling up; [. . .] smaller and smaller she grew; her skin
changed colour, and in place of the perfect whiteness of its lustre it turned
dirty brown and yellow, like a piece of withered parchment. She felt at her
head: the delicate hand was nothing but a claw now, a human talon like
that of a badly-preserved Egyptian mummy, and then she seemed to realise
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what kind of change was passing over her, and she shrieked—ah, she
shrieked!—she rolled upon the floor and shrieked!
Smaller she grew, and smaller yet, till she was no larger than a monkey [. .
.]
She, who but two minutes before had gazed upon us the loveliest, noblest,
most splendid woman the world has ever seen, she lay still before us, near
the masses of her own dark hair, no larger than a big monkey, and
hideous—ah, too hideous for words. And yet, think of this—at that very
moment I thought of it—it was the same woman! (293-4)
This is horrifying to Holly because Ayesha was always those things. It is the flame
of life, after all, that transformed her, and not any curse or spell. She simply recapitulated
the age she had not suffered for two thousand years and, in doing so also recapitulated
certain biological stages. Holly, too, represented a kind of throwback – ape-like and
powerful, frightening to passersby in England. Ayesha actually recapitulates part of her
species’ supposed evolution. These are the two figures in the book that appear the most
alien to the reader, and to Leo, the typical British youth. But Holly is the narrator, and
Ayesha is not the simple villain that Haggard had used in Mines and Quatermain. These
two are not as alien as the reader might like to imagine them – both their atavisms are
present in every person, civilized or not. If they are simply recapitulating their
evolutionary history, everyone else who is a product of that history must contain such
regressive possibility as well. Everyone could be like Holly, for better or for worse.
According to Haggard civilization could do the same. Etherington says that
“Social Darwinisn enables [Ayesha] to pursue her ends without regard to her means” and
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those means sometimes include human eugenics and her scientific studies (80). Perhaps
those offer hints as to her method. Mazlish, in talking about the Darwinian aspects of the
novel, points out the threat comes from “[t]he sense of lesser breeds threatening a pure
race, of Western civilization possibly facing spiritual decline as a result of racial mixture,
and of the empire and civilization vanishing in the face of barbaric forces (admittedly,
now both inner and outer)” (742). That recalls Katz’s claims about Haggard’s belief in the
separation of black and white. Tim Murray says that “[a]t the core of [Haggard’s]
sensitivity was a strong belief in two things. First, the British Empire was doomed to fall,
and second, its demise would be hastened by a diminution of its finest qualities at the
hands of people from trade” (180). The empire would fall at the hands of those within it
who insist on going to Africa, wasting British strength and talent in imperial adventures
while ignoring other problems – and this action would simultaneously weaken the empire
itself by killing or tiring its strongest members.
This trinity of ideas, in She, drive everything else. Ayesha is a Social Darwinist
who believes humans can make their own right and wrong based on their feelings –
something Spencer hotly denounced. There is a threat of decline due to the extension of
the British Empire and the threat of miscegenation implied therein, illustrated by
Ayesha’s careful and controlled eugenics experiments.5 A threat of decline also hides in
the culture of Britain itself, as Holly can certainly attest. He is both harried by his culture
and a product of it, trying to be genteel as he hides strength that can snap two men in half
like matchsticks. As in Allan Quatermain and Heart of Darkness, Britain in She uses its
colonial and imperial drives to channel its violence and aggression, rather than finding a
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The Fabian society in Britain had its advocates for eugenics programs, including Shaw, who
insisted a “eugenic religion” was the only thing that could “save [their] civilization” (Paul 568).
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way to ameliorate or lessen the drives. Violent tendencies are natural because they came
from our history of competition for survival, but once a civilization begins to decline its
social evolution, its apparent evolution of calmer, more beneficent traits – as per
Spencer’s claims about the evolution of morality – fall away. The decline of a civilization
is the return of the aggressive nature of its past, represented in this novel by Ayesha and
Holly. Holly and Leo give in to Ayesha, despite their claims of civilized restraint. She has
seen, or at least heard of, empires rising and falling, and she too rises and falls while
hidden away in her African kingdom. If she represents Queen Victoria, then her decline
from her magical peak represents the possibility of Victoria and her reign declining as all
civilizations must do, according to Haggard’s beliefs and the claims of the novel itself.
Ayesha is a grotesque reminder of the possibility of backsliding into history or
pre-history in every person and, by extension, every organization made by persons,
including kingdoms and empires. Every civilization grows in the same way, according to
Spencerian social evolution; they move from homogeneity to heterogeneity,
specialization making each member of the society more skilled. But at the same time it
makes everyone in society more and more reliant on the other members – the society
becomes a unit not very different from an organism. This social organism is subject to
pressure just like a biological organism. It can fall apart, or die. Decay will set in just as
readily, taking the form of violence, decadence, and weakening stronger members.
Assuming both Spencer and Haeckel to be correct, the social organism can and probably
will recapitulate its past; it runs the risk of becoming an atavism as Holly and Ayesha do.
That atavism comes about, according to Haggard, through the earlier-outlined
weakening of empire through its own colonization. Just as a biological organism could
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not survive if it mutated in such a way that its defense mechanisms no longer defended it,
when the strong, defensive members of society – the upper classes, the “knights” and
soldiers, are weakened by social strictures and commercial enterprises, then the society
cannot defend itself and can no longer survive. Haggard believed commercialism was
hastening the end of the British Empire, and he believed all civilizations would
eventually decline. She is a novel that creates an immortal empress to illustrate those
beliefs. Ayesha declines as well; she is weakened in her resolve because of her love, her
desire to “own” Leo. She tries to reassure him by stepping into the flame again, thus
giving away the adaptation that had made her strong enough to found the longest-lasting
of empires. Holly, the witness to the whole decline and death, is representative of the
weakening of the British Empire itself. The implication is that in the strong days of
Britain Holly would have been lionized – he is magnificently strong, intelligent, cunning,
loyal, and pious. He appears to be everything chivalric – save his hatred of women,
caused, apparently, by that rejection he suffered in his youth, brought on by the changed
values of his society. It no longer values his traits, or does not value them in him, because
he is ugly – reminiscent of an ape. He reminds people of their biological origins at a time
when many people try to forget them. Holly’s position, stuck as a professor of
mathematics instead of a leader of men – perhaps a general or a statesman – illustrates
where the strength of the British Empire ends up. It is not where it is needed, and just as
Ayesha falls apart before Holly’s eyes, so too does the British Empire fall apart before the
reader’s and Haggard’s eyes.
Haggard had already reminded people in his Allan Quatermain novels that there
was little difference between the savage and the civilized; in She he reminds readers that
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what has happened to the civilizations of Egypt, Greece, and Rome can happen again –he
insists it will happen again, and there is little one can do to stop it. The risk of
degeneration apparently clear in biology – represented by Holly, who cannot fit into his
society he is so atavistically large and strong – is possible in society as well, and Ayesha
withers into a monkey-like, grotesque creature in the same way her society and, in the
end, British society would. Holly worries about Ayesha going to England not because she
threatens the empire but because she could easily take over. People would have little
problem. They would give in the way he did when confronted with her, just as the
Amahagger people have already done. And they would give in because she recalls
something true in all people – that sense of banding together in a social organism
combined with a startlingly savage willingness to get what one wants.
VII.

British Invasion: Aliens in London

Ayesha threatens to come to England and Holly believes the results will be
disastrous. Other “savage” aliens did come to England. The final threat of the savage
alien – who has already terrified imperial hunters and businessmen – is that it could be as
mobile as the British soldier or world traveler. The alien could come to England. A
similar kind of threat appears in H. G. Wells’ War of the Worlds (1898), though those
aliens were not savages, but according to the narrator superior to humans – even British
humans. But there are examples of savagery coming to Britain. Richard Marsh’s The
Beetle (1897) features an Egyptian cult priestess that comes to England, terrorizes its
men, shifts genders and from human to beetle and back again. She comes to England to
seek revenge on the one man who escaped her clutches – the entire novel is filled with
the Beetle overturning the gender binary, dominating men as she worms her way into the
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heart of England. And of course her target is a well-respected politician, cementing her
move as one against English culture as well as an individual target.
The Beetle herself interrupts what could have been another novel: a confused love
plot with two pairs of lovers struggling to come together in spite of parental dislike and
political controversy. The two women, Marjorie Linden and Dora Grayling “prove
themselves willing to chase after the men they desire” which mirrors, chastely, the
“villainess whose monstrous female – and monstrous Oriental – body is the ultimate
locus of all perversions” (Hurley Body 125). The Beetle, an Egyptian priestess of Isis, is
dangerous because of “her supernatural potency” that is augmented by “the dark and
primitive natural forces she may call upon both as a woman and as an Oriental. Hers is an
aggressive and fearsome femininity that explodes cultural roles, and an Eastern mentality
that is utterly foreign: alien, inexplicable, inimical to that of her host nation” (126). Her
body metamorphoses around her desires and the desires of others; she puts her victims in
constant risk of overturning their sexuality and falling through the cracks of their English
discriminatory grid just as she falls through. This contrast between the Beetle and the
monsters this study focuses on is instructive: she is apparently unstable but actually a
stable and culturally recognized threat: the Oriental Other. Kelly Hurley calls on Edward
Said to deal with the Beetle’s threat, calling attention to her use of magic and sexual
desires too old to recall or “so unfamiliar that the West cannot fit it into its taxonomies of
natural occurrences” (127). The Beetle is actually impossible to pin down, save as a
magician and an Oriental threat. She tempts the English characters but does not reflect
anything biologically true within them. She reflects the aggressive ways in which the
ladies in the love plot pursue their desires, but not the desires themselves. The Beetle

147

serves as “a unifying function for the culture that produces” the stereotypes and threats
within the novel (Hurley 127). Rather than questioning assumptions about its own
culture’s basis of normal by creating evolutionary monsters, this novel invades England
with the absolutely Other, the frightening effects of meddling with cultures different from
and inimical to the English.
Another novel about a kind of reverse colonization is Wilkie Collins’s The
Moonstone (1868), which is about a gem, an important part of a native Indian idol, taken
by a British soldier as spoils of war. Upon leaving the stone to his family in his will chaos
ensues as the priests meant to safeguard the idol strive to get the gem back. The old
soldier served to emblematize colonization and the priests come to England solely to get
back what is theirs. They manage to survive in London, kidnapping people they believe
have information about the gem with impunity. They are never caught, continue their
operations in the background of the novel as it becomes more and more a marriage plot,
and eventually make off with the gem undisturbed, killing the criminal who stole it from
the family in the process. They are frightening to the English populace reading Collins’s
novel precisely because nothing ever happens to them and they succeed where many of
the English characters fail – they are a vengeful colonized specter come to the homeland
to take back what was stolen from them. They, like the Beetle, have abilities not
commonly understood by English or Western people; those abilities are simply not
supernatural, but the result of a lifetime of training in various Oriental arts. As the Beetle
is the priestess of an idolatrous order so too do the seekers after the Moonstone represent
the priests whose mission it was to maintain and safeguard the idol from which the stone
was stolen. The particular threat in this novel is one of destabilization; the bulk of the plot
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does not set the English protagonists against the priests, but against each other. The
perceived threat from outside is enough to make a woman assume her fiancé stole the
stone, and for him, in turn, to assume she has pawned it or otherwise secreted it away to
help his rival for her affections. In The Moonstone the legacy of imperialism undermines
English society – originally catalyzed by an invasion of a foreign force, but completed by
the assumptions and fears that imperialist legacy has left behind.
It is interesting that both novels feature marriage plots interrupted by a reverse
colonization, just as Dracula does. It is a cunning way to show the disruption of the
supposedly natural order of life in native England to have threatening foreign individuals
show up and destroy marriages nearly ready to begin – though in The Beetle and The
Moonstone the marriages are successfully carried off in the end.
In Dracula (1897) one marriage is successfully completed but another – Lucy
Westenra’s and Arthur Holmwood’s – is totally destroyed by the foreigner’s intrusion.
Dracula himself in the novel has been read as representing many things, from sexual
deviance to capital and the threat of the lower classes (Seed 62). He has been the
underbelly of British sexism, the threat of miscegenation, and even the repressed female
returning, forcing Mina Harker to drink from his breast like a suckling baby. But he can
also be read as an invasion in reverse. Dracula comes from a supposedly “primitive”
country – as made clear by Harker’s comments in the first chapter – to dominate the
height of English civilization. And unlike the Beetle or the Hindu priests, he is described
in very specific evolutionary terms. Dracula portrays the grotesque, evolutionary
“savage” learning to walk and talk like a “civilized man”; it shows the twinned threats of
the repressed rage and violence of the savage coming out and the civilizing force of
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colonization being used against itself, to eat it from the inside as British colonizers ate
countries from the outside.
The “band of men” (Stoker 326) who try to protect Lucy and save Mina from the
vampire’s influence – Van Helsing, Harker, Seward, Morris, and Holmwood – are, taken
together, a portrait of the middle and upper classes of England. Nicholas Daly believes
their identity as the “team of experts” is the focal point of the novel. He says “Bram
Stoker’s Dracula [. . .] uses anxiety to produce as both necessary and natural a particular
form of professional, male, homosocial combination” (181). Jani Scandura’s examination
of Stoker’s working notes indicates that “Stoker hoped to achieve some sort of
occupational balance between characters, to create a ‘working’ portrait of the British
middle classes” (1). Scandura sees the collation of professionals as a clue to Dracula’s
identity: he claims the novel is partly about “vampirism as social aspiration” (2). Daly
opposes the rise of the professional class, as illustrated by the powerful “band of men” in
Dracula, against the image of Victorians who believed that theirs was a culture of decline
– as Haggard claimed in his novels, for instance. Dracula, for Daly, is a novel proving
that the newer professional classes were strong and skilled enough to save their society
from any sort of impending ruin apparently on the horizon.
Their methods complicate that reading, though. At first it appears to be correct –
the first sentence of the novel is famously about train timetables (Stoker 9); references to
Kodak cameras, phonographs, and other technological advancements fill the novel. It
appears to be opposing the modern world to the older, war- and blood-filled world of
Europe’s savage ancestors symbolized by Dracula and his lust for blood and conquest.
However, for the most part these modern devices and techniques do not help the band of
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men. Dracula, too, uses modern contrivances; his library is stocked with train timetables,
directories, and other modern stores of knowledge concerning London and England
(Stoker 25). He shows himself able to be just as modern and up-to-date as anyone else –
and, in the end, more advanced than some of his opponents. Van Helsing does not have
modern contrivances or ideas to help defeat the vampire. He brings apparently
superstitious solutions back into the discourse of Seward, Morris, and the Harkers; he
reveals that they have progressed little since the Middle Ages, and that their ancestors
knew more about the world than they did.
The “band of men” also implies something about gender, as they struggle to take
control of the narrative itself away from Mina Harker, who is the best at collating and
constructing among them all. Alison Case argues that the novel portrays what she calls, in
her article’s title, a “struggle for narrative authority.” She says that “[t]he story of
[Dracula’s] defeat [. . .] is, in large measure, one about collecting, collating, and
interpreting information.” This allows Mina and her “band” to reduce Dracula “from an
otherworldly embodiment of all that threatens rationality and social order to a
predictable, and, hence, defeatable, ‘criminal type’” (223 italics mine). Dracula is set up
by the structure of the novel as an alien, as an unknowable thing, and the “band of men”
set against him represents the society he is foreign to. They are a cross-section of society,
a perfect symbol of the cohesive social unit expelling an alien menace.
The narrative structure of the novel itself indicates that Dracula is something that
cannot be understood by the characters. But the novel also implies that by the ways in
which Van Helsing and Dracula work. Van Helsing provides methods to deal with the
creature, but even he cannot entirely encompass how Dracula functions and why he is.
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Also, Van Helsing’s methods are in part mystical; they are methods that, almost by
definition, cannot be understood by those who use them. The why of Dracula is never
answered completely, but how Dracula functions is described by Mina and Van Helsing
together, after chapters and chapters of Dracula functioning as a textual black hole, a
mystery that affects other characters but never touches the narration itself. Renfield even
gets to indirectly speak his mind, through Seward’s records, but Dracula is always a
mystery.
Mina and Van Helsing’s explanation of that alien mystery is evolutionary. Mina,
prodded by Van Helsing, says that “The Count is a criminal and of criminal type. Nordau
and Lombroso would so classify him, and qua criminal he is of imperfectly formed mind.
Thus, in a difficulty, he has to seek resource in habit” (Stoker 296). She goes on to
extrapolate from what they learned of his past, that when in danger he will flee back to
his home rather than turn and fight. And they are right; he does flee back to his
Transylvanian stronghold. Mina and Van Helsing introduce to the novel the discourse of
Lombroso and Nordau, that of natural criminality and degeneration – that is, of
regression and atavism. Dracula is an atavism, a regression back to older forms of nature
and humanity. He suffers from the debilities of the “criminal type” as Lombroso outlined
– he is stuck in patterns, has few goals and those exclusively antisocial, and cannot leave
his pattern type even when that is the only way he could survive. Van Helsing brings up
the police and explains that they know how the criminal type works even without
research (296) and thus imbricates the police force and the novel’s “band of men.” He
also provides an excuse, as the band of men breaks more laws than Dracula over the
course of the novel, mostly when they trespass and break into his London home. They go
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so far as to bribe officials as they go about investigating the Count, who bought his home
legally. Technically his crimes are trespassing and possibly assault – though his victims
would likely have not pressed charges on him were they given the chance, so strong is his
hypnotic hold on them. Dracula must be a criminal type so the band of men may break
laws to catch him, as they are simply engaging in criminal behavior; they are not
inherently atavistic and violent.
But just as in the work of Conrad and Haggard, the simple division does not hold
true. Timid, fearful Jonathan becomes as aggressive and violent as his American friend,
Quincy Morris – both of them fight their way through a crowd of armed gypsies to
Dracula’s coffin, armed only with knives (324-5). Morris has a characteristically
American bowie knife while Jonathan carries a kukri; both knives are heirlooms of each
man’s heritage in their countries’ colonial conquests, America’s among the natives in the
west of the continent and England’s among the Nepalese and Indians. Jonathan finds his
place in a narrative of violence, falling back on “savage” weapons – he does not even
wait for his companions, who have loaded rifles, to help, and in fact Morris dies because
of the knife-fighting with the gypsies. Morris and Jonathan eschew rifles for knives. In
their fury they even forget all the elaborate ritual and ceremony supposedly necessary to
slay a vampire. Dracula’s death is nothing like Lucy’s; that has led many to wonder if
Dracula is really dead – as the footnote to his death in Auerbach’s Norton edition of the
novel itself points out (325).
The “band of men,” then, are meant to be indicative of the strata of British
society. They devolve as they pursue a degenerate criminal type, an alien that is
unacceptable in their society as other criminal types are unacceptable; they turn to
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wordless violence as they get closer and closer to Dracula’s stronghold in the “east.” Just
like Haggard’s heroes, the band of men in Dracula find they, too, have violence and
“devolved” tendencies within them.
They are a picture not of heroes, necessarily, but of English society. They expel
Dracula for many reasons – the reason to expel the vampire is tied to one’s interpretation
of what the vampire himself stands for – and it is significant that they must expel him at
all. He does not terrorize the Gothic hills and castles of Transylvania. He came to
London. Stephen Arata has famously dealt with Dracula’s “reverse colonization” of
Britain in his essay “The Occidental Tourist.” Arata’s primary thesis is that Dracula deals
with the cultural context of “the decline of Britain as a world power at the close of the
nineteenth century; or rather, the way the perception of that decline was articulated by
contemporary writers” (622). Dracula portrays weak Englishmen fighting against an
invading foreign force. Arata says that “[t]he fear is that what has been represented as the
‘civilized’ world is on the point of being colonized by ‘primitive’ forces” (623). He uses
She and Heart of Darkness as examples, the former of the threat to the “civilized” world
emerging from outside, while the latter represents danger from within.
He ties this fear of “reverse colonization” to “geopolitical fears” but also to
“cultural guilt. In the marauding, invasive Other, British culture sees its own imperial
practices mirrored back in monstrous forms” (623). This calls to mind the other reverse
colonization narratives from this chapter as well – the priests of The Moonstone are also
mirroring what was done to their culture, stealing to regain what was stolen from them.
Dracula, in turn, does to England what England and other “civilized” nations have done
to his homeland. His speeches to Harker about the former greatness of his people become
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more significant when viewed as the welling up of hatred and jealousy he feels at having
been a part of his warrior culture when it was great but literally witnessing its decline –
just as English people felt they were witnessing their own. He tells stories of the proud
martial past he wants to recapture. But he does not wage war on England, he learns its
ways so well he is impossible to tell from a native. He has learned from his colonizer how
to behave, how to act in society without attracting attention. He is very adamant he be
able to do so: he wants to practice English with Harker, even though Harker claims
Dracula’s English is already perfect. Dracula objects and says “[w]ell I know that, did I
move and speak in your London, none there are who would not know me for a stranger.
That is not enough for me. [. . .] I have been so long master that I would be master still –
or at least that none other should be master of me” (Stoker 26). He succeeds, too.
Jonathan recognizes the Count when he and Mina run into him in the park (155); Mina
thinks he looks bad, with a “hard, cruel, sensual” face (155), but the woman he is stalking
does not notice him and Mina only notices because Jonathan’s attention is riveted to him.
He has learned to pass undetected in London, mastering the dress and language of the
people he wants to prey on and colonize. Dracula manages to represent simultaneously
the foreign threat and the internal threat. Like Haggard’s Ayesha he comes from another
culture, has preternatural powers, and intends to colonize England after taking a lover
from among its people (Leo for Ayesha, Mina for Dracula). Like Kurtz he is a product of
the assumptions and the actions of European culture.
Dracula is the foreign but somehow familiar Other invading the European and
specifically British lands. That Other encapsulates many fears and worries that England
suffered from, including sexual deviance and guilt over colonial expansion. Those
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feelings manifest in an alien figure suffering from a criminal brain due to atavistic
devolution. The band of men appears to be a conscious reflection of British society,
professional and aristocratic – Arthur Holmwood inherits the title of Lord Godalming
around the time Lucy dies – and that band of men defends their culture from the invading
threat. But they are only able to defend themselves and others from Dracula by using old,
savage, superstitious techniques. Their modern conveniences and contrivances help them
put together their information, but as Case suggests, their collation of information also
serves to disenfranchise Mina from the story and the collation process, despite how much
work she puts into it. So they appear to be progressive, new Englishmen in their use of
technology, but they use it to re-encode the traditional values their fathers might have
supported as well.
They are Dracula if he came from England – they will do whatever it takes to
preserve their home as they believe it should be, even though their culture had a hand in
making Dracula what he is when he comes to England. They have the same resources of
violence and superstition as a Transylvanian does. Dracula creeps through the night using
spirit lights to find treasure, but the band of men creep through the night, breaking into
tombs to kill Lucy.
The idea that Dracula and his opponents mirror each other is not new. But it is
significant that Dracula mirrors a group specifically put together to, in turn, mirror the
English readers of the novel itself. Just like Heart of Darkness and Haggard’s novels,
Dracula implies that the reader of the novel, like any human who is “nineteen parts”
animal or savage, can be like the band of men and like Dracula himself. Dracula does not
invade with force, he tries to move into the country quietly. He can do that because a
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creature like him can be at home everywhere, despite England and Western Europe’s
belief in their civilization and progress up the chain of social evolution. Spencer’s ideas
claimed they were on top of a ladder, with creatures like Dracula – as defined by
Lombroso as a devolved criminal type -- below. But the novel reveals that the only real
difference is in the societal groups: England can produce a band of men while Dracula is
only master of wild gypsies and animals such as wolves. One is forced to wonder what
would have happened had Dracula been at the head of even a small force. The only other
vampires in the novel are women, and they are always removed from the narrative in
such a way as to limit their agency. If Dracula were to organize, just as the band of men
had, then perhaps he would not have been as easily expelled from London. The novel
supports the idea, then, that organization in civilization is an achievement, a progression
upward. But it leaves open the question of what could possibly happen if the alien, the
savage, were to organize as well. Spencer’s claims that the development of heterogeneous
societies is natural imply directly that “savage” cultures will one day be organized and
heterogeneous. The Boer Wars had shown an eager British populace what could happen
if an “other” group organized. Perhaps they would then be the same as the enlightened
English people colonizing them. If the difference between savage and civilized is one of
development, there is a fear inherent in conquering any savage culture as it could rise up
in turn one day – and that the civilization itself was once like the primitive, conquered
foes, and could be again. Dracula has a “criminal” brain, an atavistic brain, at the
moment, but even Van Helsing realizes that “[t]he little bird, the little fish, the little
animal learn not by principle, but empirically; and when he learn to do, then there is to
him the ground to start from to do more. ‘Dos pou sto,’ said Archimedes. ‘Give me a
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fulcrum, and I shall move the world!’ To do once, is the fulcrum whereby child-brain
become man-brain” (Stoker 296). He is explaining why Dracula will revert to type, but
hidden in his speech is the possibility that, empirically, Dracula could learn – obvious in
context, as he has been learning. Harker found the evidence of it at the novel’s beginning.
Dracula the novel points out that in every instance of colonizing a culture because they
are lower down on the evolutionary social scale that culture could possibly be higher up
the scale. Van Helsing recalls Spencer’s claim that primitive people are children to the
adults of civilized people – but children grow up eventually. If one interferes with them,
then one could be attacked in turn. Dracula points out the personal problem of the
colonizing narratives as seen so far in this chapter – it can come home to the colonizer,
because the only difference between a savage and a civilized culture in the eye of nature
is one of time and opportunity. Dracula is the savage who learned how to attack the
colonizer successfully. Only defaulting back to the savage’s tactics allow the band of
(mostly English) men to surprise Dracula and defeat him.
The savage as alien reminded readers that they were – or could be – estranged
from one another. The only difference between the alien as traditionally seen and oneself
was circumstance, and not any inherent qualities. Conrad argued against a Darwinian or
Spencerian view of other races – whether or not it was true, he argued it was not of any
benefit to treat anyone as though they were biologically inferior, and the result of doing
so is the degradation of everyone involved. Kurtz treats the African natives as animals
and becomes more like what he believes they are than – the novel suggests – the natives
are themselves. Marlow sees the disconnection between the theory and the situation even
as he cannot himself escape the pervasive thought that blacks are simply different from
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whites in some way. Kurtz is alienated from his own culture and his adopted culture by
his actions; separating people into groups like animals leads to nothing but the creation of
aliens that one cannot understand.
Haggard had a simpler view of African natives but did not distinguish much
between them and his white British readers, if Allan Quatermain’s speech at the
beginning of the novel named after him is any indication. Haggard claims in his fictions
that cultures rise and fall according to evolutionary ideas and so there is little difference
between them – Africans were once as Europeans were in Haggard’s time, and Europeans
were losing footing as well; at the same time, everyone shares certain “savage” traits that
cannot be removed and are, in fact, often the source of one’s strength. The alien in his
works is one of regression: the civilized person falling back into supposedly “natural”
savagery; this type, represented by Quatermain, Curtis, and particularly Holly, is an alien
because it cannot rest in its own culture but can do nothing peacefully in the other. These
characters it do not fit in with the blacks but return to Africa because they have released
urges latent in everyone that must be satisfied.
Stoker created a creature that, while preternatural, had the criminal brain of
Lombroso’s theories. Dracula might improve with time, but at the moment Mina and her
companions are set against him he cannot change or alter his patterns of behavior as a
model Victorian should be able to. All these “savages,” criminal or foreign (and usually
both), are monstrous and grotesque, at least from the reader’s point of view. That
includes, in Conrad’s and Haggard’s work, the very readers who were consuming their
books. These books all consider the link between evolutionary theory and the grotesque;
they come to different conclusions, but always link the monstrous and the evolutionary.
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The way in which the civilized and the savage are linked in Haggard’s work is not their
mutual capacity for kindness or valor – though every character, black and white, has the
capacity if not the tendency – but their capacity for violence and savagery. Heart of
Darkness too posits that those traits link people more than many would like to believe,
even if theoretical separations keep people apart as well. Aliens are made of foreigners
not by their very foreignness but by the way in which they are treated – violence begets
violence until everyone is unrecognizable. The differences are relative and of degree, not
kind.
The following chapter considers narratives in which the monstrous creatures are
no longer human – though in a few cases related – but separated by more than theoretical
distance. They are separated by gulfs of history that have caused them to take divergent
evolutionary paths, and the differences appear horrifying to characters and readers alike.

160

Chapter 3 – Survivals, Remnants, and Evolutionary Fossils
I. The Alien as Grotesque, Natural Other
This chapter deals with “survivals.” These are stories about creatures that, at least
in their fictional world, existed once, but are thought to exist no longer. Nature and
humankind have progressed past the stage of evolution from which these creatures
emerged. The characters soon learn that they still exist, that evolution does not have
stages in the way they thought. All these stories imply that any understanding of
evolution that assumes a “progression” is flawed, and possibly that there is no
progression at all – instead, there is just life, wherever it can be sustained in whatever
shape it takes. The horror of some stories comes from the feeling that time is estranged
from the subject; what was once familiar is made, by the images of survivals and the
theories they are based on, alien.
Everything exists within time, and generally one might expect to understand the
past. The past is familiar because it has been experienced. Much science fiction has
explored the alien feeling of the future, because it has yet to be experienced and could
harbor anything and everything. However, the past, too, can harbor more than one might
expect. For the subject to learn that the past was not as he or she understood it, that it in
fact held grotesques never heard of or imagined, estranges the past from the subject. New
arguments and evidence in biology and geology proved that there had been more to the
past than people believed – there had been more of it, too, as more and more evidence
made clear the Earth was far older than people believed.
Chapter two deals with the alien as foreigner and what that concept meant once
evolutionary rhetoric crept into the debates about the Zulu wars or the despoliation of
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Africa’s countryside. The alien as an entity of its own, defined first be being alien and not
being a part of an alien group – that is, something supposedly monstrous because it
appears to be outside nature or outside one’s experience instead of merely from another
culture or country – resulted from the incorporation of biological theories in the concept
of the alien. Slusser and Rabkin say that the “creation of the alien appears to be
simultaneous with man’s sense of alienation from nature. This is a sense of the chain
breaking” (7). The alien was not just an Other used to define humankind – it was also an
image or record of the anxiety produced by the feeling of estrangement from nature, the
feeling of Slusser and Rabkin’s broken chain.
Aliens in this sense – Others different from humankind that record an
estrangement from nature and the world – were grotesque because that was the
emblematic sign of natural estrangement. They were influenced in some way by
evolution and geology because those were the scientific fields creating the feeling of
estrangement among the Victorians. The evolutionary debate, as detailed in chapter one,
had led many to feel estranged from nature, from time, from one another. They were no
longer certain what it meant to be human – the theorists could not agree. Between
Huxley’s ideas and Spencer’s, for instance, was a large span that could contain other
ideas. The literary grotesque provided some of those ideas, speculating on what could
exist in nature, or what might have existed, only to be forgotten. Evolution made many
(though certainly not all) The peculiar paradox of the history of evolution is that as
people began to understand nature’s driving forces more, they began to feel more
estranged from nature rather than closer to it. It became less comforting, at the time,
because it became less centered on humanity and as such was more difficult to control or
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feel certain about. Darwin overturned simple truths in his works, mostly about
domestication and breeding behavior. Nothing seemed certain any longer, no matter how
convincing one found his arguments.
II. Survivals as Aliens in Time
Survivals mirror the estrangement people felt at the thought of time and the new
findings of geology. They are alien because they are horrifying reminders of
humankind’s past, the world’s past, and the lack of Arnoldian culture inherent to the
history of both. Arnold privileged a classical education. Geology proved that humans had
existed in some form for far longer than previously believed, and evolution claimed that
those pre-historic ancestors were, paradoxically, very similar to humans and very
different. That is, they were driven by nearly the same set of instinctive needs, but were
shaped differently and had different customs and habits. So the human was not defined
by the education it could maintain and receive, but by its instinctive, animal-like
responses to stimuli and needs. The older examples of humans, then – the Cro-Magnons
and Neanderthals, and even the Piltdown Man, fraud that it was – reminded readers even
more strongly than “savages” did of the primitive origins of humankind.
Survivals were aliens because of that reminder, and also because of an apparent
obscurity in time. As the past was not like the present, so the future is not guaranteed to
be like the present. It is as though the character has encountered a time traveler,
reminding him or her of the way things used to be, but still surviving into the present. 1
The difference is that a time traveler would be of its time, and appropriate to it. A
survival, on the other hand, is by its definition as a “survival” something that was
1

Imagining what our ancestors were like was popular. H. G. Wells speculated on it several times
in fiction and essays, most famously in “The Grisly Folk” (1921), in which the “Neanderthal possessed
baboon-like characteristics and was the natural adversary of early-modern humans” (DePaolo 418).
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assumed to be extinct or evolved into a contemporary creature. Robert W. Chambers
toyed with many such survivals – everything from creatures really made extinct, such as
the Great Auk and the wooly mammoth, to half lizard men that reminded readers of the
common origin of life.
These creatures are alien, then, because they are not supposed to be able to exist
at all, and come from a time that is so strange and different that it is like another place,
like another planet. They are like the ghosts popular in Victorian fiction: emblems of the
past, frightening in part because they imply the past survives all around one. But in this
case the past represents more “primitive” times. The survivals can, as in Chambers’ and
some of Machen’s fiction, be actual creatures that survive into the present time. But in
Machen’s best works on the theme, the actual survivals always serve to underscore the
survival of the primitive in contemporary humankind. Neanderthals might live side-byside with humankind, if only they knew, but humans harbor the same sort of violence and
“primitive” instincts.
III. Robert W. Chambers’ Urbane Evolutionary Horror
Robert W. Chambers is best-known for his collection The King in Yellow (1895).
He was from Brooklyn, studied in Paris, and generally tended to follow after what was
popular in fiction (Joshi, Introduction to The Yellow Sign xi-xii). However, The King in
Yellow was a powerful series of horror stories; all the main stories in the collection are
centered on a mysterious play, The King in Yellow, which will drive mad anyone who
reads it. The work is fantastic and rarely uses scientific ideas, but that is not true of
Chambers’s novels In Search of the Unknown (1904) and Police!!! (1915).2

2

It might be important to know that, in a tract by a contemporary critic lambasting Chambers’
work, In Search of the Unknown gets only a passing reference. According to John Curtis Underwood, this
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They were published as novels, at any rate, but really they are collections of short
pieces following the same character – some of which were published separately before
the “novel’s” publication (xvi). Both follow the adventures of a zoologist who works for
the Bronx Park Zoological Gardens, typically in acquiring and cataloguing animals. He
discovers, reveals, catalogues, and is sometimes nearly killed by various creatures and
monsters, many of which are survivals thought lost forever. The books are oddities
though, in that they blend humor with their adventure and horror stories. In every chapter
the narrator becomes infatuated with a woman, be she a secretary, another zoologist, or a
native. In each story this woman appears to return his feelings but loses interest in him
suddenly, over his textual protestations that he cares not for women but only for science.
In Search of the Unknown has six broad sections. In the first, “The HarborMaster,” the narrator discovers two great auks, thought extinct – the narrator mentions
reading about them in Darwin’s work frequently. He also discovers something stranger, a
sort of merman which upsets his boat in a storm and escapes. “Spirit of the North”
features him discovering living mammoths past a newly-broken iceberg that allows ships
to make it farther north than before, though he fails to bring one back and is in fact nearly
killed. “The Ux-Skin” begins with a countess presenting at a conference the skin of an
Ux, another extinct bird. Darwin is again called in to account for the bird in the narrator’s
summation. The countess claims the skin was obtained by killing a live ux in the past
year, and shows the narrator a brace of Ux eggs she is incubating. This episode ends with
the representatives at the conference sitting on the eggs because the incubator stops

book, along with nearly a dozen others, are his later work, and “lighter [. . .], calculated to please the
public” (463). So among the scanty annals of work on Chambers this book and its sequel get very little
attention, even with those who wish to excoriate the writer.
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working; some of them crash into messy yolk and others end up riding around on newlyborn uxes.
In “The Sphyx” the narrator’s boss, Professor Farrago, enlists the narrator’s help
in the Everglades, writing by letter requesting him, a male stenographer, a set of
women’s clothing, and a cage big enough for a person (Chambers 331). Baffled, the
narrator acquires all the necessary parts, though he is forced by the schedule to settle for
a female stenographer – his infatuation for the story. In his letter, Farrago reminds the
narrator that “[c]ertain jellyfish are absolutely transparent when in the water” and asks
“[h]ave you ever thought that possibly there might exist larger and more highly
organized creatures transparent to eyesight, yet palpable to touch?” (332 italics
Chambers’s). The transparent humanoids (why else the man-sized cage and clothes?) turn
out to be real, and typically for this novel turn out to be beautiful females as well. The
gasses Farrago uses turns the women visible for a short time, and he tries to coax one into
the dress, but is eventually carried off by them all into the swamp – he smiles all the
while (369). The implication of course is that he has discovered a wild tribe of beautiful,
Amazon-like women he can have all to himself, as they are invisible unless you know the
trick, the gas combination.
“The Thermosaurus” is an interleaved story, told to the narrator on a train back
from the Everglades. Its narrator fell in love with a girl whose father was a fossilenthusiast and has set up a trap for a drifting thermosaurus body, only freshly killed. It
turns out the creature is not dead and it escapes. The final story is about people who can
project their minds across distances, and the narrator’s (still the narrator of the
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thermosaurus, not the original narrator) relations with his great-aunt, who has been
projected into the body of her dog.
Police!!! is much the same. Indeed it has fewer stories about evolutionary
survivals. These two novels or collections are odd additions – and very strange starting
places – for this chapter. Chambers wrote some excellent horror fiction, but these stories
are not examples of that. These stories are fun, if a little repetitive, but they do not appear
to be meant as horror stories. They are nominally science fiction, in that they have
scientific explanations – in so far as most of the creatures really existed or look like
things that really existed, and are found in out of the way places like the Arctic or the
Australian outback.
They are interesting because they use evolutionary explanations as a counter
against the main character's frivolity. He frequently encounters the apparently alien –
both “survivals” and other sorts, such as the translucent women – and never pays any
attention. Scott D. Emmert has positioned Chambers's work alongside Bierce's in the
American culture of their time, “[hammering] away at the sunny optimism of the age. . .”
That is more obvious in a piece like The King in Yellow, and that is in fact what Emmert
focuses on. But In Search of the Unknown does some of the same work. The narrator is
perhaps a typical upper-middle-class figure, at least in the rubric of the stories
themselves. He has a few friends, most of them co-workers; he is well-off but not rich; he
spends most of his time looking for a suitable mate.
That is the center of the stories. The narrator is focused on marriage, though he
rarely refers to it by name. He is the young, good-hearted wastrel of the traditional
marriage plot, looking for a woman and willing to settle down with one, though unlikely
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to do so. In a traditional story – the sort of optimistic story Emmert positions Chambers's
horror fiction against – the narrator of In Search of the Unknown would settle down at
book's end with the most appropriate woman from among the many who drift through his
life. But he never does; indeed he continually swears them off. Meanwhile, his focus on
the mundane social world prevents his acquisition of creatures and entities that would
revolutionize his field. He often dreams of doing just that, but when he does succeed in
bringing back a creature, like the great auk pair of “The Harbor-Master,” they enter the
Bronx Zoo's collection and that is all that is ever said of them.
The narrator of this novel stands as an indictment of the figures of men in
American fiction of the time. Emmert specifically points to “the failure of love” as an
important theme in The King in Yellow,” and certainly the narrator of In Search of the
Unknown qualifies as another volley in that assault. He is good at his job, though his
sexism and childishness nearly get him fired in “Spirit of the North.” He is a young man,
in a responsible position in his field, who is as mature as a fifteen year old. The scientific
references in the stories point to the system of scientific learning that grew up in the
decades beforehand – when scientists were codifying their fields and theories, as they did
in the evolutionary debates. The horror of the creatures is often sidelined for the reader’s
horror – or at least lightly horrified bemusement – of the narrator. It is significant that
grotesque can be comic, for this piece then qualifies easily. It is excellent comicgrotesque. Surprising creatures like the mammoth and disgusting things like the harbormaster sidle for the reader's attention but cannot get it over the narrator’s single-minded
devotion to skirt-chasing. The narrative, with its ironic twist allowing the reader to see
through his protestations of devotion to science, makes of him a mild grotesque. He is
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shocking; he goes against the apparent beliefs within the narration of how a man should
behave; and he makes one laugh, even in awful situations. In these stories the world is
filled with wonders, many of which people have heard but believe to be gone. But the
narrator ignores them, even though it is his job and his supposed ideal to find and exhibit
them.
Chambers creates a narrator-protagonist in these stories that fails almost entirely
to engage with the creatures he stumbles across. A wooly mammoth is just a great way to
get rid of the new boss who hates him; a mer-person is an inconvenience that keeps the
narrator from sweet-talking a young woman. In these stories the past is strange and
riddled with mysterious creatures, many thought lost forever – extinct – but the narrator
does not care. He moves through life ignoring or not knowing the depths of strangeness
the past could have (and did) plumb. One might be reminded of the “aliens among us”
stories so popular during the Cold War; the narrator of Chambers’ stories moves in a
world that has alien survivals from a past so distant they seem to be from different
worlds. But unlike characters in those more recent stories he does not even notice at
times. He ignores the substantial lead the man on the train gives him, about the
possibility of living thermosauruses, because that man eventually takes away the woman
he had hoped to seduce. It is significant that the first, more coherent collection opens
with the harbor master, a creature trying to kidnap a woman to “marry.” The narrator,
despite his civilized and urbane manner and his scientific education and avocation, lives
the same life as his pre-historic ancestors, even those apparently half-fish. The narrator is
perfectly familiar to readers as a wastrel and foolish young man; he sees survivals that
remind readers the past was incredibly strange, but he does not care. In that way he
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stands as a criticism of what Chambers perceived in American culture – a tendency to
focus on mundane details and affairs while so much more interesting was happening in
the world.
Chambers turns his hand at the urbane sort of protagonist common in his horror
fiction and produces something distinct, if weakened by the very comedy that helps
produce it: the reader in his or her everyday life. Chambers’ career featured a great deal
of romance stories for young women, and that is evident in these pieces. He attacks the
fecklessness he perceives in American culture and points out that the backlash against
scientific discoveries and theories is mostly needless. Amid the wonders and horrors of
the past the impulse to procreate, to satisfy one’s own urges, takes precedence, just as it
did in the past made strange by geology and evolution. In Chambers’ work the alien is
not so alien as it appears to be.
IV. Arthur Conan Doyle’s Hidden English Monsters
Sir Arthur Conan Doyle constructed some stories in which the creatures were
strange and the characters knew it – and at least one in which the creature is not that
strange but is viewed as a terrible monster. Famous for his Sherlock Holmes stories,
Doyle also wrote horror fiction. And a few of his stories use the evolutionary themes he
put to excellent use in such works as The Hound of the Baskervilles (1902) and The Lost
World (1912). The Lost World’s story of Professor Challenger’s discovery of a valley
where dinosaurs still exist is very similar to what this chapter is focusing on, but there is
a fine distinction between it and his horror fiction: this novel is more of an adventure
story than anything else. The creatures are survivals as are the tribe of humans who live
in the valley. But the story verges into horror only in its small touches, like the gargoyle-
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like descriptions of the dinosaurs. In that story, as in Chambers’, the titular Lost World
appears alien at first, but the characters become embroiled in the plots of the natives just
as in any other place humans inhabit. Professor Challenger is more related to Sherlock
Holmes than Doyle’s horror protagonists.
It is interesting to note that Doyle, who is most famous now for Holmes, would
have written Gothic fiction – or quasi-Gothic fiction, depending on one’s definition. But
Gothic themes proliferated in the Holmes stories as well, most famously in Hound of the
Baskervilles, but also in many of the short stories. Tanya Pikula highlights “Man with a
Twisted Lip” (1891) as an example of his Gothic work. Pikula claims the story uses
“common Gothic imagery” to examine masculinity in the context of business and the
urban (3). She goes on to point out that both Doyle’s and Arthur Machen’s portrayals of
men are “largely influenced by contemporaneous discourses” and quotes Kelly Hurley in
saying that the discourses were “‘evolutionism, criminal anthropology, degeneration
theory, sexology, and pre-Freudian psychology’ which ‘articulated new models for the
human as abhuman, as bodily ambiguated or otherwise discontinuous in identity’” (3).
Doyle was clearly interested in the Gothic as it applied to his culture. He created models
of normality and of alienness and put them in conflict – even in the Holmes stories.
Holmes might have said “[s]ingularity is almost invariably a clue. The more featureless
and commonplace a crime is, the more difficult it is to bring it home” (“Boscombe
Valley” 77) – but his strange mysteries also serve to put him in conflict with the alien and
grotesque within his own culture.
In “Reading the Gravel Page: Lyell, Darwin, and Conan Doyle,” Lawrence Frank
establishes Doyle’s literary use of evolution in the Holmes stories. The famous opening
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of Hound that shows Holmes challenging Watson to deduce facts from a walking stick
“indicated that the worldview in Arthur Conan Doyle’s new serial would again be
thoroughly native, at once geological and evolutionary” (364-5). Between the general
scientific mindset of Holmes and the specific evolutionary themes of Hound one can
easily infer Doyle’s knowledge of evolution.
Doyle spent much of his adult life identifying as agnostic (Brown 73) before
turning to spiritualism (Nordon 141). T. H. Huxley exerted a strong influence on Doyle’s
class in college (Carr 23). Doyle himself “compared the theory of evolution to a doctrine
of progress within a moral and religious order” (Nordon 147). His worldview, then, saw
evolution as something that moved the world, and the life in it, forward, as though toward
some goal. His fiction, on the other hand, seems to focus on ecologies hidden away from
the common haunts of humans and the things in those secret places that did not progress
with the rest of the world. In that isolation the creatures of the stories adapted and passed
on adaptations that removed them further from the narrators’ common experiences.
Later in his life Doyle turned to spiritualism, which at the time tried to “be both a
form of empirical knowledge, in the scientific sense, and a practical religion” (141). In
the preface to his History of Spiritualism Doyle says that “[i]t is indeed curious that this
movement, which many of us regard as the most important in the history of the world
since the Christ episode, has never had a historian from those who were within it” (vii).
The first chapter of the work is on Swedenborg and the next on the Shakers, while a later
chapter deals with the Davenport brothers – proven frauds already (Podmore xv). There is
no interest, for this study, in either debunking Doyle’s claims of spiritual episodes or in
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mocking him for his beliefs – but his attachment to the idea of secrets already evident but
largely ignored influenced much of his fiction, particularly his horror fiction.
His horror fiction was informed by his beliefs, and particularly by his defenses of
them. The narrator of the story considered here has difficulties convincing anyone to take
him seriously; at one point he follows a doctor’s advice and, unknowingly, nearly enrolls
himself in an asylum. Doyle’s work mirrored his own feeling of defensiveness, especially
his sense of defending the ill-treated.
Like Machen’s later in this chapter, one might suspect that Doyle’s interest was
in depicting the truth in things that others have not seen. Doyle was versed in Huxley’s
histories of evolution, particularly the theories of humankind’s origins. He also likely
viewed science’s slow acceptance of truths known for hundreds of years – the existence
of spiritualistic abilities – as a refusal to see an ancient truth, just as evolution was an
ancient truth unaccepted by many. Doyle’s “survival” horror frightens the reader with the
understanding that there may be many things he or she has never seen that are entirely
plausible. Evolutionary theory was no longer in its infancy and was more reliably
plausible than spiritualistic theory. The alien of the story here is a survival of a bygone
age, but one that is less monstrous and more animal-like than Chambers’ or Machen’s
creatures. It is grotesque to the characters because it is strange, but it is no less strange, in
the balance of things, than a modern bear.
“The Terror of Blue John Gap” (1923) is the story that has this alien but familiar
creature. The story is horrific as well as scientific. The narrator, Dr. James Hardcastle,
goes to a farm in Derbyshire to recover from an illness. While there, he hears of local
legends of a monster that lives in Blue John Gap. The gap is actually the opening of an

173

ancient Roman mine. Hardcastle finds blood outside the gap after a local complains of
missing sheep, and hears a creature within. He tries twice to discover what is inside, once
armed, and manages to shoot but not kill the creature. The locals, after hearing about it,
refuse to let any of the out-of-town volunteers – sprung up after Hardcastle faints upon
being struck by the creature – go in to see what they can find, and wall up the gap with
boulders.
The creature is evidently huge. Its footprint is “deep, broad and irregular, as if a
great boulder had fallen” (74). “Even an elephant could not have produced it” (74). The
sound of its steps “gave one the impression of enormous weight carried upon sponge-like
feet” (76). When he finally sees the creature, Hardcastle describes it as a “great shaggy
mass, something with rough and bristling hair of a withered grey colour, [. . .] the huge
body supported upon short, thick, curving legs” (81). “Its hair looked like coarse faded
oakum, and hung down in long, dense masses which swayed as it moved [. . .] in size it
was far larger than the largest elephant, and its breadth seemed to be nearly as great as its
height. (81). He concludes by wondering how he could have followed “such a horror”
even after he saw it (81).
Hardcastle compares the creature to an elephant several times, but does not
mention a trunk or tusks. So this thing is presumably not a mammoth. In fact it more
closely resembles a huge cave bear, “ten-fold the bulk of any bear seen upon earth” and
Hardcastle shudders as he notes “the eyes which glistened in the glow of my lantern were
huge, projecting bulbs, white and sightless” (82). It nearly kills Hardcastle with its great
claws. This thing is grotesque enough on its own, with its great bulk; disgusting, ropy
hair; and blind eyes. Blindness, particularly in an animal one might expect to be able to
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see – such as a bear or a human – is particularly grotesque. It fulfills, on its own, what is
necessary for horrifying grotesque. It reminds the observer of bodily frailty, as any
“injury” does – it could be the observer blinded. Freud identified it as a particular source
of anxiety in “The Uncanny.” Freud identified blinding with castration, and the
uncanniness of the Sand-Man to his threat of blinding/castration (231-2). Whether
blinding does serve as a one-to-one substitution symbol or castration all the time, Freud’s
connecting of blinding and uncanniness remains valid, and a certain grotesqueness is
always in the train of the uncanny, for it reminds one of things outside the typical mental
matrix. Humans deal with the world in terms of sight, thinking in visual metaphors and
interacting with things based on how they look. So for a creature to exist that is blind but
a threat is horrifying, for it reminds readers not only that they could be blind but also that
the world is not based out of sight and that other faculties might let creatures navigate it
as well as we do – which in fact the creature from the Blue John Gap does.
So Hardcastle has good reason to shudder. But the story does not leave it at that.
Hardcastle works out the creature’s origin: the limestone of the region allowed water to
pass underground – he encounters a large stream in the cave at one point – and the water
likely evaporated, making rain, leading to vegetation. The vegetation could support
animal life as well, but likely the vegetation would come “from those seeds and types
which had been introduced at an early period of the world’s history, when
communication with the outer air was more easy.” Cave bears, wandering in, if trapped,
would slowly evolve with the underground ecological niche, “growing steadily away”
from the outer world (83). So the creature could also represent a newly-evolved creature.
It appears in this chapter rather than the next because of the subverted Vernian hint in the
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story: there could be an entire lost world beneath England for all the characters know,
with different ecologies, similar to Verne’s Journey to the Center of the Earth (1864).
But instead of exploring the world, even as Professor Challenger might in Doyle’s own
version, Hardcastle and the locals try to destroy and wall off the possible world below.
The horror is greater than the marvel, and the marvel is a remnant of an older world, even
if it has been changed by time.
George E. Slusser says the story is one in which man “seeks his prehistoric past in
[a] dark subterranean realm beneath the old Roman mine. But in his utter revulsion at the
incomprehensible, shapeless form he encounters, the modern explorer remains
irrevocably cut off from a being less his evolutionary ancestor than his exact opposite”
(xvii-xviii). Slusser claims that Doyle’s science fiction is always set in a world that is “a
self-regulating machine” that excludes “man altogether as purposive agent” (xvi). He
examines the “split between body and mind” exacerbated by the advance of science (xvi).
For the survivals in Doyle’s fiction – for the creature in the Blue John Gap – that means
there is a bodily world represented by evolved things, by creatures in caves, and they
horrify because they remind humans of their own evolved state. But more particularly in
this story, Hardcastle and the reader feel horror at the grotesque visage of the creature
and the knowledge that it survived into the present. It should not have been able to do
that, being a creature that was extinct – obviously it is not extinct, but Hardcastle’s belief
that no creature like this one survives into his time is the particularly “discriminatory
grid” that is disrupted by the creature’s appearance. It is also unafraid of humans entirely,
making it more frightening because it comes from a time in which humans were not as
organized or powerful as they are in Hardcastle’s time. It is significant that it is buried in
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its cave system by a team of people, rather than Hardcastle alone. They band together
against it in a way humans might possibly have been unable to do when the creature’s
progenitors hid in the caves.
However much the characters identify the creature as monstrous, though, the story
complicates matters. The cave-bear usually only attacks sheep, seemingly attacking
humans only when they get in its way. As Slusser points out, the cave-bear reminds
readers of the pre-historic past, but it is, itself, a relatively innocent component of that
past. It is ghastly to look at, and causes shudders with its ropy hair and blind eyes, but it
reminds one that pre-history might have had animals like this one everywhere. It survives
in a cave system that preserves it, even while blinding it with its darkness. The cave’s
entrance is a Roman mine, furthering the imagery of a creature coming from the past.
The cave-bear represents the feeling of being alienated from the past, but unlike
Chambers’ creatures it is violent without malicious intent (Chambers’ creatures were
either malevolent or not particularly violent – a frightened stampede of wooly mammoths
are not so much violent as simply dangerous). It represents a personal danger; it is from a
time when all creatures seemed to have stronger, more vicious means of fighting and
protecting themselves, like tusks and enormous teeth. But still it seeks only to eat and
stay healthy, as Hardcastle seeks to be healthy. Both are kinds of invalids and strangers in
their own times, though Hardcastle is strange primarily because of his experience with
the cave-bear. No one will listen to him until he nearly dies. The return of the pre-historic
unnerves Hardcastle in a way Chambers’ protagonist never could be, simply because
Hardcastle is paying attention. He falls into a faint for days after his encounter with the
creature, after his encounter with the doctor who assumes he is crazy because of his
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description of it. His worldview has been severely affected and it takes time for him to
recover. What he saw was worrying and frightening, but not totally alienating. The past is
still in some way understandable, in some way relatable, even through violence and fear.
There are some survivals in literature, though, that are beyond comprehension. And
others that appear to be, even as they come closer to home than anything yet discussed in
this chapter.
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V. Ruined Humanity and its Evolutionary Remmants in Arthur Machen
Arthur Machen seems to have specialized in remnants and survivals. Nearly all
his most famous work, and some of the more obscure pieces, discuss in some way the
return of the past into the present. He crystallized the sense of the alien in the past that
this chapter is devoted to. He made of the past an alien place, sometimes good and
sometimes bad. His work was not always horror, but it was nearly always devoted to
studying the effects of the past on the present. In every case, the wisdom or the horror of
the past lies in plain sight, but no one notices because they are tuned instead to the
modern world. The alien, here, disrupts the modern world by implying it is a lie or a
construction covering over truths that have always been true and probably always will be.
Even his work outside of horror included survivals of old things intruding on
modern life. “The Bowmen” (1914) is likely the most famous, as it spawned the legend
of the angels of Mons.3 In the story, English soldiers losing to a German assault are saved
by the prayer of a young man who had eaten at a restaurant with images of Saint George
on the plates. He prays to George, who appears and leads the spirits of a corps of
medieval bowmen against the Germans, killing them all with phantom arrows. In A
Fragment of Life (1904) the protagonist’s dull, quotidian life is changed as he begins to
study his familial history, until an older, more spiritual way of living life grows in him
and he takes his wife away from London to his ancestral region in Wales.

3

In his lifetime this is likely what made Machen as famous as he was, at least to the general public
(Roberts 23). Machen himself outlined most of the strange controversy surrounding the story. He was asked
twice, as the story went into print the first time, “whether the story had any foundation in fact” (White
People 178). He claimed to have been confused, as it was made up and he was sure no rumors of spirits on
the battlefield had appeared yet (179). Joshi suggests that Machen knew to some extent what he was doing,
though; he says it was “a kind of hoax” evident from its first publication in a newspaper combined with its
journalistic tone (“Introduction,” White People x-xi).
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Machen’s fascination with the return of the old in stories that are not terror makes
sense given his personal sensibilities. He was an Anglo-Catholic4 and claimed in his nonfiction that the purpose of literature was to induce and describe “ecstasy,” which he said
could be called by a variety of names, including “beauty, adoration, wonder, awe,
mystery, sense of the unknown, desire for the unknown” (Hieroglyphics 11). Joshi says
this attitude and his religious feelings led Machen to “undertake as systematic a rearguard opposition to the course of modern civilization as it is possible to imagine” (Weird
Tale 14). Materialism and narrow-minded science were two of Machen’s favorite
stalking horses. That helps to understand the aforementioned stories – the spiritual past
intrudes into the materialist present. That theme is even stronger in “The Great Return”
(1915), in which the Holy Grail and its mysteries appear in a religious Welsh town,
confounding the pragmatic narrator as he investigates the miracles and sightings.
That still leaves a question: why would Machen employ these ideas in horror
fiction? If he used the return of the old as a mechanism to show people the light of
spirituality, why would he use it as the means to create horrors? Later in life he somewhat
regretted his use of horror. Describing his horror fiction, and referring to his younger self
in the third person, he wrote that he had minor successes but “[h]e dreamed in fire; he has
worked in clay” (Far Off Things 101). Machen felt that he had missed the vital element
he had always been aiming for. That feeling is one of ecstasy, as he said in
Hieroglyphics, but in Far Off Things he might have explained it more clearly. In referring
to an unnamed secret society – probably the Golden Dawn, of which he was a member
for some time (Reynolds 74) – Machen claimed to have read one of their pamphlets, for
4

Lovecraft’s assessment of Machen’s state of mind, in “Supernatural Horror in Literature,” was
that “[h]e has absorbed the mediaeval mystery of dark woods and ancient customs, and is a champion of the
Middle Ages in all things -- including the Catholic faith” (159).
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new members, which said, “remember that nothing exists which is not God” (Far Off
Things 26). Machen had difficulty with that idea, but said that “as a child, [he] realised
something of the spirit of the mystic injunction” (26). Machen wanted to revitalize that
feeling in himself and others.
The “ecstasy” of Hieroglyphics is the feeling of that universal wonder returned to
an adult reader. He claims in that work that “[w]e read the ‘Odyssey’ because we are
supernatural, because we hear in it the echoes of the eternal song, because it symbolises
for us certain amazing and beautiful things” (51). So in stories like “The Great Return”
Machen creates a beatific survival, a return of something humankind has lost, a spirit or
holiness he felt was obscured by industrial society, and by literature such as Austen’s and
Thackeray’s, which, according to him, did nothing but reproduce and mimic “the faces of
our friends” (51). It is a harsh judgment, but makes Machen’s opinion clear. He felt the
purpose of literature was to approach the unknown, quasi-mystical, ecstatic feeling that
could be found in religion as well – though Machen’s experiments with self-hypnosis and
the Golden Dawn illustrate that he did not feel traditional religion, on its own, could do
the job. His staunch defenses of Catholicism and the Church of England show, in their
turn, that he did not want to turn away from religion altogether.
The puzzle remains as to how his horror fiction could express these things. He did
regret the horror fiction he wrote, so it is possible that they do not. But he always had
such ideas, even if he could only articulate them after much of his career. He was
influenced heavily by horror fiction in some form or other for much of his life. He and his
parents were devoted fans of the Brontës, particularly Emily Brontë’s Wuthering Heights
(Far Off Things 33-4). He wrote of Parker’s Glossary of Gothic Architecture and said it
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was his “initiation into the spirit of the Gothic, and [he thought that] one of the most
magical of all initiations [. . .] It is the art of the supreme exaltation, of the inebriation of
the body and soul and spirit of man” (55-6). His comments are mostly about architecture,
but given his early turn toward Gothic horror it is probable he felt these ideas applied to
Gothic literature as well. In addition to his love of Wuthering Heights, Machen also had
strong feelings about Stevenson’s The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde (1886).
In Hieroglyphics he uses it as an example of a work with ecstasy in it, but almost lost to
its own artifice. It makes it into his “fine literature” classification “by the skin of its
teeth” (706). He compares it with a cryptogram, claiming all interest in both falls away as
soon as the mystery is uncovered. But the “Conception” saves the book, even though it is
“buried rather deeply, [sic] beneath the plot” which is too mechanical and artificial for
Machen’s taste (719). This conception is that “‘[m]an is not truly one, but truly two,’ or,
perhaps, a polity with many inhabitants” (725). Machen thought the plot mechanical, and
the style too conscious and laborious (722), but he still found it to be a member of his
highest classification of art.
He knew some of the “Decadent” writers of his own period, but was not strongly
influenced by them, despite being grouped among them at times. According to Aidan
Reynolds and William Charlton, Machen’s contemporaries were Poe and De Quincey
(42); he learned more about his trade as a writer of horror from them than from writers
such as Wilde or Stoker. Given that Machen said his introduction to the Gothic was an
architecture guide and his favorite book growing up was Wuthering Heights, it is possible
to see Machen as a consciously old-fashioned writer, but instead he appeared to be trying
to mine the recent past of his culture for methods to deal with the new developments in
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science, theology, and the world around him. Many of his characters were men of
science, such as Gregg and Raymond. He tended to dislike or be angry with scientific
ideas if they countered spiritual or religious ideals. Joshi goes so far as to say Machen felt
“a violent hostility and resentment at the growing secularism and ‘scientism’ of the
modern world [. . .] it seemed to him that scince was coming to rule all aspects of life,
even those aspects – the spiritual life and its corollary, art – where it had no place”
(“Introduction” Three Impostors xvii). This might be too generalized, but certainly in his
fiction and his non-fiction Machen argued for an increase in spirituality – science, when
it interfered, knew not what it did. The theories of evolution appeared to make people less
than the spiritual beings they could be, and Machen’s aliens were the pre-spiritual
creatures humans might have been and, in some cases, remain.
Aidan claims that Machen was not cut of the same cloth as the Decadents: they
share similarities, but Machen’s literary evil was captured from the awe such horrors can
inspire (46). His impulse to write horrors appears to have come from that. The darkness
in people can be exposed there, and Machen worked to expose them.
He specifically worked, in these stories of survivals, to expose the darkness in the
past of humankind, that darkness so many people, like Spencer, thought we were
evolving away from. His opinions might have been out of step with many in his time and
his country, but they reveal a fascination with opposites and duality that would have
drawn him towards the Gothic, particularly given his distaste for realism. Realism did not
offer him the lens he wanted, a lens that could deal with the literal and spiritual eruption
into the present of the past. Given the status of the past in his time, though, Machen may
have felt the societal anxiety toward the past even as he lionized it. The past had become
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a strange place, an alien place, and if good could come out of the fairly recent past, what
might survive from the depths of pre-history?
Machen’s membership in the Golden Dawn shaped his ideas and his methods of
expressing the mysteries of the past. Their belief in initiation taught him a great deal
about both the form his stories could take and the way in which people could miss
mysteries surrounding them. He would adapt that to insert his aliens into the world
without anyone realizing their presence.
Machen did not speak in detail about his membership in the Order, but the core
ideas of the group drew him in even as he found most of their rituals useless and
eventually quit. The ideas of the Golden Dawn, at least at first, centered on initiation, on
learning about the mysteries of the world around the initiate that he or she had missed or
had been unable to see before guided to them. Israel Regardie’s history Order quotes their
own documents, which claimed that the wisdom at the founding of the order came from
Egyptian magic “in which the Hebrew Pentateuch tells you that Moses, the founder of the
Jewish system, was ‘learned’, that is, in which he had been initiated” (qtd. in Regardie 3,
italics mine). This claim sets out the way in which the Golden Dawn works – through
initiation. Aleister Crowley’s account of the formation of the Golden Dawn, “Liber LXI
vel Causae,” opens with a kind of prayer or long epitaph to the anonymized history of the
Golden Dawn.
I. In the beginning was Initiation. The flesh profiteth nothing; the mind
profiteth nothing; that which is unknown to you and above these, while
firmly based upon their equilibrium, giveth life.
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II. In all systems of religion is to be found a system of Initiation, which may
be defined as the process by which a man comes to learn that unknown
Crown.
III. Though none can communicate either the knowledge or the power to
achieve this, which we may call the Great Work, it is yet possible for
initiates to guide others.
IV. Every man must overcome his own obstacles, expose his own illusions.
Yet others may assist him to do both, and they may enable him
altogether to avoid many of the false paths, leading no whither, which
tempt the weary feet of the uninitiated pilgrim. They can further insure
that he is duly tried and tested, for there are many who think
themselves to be Masters who have not even begun to tread the Way
of Service that leads thereto.
In this “lection” Crowley states the importance of initiation, but also defines it. Initiation
is not merely the act of being let into an order, though it is also that – it is the experience
of having one’s eyes opened to the mysteries of the world around one. The “unknown
Crown” that initiation serves to lead people to is knowledge of that mystery; knowledge
of it would, in turn, make the initiate a master, and even initiates can guide others if they
understand something of the mystery they seek. Masters serve to assist seekers in
overcoming their obstacles and seeing through illusions. They keep initiates from
temptations and test them so they may be sure they are learning well and on their way to
a spiritual and mystical enlightenment.
Crowley in this passage paints the entire mystical endeavor as one of initiation –
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there is a truth in the world that the seeker can find once freed of his or her own
assumptions, temptations, and illusions. Once taken, the opportunity puts seekers on the
path to learning about the world around them – learning its secrets and seeing through the
illusions that bound them and still bind so many others. The mystic in their view is
attainable and everywhere. One changes one’s view of the world, rather than the world
itself, to find it. What one finds when one changes views is that the world is suffused with
meaning and God’s power, which initiates, seeing it for what it is, can utilize.
The alien in Machen’s horror fiction took the role of the “unknown Crown.” They
were ever present but always missed. Rumors precede them, and in some cases they are
invisible to many characters even while sharing a room with them. Machen’s fiction
almost always follows the pattern of seeing what has always been true. In his horror
fiction it often has something to do with an older form of life, either an ancient human or
Neanderthal type that survived to the present day.
The past, for Machen, “is simultaneously terrifying in its primitivism and
awesome in its suggestions of intimate, symbolic connexions with the essence of life and
Nature” (Joshi White People viii). That primitivism is what makes the past and older
forms of life terrifying. Machen’s horror-survivals are like atavisms, grotesque reminders
of what humanity could have been, was once, or in many ways still is, with the light of
spirituality gone entirely from the human frame – but they did not revert to their forms.
They have always been the way they are. In his non-fiction Machen claimed that “[m]an
is a sacrament, soul manifested under the form of body” (Hieroglyphics 84). He did not
always use evolution to explore this idea – “The Inmost Light” (1894) is a story about a
woman’s soul extracted from her body and placed in a jewel, and the evil, animalistic
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persona that takes over the body once the human soul is gone – but he often did. If people
could find an older way of religious peace and spirituality, so too could they discover an
even older state of primitive horror. Adrian Eckersley has argued that the fear of
degeneration underlies all of Machen’s horror fiction (277). His survivals do not threaten
to change their victims into primitives as Conrad’s savages appeared to, or destroy one’s
view of nature as Hodgson’s animals did; they remind the characters and readers of the
vast, unknown depths of the past and what humankind might have been – and given their
evolutionary heritage, still are.
“The Great God Pan” (1890) is probably Machen’s best-known story now; it is
about an experiment in which a scientist, Raymond, performs brain surgery on a woman
he rescued from starvation, Mary. This surgery allows her to “see the god Pan” and the
spirit world as it “level[s] utterly the solid wall of sense” (Three Impostors 3-4). When
she wakes from the surgery, Mary reacts to something the two men, Raymond and his
friend Clarke, cannot see. First she reacts with wonder, but it fades “and gave place to the
most awful terror. The muscles of her face were hideously convulsed, she shook from
head to foot; the soul seemed struggling and shuddering within the house of flesh” (7).
Days later Clarke learned from Raymond that she had entirely lost her mind, but “after
all, she has seen the Great God Pan” (7). Whatever she saw horrified her enough to
destroy her mind, but Pan was always a fairly benevolent god who watched over
shepherds and rustic pleasures. Those old, earthy pleasures strike one in Machen’s
position as the dark heritage of pre-historic times – primitive, corrupt, and violent. They
were something to evolve away from, not retain.
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Patricia Merivale awards to Machen the title of “creator [. . .] of the ‘Gothic’ or
sinister Pan of the early modern horror story” (298). W. R. Irwin claims that the power of
Pan in Machen’s story is “irresistible and indescribably evil” (161). Certainly Pan’s
influence on Mary is evil enough; she becomes a mindless idiot. But it becomes clear
later in the story that Pan had sex with Mary, as she gives birth nine months after the
experiment to a child named Helen and dies soon after. Mary’s struggles would indicate
it was a rape, but she begins the encounter with wonder on her face, struggling only when
the physicality begins. Machen keeps the details vague and literally unseen – two men are
in the room with her and cannot tell what is going on.
Mary and Pan’s child proceeds to engage in what are apparently the wickedest
things she can find, nearly all of them sexual in nature. She was caught by a boy in the
woods with “‘a strange, naked man’ whom he [the boy] seemed to be unable to describe
more fully” (11). The boy is frightened by a Roman bust of a faun or satyr in a nearby
gentleman’s house, implying that was the “naked man” he saw (12). Helen, as a child,
appeared to be playing with, possibly sleeping with, her own father, or another creature
like him. Later, the young Helen “contracted a friendship of a peculiarly intimate
character” with a neighbor, Rachel, who accompanies Helen on her trips into the woods.
She returns one day, distraught, and begs to know of her mother why she allowed her to
accompany Helen into the woods while half-dressed in her room (12-3). It seems clear
she was sexually assaulted, but it is unclear if Pan or Helen assaulted her. Helen’s adult
life is a string of affairs that lead to her clandestine lovers killing themselves in gruesome
manners, many of them hanging themselves from their bedposts.
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Joshi credits the sex with the entire power of the story. “[F]or all the powerful
conceptions and symbolism Machen is suggesting here, the actual tale degenerates into a
frenzied expression of horror over illicit sex” (Weird Tale 21). In another work Joshi
explains this idea, saying “the life-principle itself was inherently horrific, and can be
made acceptable only by the rigid repression of civilised society” (Three Impostors xii).
Eckersley claims that in this story “lurks a sense that sexuality itself is demonic” (284).
Tabitha Sparks suggests that Helen represents the New Woman, and that Raymond and
Clarke are “seizing (back) control over women’s sexuality and reproductive capacities”
(111). The men in the story are certainly trying to make of Helen a typical woman, a
woman more fitted to the conservative portions of society she moves in. But they do this
more because she moves in taboo spaces, not because she is fighting to exercise rights
they do not believe she should have. Helen can represent the New Woman, but only in
the eyes of a reactionary – Helen is not human, not entirely. She is half satyr.
Kelly Hurley suggests that “[t]he text hints at a correspondence between Helen's
perverse activities and primitive, orgiastic rites [. . .]. The great god Pan, the text
indicates, is a ‘presence’ impinging upon human realities, but not explicable within
human symbolic systems. Though embodied, this ‘god’ exists at the juncture of various
bodily identities” (Gothic Body13). Hurley also works to make sense of the ending
outside the context of evil sexuality – in the end Clarke, who was friends with some of
Helen’s apparent victims, confronts Helen because of her role in their deaths. She
willingly strangles herself with a rope he brings, and her body transforms several times in
her death throes. The conversation that convinces her to kill herself is not recorded.
Hurley’s attention is drawn to the transformations themselves: “the body of the dying
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Helen Vaughan loses its human specificity in a series of rapid transformations” that are
often human, bestial, and neither, and which end in a jelly-like goo (“British Gothic
Fiction” 189). For Hurley, it is the lack of specificity in Helen’s corporeal body that
focuses the horror of the story. Pan is grotesque – he is “not explicable within human
symbolic systems” – and Helen is his daughter, at least halfway into his world that we
cannot see or explain well. So her body functions between the lines of the grid humans
use to figure out everyday life. Her very life force is grotesque and taboo, rather than her
activities. It is not her sexual behavior that makes her frightening, it is herself, her lack of
specificity in the defining terms of human (English, hetero-normative, sexually private)
culture. She appears to pre-date such conceptions, as her father did.
Christine Ferguson perhaps comes closest to offering an explanation of why
Helen, successful and powerful, would let herself die because someone she had never met
told her to. She says that after each apparent death, each phase of her life, Helen moves
on, “remak[ing] herself” even though she never makes of herself something that can be
“absorbed into the logic of her surrounding culture” (475). Helen’s
ultimate refutation of the imperative to be semantically stable and socially useful - to, above all else, mean something – comes, ironically, when she confronts the
greatest of all limitations placed on the subject: death. [. . .] Vaughan's relentless
transformation makes a mockery of the finitude associated with death; indeed,
such a mockery is arguably the main reason for her compliance with Clarke's
laughably feeble threats. (After all, why would the child of an immortal pagan
deity, able to drive people mad on sight, fear a man with a rope?) (475)
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Ferguson’s claim is that Helen kills herself to further destroy the boundary between her
world and the world of staid English humanity. She is on a mission to destabilize
everything in the way that her very body is destabilized, and her death is another step
toward that goal.
Ferguson’s claim makes clear that Helen’s grotesqueness is obvious and is what
the story hinges on. She has no normal body, no normal place in the structured worldview
of people like Clarke – and presumably the reader. Helen’s body is what Hurley focused
on, as another example of what she calls “the abhuman.” Helen reminds readers of the
assumptions about their own bodies, their own humanity, and reminds them of the truth:
that many of the assumptions about one’s body are socially ordered rather than based in
biology – certainly Victorian medical theory on the female body is enough to show that.
Helen and the story remind readers what humans might have once been, and hint
that we might still be those things, under the veneer of civilization. Ancient Roman busts
still permeate the countryside of Machen’s fiction, like the faun bust that frightens the
young boy. Helen obliquely represents where people came from, as well as what they are
now. Those “orgiastic rites” had to be performed by someone.
Dr. Matheson is the character who directly describes the transformations attendant
on Helen’s death. He writes that,
I know that the body may be separated into its elements by external
agencies, but I should have refused to believe what I saw. For here there
was some internal force, of which I knew nothing, that caused dissolution
and change.
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Here too was all the work by which man had been made repeated before
my eyes. I saw the form waver from sex to sex, dividing itself from itself,
and then again reunited. Then I saw the body descend to the beasts whence
it ascended, and that which was on the heights go down to the depths, even
to the abyss of all being. The principle of life, which makes organism,
always remained, while the outward form changed. [. . .]
I watched, and at last I saw nothing but a substance as jelly. Then the
ladder was ascended again... [here the MS. is illegible] ...for one instance I
saw a Form, shaped in dimness before me, which I will not farther
describe. But the symbol of this form may be seen in ancient sculptures,
and in paintings which survived beneath the lava, too foul to be spoken
of... as a horrible and unspeakable shape, neither man nor beast, was
changed into human form, there came finally death. (46-7)
The life force here does not seem to be inherently evil as some critics have said; instead it
seems purely volitional. As evolutionary theory posited, and as some evolutionary horror
stories would speak about more directly, the forces of nature are entirely without
preference, without opinion. Life has no connection to the ideals and concepts of human
civilization, whatever they are. Helen Vaughan has, similarly, almost no connection to
these things either. Her death illustrates the life principle within her, and her similarity to
those “ancient sculptures” and paintings “too foul to be spoken of.” She has within her
“all the work by which man had been made repeated,” as do all people. Helen’s story is
one of survivals because of her father Pan and the way the story makes the little of ruins
and statues in the world an ominous reminder of the ancient past. Helen does not simply
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regress as Ayesha does – she was first born of a human and a pre-historic nature entity,
and is thus closer to nature than those around her. She can see that spiritual world that
drove her mother mad.
The story’s care to point out that the ominous statuary survives beneath lava
makes them like fossils, further evidence of the history of life on this planet. They bring
to mind geological work. But in this case the statues serves to remind the reader of what
they could be and once were, as well as how their conceptions of what “human” means
only apply to people reared in similar cultures, with similar assumptions, as in chapter
two. Helen, through the direct intervention of nature itself – in the form of Pan – has
become something people once recognized and recorded. In this fictional world satyrs
and fauns are representations of something found in nature, perhaps spirits of nature
itself, and the English worldview of people like Clarke and Matheson exclude them as
unspeakable – but they are not inherently so. They were once the subjects of art, and a
great deal of art, much of it publicly displayed. The works of art may be hidden beneath
the lava now, but they were once shown proudly, even though to Machen’s upright
British characters they seem abhuman. They are alien in their adherence to codes and
standards entirely unlike the characters’ and readers’ own, like the “savages” of chapter
two. But the many references to ancient rites, rituals, statuary, and primitive gods in the
story make the claim that the characters’ ancestry was like Helen once. They were closer
to the energy of life and farther from the civilized ideals they follow in the present. Helen
herself is not a survival, but the mores and energies she manipulates are. Those mores
and energies are alien within the story because they spill out from the private arena where
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contemporary discriminatory grids had confined them. They were more accepted in the
past but emerge from it in the present as strange, grotesque rites and orgies.
This story, like much of Machen’s fiction, follows the Golden Dawn’s pattern of
initiation. He ushers the reader into mystic knowledge of the power in the world around
them. Machen takes the place of the doctor and readers the place of the Mary. Every story
considered in detail in this chapter features a truth about the world revealed in the course
of the story, previously unknown to all but a select few. Most of the secrets emerge from
the past, generally humanity’s, and they usually have something to do with the possible
goodness and the certain badness of people evolved into their current position in life and
history. This pattern was particularly sensitive to Machen’s contemporaries, who seemed
to be finding their beliefs in the world under attack by the world itself, by the things
extant but unseen that, it turns out, had been there all along. Fossils lay under the ground,
waiting to be found. Geology’s advancements in the nineteenth century were a kind of
communal initiation into secrets of the earth that had been there since before humanity
but never noticed by anyone until the present. Like Machen’s survivals, the past itself
could appear to be a mystery lying all about the subject in fossils and ruins, ignored or
missed by history.
“The White People” (1904) is considered by some to be Machen’s greatest story,
and in it one hardly glimpses the ancestors poking into our world. It focuses its energies
on the act of initiation, even more so than “The Great God Pan.” It begins with a frame
story in which two men discuss the “spiritual world” and the “portion” that evil maintains
in it – real evil, as opposed to lack of goodness, is as spiritual a thing as good itself, one
character claims (White People 62). Most of the rest of the narrative is the journal of a
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young woman who is unknowingly initiated into a witch cult by her nurse (Joshi White
People viii). She relates all the stories her nurse told her, the white, ghostly figures she
watches dance and sing in the forest, and the rituals her nurse performs for her, taking
care in instructing the narrator just how to do them as well. The story ends with the
narrator dead of self-poisoning. According to Joshi, the only explanation for what
happens in the end has been offered by Lovecraft, who wrote in a letter that the narrator
has undergone an immaculate conception, though with the spiritual forces of evil. She
poisons herself so she will not suffer carrying the “Horror” to term (White People viii-ix).
The telling lines are at the end, when the frame narrative returns. The man who
owns the lady’s journal, Ambrose, says “she poisoned herself – in time. No; there was not
a word to be said against her in the ordinary sense” (97). That direct juxtaposition
indicates that the question of what could be “said against her” would be about more than
her behavior. The implication is that she never slept with anyone, and yet she was found
pregnant. No mention is made of how far along she was, or if anyone studied the fetus.
Ambrose tells a story about a child who smashes its fingers in a window and its mother,
whose fingers hurt after witnessing the injury. The mother’s fingers were damaged
through her sympathy with her child. Ambrose implies is that the young narrator was
made pregnant through sympathy with some vision; Ambrose goes on to describe a white
statue in the glade where she was found. It was ancient, from Roman times, and adopted
into rituals of the witches’ Sabbath. Ambrose says anyone who saw it once was required
to blindfold themselves in its presence ever after – and the young woman did not.
Ambrose says he had the statue destroyed (98). Those who worshipped the statue would
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have been impregnated had they not blindfolded themselves; the narrator is ignorant of
the risk and goes regularly to the statue after she discovers it.
“The White People” can be read as a story of “ecstasy gone wrong” (Aidan 68).
Evolution is not mentioned at all, but the story is related to Machen’s other works in this
chapter in two ways: it exemplifies the slow initiation Machen sought in all his works.
The story tells the tale of a young woman initiated into mysteries surrounding her; the
pace and narration of the story works to do the same to the reader, creating a feeling of
mystery in the world that awes and frightens. The story also connects to Machen’s “Little
People Mythos” (Weird Tale 23) that spreads across the rest of the stories in this chapter.
The idea of the little people being survivals of ancient humans was suggested to Machen
by the work of Sir Oliver Lodge (Aidan 50). The story is a dramatization of the return of
older ways of life, terrifying because they are true. In the fictional world of “The White
People” magic and spirituality have foundations in physical reality, and science has not
caught up yet – though Ambrose hints that they are beginning to. The horror comes from
the grotesqueness of the young woman’s indoctrination – the reader might ask, at story’s
end, how anyone could become a witch without noticing – and the dread she experiences
when contemplating her immaculate pregnancy. She is going to give birth to a god’s
child, but that is horrific as well as mystical; the reader never learns much about what the
statue that sympathetically impressed its image into the young woman’s womb looks like,
but it probably was not entirely human. The hidden, murmured events of “The White
People” are probably similar to the overtly stated events of “The Great God Pan.” It was
likely a Roman centaur, satyr, or other demigod figure sculpted in that glade. The return
of Roman grotesquerie flanks the return of ancient mysticism and nature worship in the
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young woman’s life, and the end result is a “Horror” growing inside her. Like in “Great
God Pan” the past survives in pockets around the English countryside, waiting to ensnare
those who are supposedly evolved past it. The alien of this story is not evolutionary, but it
helps prepare for those evolutionary aliens Machen did write about. In this story, like his
others, the alien is ever present, simply forgotten. It is pre-historic but ignored save by a
handful who are destroyed by their brush with ancient powers.
The Three Impostors (1895) is an oddity in Machen’s horror fiction. It is a series
of short stories bound together in a frame narrative that seems to undermine the stories’
horror. The frame narrative concerns a “young man with spectacles” who, one learns near
the novel’s end, was drawn into a crime syndicate and helped to waylay and kill an old
man without knowing exactly what it was he did. In his horror he keeps his grasp on the
gold Tiberius, the coin the old man was killed for, and flees. Three agents of the
syndicate’s leader pursue him over London, and the short stories are the excuses they
give to the protagonists, Dyson and Phillipps, explaining why the criminals need to find
the young man in spectacles. The end is the only moment when anything horrific intrudes
on the frame story itself, when Dyson and Phillipps explore an abandoned building and
find the corpse of the young man within. The language of this chapter enters the narrative
directly at this point. Dyson calls the “deserted residence” a “survival” and the narrator
describes it as a “remnant of old days” (Three Impostors 251). The novel is bookended by
Dyson and Phillipps looking at and investigating the house. At the novel’s beginning
Dyson says “the house lies all enchanted; that very room, I tell you, is within all blood
and fire” (104). This comment is painful foreshadowing, as the young man lies in that
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very room, torn and burned with hot irons, and with the coals still hot where they have
burned through his chest (234).
If the first oddity of the novel is the frame story itself, the second is the lack of
relation between the components. It seems as though the “novels” told to our protagonists
by the searchers have nothing to do with anything; they are simply odd stories made up,
possibly, for the joy of lying. One of the “novels” – “The Novel of the Iron Maid” – was
written before The Three Impostors and added to it (Joshi Weird Tale 25). But all the
others were written in the context of the novel, and need to be taken as part of a whole.
Many critics do not, and the chapters are in fact often printed as short stories independent
of their frame.
Only two of the novels directly concern this study. However, all the stories can be
seen as repeating common themes. The subtitle of the novel is The Transmutations, and
every story chronicles a transmutation of some kind. But they all have some sort of
survival creature theme. “The Novel of the Dark Valley” is the story of a man hired as a
secretary to an Englishman who is secretly a crime gang leader in America. His gang
does some of the most unspeakable things in the territories, and the speaker says he saw
his boss leading a ritual in the valley where he weighed with golden scales and offered
life and blood for money. A simple western outlaw story inexplicably introduces a ritual
seemingly out of an ancient secret society. The story ends with the narrator being
mistaken for his boss, nearly being lynched, and saved at the last minute by someone who
saw him leave the train with his boss, proving there are two of them. The narrator claims
the boss is the young man in spectacles.
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“Novel of the Iron Maid” is not even an explanation of why its narrator needs to
find the young man. It is simply a way to pass the time while he sits around and waits for
the young man to appear. It is even simpler. The narrator claims to have met a man from
his club out in the street, because he had missed his train. The man invites the narrator
home, and while chatting shows him his collection – ancient torture devices. He lovingly
describes all of them, and showcases his latest acquisition: a metal statue of a woman
with clockwork mechanisms inside, which tighten her arms in an embrace around the
victim until he or she is killed. Inevitably the collector is trapped in the machine and
killed before the narrator can do anything about it. “The Dark Valley” brings up the
survival of mob justice, secret society rituals, and the like underlying everyday
occurrences. “The Iron Maid” talks about the savagery hiding inside love of the
medieval. Between the two stories Machen indicts every class – lower, working classes in
“Valley” and higher, aristocratic classes in “Maid” – of holding inside them old hatreds
and savagery, allowing them to survive into the present day.
It is the last two “novels” that are most famous, though, and most useful. It is
interesting to the novel as a whole that both these stories are delivered to our auditors by
the woman in the pursuing group, one story to Dyson and one to Phillipps. The first, “The
Novel of the Black Seal,” she delivers to Phillipps, the confirmed skeptical materialist.
He leaves believing her story more firmly than Dyson believes any of the stories he hears
in the whole course of events. In the “Black Seal,” Miss Lally – the assumed name of the
woman – became the governess and research assistant of Professor Gregg when he saved
her from starving in the streets. After Gregg finishes a book he agreed to write before he
meets Lally, he begins to seriously pursue the research that has long fascinated him. He
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believes there are still Neolithic people living in the English countryside and that they are
the beings called fairies, as “much of the folk-lore of the world is but an exaggerated
account of events that really happened” (165).
Gregg takes Lally into the countryside and hires a local boy, purportedly to help
with the housework. But the boy, Cradock, is “simple” and speaks in a “queer, harsh
voice [. . .]; it gave [Lally] the impression of some one [sic] speaking deep below under
the earth, and there was a strange sibilance, like the hissing of the phonograph as the
pointer travels over the cylinder” (153). Cradock turns out to be the spawn of the hidden
people who caught a local woman in the hills after dark. He has fits, too, which turn out
to be his other, non-human nature trying to assert itself. In the manuscript Gregg leaves
behind before he disappears, he describes one of the fits, as well as translating the “fairy”
language from the titular Black Seal. He says
I saw his body swell and become distended as a bladder, while the face
blackened before my eyes; and then at the crisis I did what was necessary
according to the directions on the Seal, and putting all scruple on one side,
I became a man of science, observant of what was passing. Yet the sight I
had to witness was horrible, almost beyond the power of human
conception and the most fearful fantasy. Something pushed out from the
body there on the floor, and stretched forth a slimy, wavering tentacle,
across the room [. . .]. (174-5).
He goes on to compare the phenomenon to a snail’s horns, but cannot get over the horror
he feels. He has helped in blurring the line between human and animal, helped show the
line is more fanciful than most people would like to believe. Cradock is already grotesque
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when he hisses and faints in screaming fits – he is a reminder of the risks we run, that we
could all suffer fits were we as unlucky as Cradock. But there is something more there.
Gregg brings out what Lally senses when she first meets Cradock: the boy is only partly
human, just as Helen Vaughan was only partly human. But Gregg’s manuscript worsens
the horror, because he says the instructions of the Black Seal allows one to reduce man
“to the slime from which he came, and [force him] to put on the flesh of the reptile and
the snake” (172). Any human could be forced into the transmutation the half-human
Cradock experienced; it was simply easier to do to Cradock, as he was closer to
humanity’s bestial beginnings. Gregg goes out to try to find the fairy people himself and
never returns. The seal itself is ancient, recorded by the pre-historic humans in Britain
before they disappeared into the hills. This atavistic regression to animality was
something they learned how to do and recorded in detail enough for Gregg to do it to
someone as well – though the youth he transforms was half “fairy.” That positions the
“fairy” people – the pre-historic humans who have survived out in the hills – as a link
between civilized human and animal. They become a threat from the past that reminds
one that the ancestry of humankind was not only violent (they rape a woman) but also
animal-like. They are, within the story, actually Neanderthals or Cro-Magnons, never
evolved past their primitive states, but surviving out in the countryside, keeping alive the
beginnings of humankind’s history.
The last story is also Helen’s, this time calling herself Leicester. It is “The Novel
of the White Powder.” It is delivered to Dyson in a lodging house – Helen is posing as a
widow, or rather she is posing as someone posing as a widow. She tells Dyson she is in
hiding. Her story, her “novel,” is about her brother, who came home to study for the law
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and worked so hard he damaged his health. He was still relatively healthy, though, and
the family doctor, Haberden, prescribed a white powder, mixed with water, to set
Leicester straight. It appeared to work, and suddenly Leicester told his sister he would
take a break, enjoy himself, and promised a trip to France shortly. Weeks of debauchery
followed. Then he locked himself in his room and refused to see anyone. Disgusting fluid
dripped through his floor into his sister’s ceiling, and one day when she went out she saw
a horrifying shape in his window, even though he insisted later he was alone in the room.
When Haberden checked up on him he came away shocked and tells Miss Leicester
(Helen) that he can do no good there and she should never call on him again for this
problem.
Eventually, though, she was forced to as her brother’s condition worsened.
Haberden broke down the locked door.
There upon the floor was a dark and putrid mass, seething with corruption
and hideous rottenness, neither liquid nor solid, but melting and changing
before our eyes, and bubbling with unctuous oily bubbles like boiling
pitch. And out of the midst of it shone two burning points like eyes, and I
saw a writhing and stirring as of limbs, and something moved and lifted up
what might have been an arm. The doctor took a step forward, raised the
iron bar and struck at the burning points; he drove in the weapon, and
struck again and again in the fury of loathing. (207)
In this story the survival is less direct than in the previous one – it is akin to that found in
“The White People.” The brother becomes an atavism and then a boiling mass of
protoplasm, like Helen Vaughan. But it is the white powder itself that is most important.
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Before Haberden abandoned the case altogether, he sent a sample of the white
powder to a chemist friend to be identified, they having discovered it was not what he
prescribed. Haberden’s friend writes a letter in which he says
It is a substance which was known to a few many hundred years ago [. . .]
it is the powder from which the wine of the Sabbath, the Vinum Sabbati,
was prepared [. . .] The secrets of the true Sabbath were the secrets of
remote times surviving into the Middle Ages, secrets of an evil science
which existed long before Aryan man entered Europe.[. . . I]n the blackest
hour of night, the Vinum Sabbati was prepared, and this evil gruel was
poured forth and offered to the neophytes, and they partook of an infernal
sacrament. . . (209-10)
So an ancient formula for a witches’ brew, a chemical that would give to a neophyte his
or her own sacramental mirror image, turned a young man into a protoplasmic pile of
goo, a reminder of the primal life force that humans share with any other sort of life, even
amoeba. The chemist guesses in his letter that the temperature variations, over time, must
have turned the original powder into the Vinum Sabbati. One could find a holdover from
ancient times through chance, and with no malice intended – say, on the part of the
chemist.
Like Helen’s previous story, told to Phillips, this one too deals with the ancients’
knowledge of humanity. They were able to make a compound that could turn a person
into an animal or a still-living goo. Like the “fairies” of “The Black Seal” the witches
understood the fundamental linkage between human nature and human biology, and
manipulated both. What survives here is the work of the witches; it comes out of the past
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to reduce a person to his basic parts, as his species’ evolutionary history has been a
putting-together of those parts.
Looking at the whole novel actually reveals more about Machen’s contribution to
the grotesque alien than taking the stories separately. Joshi, in fact, insists that nearly all
of Machen’s work is unified in its thematic links, if in no other way, (Weird Tale 38), and
points out that Machen himself classified The Three Impostors as a “wonder story,” a
story “of events which are beyond the ordinary range of human observation, of events
which we roughly call impossible” (qtd. in Weird Tale 37). Machen also said, in an
introduction to the work when republished, that he had encountered a series of events in
London oddly similar to what happens in the novel, and that “[i]t may turn out after all
that the weavers of fantasy are the veritable realists” (qtd in Weird Tale 38). Joshi lumps
this in with Machen’s inveterate battle against materialism and passes on. But the status
of the novel related to realism and fantasy is key to understanding it. Once one works out
precisely what relationship the novel has to what is real and what is fantasy, one will be
able to see what is happening in the novel as a whole, something at first glance quite
confusing.
Martin T. Willis insists the work is entirely fantasy in his “Scientific Portraits in
Magical Frames.” It is clear from the title that Willis will argue that the scientific
language is merely a façade meant to encase the vital fantastic elements within. He says,
What appears to be a series of [extant] and autonomous “novels”
describing the rationally scientific in opposition to the wholly mystic (with
the mystic appearing far more probable than any of the weak scientific
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explanations) actually describes the “playing-out” or processes of certain
mystic forces which go beyond any earthly system of comprehension.
Willis goes on to point out that, really, all the encounters of the novel are coincidences –
the young man’s pursuers don’t know Dyson has the Gold Tiberius, and their stories do
not actually help them in their pursuit. “However, Machen--like Hoffmann--bases his
narrative integrity not on the traditions of the human plane but on the esoteric. The [text]
in this case is, as Manlove says, "of another order of reality" (3), that reality being the
preternatural and the magical. . .” What preternatural and magical reality does the novel
reveal, given it is about three people who wander around, lie constantly, then murder a
young man?
It is possible that their stories are not lies. At least, not cunning lies. In the young
man’s account one learns how he was recruited from the research tables of the British
Museum. His employer – and the three pursuers’ employer – Dr. Lipsius, is no ordinary
gangster. He is a criminal scholar, who uses his knowledge to buy and sell curios for high
prices. The pursuers are not ordinary thugs either. They revel in their deceptions. At
novel’s beginning they say goodbye to their alter egos. Helen says “[f]arewell to Miss
Lally, and to Miss Leicester also [. . .] Farewell to all occult adventure; the farce is
played” (103). So clearly the stories are not true – at least, they did not happen to their
interlocutors. But they might have all happened –to their previous victims, perhaps. And
more importantly, they are all revelations of what the pursuers are doing throughout the
text. They are transmuting not the hills of Gregg’s countryside but the city of London.
Stories of horror happen, in their narratives, in the wilds of America, in the English
countryside, and in a small town away from London. But the one horror that absolutely
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does happen within the novel – the horrible torture and murder of the young man –
happens right in London. And in his narrative the young man gives oblique evidence that
someone else is murdered in London and hidden in a sarcophagus likely on display in the
Museum. So in both cases a grisly murder is on display before the public of London, if
only they know the right way to look at things. As we already saw, it is Dyson’s vision of
the house in which the young man lies dying, a vision of it covered in blood, which
allows them to actually see the bloody spectacle hidden in the residence.
It is possible the “novels” have some basis in Dyson and Phillipps’s reality, but
also possible they do not. The definite reality in the novel is that three peculiar people
pursue a young man, telling needless stories to the people they meet – Dyson and
Phillipps. They catch the young man and help torture and kill him, with irons and hot
coals. The young man’s account says he was beguiled by their criminal organization, and
then without thinking, in the horror of what he had helped do – murder the old man who
owned the Gold Tiberius – he stole the rare coin and ran. But he does not have it, Dyson
does. The whole “farce” seeks to retrieve the coin, but never appears to make any
headway. It disappears into Dyson’s study. The implication is that this sort of thing,
violence and insanity, are normal, but screened behind the workings of civilization.
Dyson begins his interaction with the story by seeing the young man flee down an
alleyway, suddenly. He remarks on how amazing it is that the place was so quiet, with a
“roaring main artery of London life” close by (108). This scene was the beginning of the
adventure and the violence. Dyson happens to witness it and find the cast-away gold coin,
which, it turns out, was minted to “commemorate an infamous excess” and all but this
one particular coin were accidentally smelted down again (109). So a beautiful gold coin
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actually signifies an ancient “excess.” A quiet London street, with the riot of typical
London life just around the corner, hosts the opening act of a play of barbaric violence.
The Three Impostors is a “wonder story,” in Machen’s words, because it hints that typical
civilized life is not just at risk from transformation and intrusion by survivals of old ways
and lives, but that they persist, side by side with the civilized. They permeate the culture
that tries to do away with them. The lies told by the pursuers are all about violence
surviving into the present from the dark past, but the past violence has survived in them –
they are in the present and committing excesses of violence just like the figures in their
stories. Like in the previous chapter, the primitive impulses of violence and dominance
survive into the modern day, but this time not in “savages” but in Londoners. In a culture
that prides itself on its civilized society in which everyone works together, Dyson and
Phillips discover the same violent and aggressive tendencies Huxley warned about in his
“Evolution and Ethics.”
Aidan and Reynolds claim that The Three Impostors, as well as other Machen
stories, is about “wholly evil” forces (50), as contrasted to the often pitiable ghosts and
spirits in other horror stories of the time. That is interesting given the presence of the
young man, who is in many ways a duplicate of Machen. Far Off Things is a portrait of a
young man suffering in London for want of companionship and proper work for his
mind, and those very wants drive the young man to the reading rooms and the dark
shadows of Dr. Lipsius’s world. It is not hard, then, to take the young man as an innocent,
both from internal evidence – he never realizes, until too late, that he is helping with a
robbery and murder, despite how obvious it is – and his resemblance to his author. So
The Three Impostors becomes a duality between good and evil in the streets of London, a
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working out of what Machen loved in Jekyll and Hyde. The book was influenced in many
ways by Stevenson’s work. The Three Impostors was indebted to Stevenson’s The
Dynamiter (1885) for its broad outline and its protagonists (Aidan 48). The Three
Impostors is about what “wholly evil” forces can do to an innocent, similar to the evil
remnants of dark witchcraft destroying the innocent young girl of “The White People.” In
The Three Impostors the evil is insidious because of its ability to blend into the London
streets. The façades of the stories hide their intentions but reveal their fascination with
destroying innocence. Like a gas bubble in a swamp, their evil rises to the surface even as
they try to hide it and misdirect it onto the young man. Dyson and Phillips remain
entirely ignorant of what they have seen until they find the young man’s notebook,
because the evil of the pursuers is not strange, it is familiar. It interpenetrates and
shadows the London streets around them in a way the narrative structure helps to
underline. The evil forces in the pursuers could be in anyone, because they come from a
love of the grotesque and the pursuit taken too far. Like the young girl in “The White
People,” they identify with their grotesques and become grotesque and abject themselves
– but in the case of the three pursuers, they make the young man abject – as they do, to a
lesser extent, Dyson and Phillips as well. They remind all three of the horrors the human
world has contained in the past and continues to contain. There may be “wholly evil”
forces, but they are typically part human in Machen’s stories, and wholly human in this
one, as humanity has not escaped its supposed dark past in the way an evolutionary
progressivist might have argued.
Dyson figures in several more Machen stories; he became for Machen a kind of
detective of the supernal, something like Doyle’s Holmes, Hodgson’s Carnacki, or
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Blackwood’s John Silence. Dyson is an author who sells little of his work and is
endlessly fascinated by the romantic splendor of his city – in these points he, too, is a
viable stand-in for Machen himself. He is the “detective” in “The Shining Pyramid” and
“The Red Hand” (both 1895).
Both stories have similar plots. In both Dyson manages to unravel a mystery, and
in both the mystery is that savage, horrifying Neolithic people still survive in the wild
hills of England. “The Shining Pyramid” shows Dyson’s friend in the country worried
about his valuables because of chalk marks scrawled on his walls and flints arranged on
his lawn in obscure patterns. The symbols are eyes, but not the eyes that children would
draw – and it is important that Dyson, in his detection, deal with the idea children drew
the eyes, because everything scrawled on the wall is about three and a half feet above the
ground, far too low for a full-grown person to have drawn them (Three Impostors 86).
The flints are oddities as well – in the hands of an archaeologist or even farmer who
would get to an archaeologist, the flints would be worth a good deal of money, and yet
the perpetrators leave dozens behind as though they were worthless (87). These things
are, on their own, remnants. They are precisely the things one would have to use to detect
an ancient culture once it was gone. They survive – as they did in “Pan” – through their
art and the things they have left behind. It turns out that these people are not gone, and
they have abducted a local girl, whom they eventually sacrifice to summon the shining
pyramid – a pyramid of flashing fire using the girl’s body as fuel. Dyson assures his
friend that they could do nothing for the girl despite witnessing the ritual from a distance.
She had been held by the little people for weeks: she was “no longer fit for earth” (99).
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She has apparently been so debased that Dyson believes she is no longer really human the
way he and his friend are. Letting her die is a mercy, not a cruelty.
“The Red Hand” features Dyson solving a murder, rather than watching one. He
and Phillipps come across a corpse in a London alley beneath a hand scrawled in red
chalk on a wall. The dead person was Sir Thomas Vivian, physician to the Royal Family.
He was killed by a flint knife roughly 10,000 years old (White People 5), which was lying
by the body when discovered. Vivian was friends with a man named Selby, who was
convinced that the hills in rural England held treasure from the old race that once lived
among them. He finally decodes a stone with directions to make it into one of the treasure
troves, and comes away with a few things. When both were poor, Selby had promised
Vivian to let him have a share of the treasure. He contacted Vivian, now wealthy and
respected. Vivian attacked Selby with a knife once he had learned precisely how to get to
the trove, and Selby used the flint knife, taken away from the treasure, to defend himself.
The horror of this story is two-fold. The most civilized person in the story – the rich,
influential doctor – reverts to base violence, suddenly, without warning. But Selby tells
Dyson and Phillipps that the keepers of the little people’s treasure live still, and they
watched him as he tried to explore the treasure house. He also brought away one gold
sculpture, something he calls “The Pain of the Goat.” Characteristically, Machen does not
describe it, but it makes Selby feel as though he burned in hell, and Dyson and Phillips
both cry out “in horror at the revolting obscenity of the thing” (27-8). They beg Selby to
put it away, and he does so swiftly.
Both these stories have the epitome of horror story survivals. The “little people”
of folklore are really a savage pre-historic human race that survives in out of the way
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places. Just as in “The Novel of the Black Seal,” they serve to remind Dyson and the
reader that the origins of humanity are in biology and what many at the time might have
called primitivism. Humans did not come from their moral and civilized standing, they
adapted toward it. They emerge from the past as though it is a different country, but the
country all humans are from. They are humans as the species once was, and given
Vivian’s behavior and Selby’s acuity with the knife, still are.
These stories also serve to remind readers that there is, in the idea of progression,
a long way to go. And more startling for Machen’s readers, they hint that there may be no
progression, that humans had not changed at all. The little people may be so alien to
humans that their art stuns and horrifies moral, upright men in a calm sitting room, but
their stone weapons still work in human hands. The watchers for some reason let Selby
escape with a piece of their treasure, but when Vivian contemplates sharing a treasure he
did not previously believe existed, he tries to kill his old friend. Dyson may want to think
the little people are different; it is horrifying enough that they “may very probably be
lurking in our midst, rubbing shoulders with frock-coated and finely-draped humanity”
(2). But they are just like humanity. They lurk among the “finely-draped humanity”
because they are a part of it.
That is how Machen’s fiction manages to address so many different facets of the
evolutionary idea of survivals, because they are just as bad – and just as good – as
humanity. Humans are able to rise “higher” in a moral scale roughly equivalent to the
Christian model, but they typically do not. Each time a survival does something
horrifying in Machen’s fiction, it is matched by a human doing something horrifying as
well. The white people may remind respectable doctors of old, disgusting sexual rites, but

211

meanwhile nurses are teaching children how to make voodoo dolls (84-5). Helen
Vaughan destroys the lives of men by simply showing them something they had never
seen; the men seek it out. The Three Impostors is the text with the most concentrated
criticism of primitivism in contemporary humanity, with the three pursuers modeling
terrifying violence and a hatred of orderly, honest life. Dyson may be nearly as intelligent
as Sherlock Holmes, but he does not emulate that more famous detective’s traditional
chivalry and courage. Having concluded the young woman of “Pyramid” was abducted
by the little people, he tells no one, even though they might have been able to save her.
He takes his friend to watch her die instead. His action serves only to assure his friend
that his material possessions are safe. His primitive urge to own and protect can be
soothed. The “Red Hand” shows the reader that humanity is falling away from whatever
heights it might have ascended. But also, it is interesting to note that the “Pain of the
Goat” is horrifying – not alien altogether. Dyson and Phillipps can still recognize it as
something startling and foul to them. It is alien, grotesque, but not out of their
conception. So these taboos, these things that are apparently positioned so the civilized
human matrix of thought cannot access them, are just as available, only avoided. They
are not really unnatural, just unfamiliar.
Machen dwells on the grotesque in these stories for that reason. The things his
contemporaries wished to view as human and cultured – as well as the things they wished
to oppose to the human and cultured – were equally accessible, equally familiar.
Lombroso had said the criminal was a para-human; Spencer had said humans were
evolving primitive traits away, like soil eroding in the rain. But the presence of the
grotesque in Machen’s fiction and its direct identification with the primitive and the
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evolutionary survival reminds readers that these typically undesirable traits are still a part
of people, just a part rarely described or thought about. Machen’s fascination with duality
comes to the fore. Both the respectable human, represented by Dyson, Phillips, and the
young man with spectacles, as well as the violent, aggressive, degenerated human,
represented by Helen, the young girl, the impostors, and the treasure hunters, are still
human. The “evil” characters may be survivals of older kinds of humanity factually, but
the traits they represent, cruelty and violence, survive still in all people according to
Machen and his fiction. Civilization might do all it can to repress those urges – and
Machen appears to believe it should – but they are not gone and may never be.
This chapter’s aliens come from the past to remind readers of their own heritage.
In Chambers’ fiction they show readers how little biology can matter to someone who has
some very primitive urges on his mind; in Doyle’s the creature is a simple animal but
monstrous solely because it is dangerous – enormous and able to kill other enormous
creatures, little alive in the narrator’s time could survive its wrath; Machen’s survivals are
intimately connected to the humans they horrify. They are nearly always a more primitive
form of humankind surviving into the modern day. They highlight civilized humanity’s
roots in the primitive past and exactly how much violence and aggression humans retain
from their pre-historic, animal-like past. In Machen’s work modern humans can be turned
into animals or sub-animal, protoplasmic goo. But that is because they retain still the
seeds of those states despite the apparent progression. The survival as alien is grotesque
to highlight how strange and horrible the newly-unearthed past appeared, but in
Machen’s fiction they are not nearly as strange as they appear to be. If so much time had
passed and evolution had been at work all the time, it seemed to people like Machen that
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it should have erased the primitive parts of humanity. That it did not implied, as Machen
did when he wrote on Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, that the primitive is as much a part of
humanity as the newly-evolved social aspects. Humans can be social or violent, but it is
an individual choice, not an evolutionarily-determined state. That so many people turn to
violence and aggression is cause for anxiety.
One might wonder if this anxiety was felt by more than a few sensitive writers
and thinkers. The general sales of horror fiction at the time indicate otherwise.
“[B]etween 1880 and 1914 horror fiction appeared regularly on the wholesaler’s list of
best sellers” and those books included Dracula and The Beetle – which stayed on the lists
for six months (Gilbert 26). Stories of regressions and reminders of primitivism were
popular; they touched something in the population, even “across class and gender lines”
(Gilbert 27), given the price ranges of the publications. Machen published “The Great
God Pan” amid this new rush of horror fiction, and the reviews of it are instructive for
working out just what was touching the British reading public. A reviewer claimed of
“Pan” that “although men and women who are morbid and unhealthy in mind may find
something that appeals to them. . . the majority of readers will turn from it in utter
disgust” (qtd. in Gilbert 27). For other stories Machen was called “a degenerate mind
steeped in morbidity” (qtd. in Gilbert 27). In the stories of this chapter, Machen’s
“morbidity” centers on pointing out an uncomfortable conclusion: the social ills of
violence, greed, and animality appeared to be inherent in humans, something evolution –
with more time to work on “improving” humanity than ever previously imagined – had
left alone. The contrast in “The Red Hand” highlights this idea: the very strange is
opposed to the very mundane, and the brutal murder is not the strange, but the mundane,
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element in the story. These anxieties were strong and expressed in the horror fiction of
the day even as reviewers, all professionally tied to the ideas of “culture” as improving
mechanism – certainly a reviewer for The Lady’s Pictorial would want improving,
upstanding literature in a lady’s library – attempted to throw up Arnoldian bulwarks
against the tide of anxiety-ridden horror stories of the alien. They tried to label such
musings as morbid because they did nothing to improve the mind or soul; they only
expressed the fright many felt when considering the new past stretching behind them, or
even the nature surrounding them, as in the chapter following this one.
V.

The Construction of the Past as Alien
In the previous chapter Holly represented the risk of a person, or possibly a

nation, going backward along a perceived scale of evolutionary advancement, with the
Victorian at the end of the scale and humankind’s primitive ancestors at its beginning.
The survivals of this chapter come from the first portions of the scale but co-exist with
the Victorians who are meant to be at its end. Some believed that evolution had advanced
to its goal – humanity – while others believed there was still progress in the future to be
seen, but humans were an integral part of that advancement of evolution’s supposed
goals. These assumptions are shaken by the presence of a survival. If evolution is
attempting to progress the world “forward,” then how can anything so old survive?
Should they not have been supplanted by more advanced beings? The danger of a shark
or crocodile – each a creature virtually unchanged for millennia – poses a problem to a
person who believes they are members of evolution’s latest and greatest advancement.
So, too, do these survivals that are alien from and dangers to the Arnoldian Victorian and
his or her beliefs of nature.
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The past was estranged from the present to such a degree by advances in geology.
Along with other sciences, geology “disturbed traditional contexts of temporality. During
the course of the nineteenth century scientists began to debate the age of the earth (and
the extent of human antiquity) in units of time which had hitherto literally been
unimaginable” and sometimes still were (Murray 175). Before Queen Victoria’s
coronation Charles Lyell had frightened people with his narrative of species extinction in
works such as the seminal Principles of Geology (1830). One of the telling details he uses
to explain fossil history is that mammoths lived in England, and an England with
relatively similar climate, given mammoth remains discovered in York (1775). Lyell was,
in part, arguing against a “catastrophic” view of geological history – that is, “the idea that
major geologic changes were the result of periodic catastrophes, such as the Flood”
(Blutlinger 72). Lyell argued instead for “the adequacy of existing natural processes in
geological explanation” (Rudwick 6) That had two major effects. The first was to claim
that the Earth came to be as was in Lyell’s time due to continuous, small changes that
happened all the time – and were still happening. The Earth could conceivably change
more, but it would take millions of years for large differences to be noticeable. That
assumed that the Biblical age of the Earth was not scientifically accurate, which led to the
second effect of Lyell’s insistence on existing processes: God was removed from the
causation of the world’s shape. Victor Joseph Di Fate argues that Lyell’s history of
geology – an apparently benign way to begin a three-volume treatise on the Earth
sciences – was really the first rhetorical move in Lyell’s attempt to show the way forward
and insist on slow processes rather than catastrophism. Fate says Lyell’s history implies
that “trying to reconcile geological evidence with Scripture and speculating on the origin
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of the earth have been spectacularly unproductive, while conclusions on which there has
been lasting consensus have been obtained (of course) by explaining phenomena by
reference to present causes” (144). Those “present causes” are currently working, totally
physical causes. So the past was, on the geological level, just like the present. The
changes evident in the geological record could only have happened, then, if there were
simply more time in the past than people believed. It was not just that the Biblical
account was wrong. It was that the history of the Earth was much longer than anyone had
believed, even geologists not attempting to reconcile the Bible and the fossil record. One
of the “traditional objections” to Lyell’s claims was that “time is insufficiently deep” (Di
Fate 144). Lyell posited that objection was already giving way in his field, and that there
was sufficient time for the slow changes he claimed had accumulated over vast periods of
time. Lyell’s work altered the perception of time itself by circuitously proving that there
was, simply, more time than anyone had thought. Michael Tomko says of Lyell’s ideas
and cultural impact that
The geological strata “formed by slow and insensible degrees in a great
lapse of ages” bear witness to a span of time beyond human conception [. .
.] Slow erosion, the trickling of water, the constant wearing of waves, the
slow movement of earth, have caused and will continue to cause great
shifts between sea and land that defamiliarize the very steadfast soil and
conceptual construction of Britain [. . .] All human creeds, institutions, and
conflicts pale under this gaze [. . .] (117-8)
The future is inaccessible, impossible to reach because within the geological realm it is
endless, slow, and indifferent. It has the time to carve mountains and shape life through
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competitive pressure, and that time is so impressive and vast that it makes of the era a
foreign place. The past is when similar changes happened, though unlike the future is has
been in some way already experienced. But as geologists found more fossils and put them
together, discovering species that never existed in the same eras as humankind, the past
appeared to be just as alien. It is impossible to reach and people once thought of it as
familiar, but it was stranger than a foreign country.
It was so foreign because, as Murray pointed out, people were almost unable to
imagine the vast gulfs of time between them and when a dinosaur or Neanderthal lived.
Even though evolution is implied in the sense that early Cro-Magnons were the ancestors
of contemporary humans, it did not necessarily follow that the issue of geological time
had to be dealt with through evolutionary horror, particularly using the grotesque. Why
did some writers respond to the idea of geological “distance” in time with these
monstrous aliens? Evolution implied or outright stated – depending on who was writing
the essay in question – that life changed over time and that certain fundamentals were
almost always true in life forms. The first idea makes it necessary, in a literary work, to
face the concept of vast reaches of time as a cause of great change. If the Earth is as old
as the geologists say, then even more evolution could have happened. Darwin might have
chronicled minute changes in birds across the Galapagos islands, but over millions or
billions of years even the small changes would add up to make creatures of the past
unrecognizable, similar to the cave bear of Doyle’s story – both the changes made in its
peculiar, underground environment and its relation to animals mostly extinct make of it
an alien being, a strange, horrifying creature that appears to be an abomination in
Hardcastle’s eyes. It should not exist, given the history of the world Hardcastle and his
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neighbors are familiar with. The second idea, that evolution implies a lack of change,
refers to the fundamentals of survival. Those fundamentals are the drives and urges most
life forms experience and are subject to. Evolution changed the face of the world
drastically, but the same common denominators remain over time. Machen’s work
consistently focused on the lack of change in the world, particularly in humans. They
remained as vicious and violent as their pre-historic ancestors.
As Murray points out, the change in the perception of time was “widely
understood by those living through [the change], and stimulated one of the great passions
of Victorian society – a contemplation of the antinomies between progress and
degeneration, of perfectibility and original sin, of the particulars of history and the great
generalizations about the course of human history” (176). Writers such as Machen
directly connected the image of the creature surviving through vast stretches of time with
the opposition of perfectibility and original sin. The Victorians strove ever for
improvement, individual and social, and evolution could offer hope to many that the
perfectibility was possible as history was an ever-advancing improvement; at the same
time “base” urges like anger, competitiveness, and the will to violence remained despite
the long duration of humanity and proto-humanity. Those things seemed to have been
part of “human nature” since there were humans, and they had never evolved away.
Chapter one points out Huxley’s claims in the debate about natural and social evolution
and his idea that it was necessary to move away from nature to society – those urges to
competitiveness made sense for individuals but not for social units. They did not go
away. One of the “generalizations” Murray talks about is the belief that people were
improving over generations – it was part of the system that allowed people to believe
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primitives were behind them in terms of evolutionary advancement, but more time filling
into the past, making the past stretch out to limitless lengths, produced anxiety. If people
were advancing steadily as many believed, should they still be struggling with basic
problems? Should the pre-historic axe fit so well in the hand of a modern human, as it
does in Machen’s “Red Hand”?
The anxiety was that there might be unpleasant truths in the core of human nature
that could not be effaced. No amount of evolution could change the obsessions and
proclivities of humanity. In the stories that follow, characters will ignore amazing
scientific discoveries to try (and fail) to find a girlfriend; a whole countryside will be
terrorized by a bear because it is an ancient bear, and thus a monster; and people will
struggle against disgust when encountering the habits and persons of pre-historic humans,
but give in to the base urges those primitives supposedly represent.
The question still remains why it is necessary for these creatures to be grotesque.
It follows they might be, because they are so strange, but why go through the effort
Chambers or Machen do, to make them patently and overtly grotesque? It helps to
represent the strangeness of the time and the creatures themselves.
The creatures dug up that lived in the distant past were monstrous: dinosaurs and
mammoths and trilobites – and the distant ancestors of humans. That is what makes the
survival so alien and yet so horrifying. It is linked to the history of humankind. The
distant past, the geological, strange past, is like another country, but one impossible to
visit. However, things from that “place” can visit our time and place by surviving into it.
It is as though they are time travelers that deny the ability of travel. They “arrive” in the
present through vast ages but the people in the present can never arrive where the
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survival is from. And implicit in the “visits” of such survivals is that humankind’s
ancestors were alive in that time period as well. Some authors extended the logic and
portrayed those primitive ancestors of humans surviving into the present as well. In both
cases the creature is something that should not exist within the discriminatory grid that
assumes the world is as it is because of either divine proclamation or evolutionary
advancement. Unlike an atavism, which is something born in the present that regresses, a
survival lived through the times that supposedly stamped it out. It was frightening enough
to think that an entire species could go extinct, partly because it implies humans could go
extinct as well. But for something to survive the pressures that made the world as it is
now reminds one that the world is not meant to be the way it is; it simply is. Survivals
qualify as aliens because they come from an inaccessible place almost impossible to
imagine.4 The survivals in this chapter illustrate many things, from the way in which
certain classes interact with the world to the power of the past and humanity’s inability to
leave behind certain core habits or behaviors. But they all emerge from the past like a
foreigner, things that are not supposed to exist but suddenly do. Geological and
evolutionary studies alienated people from not only each other, but also their own pasts.
The creatures represent that, but continue to remind observers of their assumptions: they
were not transported or recreated in the present, they survived, meaning nothing in nature
has changed sufficiently to kill them as one might have thought it did. They can function
in the present just as well as anything else alive, including humans. They were
supposedly left behind in the advancement of life on the planet but continued anyway
through simple accidents.
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The alien had always been a place to foster anxiety. Evolution had made it more
strange, but ultimately linked together the strange and the familiar – as it was all the
product of the same evolutionary strains. But stranger things than the pre-historic or the
savage could emerge from evolution, and more familiar things than the past could be
made alien by it. The next chapter deals with nature itself, and the morally neutral life
within it, that was made strange by evolution, particularly as people found there was
apparently no limit at all to what nature could produce.
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Chapter 4: Naturalization – Horrifying Animals
Animals and other life on Earth already would seem to be “natural” and incapable
of inducing a feeling of abjectness in characters or readers, but they do frequently. As
mentioned in chapter one, animals such as the bat are considered grotesque because they
mix “species” in that they fly but have fur and not feathers. Many people have aversions
to sea creatures, ranging from squid and octopodes to simple fish, simply because they
are so strange from the standards humans, as land-based mammals, use to judge
normality.
The monsters of some Gothic evolution stories were actually just animals. In Conrad’s
work the people are people, even though they are perceived as monstrous or animalistic;
in Machen’s the horrors were people or creatures that survived from a past time
supposedly left behind; but in the work of some authors, such as William Hope Hodsgon
or Algernon Blackwood, the monstrous things of the stories are natural life forms. Some
are speculative but some are actual zero world life forms that happen to threaten the
characters. These creatures all appear grotesque and monstrous at first because they are
threats, but also because they are outside the experience of the characters. But they are
not unnatural, despite assertions to the contrary. Many of the characters, such as the
narrator of Hodgson’s The Boats of the “Glen Carrig” (1907), insist throughout their
stories that the creatures are unnatural, despite all the evidence to the contrary that they
miss and the reader can pick up as the narrative progresses.
These animals represent the alienation of nature itself. Many people felt that nature had
been transformed by evolutionary theory. It was not a simple binary change – good did
not become evil – but a deep, abiding alteration to the world surrounding us had
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apparently been effected by the theories of Darwin and others. Nature was once either
benign or good; it could no longer be benign in an evolutionary worldview. It could still
be good – progressing the world forward as in theories such as Spencer’s, but questions,
such as those raised in the previous chapters, complicated that view. Nature could be
cruel, insisting its “children” compete with one another to survive. Or it could be amoral,
empty of any sense of right and wrong or good and bad. All these perceptions were
common in the late Victorian period; nature had become something different. It had been
familiar and was suddenly alien, strange to the human subject. The animal-monsters of
Hodgson and Blackwood’s work exemplify that change, through their apparent
destruction of the natural order and their implication that nature’s variety could be
endless and make little to no “sense,” as anthropocentric logic does not drive
evolutionary adaptation.
What does it mean for horror stories to be centered on simple animals or other life forms,
rather than demons, vampires, or monsters of some kind? It proves to the reader and
sometimes the characters that “natural” really means “produced by nature” and not
“conforming to one’s own personal or cultural discriminatory grid.” For many of the
characters in the following stories they feel nature itself has been violated, but typically
the only violation is of a territory, and it is done by the characters themselves. Just as few
people would blame a bear for attacking a human near its territory, no one can blame the
creatures contained in this section for much more than responding to what must be
viewed as aggression. The creatures of Blackwood’s stories, which come at the end of the
chapter, are strange in some ways and appear to have more than defense in mind, but
even then they cannot be explained by malice alone.
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I.

Strange Creatures in the Sargasso Sea

William Hope Hodgson created many monstrous creatures that, in the end, were simply
animals. He explored the grotesque bounty of the oceans, particularly the mysterious
Sargasso Sea with its thick drifts of seaweed. All his horror fiction explores, to some
degree, the status of morality in the cosmos and nature, but his biological horror stories
particularly question how natural morality is and find it is not – and that nature is
profligate with forms and to expect it to follow familiar patterns is to live in a hellish
world where evil appears to be everywhere. Evil emerges not from creatures that are
inherently evil, but in a self-centered worldview that assumes everything must be the
same.
It is unsurprising that Hodgson’s views on morality were odd given that his father
was an Anglican minister who was forced to move constantly due to “his unorthodox
religious beliefs” (Bell 1). Despite his father’s occupation, the author had “an extreme
disinterest in religion” that caused problems in the family, according to Hodgson’s sister
(Everts 1). Hodgson’s interest in sea fiction came from his childhood fascination with
sailing – he tried to run away several times by the time he was thirteen (Everts 3) – and
his experience in the profession. Hodgson became a cabin boy and later, in 1895, studied
for and received his mate’s certification (Anderson 8).
The professional side of seafaring appealed little to Hodgson once he advanced far
enough to see it did not get much better. He called it a “comfortless, weariful and
thankless life” (qtd. in Tremayne 12). But he always enjoyed the sea itself, as attested by
his amateur photography. In fact, he managed to take a photograph of a water spout as it
headed for his ship, and he claimed that he finished the photo just before the spout burst
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and drenched him and his camera (Hodgson “Through the Vortex of a Cyclone” 125).
According to Jane Frank, this was barely a decade after the first photographs of these
sorts of phenomena had been taken at all, and in 1920 the Meteorological Office of the
Air Ministry in London purchased prints of some of Hodgson’s photos of weather (13).
His interest in the natural world, and particularly the peculiarities of ocean life, would
carry on to his fiction.
Upon returning home Hodgson opened a gym, of all things. He began to write in order to
promote his school, and probably wrote the local paper’s report on his dangerous stunt –
he rode down a steep staircase on a bicycle (Everts 8).
Hodgson could not sustain himself entirely on his articles and his gym went under (Frank
13). He set about writing at first simply to make ends meet. By the time of his death in
the first World War, though, he had published consistently for over a decade. He was
clearly influenced by his time at sea, but also by certain literary impulses. His letters
reveal that he read several of Bulwer-Lytton’s proto-science fiction novels (Frank 30).
Hodgson’s work was not utopian but naturalistic in the sense that, as E. A. Edkins says of
Hodgson’s poetry, in his work there was “a longing to rationalise and synthesise the
emotions of a sensitive mind with the inscrutable brutalities of nature, a yearning to
understand the baffling mystery of existence” (qtd. in Frank 37). These influences and
forces in Hodgson’s life must have drawn him inexorably toward the brand of horror he is
best known for, in which the natural world appears alien and grotesque but still the result
of evolution and natural forces rather than evil or the supernatural. The “baffling mystery
of existence” lay behind every dazzling new form of life discovered by zoologists and
geologists.
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Hodgson is perhaps best known today for two of his novels, House on the
Borderland (1908) and The Night Land (1912). In the first work two campers discover a
ruined house on a precipice and read the journal of the man who lived there. That man
fought off a horde of pig-men and, in a hallucinatory, revelatory vision, jumped into the
future and saw galaxies and worlds in birth, met his long-lost lover, and returned to his
home. The pig-men are grotesque and frightening, certainly, but products not of nature
but of fantasy. The novel hints at cosmic awareness that even the narrator little
understands. The Encyclopedia of Science Fiction says of it that “a man living in a house,
which apparently co-exists in two worlds [. . .], undertakes an allegorical spiritual
odyssey through time and space, witnessing the destruction of the Solar System; his vigil
in the house, which is located at the rim of a vast Portal [. . .] into the illimitable, has
become a classic example of Horror in SF” (Clute et al “William Hope Hodgson”). The
Night Land works in a similar way, though it portrays a post-apocalyptic world in which
creatures have evolved so strangely that humans have to live in a single colony, the “Last
Redoubt,” to survive while the forces of evil – literally the forces of evil, apparently
released into our dimension by an experiment ages past – ravage the world. Both of these
novels depict powerful grotesques, such as the enormous eyeball that stares at the Last
Redoubt and the enormous ear that vibrates as it listens to orders the humans cannot
intercept.
Hodgson in these stories explores the shifting corporeality of evolutionary
existence, as Kelly Hurley makes clear. She says “[e]volutionism posited the essential
mutability of bodies, and the theory of natural selection seemed to show that any morphic
transmutation was possible, given time, chance and species variability” (“Abominations”
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133). The Night Land is millions of years in Hodgson’s readers future and thus certainly
gives its monstrosities the time and chance needed to evolve to their future forms. The
“occult forces” in the novel “materialise into a bizarre variety of biological, structural,
geographical and abstract forms” (140). The novel also “uses the narrative impetuses of
human degeneration, entropy, the random workings of evolution, and supernatural horror
[. . .] to aggravate rather than contain disorder” (140). But even The Night Land,
Hodgson’s occult, apocalyptic novel, admits that the horrors are not, on their own,
inherently evil, though much of the occult force in the world is. The narrator watches a
rat creature from a hiding spot and sees it drink and curl up near a fire for warmth. Upon
seeing this more normal behavior in a monster, he thinks that “these creatures did be but
of their circumstance” (Hodgson 265). Even in a fantasy of the end of the world and the
remnants of humanity that fight forces defined by the text as absolutely evil, Hodgson is,
as Hurley says, “[a] thorough post-Darwinian” who wrote “posthuman subjects –
admixed and metamorphic entities” (130). Hodgson’s monsters are almost always
intimately bound up with ideas of evolution in some way. But the actual evil unleashed
on the world maintains a spiritual center in the novel as well.
China Miéville identifies Hodgson’s fiction with another cultural event in Britain:
the coming of the Great War. Hodgson enlisted and died in World War I, and according to
Miéville and John Clute Hodgson’s work was “pre-Aftermath fiction” (514). In a letter
from the front Hodgson referred to his own The Night Land in trying to deal with what he
saw around him.
What a sense of desolation, the heaved-up mud rimming ten thousand
shell craters as far as the sight could reach, north and south and east and
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west. My God, what a Desolation! [. . .] My God! Talk about a lost World
– talk about the END of the World; talk about the “NightLand” – it is all
here, not more than two hundred odd miles from where you sit infinitely
remote.” (qtd. in Miéville 515)
Hodgson’s Desolation crept from his fiction, from the minds of not only his readers but of
all the people living in his pre-war and war-time zeitgeist, into the real world. The world
appeared a Desolation for the people struggling against the cultural changes that the end
of the nineteenth century brought about. Hodgson, odd and uneven though his writing
sometimes was, struggled to put this vision into words. The very world appeared to
change around the Victorians – people, time, and nature itself had all changed in less than
a generation. Nothing was a surety any longer; anything could change, everything could
exist. In nature, as Hurley pointed out, “any morphic transmutation was possible.”
Miéville points out that Hodgson’s letter from the front lines locates the terrible in
humans – the war “is here something that was done, by humans, and all the more terrible
for that” (515). The world appears to be a terrible place, a desolation – but humans made
it that way. The fearfulness is not in the world, but put there by people.
Lovecraft identified in Hodgson’s fiction what he called “conventionally
sentimental conceptions of the universe” but admitted that “[f]ew can equal him in
adumbrating the nearness of nameless forces and monstrous besieging entities”
(“Supernatural Horror” 155). Whether Hodgson’s spirituality, worldview, or national
pride was “sentimental” or not, it certainly informed his fiction, though not always in the
way Lovecraft claims. In many of his stories, including all those discussed in this chapter,
Hodgson’s experience with spirituality in the people around him lends his stories an irony
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they would not otherwise have had – in these stories it is clear the creatures assaulting the
characters are animals of one kind or another. They are trying to eat or defend themselves
from the human intruders. But the characters constantly and consistently think of the
creatures as devils, demons, and other evil beings rather than animals. As a character in
another Hodgson story, “The Terror of the Water Tank” (1907), puts it, any one of these
creatures is merely “one of those abnormalities that occasionally astonish the scientific
world. It [. . .] has developed under abnormal conditions” (qtd. in Warren 43). The
abnormality is in the perception of the person, not nature itself – but still nature is capable
of anything. Even scientists are “astonished” by what nature can produce. The creatures
appear demonic because they call into question the assumptions of human centrality in
nature. Human ecologies are not the only ecologies on Earth.
Kelly Hurley says of a scene in “The Crew of the Lancing” – when the characters
are confronted by seal-like creatures with tentacle limbs that still, somehow, resemble
humans – that “[t]he horror of the spectacle [. . .] lies in the indifferentiation of the
monstrous body, an indifferentiation that serves most notably to defamiliarize human
identity” (23). “Lancing” is one of his Sargasso Sea stories, in which a crew of a ship
discovers an area never explored by humans – at least, never explored and reported. The
crews of these stories invariably encounter dangers from creatures that horrify them, and
they have to fend the things off.
It is in his Sargasso Sea stories that one finds the “monster” free of its status as demonic
force – even as the characters repeatedly call it that. Emily Alder points out that
“Hodgson uses the sea as a liminal region in which mysterious events can happen, a
borderland in which his characters may encounter the terrifying Other” (52). This “Other”
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is dangerous physically, but it also undermines one’s perception of nature as ordered or
progressive. Anything can apparently exist in nature, so long as it is adapted to its
environment. So the only limits to life forms in nature are the environments themselves –
and as zoologists were beginning to discover, there were strange environments and
stranger animals in them.
Hodgons’s Sargasso Sea was so far out of the way of human travel that no one
could swear definitely that this or that creature did not live in its “weed-chocked [sic]”
reaches; Hodgson “first began to explore unreality, and the borderlands of human
existence” (Lassen xi) in that fantastic setting. In this setting nearly anything could exist
– generally but not always marine in nature – and the humans who stumble on the
habitats of these creatures tend to be sailors used to the sea but still shocked by them.
They appear unreal or devilish to them, even when, sometimes, the narrator might be
knowledgable enough to recognize the cuttlefish and octopodes for what they are. And
even that recognition does not stop the attacks of the creatures attracted to the ships as
food sources.
Hodgson might have begun to explore unreality, but he based it consistently in
biology and evolution. Everett F. Bleiler wrote that a few of Hodgson’s works were
supernatural, but most “fit into a general category of sea-adventure-horror, in which the
mechanism is sometimes supernatural, but more often, what with biological
monstrosities, is science-fiction of a sort” (245). His creatures leave behind trails of
slime, droppings, and remnants of meals. Fungus creatures take over invaders not through
combat but through growth – the invaders become fungus creatures as well. Humans can
even live side-by-side with the monstrous things at times, though the characters are in
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danger from them. “The Island of the Ud” is the odd story out in this chapter: it is set in
the south Pacific, not the Sargasso Sea. But in it the drunken and avaricious Captain Jat
and his cunning deck hand Pibby go ashore on an island Jat found years before, where the
natives dive for enormous pearls. But as Pibby sits in the boat waiting on his captain, he
hears a peculiar sound, “[s]lither! Slither! click-click, and then a loud squelch and a great
splashing, as if some huge thing scrambling over the rocks, had slipped and fallen into
one of the pools left by the sea” (420). Pibby later hears “inhuman howling” and then
sees lights on the beach (421). It appears at first that the natives are monstrous
themselves, with claws for hands, but Jat, on his return, assures Pibby that the natives
wear giant crab claws because they worship a crab god. But he has to admit that the
priestess he knew, who told him of the pearl treasure, also said “some of ‘em was real –
growed that way; but I can’t think it, scarcely” (424). He and Pibby see their god, an
enormous but otherwise typical crab. “It was a monster, capable of destroying an elephant
[. . .]. The thing was rising higher and higher. Nothing could save the woman. . . nothing
on earth” (432). The natives are sacrificing the captain’s lover who helped him find the
treasure. The crab has come most likely because it is used to food being presented in this
way at regular times. The story never implies it is anything but an animal, though Jat calls
it the natives’ devil. Jat and Pibby shoot the creature, injuring and possibly killing it, as
they make off with the pearls.
The story is an odd one, as the characters, at its end, do not reflect on the horror
they witnessed, only the treasure they carried back to their ship. But the reader is left with
a reminder that the horrors of the sea can disgust one group without disgusting another;
the natives do not find the crab monstrous so much as divine, given that they appear to
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worship it. It is simply a giant crab Jat and Pibby are so horrified of, along with the
danger it and its worshippers pose. Within the confines of the story there is no reason a
crab could not grow to that size – dinosaur fossils continued to amaze geologists with the
apparent size of the creatures that once lived, and certainly sharks and whales could grow
to colossal size in the oceans. So, why not crabs? Jat’s “devil” is really just a creature
grown to improbable, but not impossible, size – and its priestesses wear giant claws and,
perhaps, grow them instead of hands. That is never a certainty in the story – we are never
presented with an affirmation that the claws are anything but cast-offs fitted over human
hands. But the suggestion is still within the confines of Hodgson’s amazed view of nature
– there is nothing in nature itself to preclude such a growth. Perhaps their diving made
hard hands, and then sharpened, hard hands advantageous. This is all speculation, of
course, but it helps to illustrate that even the most fantastical element of “Island of the
Ud” can function within the confines of biology and, in doing so, underscore the sense of
endless possibility and fright contingent in the estrangement of nature from the
anthropocentric world.
Hodgson wrote several other stories in which animals and nothing else threaten
and disgust the characters. They were more often squid and octopodes, those perennial
horrors of ocean biology. “From the Tideless Sea” parts one and two begin with a ship’s
crew finding a barrel sealed with pitch – inside that barrel is an account of what happened
to the Homebird, a vessel lost at sea long beforehand – the captain remembers the ship
being in the news when he was “quite a young feller” (137). The account from the barrel
begins with a description of the Sargasso that Hodgson would come back to again and
again. It says “we are in the heart of the dread Sargasso Sea – the Tideless Sea of the
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North Atlantic. From the stump of our mizzen mast, one may see, spread out to the far
horizon, an interminable waste of weed – a treacherous, silent vastitiude of slime and
hideousness” (137). The account sets the Sargasso up as a foul and treacherous place in
which life is slimy and hideous. It is also murky, representing the letter-writer’s inability
to see the dangers surrounding him, as well as the thematic problem of seeing through the
murk of nature’s methods in creating life forms. The Songbird was trapped in this morass
of weed and slime. The creatures that finally attacked it first came upon the boat. The
narrator says “I stared astern to where I knew the boat to be. The weed all about it was
quaking queerly – the movement extending far beyond the radius of their hooks and oars”
then he hears “the hoarse scream of a man in sudden agony” (143). The creatures
approach like monsters, creeping, hidden by the weed. They terrify before ever they do
anything, and finally they catch someone, but not so quickly that he cannot scream in
pain, thus heightening the tension.
They saw an arm come up out of the weed – only a part of the creature at first, not
the whole entity – and it was “sinuous, and it flickered once or twice from side to side;
then sank back among the growth” (143). Even when the narrator is able to identify the
creature it is presented as a monster; he sees only its eyes, still not the whole thing. It had
“two immense eyes [. . .] I knew instantly to what they belonged; for I had seen large
specimens of the octopus some years previously, during a cruise in Australasian waters”
(149). A sailor has cast a lump of coal into the eyes, and the creature lashes out with its
tentacles. The strangely calm account of identification, sounding more like a report than a
tense account of a fight with a monster, segues back into the fight immediately. The
narrator can offer no advice other than to get away from the ship’s rail. His knowledge of
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the creature’s identity makes it no less hideous or dangerous. The first part of the story
ends with the narrator alone with the captain’s daughter, marrying her and looking
forward to a child and enough provisions to last the three of them seventeen years. They
have built up scaffolding over the open deck, making a roof that protects them from the
reaching arms of the octopodes.
The second part of the story is the narrator’s final missive, found by a different
ship some years later. In it the narrator says that
I have grown to believe this world of desolation capable of holding any
horror, as well it might. Think of it – an interminable stretch of dank,
brown loneliness in all directions, to the distant horizon; a place where
monsters of the deep and the weed have undisputed reign; where never an
enemy may fall upon them. . . (156, italics mine)
He highlights the mysterious nature of the ecosystem around him: it is capable of
producing anything. The narrator even knows why, practically, that is true: “never an
enemy may fall upon them.” He goes on to say humans could never bring adequate
weapons to bear on the creatures, and no other animals contest their place as apex
predators (156), so they simply outcompete the other forms of life that could kill them –
including humans.
Despite the narrator’s knowledge of sea creatures and biology he still views the
octopodes in terms of normative animal behavior and design. They are horrible because
of their physical bodies – he dwells on descriptions of their motion and their limbs
emerging from the water – and because they are preying on humans. That would make
them larger than any octopus on record – they are capable of lifting their arms up over a

235

ship’s rail from the water below – but they are not monster-octopodes, merely incredibly
large. Just like Captain Jat’s encounter with the giant crab, the Homebird’s encounter with
the giant octopus is horrible and grotesque because it is outside the ordinary life of the
Englishmen on board the ships. One can imagine that the sailors and the narrator would
not have the same reaction to a bear, a boar, or even a shark, even though all three can be
dangerous to humans. It is the grotesquerie of the creature that makes it so horrifying, and
yet it is perfectly natural, if larger than usual. The octopus’s body implies that there is no
governing design in nature – at least not one amenable to human design and aesthetics –
because it is a soft, boneless form with arms. Like a snake, the octopus’s tentacle wavers
and slithers, which the narrator calls attention to several times. The creature cannot be
blamed for its actions, and the narrator does not directly do so – he shifts the evil in his
situation from the attacking creature to the habitat that produced it. But that is equally
blameless, in that it did not directly produce the creature; it was only the environment in
which such a creature’s adaptations were most advantageous.
“Mystery of the Derelict” (1907) is another of Hodgson’s stories that is a variant
on “From the Tideless Sea.” It features rats instead of octopodes, but other than that is
virtually the same. A crew comes upon a ship wrecked against a derelict in the Sargasso,
and upon going to help hear terrible noises and have to fight ghastly rats to get back to
their own ship alive. The sounds are terrible, such as the “ghostly, piping skirl” heard
before they embark, “that made so dree and inhuman a sound” (180). Upon clambering
aboard the wrecked vessel they suffer from a repugnance that stemmed from “something
elusive – a remoteness from humanity, that was vaguely abominable” (182). The rats
apparently ate the crew of the wrecked ship, and after fighting them off and regaining
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their own ship, the crew leaves. The narrator of the story speculates afterwards on the
nature of the creatures that nearly killed the crew. He says “[w]hether they were true
ship’s rats, or a species that is to be found in the weedhaunted plains and islets of the
Sargasso Sea, I cannot say. It may be that they are the descendants of rats that lived in
ships long centuries lost in the weed-sea, and which have learned to live among the weed,
forming new characteristics, and developing fresh powers and instincts” (186). Evolution
appears in this story directly, through this speculation on the history of such rats as those
the crew faced. The narrator ends his story with a flourish, reminding readers he was not
there and the story is only one he records “as it is told in the fo’cas’le of many an oldtime sailing ship – that dark, brine-tainted place where the young men learn somewhat of
the mysteries of the all mysterious sea” (186). But this flourish also reminds readers that
the sea is a kind of Gothic place, a mysterious place in which horrors can and do live –
sailors must learn of the mysterious sea, and this story is one of the things they learn.
Like the countryside of a Radcliffe novel, danger and fright lurks everywhere, casting a
dreadful pall over everything.
Another story that revisits the plot of “From the Tideless Sea” is “The Finding of
the Graiken” (1913). It returns to tentacle creatures and retains, as all these stories have,
the “superstructure” – the word Hodgson used each time to describe the protective shell
every besieged ship built over its deck in every story.
In “Graiken” the narrator is the friend of a man named Ned Barlow whose
sweetheart was on the ship Graiken when it disappeared into the Saragsso. Ned kidnaps
his friend the narrator because the narrator owns a ship; he convinces the crew to help
him search for the Graiken. Upon finding the Graiken Barlow is attacked by an octopus:
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“[s]omething was curled about his left ankle – something oily, supple, and tapered” and
when they lift him back out of the water “a mass of weed that enfolded something
leathery, from which numbers of curling arms writhed” comes with him” (212). At one
point an octopus wraps its tentacles around an entire boat, nearly dragging it underwater
even as the crewmembers aboard shoot it. The crew calls the octopodes “devil-fishes”
(212). Once again the narrator knows what the creature is, and knows they are natural if
dangerous, but the pervading mood is still one of diabolic malice. They appear to be evil
because of their disgusting physical natures and their attacks on the humans, but the
humans are simply strange enough to seem like food.
In Hodgson’s Sargasso Sea stories, particularly the short fiction, humans are
reminded that they are apex predators only until something else comes along – and
perhaps there is already something that could prey on humans that has not been
discovered yet. Anything could exist in the natural world and escape detection for
centuries. The Sargasso was not merely a romantic setting for Hodgson’s sea stories; it
was a place poorly explored even in his own time. Legends of giant sea creatures were
certainly on the minds of those who explored the oceans, and biologists wondered if giant
squid might be found in some far reach of the sea. It was a region in which people were
finding strange, apparently monstrous creatures. It was proof that nature could produce
anything and everything and take no notice of the humans that were horrified by the
results.
Hodgson wrote one book-length treatment of this theme of creatures assaulting a
boarded-up ship: The Boats of the “Glen Carrig” (1907). In it there is another ship with a
“superstructure” as well as an innocent crew of another ship caught up in its troubles. But
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the novel not only develops the theme further, it adds features and unrelated episodes that
build up a picture of terror surrounding the entire ordeal. Most importantly, it is the one
story that features creatures patently fictional – not just larger versions of real creatures,
but literary amalgams.
The novel is narrated by an educated man named John Winterstraw to his son, James in
1757 – the back-dating of the novel prevents it from conflicting with any possible
advancements in exploration, and also puts the steam-engine too far into the future for the
ships in the narrative to just steam their way out of the Sargasso’s weed drifts. The novel
opens by saying it is a narrative of the “strange places of the Earth” (1). The crew of the
Glen Carrig are adrift in two boats after an undescribed accident at sea. Wintershaw’s
boat loses sight of the other as they drift, leaving them alone. They find land and odd
trees with thin branches weighed down with “cabbage-like” sprouts (6). Then the crew
hears “a curious, low sobbing” which marks the first sign of animal life (7). This is
followed by a hungry growling that, a little later, Wintershaw describes as “demoniac”
(13). As of yet Wintershaw and the rest of the crew have caught no sight of either life
form.
And they never really do. They sleep in a deserted ship they find up a river,
beached and ruined. Wintershaw and the bo’sun hear new noises in the night from the
deck above them. It was a “noise of something fumbling” (14). But they cannot
tell what manner of thing it might be which produced so strange a noise.
For it was neither shuffling, nor treading of any kind, nor yet was it the
whirr of a bat’s wings, the which had first occurred to [Wintershaw],
knowing how vampires are said to inhabit the nights in dismal places. Nor
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yet was it the slurr of a snake; but rather it seemed to us to be as though a
great wet cloth were being rubbed everywhere across the floor and
bulkheads. (14)
The following morning Wintershaw and the bo’sun find that the room above that in which
they slept is peculiarly “chafed” as though something had rubbed all over, calling to mind
its sound “like a great wet cloth.” But the image of the vampire was invoked, even if only
to negate it immediately. It is clearly in Wintershaw’s mind, and once he mentions it the
idea makes its way to the reader’s mind as well. Whatever sort of creature it is, after that
passage its visits are always like a vampire’s in the night, seeking to gain entry. They find
a manuscript from one of the ship’s original passengers, describing the same sound and
how it appeared to be searching through the ship. In reading the story they pause and “in
a little, something touched upon our door, and it was [. . .] as though a great swab rubbed
and scrubbed at the woodwork” (18). Soon after it approaches the room’s small window,
and they see against it “a reddish mass, which plunged up against it, sucking upon it [. . .]
[Wintershaw] saw that it had the appearance of a many-flapped thing shaped as it might
be, out of raw beef – but it was alive” (19). The creature seems to be a kind of red slug,
slipping and chafing against the decks and walls of the ship in search of the new life
aboard it. Like a vampire it comes in the night, but it is a creature of no intelligence,
questing blindly through the dark for them, unable to force back the barricade the crew
pushes against the door when asleep. The vampire motif continues throughout the book,
with all the major threats to the crews’ lives coming in the night – and at one point even
leaving marks across Wintershaw’s neck. This motif connects the animals to vampires
after Wintershaw mentions the monsters by name. It is the opposition of infinite
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possibility and limited scope that drives the thematic tension here: nature can produce
anything, and has, in the Sargasso. It produced giant slugs and the other creatures to
follow – but Wintershaw can only perceive them through his discriminatory grid, so they
appear to be demons and monsters.
The strangest and most horrible creature in the book follows directly after
Wintershaw’s face to face encounter with the questing red slug. The following day they
seek after a spring the manuscript had mentioned, and in returning find odd trees “soft as
pulp [. . .] much after the fashion of mushrooms”; one of these trees has a shape on its
bough remarkably like a bird, though Wintershaw believes it to be only a growth (23).
One of the crew, George, heard pained crying from the area of the pulpy trees.
Investigating, the bo’sun finds a tree with its limbs wrapped about it, rather than stretched
up and outward; soon dark begins to fall and the tree wails. Then Wintershaw sees “a
brown, human face peering at [them] from between the wrapped branches” and George
sees another in it, a woman’s face (24). The bo’sun realizes something he does not
explain and cuts at the tree, which bleeds “like any live creature” (24-5). Wintershaw
never figures out exactly what the trees are, even though he hacks at a branch that
pursued them as they left. The tree appears to absorb moving life that comes near, and the
multitude of wails and sighs implies that all the trees do the same. The crew has stumbled
on an island with forms of life unknown elsewhere. Certainly Hodgson’s reader would
likely have known of the fly-eating plants, such as the venus flytrap, but these trees are
larger and can absorb anything, even a human. Ghastly remnants appear behind those
absorbed.
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This episode of the novel is relatively short. The crew soon leaves the island,
freshly supplied, and never encounters anything quite like the life there. But this episode
opens the novel and its import is never quite explained. In a story about rescuing
castaways on a stranded ship from dangerous sea-creatures, why does this adventure
appear at all? The novel is a development of “From the Tideless Sea” which includes
nothing like it.
The tone of the novel is certainly affected by the passages. It becomes a kind of
Gothic novel in its beginning, with a haunted wood and a nightmare visitant. The
creatures cannot be explained by Wintershaw or the bo’sun, who leave the Sargasso
believing they have encountered demonic forces. But the novel actually lies in the realm
of the explained supernatural Gothic – such as Ann Radcliffe’s fiction. The creatures
appear to be supernatural, just as the ghosts in Mysteries of Udolpho appear to be real. As
the ghosts turn out to be bandits “haunting” a castle to keep people away from their
treasure, the monsters of Glen Carrig turn out to be nothing more than animals searching
for food or defending their territory. In both cases the threat is very real, but the
explanation shifts the entire tone of the story. Glen Carrig’s opening episode establishes
both the novel’s relation to the Gothic monster as well as set the standard for much of
Hodgson’s fiction: Wintershaw and the bo’sun think of these things as evil but the reader
knows that they are not. Wintershaw, at least, is highly educated, and understands on
some level that he has entered into a strange ecosystem with each encounter. That does
not stop him from being afraid, and even of sharing the bo’sun’s feelings that the
creatures they face are preternatural, but they are not. The island they land on might seem
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haunted, but only by the half-digested people caught in the trees in the way a rat might
still struggle in the stomach of a snake, its shape visible through the reptile’s skin.
The trees and the slug-creature establish that the survivors of the Glen Carrig
have gone from one terrible accident to another; they have stumbled into an ecosystem
with creatures that can prey on them. But the ecosystem cannot support predators like
lions or bears – instead the creatures seem more insidious because they are not
mammalian. They eat and fight in ways disturbing to Wintershaw. Even the trees’ pulpy
texture – like mushrooms – is horrid. Trees are images of strength, in that they
themselves withstand the weather and that their texture makes them ideal materials for
building. Nothing could be made of the pulpy material of these trees. They absorb
humans the way other trees absorb nutrients from soil. They frighten not only because
they are dangerous but because they seem unnatural. But like the creatures Wintershaw
encounters next, they are merely amalgamations of things already encountered in nature.
In this case, trees, flytraps, and mushrooms.
The crew lands on another island, and the rest of the novel takes place there.
While there the crew is attacked by creatures in the night several times and eventually
discovers a ruined ship floating near the island, with survivors of similar attacks still
living in it. As in “From the Tideless Sea” the crew of the ruined ship constructed a shell
over their decks to protect them. As in “The Finding of the Graiken” the crew of the Glen
Carrig rescues these passengers. But instead of simple octopodes the creatures that
confront the characters and readers in this novel are not real animals. They are
composites like the fungal flytrap trees.
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Wintershaw first encounters one of the creatures when he leans over the rail of the
boat, and he says he found himself “looking down into a white demoniac face, human
save that the mouth and nose had greatly the appearance of a beak” (40). Later he wakes
up to find his face slimy and a swollen place on his throat similar to a mosquito’s bite
(51-2). The creatures had touched him in the night and possibly even bitten or pierced
him somehow. Again the creatures come in the night and again they are like demons or
vampires rather than animals – according to Wintershaw. But they have no preternatural
powers, appear to be more intelligent than most animals but not as intelligent as the crew,
and they fear fire like any animal unused to it. When tracking the creatures later the crew
finds they left behind “tracks of mighty slugs amid the mud [. . .] there were other
markings such as might have been made by bunches of eels cast down and picked up
continually” (56). These are the soft bodies of the creatures being dragged along by the
steps of tentacles raised and lowered like feet. The eel tracks are the footprints and the
slug tracks are the body dragged behind. Hodgson’s careful prose makes clear what the
creature looks like even while Wintershaw is mystified. He says of his characterization of
the tracks as slug-like and eel-like that “this is what they suggested to me, and I do but
put it down as such” (56). Even after seeing the creatures more fully later in the narrative
he cannot countenance what they look like.
The creatures take one of the crew, a man named Job, and Wintershaw describes
his body, when found, as “covered with the little ringed marks that I had discovered upon
my throat, and from every place there ran a trickle of blood, so that he was a most horrid
and fearsome sight” (61). Job bleeds as though from a vampire’s bite, but instead of two
neat puncture marks on the neck he is instead covered in the marks of round, needle-
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toothed mouths. The creatures combine the horror of a monster like Dracula with simple
biology – they have some degree of willpower and volition, proven when they take Job
away rather than simply attack him where he lay. But instead of wounds reminiscent of
an attack by a human Job’s body is covered in sucker marks; the bodies of these creatures
are still taboo – wriggly, loathsome tentacles and sucker mouths, octopus beaks and
human faces.
Indeed, Wintershaw says as much when he finally sees the creatures outright. The
creatures were “white and unwholesome in the moonlight, and their movements were
somewhat like the movements of monstrous slugs, though the things themselves had no
resemblance to such in their contours; but minded [him] of naked humans, very fleshy
and crawling upon their stomachs” (90). He goes on to say that “these things [. . .] had
each two short and stumpy arms; but the ends appeared divided into hateful and
wriggling masses of small tentacles, which slid hither and thither as the creatures moved
about the bottom of the valley, and at their hinder ends, where they should have grown
feet, there seemed other flickering bunches” (90 italics mine). So they have tentacles in
place of hands and feet, but still the basic shape of humans; they cannot walk upright
because they have no solid feet, but drag themselves along the ground. They are aquatic
but can survive and move about on the ground, given that Wintershaw first saw one
gazing up at him from the water. They are, from the point of view of Wintershaw and the
crew, in between two types of movement, two worlds – sea and land, swimming and
walking. They appear unnatural because they are not strictly defined, they are not limited
to one or the other. One is reminded of the lungfish, which can also survive out of water
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and can move about on its flippers. Its motion can also seem disconcerting to humans, as
it drags itself along rather than walking.
But Wintershaw’s description brings up an important question as well: why
“should” they have feet instead of tentacles? Wintershaw’s choice of words reveals the
horror that the crew suffers from. They have very set ideas of what “should” exist. If
something has a certain shape they “should” have feet on the ends of the lower limbs of
their body. The only reason for that assumption is the existence of feet at the bottom of
human lower limbs – few other animals even have two limbs for walking, so why ought
there to be feet at the ends of these creatures’ legs? Why even consider them legs? He
does so because he makes normative assumptions about how biology works based on his
own experience and his own body. Mammalian and human bodies form the basis of his
view on how creatures should be shaped, and he cannot see past those assumptions – he
cannot see outside his discriminatory grid – and realize that he is recoiling in horror from
animals. They are dangerous, certainly, and the actions of the crew in fending them off
are still necessary – but the attitudes recorded add to Wintershaw’s horror. He faces, in
his mind, not just a physical threat but a spiritual one. The crew feels the same way. They
seem to fight not only for their lives but for their souls. Job’s body is not just damaged
but ravaged and despoiled – like the women Dracula preys on, or the victims of the
“ghosts” in a Gothic mansion – Job too is a frightening sign of what could happen and
what sort of devilish grip the creatures can exert.
The novel ends with most of the crew safely home in London, even stubbornly
refusing the help of other ships they meet after they get under weigh (132). Wintershaw
marries the fine lady who was aboard the ship he helped to rescue, and she, her
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handmaid, the handmaid’s husband, and the bo’sun all move onto Wintershaw’s estate to
live happily ever after. Except Wintershaw admits that
to this day do [the bo’sun] and I fore-gather, and let our talk drift to the
desolate places of this earth, pondering upon that which we have seen –
the weed-continent, where reigns desolation and the terror of its strange
habitants. And, after that, we talk softly of the land where God hath made
monsters after the fashion of trees. Then, maybe, my children come about
me, and so we change to other matters; for the little ones love not terror.
(132-3)
These are the last lines of the novel. It affirms that Wintershaw and the bo’sun made it
safely back home, but it also reminds readers that more than the physical safety of these
two were at risk. They are still shaken, still gripped by their experiences. In that they
cannot get over their time in the Sargasso they are like soldiers rather than sailors; their
time in the boat and on the succession of islands has marked their lives and their outlooks
– they are not the same and never will be the same because of what they saw and what
they think of it.
These things they encountered are life forms, life forms filling niches unknown in
England. They are simple or complex as the case may be, ranging from fungal trees to
articulated sea creatures that can walk on land and attack apparent food – humans.
Wintershaw and the bo’sun are not shaken for the rest of their lives because they were in
danger, but because they believe they found preternatural creatures – that is, creatures
that are not natural. The ending makes of Glen Carrig an explained supernatural Gothic
novel in which the supernatural is never explained to the characters. The readers know
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that Wintershaw has encountered only animals, but he does not. He still believes he faced
down demonic presences. The limitless bounty of nature has, in his mind, become a
curse, a kind of apocalyptic evil akin to The Night Land’s blasted landscape.
This novel does not depict the horror of frightening creatures or creepy trees; it
depicts the horror of believing that there is a norm in nature and that humans are it.
Believing the world centers on humans and anthropocentric biology – the shapes of
bodies, the way digestion and hunting works – makes everything that does not match
those types horrifying. Wintershaw and the bo’sun believe they have evidence of evil on
Earth; they saw not creatures like themselves, like tigers or snakes or bears, but demons.
They believe they live in a Night Land of their own.
Wintershaw and the bo’sun have populated their own world with demons that were not
there before. Hodgson posits a world that does not have the sort of evil Wintershaw fears.
It does not have demons out for the bodies and souls of good Christians. Those demons
are the products of human minds. The novel does not say anything about God – God may
or may not exist in the novel and in Hodgson’s work – but evolution is certainly the
system by which life arrived at its current form in his Sargasso Sea fiction, and given that
demons are not natural things, natural things are not demons. They cannot be. Their
danger to humans and their loathsomeness are products of, first, their status in their own
ecology and, second, humans being products of different ecologies. One is strange to the
other. This point is where the grotesque of Gothic writers began to produce aliens almost
like those of later science fiction writers. The creatures in the Sargasso Sea are effectively
aliens from other worlds, because they are products of ecosystems strange to the humans
that encounter them. Nature is alienated from Wintershaw by his belief that the
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supernatural remains in biology – like the hypothetical Radcliffe protagonist that never
learns the ghosts were bandits and the festering corpse was an effigy, Wintershaw lives in
constant fear of the unnatural things he encountered, because he cannot explain them
adequately to himself.

II.

Trees as Gothic Alien in the Work of Algernon Blackwood

Algernon Blackwood, for much of his career as a writer, was known as the “ghost
man,” (Hudson 105) but is more famous now for his stories about nature. He disliked the
title and insisted he wanted to talk about human consciousness, which included, but was
not limited to, ghosts (Johnson 195). He was interested in the way human consciousness
interacted with nature. Critically, his work is typically considered in the light of his
lifelong questing after Romantic mysticism.
His father was Stevenson Arthur Blackwood, a Crimean War veteran knighted for
his services.1 Algernon was born in 1869. Stevenson raised Algernon in an Evengelical
household, and even sent him to a strict school, that of the Moravian Brotherhood, in
Germany. In 1886, at the end of this year at school, when he was sixteen or seventeen, he
read Patanjali’s Yogi Aphorisms, which was his entryway to spiritualism, theosophy, and
eventually his idolization of nature. His extreme nature worship seems to come, in part,
from a reaction to his strict upbringing.
Blackwood traveled a great deal, finding more pleasure in the woods than in
cities. He went to America and spent a long while camping in Canada before settling in
New York City. His first publication came in 1889, before he left for America, but most

1

Biographical information will come from S. T. Joshi’s Introduction to Ancient Mysteries and
Other Weird Stories unless otherwise specified.
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of his work was published after 1900. Apparently he wrote a great deal before trying to
publish any of it, so his first major publication was a collection – The Empty House and
Other Ghost Stories (1906).
Most of his stories blend awe, wonder, and horror in a way that make them hard to
categorize. The bulk of the rest of this chapter will deal with “The Willows” (1907) and
“The Man Whom the Trees Loved” (1912). These stories help mark the historical change
happening around the writing of proto-science fiction – “The Man Whom the Trees
Loved” is sometimes difficult to read as a horror story at all. Most of his fiction idolizes
nature, even though many of his stories imply ambivalence in humanity’s practical
relationship with this perfect nature. So the “horror” often comes from the human
characters’ circumstances and the personal danger they undergo; it does not come from
the threats against them being specially evil or awful. They do not even appear evil to the
characters for very long, though they sometimes do when the characters first encounter
them. Products of nature are rarely loathsome or grotesque for Blackwood – he reserves
that feeling for people who ignore nature’s beneficence.
Blackwood never ignored nature’s goodness. Blackwood claimed that “[b]y far
the strongest influence in my life . . . was Nature” (Episodes Before Thirty 13). “In times
of trouble,” he wrote, “as equally in times of joy, it was to Nature I ever turned
instinctively” (14). As S. T. Joshi puts it, for Blackwood “nature worship functioned as an
ersatz religion [. . . T]his perception of nature was linked – indeed, became united – with
[Blackwood’s] mystical sense of the oneness of all existence” (Weird Tale 93).
Blackwood had a romantic view of nature as something that could make people whole,
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usually contrasted to the urban world, which drove people – or people like Blackwood –
to distraction and incompleteness.
Of all the authors Blackwood read in his quest to understand nature, perhaps the
most representative and best-known was Ralph Waldo Emerson. That Blackwood was
familiar with Emerson’s work is certain: he pulls a long quotation from Emerson’s essays
to open chapter thirty of The Centaur (227). Blackwood does not appear to outright reject
Emerson’s ideas, but his stories and his faith in a “cosmic consciousness” point to an
unwillingness, at least, to accept the importance of the human in Emerson’s conception –
even though Emerson still removed humans from nature to a degree. Certainly there was
a great deal in Emerson for Blackwood to like – in “The Over-Soul” Emerson writes that
he finds himself a “pensioner” not a “cause” as he puts himself “in the attitude of
reception, but from some alien energy the visions come” (155). The visions come, it
seems, from “that great nature in which we rest [. . .] that Unity, that Over-Soul” which is
made up of all humankind’s being (155-6). It is appropriate, then, that Emerson figures
among the authors quoted in The Centaur (William James, Herbert Spencer, and
Elizabeth Barrett Browning, among others, adorn chapter headings in the novel as well),
as that novel is Blackwood’s realization of his belief in merging with nature, becoming
one with it. But even then Blackwood removes nature somewhat from Emerson’s
intimation that nature is made up of humans. Certainly humans are natural, and part of
nature, but no longer, in Blackwood’s view, intimately connected to the spirit and
consciousness of nature. The protagonist of The Centaur must die in order to join that
consciousness for good.
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In “Nature” Emerson talks about how natural things, objects and views untouched
by human endeavor, “are the music and pictures of the most ancient religion” and cleanse
the mind (312-3). He goes on to say that nature “is loved as the city of God, although, or
rather because there is no citizen [. . .] the beauty of nature must always seem unreal and
mocking, until the landscape has human figures, that are as good as itself. If there were
good men, there would never be this rapture in nature” (315). This portion of
Transcendentalism agrees well with Blackwood’s conception of nature as separate and
somewhat aloof from humankind, but still something that makes a human better for
interacting with it. However, Emerson says that “[m]an is fallen; nature is erect, and
serves as a differential thermometer, detecting the presence of absence of the divine
sentiment in man” (316). That is the portion of Transcendentalism that would have kept
Blackwood from endorsing the philosophy wholeheartedly; it was not the divine
Blackwood was interested in, only nature. Nature was not a vehicle for goodness, but
goodness itself. Blackwood certainly held transcendental views of nature, but pointed in
his literature to a permanent alteration a human could create in him- or herself if only he
or she could understand nature well enough and become part of it fully.
For some time this pursuit of the mystic and wonderful in nature led Blackwood
to join and participate in the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn (Ashley 96). He left
that organization, as the mysticism it offered did not center enough on nature. But
Blackwood’s conception of nature was more complex than simply equating it with
goodness. Nature can both destroy and heal in Blackwood’s work (Johnson 195). Often,
especially in the fiction, it depends on what people do when confronted with the evidence
of the “cosmic consciousness” through the medium of nature; this confrontation “enables
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man to save himself by acknowledging and celebrating his kinship with its preternatural
manifestations” (Healy 64). So Nature, for Blackwood, is something to emulate in order
to improve one’s own consciousness.
Blackwood’s conception of nature was finally and firmly shaped by works such as
William James’ and R. M. Bucke’s. Blackwood writes in Episodes before Thirty (1923),
his memoir, that he had an early childhood idea that everything was alive and connected,
but he lived in “emotional disorder” until he read certain works: “Fechner’s ‘ZendAvesta,’ and later still, James’s ‘Pluralistic Universe,’ and Dr. R. M. Bucke’s ‘Cosmic
Consciousness’” (13). He insists in the same passage that he wanted facts about the
universe, not “fairy tales” (13). That differentiation is interesting, because it implies that
the entirety of his work about nature might have stemmed from purportedly scientific
views of the world. That is likely the reason he did not become, for instance, a staunch
Emersonian – he wanted a plausible scientific explanation, and no philosophy would
suffice for him.
Blackwood often used the phrase “cosmic consciousness” in his work. Cosmic
Consciousness: A Study in the Evolution of the Human Mind (1901) was a book by R. M.
Bucke, a Canadian psychiatrist who began to question typical views of consciousness
while running an insane asylum (Paglia 74). In Cosmic Consciousness he describes three
forms of consciousness. The first is “simple” consciousness. Both animals and people
share this one, and it is consciousness enough to feel, react to the world, and recognize
one’s own body as one’s own. The second form is self consciousness, which allows a
person to use one’s “own mental states as objects of consciousness.”
The third is the relevant one: cosmic consciousness. Bucke defines it in this way:
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Along with the consciousness of the cosmos there occurs an intellectual
enlightenment or illumination which alone would place the individual on a
new plane of existence—would make him almost a member of a new
species. To this is added a state of moral exaltation, an indescribable
feeling of elevation, elation, and joyousness, and a quickening of the
moral sense, which is fully as striking and more important both to the
individual and to the race than is the enhanced intellectual power. With
these come, what may be called a sense of immortality, a consciousness of
eternal life, not a conviction that he shall have this, but the consciousness
that he has it already.
This may bear resemblances to the traditional Romantic view of nature, but key
differences can help one see precisely what Blackwood is doing in his stories. In this
iteration, it is the physical world itself, and not any sort of deity, that exalts. Nature is the
end of the study, not the means to reach God. Bucke also appears to be positing an actual
change in the person so exalted. Later in his book he uses both the Buddha and Christ as
examples of people who reached cosmic consciousness, though he does, in turn, use their
experiences as data to support his arguments. But these people were actively changed by
their exaltation; they did not just view the world differently, they resided in it differently.
The most important part of Bucke’s theory is that this exaltation, this acquisition
of cosmic consciousness, “would make [a person] almost a member of a new species.”
Bucke is trying to practice psychology here, and in doing so is adding at least a veneer of
scientific speculation to his thoughts. That is very important when dealing with
Blackwood, who wanted “facts” about nature, not “fairy tales.” So Blackwood viewed
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the world as having a consciousness he could connect to in some way, by raising his own
consciousness through communing with nature. This appears in his fiction several times.
In his novel The Centaur (1911), the main character, loosely autobiographical,
travels the world, hiking, writing, and trying to experience nature. He meets two men
who seem to be part of nature itself, and they reveal that he, too, could become one with
it. He desperately wants that, but stalls for time because of his human fear of death. He
fears the loss of his own identity; he fears the end of his time as a human and the
beginning of his time as “almost another species,” but eventually gives in, rapturously, in
the middle of London. Much of the horror in Blackwood’s nature-driven stories – as
opposed to his traditional ghost stories – stems from the threat that people might lose
their personal identity as in Centaur, might stop being human, even if the result is greater
than where they started. The Human Chord (1910) is about an attempt to speak God’s
name, which needs to be sung in four parts. The protagonist and his fiancée are two of the
four singers in the titular human chord, but abandon the project in the middle because
they want to have the baby they have been imagining. The novel contrasts ultimate
spiritual and natural knowledge with the human desire for a family, and the threat to the
hypothetical family keeps the project from going forward.
Obviously not all Blackwood’s stories use science. The Human Chord is about
songs and tones that can define and redefine reality. The Centaur is about a man merging
his spirit with the motherly spirit of nature. That idea is particularly antithetical to the
idea of a grotesque nature. But Blackwood used science more often than those two novels
would suggest. In some of his stories, including a few of his best-known works, it is not
the language of mysticism but the language of science that offers the best explanation for
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the apparently supernatural phenomena. Like Hodgson, Blackwood – who in his life was
fascinated with any and all explanations for the universe – used scientific language to
deal with nature, even though dogmatically materialistic characters are usually buffoons
or driven nearly mad. Specifically, in a handful of his stories Blackwood uses the
language of evolution to explain the alien others within nature, who are as native to the
world as humans, but so differently evolved that a vast gulf of difference opens between
us and them. Humans are often unable to understand these other beings and, as in The
Centaur, fear for their personal psychic safety. That helps one to understand how a writer
who loved nature as well as Blackwood could write stories in which the horrors are
representations of nature in some way. Nature itself becomes an alien, though not
absolutely a threatening one.
“The Willows” begins with a careful detailing of the beautiful scenery on the
Danube, though intimations of humankind’s inability to control it enter into the
descriptions almost immediately. However, the beauty of the countryside still comes
through, especially in light of the characters’ rugged camping trip. “[W]hen the sky was
reddening before sunrise, we had slipped swiftly through still-sleeping Vienna, leaving it
a couple of hours later a mere patch of smoke against the blue hills of the Wienerwald on
the horizon; we had breakfasted below Fischeramend under a grove of birch trees roaring
in the wind” (18). At the beginning of “The Man Whom the Trees Loved,” one learns that
Sanderson, the tree-painter, “painted trees as by some special divining instinct of their
essential qualities. He understood them. He knew why in an oak forest, for instance, each
individual was utterly distinct from its fellows, and why no two beeches in the whole
world were alike [. . . H]is drawing was often wildly inaccurate, and [. . .] his perception
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of a Tree Personality was true and vivid” (211). Neither of these openings are traditional
paeans to the beauty of nature, but they still privilege nature’s position as the primary
“preternatural manifestation” of the cosmic consciousness as related to humankind. In
both openings characters are portrayed as building a special relationship with nature,
which, especially in Sanderson’s case, appears to provide wisdom. The wisdom is almost
mystical, but not quite. It is a deep understanding of nature that surpasses a normal
person’s. If nature is vast and has its own life, how important can we be? Blackwood’s
fiction suggests human unimportance, though much of the time humans can get hold of
something better if they commune with nature.
Jack Sullivan has pointed out that “communion with nature in [. . .] Blackwood
shows us that nature is a distinctly ‘other’ form of life to which humanity is profoundly
irrelevant” (123). Sullivan sees no way at all past this problem in Blackwood’s fiction.
Joshi suggests otherwise, that for Blackwood nature can also be the key to expanding our
consciousnesses enough to appreciate the world and move past the limitations of our
society and our physicality (Weird Tale 93). However, nature itself is still alien to humans
in the way Sullivan suggests. Linda J. Holland-Toll describes this alienness, this
horribleness, of nature well when she writes, about “The Willows,” that horror stories
about alien nature make “human beings diminutive and powerless. By exploding the
myth of mankind’s dominion [. . .] certain horror fictions directly confront mankind”
(25). This confrontation is where the horror lies, and whatever grotesque one can find in
the stories lies here as well.
This alienness leads to the problems Blackwood’s characters face. Unlike many
horror stories, “The Willows” and “The Man Whom the Trees Loved” do not suggest that
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the forces arrayed against the human characters are malevolent. They are simply alien.
“‘[P]rimeval’ apparitions in nature are merely menacing. For the pursued character in the
story, however, the distinction is likely to seem a dubious one” (Sullivan 125). This
distinction is “dubious” for the characters, but important for readers. It allows the stories
to suggest that human systems of behavior are irrelevant to nature, that people ascribe
malevolence to things that, in reality, happen to menace humans when humans put
themselves in dangerous situations.
Similar to Hodgson’s assertion that people populate the world with demons,
Blackwood’s stories point out that Nature functions on its own with no reference to
human concepts of good and evil. To suggest malevolent purpose to a waterfall that kills
someone that goes over it is to miss that the person put himself or herself in a river
ending with a waterfall. Blackwood’s stories use supernatural representations of nature to
make this clear, removing readers from familiar surroundings and sensations.
He effects this removal through the use of evolutionary discourse. In Blackwood’s
fantasy The Human Chord (1910), a character says, “I have often felt – wondered, rather
[. . .] whether there might be other systems of evolution besides humanity” (386). Joshi
points out that this phrase “recurs repeatedly throughout Blackwood’s work” and that
even in the most mystical of his stories, Blackwood seems to feel a need to reconcile
mysticism with science (Weird Tale 109). In the stories of this chapter this is more than a
passing phrase or conjuror’s trick – the themes of these stories are inextricably bound
with the ideas of evolution, particularly the concept that differently-evolved entities
would necessarily have different moralities and ethics. At the same time, they would not
be subject to human systems. They also shock the charactesr because they never would
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have considered trees as sentient or intelligent entities, but evolution had implied htat
other forms of intelligence might be possible in nature.
Of the two stories, “The Willows” features the most apparently-malign entities. In
this story, the narrator and his friend, “the Swede,” canoe down the Danube. They make
camp on a small island which the rising river is eating away, and undefined feelings of
tension worry both of them. In the night the narrator sees shapes and hears movement,
but can identify nothing threatening. In the morning they find their canoe has been
sabotaged and some of their food is missing. They cannot leave. They find strange
conical indentations in the sand. The following night the threats get worse, and the Swede
says entities from another place, possibly reaching through to them using the fourth
dimension, are accessing our world at the island, that the island is deserted because it is
where the border is weakest. They are almost taken by the entities; the Swede almost kills
himself in the night, but another man, a stranger, passes by and the entities take him
instead.
As with so much of Blackwood, the style and mood of the story matters as much
as the events. A summary does little justice to the story. The mood of the piece can
illustrate the moral conundrum and strangeness involved. From the story’s start the
countryside is described as beautiful but also threatening, dangerous, and alien. “[T]he
country becomes a swamp for miles and miles [. . . T]he Danube here wanders about at
will among the intricate network of channels, [. . .] tearing at the sandy banks” (17). The
river is uncontrollable, doing what it likes; it is also violent, tearing at the banks, places
most hospitable to the humans boating down the river’s length. Even when the characters
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enjoy the isolation and joke about it, their language hints at the specific sort of terror they
will soon meet.
The sense of remoteness from the world of human kind, the utter isolation
[. . .] instantly laid its spell upon us both, so that we allowed laughingly to
one another that we ought by rights to have held some special kind of
passport to admit us, and that we had, somewhat audaciously, come
without asking leave into a separate little kingdom of wonder and magic –
a kingdom that was reserved for the use of others who had a right to it,
with everywhere unwritten warnings to trespassers [. . .] (18)
Similar language fills the story. The narrator always speaks of their passing into the land
of the willows as an intrusion, as though there is a life there, sometimes a “kingdom,”
that has nothing to do with humans or humanity. He even pointedly separates his
experiences of nature. As a habitual camper, the narrator seeks humbling views of nature.
He says,
“[g]reat revelations of nature, of course, never fail to impress in one way
or another, and I was no stranger to moods of the kind. Mountains
overawe and oceans terrify [. . .] But all these, at one point or another,
somewhere link on intimately with human life and human experience [. . .]
With this multitude of willows, however, it was something far different, I
felt. Some essence emanated from them that besieged the heart. (23)
All these thoughts are responses to the feeling he has that the willows illustrate
human insignificance and represent “a new and mighty power, a power, moreover, not
altogether friendly with us” (23). This character has thought of as something to
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contemplate; once he does so, he leaves it feeling awe and grandeur. This habit shoehorns
nature into human systems. Emerson’s eye, according to Blackwood, does not participate
in nature; it only uses nature to do something in the human mind.
The willows are not good – but neither are they bad. They are threatening. But as
Sullivan points out, that does not actually mean they are evil. The narrator learns that as
the story progresses. He hints at it early on, in reference to how insignificant the woods
made him feel. The Swede tells him, near the climax, that there “are forces close here that
could kill a herd of elephants in a second as easily as you or I could squash a fly. Our
only chance is to keep perfectly still. Our insignificance perhaps may save us” (51). The
willows, or the entities that act through them, may kill the narrator and his friend. But the
story suggests they are not malicious, only violated – the narrator has trespassed in their
place. They are not used to finding humans there, and it is intimated that the psychic
attacks of the entities are not attacks at all: they may simply be the methods the entities
use to sense and interact with the world around them. These methods are mostly
telepathic in nature, and disturb the narrator when he undergoes them.
The difference between entities provides the only grotesque here. The telepathy is
the most obvious example, as the narrator cannot experience telepathy anywhere else. But
the conical impressions the willows leave also highlight their difference and
grotesqueness. The impressions are footprints, but look like none the reader or the
narrator could be familiar with. They are not only strange but unlike any other footprint.
They go down, not across. They are defined by their depth, their conical shape, where one
would expect footprints of any animal to be defined by a flat shape. These footprints, or
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rootprints, do horrify the narrator of the story, especially when he finds them all over the
stranger who is attacked by the trees in his place.
The rootprints represent the distance between the two types of entities in the story.
This vast gulf between humans and the entities comes from their evolutionary
differences. As in The Human Chord, the characters imagine these entities as on a branch
of the evolutionary tree far separated from humankind. Early in the story, before the
willows pose any direct threat, the narrator says they “made [him] think of a host of
beings from another plane of life, another evolution altogether, perhaps, all discussing a
mystery known only to themselves” (29). The comfort of a threat within nature is denied
to these characters, as there is no way to relate to these entities that seem to hunt them.
Later the Swede compounds this feeling by saying that the sound the entities make “has
that about it [. . .] which is utterly out of common experience. It is unknown. Only one
thing describes it really: it is a non-human sound; I mean a sound outside humanity” (49).
Right after that the narrator says he has been “attacked by indescribable suggestions of a
‘beyond region,’ of another scheme of life, another evolution not parallel to the human”
(50). These entities “have absolutely nothing to do with mankind” (52-3). Alongside the
narrator’s claims that he feels like an interloper in someone else’s country, these
references to alienness through evolution highlights the anxiety that nature has been
separated from humankind. What were once parts of a carefully orchestrated whole –
humans and plant-life – are on totally separate branches of the evolutionary tree, with
vast gulfs between them. The narrator and the Swede cannot understand the entities that
manifest through the willows. In fact, they never get to see the entities or experience
them in any way other than the eerie, gong-like sound that seems to come from within
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them rather than from outside (48-9) and the circumstantial evidence they leave behind,
such as the funnel shaped prints.
The implication is that they cannot experience the entities. The closest they come
is seeing and feeling impressions of things that are not actually there for them. The
entities are nearby, the two groups cannot run into each other, not in the way the friends
run into people in the towns they pass through. They simply do not occupy the same
space, the same world. That is because they evolved along lines so different that there
exists between them an unbridgeable gulf. Across that gulf, either side appears
malevolent. The willows seem to be hunting the narrator and his friend, trying to destroy
them. But at the moment of greatest danger the narrator does not feel any of that
happening. What he felt is that his “consciousness was expanding, extending out into
space, swiftly [giving] way to another feeling that [he] was losing it altogether, and about
to die” (57). As Joshi pointed out in The Weird Tale, nature is expanding the
consciousness of a human when they come into direct contact. But in this story, as
opposed to Blackwood’s more hopeful works, this expansion threatens the death of the
individual. The gulf is too vast – to experience the world in the way the willow entities do
would be to die, at least as a human. No real malicious intent lies on either side of the
gulf. We know the humans do not mean to harm the entities; they may be unable to, as
the Swede hints. The willow entities do not appear to mean harm to the humans, either.
They want to know what this new presence, this intrusion, is. The touch of their minds on
the narrator’s is enough to kill him, and only the brevity of the contact saves him.
Another man, a stranger, passes down the river when the entities are closest to our realm
and he dies instead. The narrator touches the man’s body and rising off it are the sounds
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the entities made, as though they were at work on the body (62). The Swede was almost
taken just before that moment, and says of the pull toward them that he is “going inside to
Them” and “taking the way of the water and the wind” (60). These remarks sound as
though he were about to receive a kind of Communion through his contact with nature.
But evolutionary history has distanced humanity from the tree-creatures, just as
evolutionary theory appeared to distance humans from nature. We evolved in the same
way as the willow trees, but not along the same path. In humanity’s present state two
paths cannot be bridged.
It is in another of Blackwood’s tree stories that defines and comments on this gulf
between separate paths. The story is “The Man Whom the Trees Loved.” This story is not
typically thought of as a horror story, and it is certainly more ambiguous than most. Many
critics do not view it as anything but a panegyric against narrow-minded people who do
not or cannot appreciate nature. In the story, a retired couple, Mr. and Mrs. Bittacy, invite
an artist named Sanderson to their cottage at the edge of an old forest. Sanderson paints
trees, and thinks of them as conduits to mystical realms. He also views them as
individuals, and likes trees as much as people. Mr. Bittacy was a ranger in India and
Sanderson’s descriptions of trees clarifies his own love of them. He finds that trees love
him in return, because he has devoted his life to helping them. Mrs. Bittacy, on the other
hand, is a traditional Christian woman who tries to keep her husband from becoming
more and more tree-like, but she fails. Mr. Bittacy loses his personality to the trees and
Mrs. Bittacy is left virtually alone.
The two reasons the story is so ambiguous with its emotional import is that Mr.
Bittacy never tries to struggle against the trees, and Mrs. Bittacy, who does, is at several
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points in the story gently mocked by the narrator. Healy describes her as “narrow-minded
and obtuse,” and says “Blackwood reveals Mrs. Bittacy to be a religious fanatic who
believes that the supernatural, embodied by her husband’s relationship with the trees, is
evil and to be feared because the Bible does not mention such things” (62 emphasis
Healy’s). He goes on to characterize her reliance on Christianity as an obsession with
authority (62). It is only her closed-mindedness, Healy claims, that causes Mrs. Bittacy to
view the trees as threatening. Her husband accepts them and walks among them easily,
while his wife’s trip into the forest is fraught with peril and danger, all because of how
she views the trees (62). Mr. Bittacy, then, is the exemplar of the story in this view,
someone to be emulated – Mrs. Bittacy refuses to pay attention to the world and keeps to
the model of nature she was given in her childhood.
These images of Mrs. Bittacy have some truth to them. In the work of someone
as delighted by trees and forests as Blackwood, one does tend to suspect characters like
her, particularly when then narrator says that Mr. Bittacy’s “passion [. . .] for trees was an
old bone of contention, though very mild contention. It frightened [Mrs. Bittacy]. That
was the truth. The Bible, her Baedeker for earth and heaven, did not mention it [. . .] She
liked the woods, perhaps as spots for shade and picnics, but she could not, as he did, love
them” (217). In Mr. Bittacy’s opinion, Mrs. Bittacy’s only fault was “this religious mania
carried over from her upbringing, and it did no serious harm. Great emotion could shake
it sometimes out of her. She clung to it because her father taught it her and not because
she had thought it out for herself” (217). These remarks bear out the opinion that scholars
like Healy have of her.
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The story does not let it go at that. Even as she is characterized as closed-minded
– though “great emotion” opens her mind, and one could expect the events of this story to
induce great emotion in her, as they do – the story dwells even more on her good points.
The reader is told that “Mrs. Bittacy, daughter of an evangelical clergyman, was a selfsacrificing woman, who in most things found a happy duty in sharing her husband’s joys
and sorrows to the point of self-obliteration” (212). Despite her dislike for Sanderson, she
assumes he is dressed so shabbily because he spends his money on some sick relation she
imagines. The narrator says she does this “in her genuinely charitable heart” (220). When
she begins to pray for her husband’s safety, the narrator says of her that
in spite of much surface foolishness that many might have read as
weakness, Mrs. Bittacy had balance, sanity, and a fine deep faith. She was
greater than she knew. Her love for her husband and her God were
somehow one, an achievement only possible to a single-hearted nobility of
soul. (240)
Many other references to her goodness and kindness fill the story. So it is not
correct to sum Mrs. Bittacy up as a foolish, dogmatic woman. She is kind, selfless, and
loving. Also, more simply, she is more the main character of the story than her husband
is. After the scene-setting first sections which follow Mr. Bittacy and his conversations
with Sanderson, the story stays close to Mrs. Bittacy. The reader never sees Mr. Bittacy
again except as his wife sees him. It is difficult, at least, for a reader to think so poorly of
the character he or she follows and sympathizes with.
And the story insists on sympathy with her plight. Her husband slips away farther
and farther into the grasp of the trees while she is left alone and, by story’s end, half mad.
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One must ask what she struggles against. That is the other half of this misconception –
Mrs. Bittacy is usually seen as foolish and the trees are usually viewed as benevolent,
loving creatures. They love Mr. Bittacy, surely. The title even states that directly. But they
oppose themselves to Mrs. Bittacy, and are described sometimes in unkind terms. If the
trees are totally good and beneficent, then why does Sanderson claim about the cedar in
Mr. Bittacy’s lawn that it “will protect you here, though, because you both have
humanized it by your thinking so lovingly of its presence. The others can’t get past it, as
it were”? Mr. Bittacy’s surprised exclamation mirrors those who insist the trees are good:
“Protect me! [. . .] Protect me from their love?” (227). Their love is something he needs
protection from, despite the fact that he welcomes it. Sanderson describes the risk Mr.
Bittacy runs by saying “‘Amalgamate’ seems the best word, perhaps [. . .] They would
draw you to themselves” (226). Sanderson values the trees as nature romantics do – he
paints them, using them as background for artistic creations – but only by glossing over
the amalgamation the trees seek. They try to absorb Mr. Bittacy into themselves.
Eventually they succeed, and he is effectively no longer human. Just as in “The Willows,”
the expansion of consciousness brought about by contact with nature destroys just as it
might have created. It does not blast Mr. Bittacy, but the person who was David Bittacy
ceases to be. He moves and even speaks as a tree might be imagined to.
Recall that the cedar protects the Bittacys from the trees because it has been
humanized. It is closer to human than tree, at least in its sympathies. It tries, then, to
retain for Mr. Bittacy his human personality. Forces from the forest do try several times
to get to Mr. Bittacy, only to be stopped by the cedar (233). Eventually it is destroyed by
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the forces out in the forest, who claim Mr. Bittacy, whose human form is “but the shell,
half emptied” (273-4).
The trees are not exactly good, as Sanderson claims. They are also not exactly
evil, as Mrs. Bittacy believes for most of the story. Early on, she hears her husband’s
voice in sleep speaking of the trees, and Mrs. Bittacy feels the tone is “somehow wicked.
Evil and danger lay waiting thick behind it” (238). She tries to ease herself and her
husband away from the fear and the influence of the trees by saying “[t]here are things –
some things [. . .] we are not intended to know, I think” (249). She seeks for the guidance
of God in this moment, recurring to the idea of a world ordered by a deity, with parts
meant for humans and parts meant to be denied them.
However, she cannot fight the trees. Her attempt to go out in the forest after her
husband ends disastrously. Mrs. Bittacy realizes the trees hinder her, open paths for Mr.
Bittacy, and are jealous of his wife (257-262). Her failure out in the woods seals her
resignation, a feeling that builds in her even earlier in the story. She began to fear Mr.
Bittacy’s condition because she realized “its treatment lay altogether beyond her powers”
(248). Near the end, she realizes wholly that the trees are “in some extraordinary sense
not evil” (264). The story goes on to say that,
[h]itherto she had divided the beyond-world into two sharp halves – spirits
good or spirits evil. But thoughts came to her now [. . .] that besides these
definite classes, there might be other Powers as well, belonging definitely
to neither one nor other. [. . .] The failure – or unwillingness, as she
preferred to state it – of her God to interfere and help, that also she came
in a measure to understand. For here, she found it more and more possible
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to imagine, was perhaps no positive evil at work, but only something that
usually stands away from humankind, something alien and not commonly
recognized. (264-5)
As in “The Willows,” the entities are dangerous not because they are malevolent,
but because they are so vastly different from humans that interchanges with them are
simply fraught with danger. The gulf this story deals with between trees and humans can
be bridged – is bridged, by Mr. Bittacy – but not without danger. He loses himself among
the trees. Trees, and nature itself, is something one can be lost in, something that can
change a person permanently.
Also as in “The Willows,” the trees are in this story alien because of their
evolutionary history. An aside readies the introduction of the evolutionary theme. Early
on the story mentions that Mr. Bittacy loves Mrs. Bittacy, despite her shortcomings, and
views her Biblical literalism in the same way he views “horns and little useless things
some animals have not yet lost in the course of evolution while they have outgrown their
use” (218). This comment serves also to imply that our morals, our religious teachings,
are evolutionary constructs based on our history, and not something inherent in the
natural or supernatural world. Given Mrs. Bittacy’s realization near the story’s end, this
story focuses in on something that is only indirectly implied by “The Willows,” that
human morality has nothing to do with nature. This story states it explicitly.
And since evolution is the mechanism that crafted human needs, it was also
responsible for our minds and our morals. Immediately following the narrator’s comment
about useless horns and things, the Bittacys have a conversation over an article Mr.
Bittacy reads. It is about the consciousness of trees.
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[L]isten to this, my dear Sophia. It’s from an address by Francis Darwin
before the Royal Society. He is president, you know, and son of the great
Darwin. Listen carefully, I beg you. It is most significant [. . .] It is
impossible to know whether or not plants are conscious; but it is consistent
with the doctrine of continuity that in all living things there is something
psychic, and if we accept this point of view [. . .] we must believe that in
plants there exists a faint copy of what we know as consciousness in
ourselves [. . .] That, my dear, is the statement of a scientific man of the
Twentieth Century (218-19).
This conversation precedes Sanderson’s visit to the Bittacys. It shows us that Mr.
Bittacy feels sympathy for the trees. It also introduces the idea that biology and the
effects of evolution on trees lead to the trees’ consciousness and desire to amalgamate
with Mr. Bittacy. They may very well have consciousness, even though humans have
long interacted with, cared for, and chopped down trees. Like Hodgson’s stories, this
story reminds readers that nature can produce just about anything given the right
circumstances, and there is no fundamental reason trees could not develop consciousness
– at least, within the anxiety-driven new rubric that made of nature a frightening
kaleidoscope of development and change.
Like in “The Willows,” “The Man Whom the Trees Loved” does not explain its
evolutionary suggestions. It uses them to deepen the mystery around the trees that
threaten human minds. The stories do not dwell on the evolution so much that the entities
are not supernatural; Blackwood is not explaining his aliens as someone like H. G. Wells
might. Joshi pointed out the oddity of the mystical, supernatural stories of Blackwood
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featuring such scientific language, and the tension with worldviews that might imply
(Weird Tale 109). They also situate the entities in our world. If they are products of
evolution, they are not fairies to be explained away by modern science. The stories hint
that modern science simply has not caught up to everything in the world.
In these stories particularly, the evolution themes do even more than make the
horrors plausible. These trees, or tree-entities, are alien from humans just as some people
of the time felt nature was alien. In “The Willows” they suck out a man’s mind simply
from their proximity. In “The Man Whom the Trees Loved” the Christian binary of good
and evil fails to account for them, and Mrs. Bittacy, kind Christian woman, has no tool
that could lever her husband away from the trees, because her tools are crafted for
combating evil and not the misapprehended alien. The trees are not evil, as that is a
human thing. These entities remind the reader that his or her sense of ethics is a human
thing. It is not innate to the world itself, further splintering one’s sense of identity with
the surrounding world.
These stories continue the tendency from the Victorian period to explode the idea
of sympathetic nature. After Darwin this view seemed untenable. Blackwood created
monsters from nature, from trees – things he personally loved very much – to remind
readers of nature’s basically neutral stance outside morality and to employ the cultural
anxiety surrounding evolution and nature itself. Critics are right in so far as they point out
that Mrs. Bittacy’s point of view matters to the events that unfold around her. The story
reminds readers how they might slot trees into their own viewpoint. When she goes out
into the woods the trees see her, and she finds
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she had looked at them from her own point of view; now they looked at
her from theirs [. . .] Hitherto in life she had watched them variously, in
superficial ways, reading into them what her own mind suggested. Now
they read into her the things they actually were, and not merely another’s
interpretation of them. (259)
To attribute evil to them – or even to attribute good to them – is to look at the
trees from a human point of view. They have their own, because they are different from
humans. The story suggests that through their evolutionary history and its language of
alienness.
In both stories Blackwood suggests our inability to actually sympathize with
something as familiar to us as trees by pointing out their different evolutionary history
and crafting entities that are so alien our minds cannot deal with even a short contact. The
trees are relentless in their assaults, but throughout the stories are characterized as
something different from either good or evil. Post-Darwinian views of nature did not
change our relationship with the world as much as it seemed to. Darwin’s theories
actually claim that nature is neutral, literally amoral as it cannot have morals.
Blackwood’s nature is the same in his horror stories, replete with its spirits and alien
entities – they are dangerous to us, and retain great secrets, but are not good and are not
evil. But they are always inexplicably alien and impossible to truly understand from a
human point of view. The narrator of “The Willows” almost comes to understand them,
and the experience nearly destroys his mind. Mr. Bittacy does come to understand them
and is, by story’s end, a tree consciousness in a human shell, perfect for cutting away
strangling weeds and creepers from his companions’ immobile bodies.
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For Blackwood, given his sympathies with ideas such as Bucke’s, this is
important. Humans could, in Blackwood’s fiction, somehow join these beings, something
impossible in most of the other authors in this study (though Lovecraft often threatened
his characters with joining the aliens). But the act of joining them, bridging the gap
evolution led to between us and them, threatens to destroy the human altogether. The
narrator of “The Willows” feels his identity slipping away, and Mr. Bittacy loses his
entirely. They become “almost [members] of a new species.” In Blackwood’s horror
fiction and even in some of his more positive stories – such as The Human Chord – this
threat is too much.
The same threat is not found in Hodgson’s fiction. Hodgson did not create whole
new spectrums of intelligent life. In some stories the grotesque creature is a crab or a
colony of rats, but never anything that intimates that humankind shares the world with a
wholly new sort of intelligent being – though perhaps the creatures in Boats of the “Glen
Carrig” come close. Hodgson suggests in his horror sea fiction that the rules of nature as
posited by humans are, in the end, based on nothing more than the inductive fallacy. Just
because no one has seen a creature of some kind – a snail-octopus-man, for instance – is
not safe reason to assume they could not exist. Hodgson’s insistence that people do not
really know what nature is capable of, but only what they have seen nature do, violates
nature itself from the point of view of one who had such assumptions. That is, Hodgson’s
fiction is most certainly horror, most certainly grotesque, in that it portrays a nature that
seems to be monstrous and then reveals, to the reader if not the characters, that the
monsters are animals in the end. The stories explain their supernatural elements as in the
Radcliffe style of narrative, but prevent the characters from realizing what the reader
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knows. They are not evil, not supernatural, but products of a nature that can make
anything given the right circumstances. Nature can suggest, cajole, and remind one, using
its strange creatures and evolutionarily different entities, that the world might contain
more than one ever thought possible. That idea, in turn, might ruin the tidy placement of
humankind in the cosmos, might suggest the cosmos is neutral and massive and basically
uncaring when it comes to humans. And that is an expression of the anxiety evolutionary
theory left behind. People felt alienated from nature itself, in the same way they felt
distanced from their own pasts and other humans.
The next chapter contains extraterrestrials – fully literary images of the alien,
hypothetically (but rarely practically) disconnected from everything on Earth. These
creatures could be images of any and all types of anxiety, and as evolution settled into the
mind of society and became less of a hot-button issue, extraterrestrials became the focal
points of the fear of the alien, much as they sometimes do today.
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Chapter 5: Final Transformation: The Fully SF Works of Wells and Lovecraft
I.

Overtly Scientific Narratives

If this history of the grotesque, Gothic alien can be described as having a turning
point, this chapter describes it. Neither H. G. Wells nor H. P. Lovecraft cause problems
when labeled “science fiction.” They are both commonly read, published, and discussed
as SF authors rather than proto-SF authors. Wells predates the term, but his inclusion in
the early magazines edited by Hugo Gernsback assured his place in the pantheon of SF’s
first practitioners (Attebery 33). Lovecraft published in Amazing Stories. Both were
widely read by the authors of the first and second generations of SF. Lovecraft’s
reputation has oscillated – Brian Aldiss, in Trillion-Year Spree, is quite unkind: “he
developed a demoniac cult of hideous entities, the spawn of evil, which were seeking to
take over Earth, Cthulhu, Shub-Niggurath, Yog-Sothoth, Nyarlathotep, the Magnum
Innominandum, and other titles like anagrams of breakfast cereal names” (212). Not only
is this judgment of Lovecraft unkind, it is inaccurate. The creatures in the bulk of
Lovecraft’s stories are not demoniac, but alien, usually literally. They come from other
planets or dimensions. Very few wish to take over Earth, as they generally have not
noticed humans at all. This misreading of Lovecraft was once common, likely because his
stories’ narrators often used such terms as “demoniac.” Otherwise acute critics suddenly
fall down when Lovecraft uses an unreliable narrator – they assume his speakers are all in
their right minds despite that being the one thing they are never in. Danger, madness,
other worlds they might inhabit, but rarely their right minds.
However, just like with Wells, nearly everyone read Lovecraft, mostly more
sympathetically than Aldiss does. That is important because, as much as this history has a
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single funnel point, Lovecraft and Wells were it. Most of the first SF writers in the
twentieth century read Wells and Lovecraft. Lovecraft, at least, most assuredly read all
the authors and stories discussed so far – most appear in his critical work, “Supernatural
Horror in Literature.” In a very simplified way, the history of the grotesque, Gothic alien
could look like this: writers used evolutionary ideas to create grotesque monsters in
basically Gothic stories. Machen did so. Other writers used evolutionary ideas to make
similar monsters in less Gothic stories, sometimes approaching what some critics call
proto-SF. Hodgson did this, making monsters that appeared supernatural but were really
creatures living in the depths of the unexplored regions of the oceans. Then writers made
entities that were wholly outside human experience, though generally in some way still
Earthbound, like Blackwood did with his sentient and intelligent trees. Wells and
Lovecraft, influenced by the prevalence of these sorts of stories, created totally alien
extraterrestrial creatures that were grotesque through unfamiliarity.
II.

The Poor, Martians, and H. G. Wells

H. G. Wells lived a success story similar to that of his hero Huxley. They both
rose from relative poverty to wild fame and success. Wells grew up the child of servants
in Atlas House, and the marriage of his parents was “no more than a lingering disaster”
not leavened by the children resulting from it – each was a source of anxiety and Wells’
mother Sarah worried about pregnancy so much that [m]onth after month in her diary she
inserted [. . .] the note ‘Anxiety relieved’” (Mackenzie 15). Wells’ father, Joe, tried to
avoid as much responsibility in his job and his marriage as he could” (16). Sarah sent
Wells off at fourteen to apprentice to the drapers Rodgers and Denyer (33). It was a job
Wells disliked and slacked off on as much as possible – he avoided the chores such as
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dusting, he read or solved algebra problems on the job, and he wrote letters whenever he
could hide them from his supervisor (34-5). Soon after he was let go his mother sent
Wells to a chemist, and while this job, too, failed to work out, it provided him with the
contacts that later allowed him to get into school (39). His chemist mentor, Cowap, sent
him to a school so he could learn enough Latin to become a dispenser; this school was
run by Horace Byatt, who switched him from Latin to physiology and math (40) because
they suited Wells better and – but also because Wells could more easily earn grants from
their study to fund his education, as his mother could no longer pay the fees necessary to
keep Wells in school (39). But he still could not pay for his school after all, and he was
forced to accept his mother’s wrangling and apprentice himself to another draper. During
his time there he read enough to become familiar with evolutionary theory and struggled
to deal with its implications on religion (42). Wells began to try different sorts of
religious services while at his second drapers’ apprenticing, but he could find nothing to
satisfy him entirely (42-3). His job that he hated and the religious pressure around him
caused him to consider suicide (44). When he began to look for a job he found Byatt
again, who offered him a chance to become an assistant schoolteacher and thus learn
enough to one day teach on his own (44-5), and his application to his mother to let him
do so caused his family to be “convulsed with threats and counter-threats” (45). He
managed to secure scholarships for study at the Normal School of Science, at which
Huxley taught and left Byatt’s school to study (50). So like Doyle, H. G. Wells was welleducated in the sciences. Beatrice Webb said of scientists such as Huxley that they had an
“almost fanatical faith . . . that it was by science and science alone that all human misery
would be ultimately swept away” (qtd. in Mackenzie 55). Wells was disturbed by many
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things in his culture, and as he began to write he tried to deal with them.
It is unsurprising that he decided to use his training to come up with ideas. But at
the time his ideas were startling and sometimes frightening. The War of the Worlds (1898)
is Wells’ work most important to this study, but The Time Machine (1895) hinted at what
he could do when he set his mind to it. Indeed, the time around the publication of The
Time Machine saw Wells rise quickly in the literary world. He averaged “one book and
thirty stories or articles every six months” (Mackenzie 116). Those works were greeted
with acclaim and astonishment: Ford Madox Ford said “[i]t did not take us long [. . .] to
recognize that here was Genius. Authentic, real Genius. And delightful at that [. . .] And
all Great London lay prostate at his feet” (qtd. in Mackenzie 116). He had worked as a
journalist before getting his fiction published, and so he could turn his hand at articles as
well as fiction – which made him hard to pin down. People wondered if he were “a
serious writer, an exponent of modern science, or simply a spinner of tales which gave a
scientific twist to the popular vogue for the supernatural” (117). It is understandable why
people would be so confused. His science fiction stories appeared to be great fables of
imaginative power, but his articles hinted that they were not only that; they were also one
of the prongs of his attack on the follies of his culture. The Time Machine reported on a
world changed by time, but also by social forces: the novel shows the effects of evolution
on rich and poor if they were as separated for ages as they were in Wells’ time. The
metaphor is clear. If the poor are kept uneducated, like animals, they will become violent
predators and all they will have to prey on will be the soft rich who do no work.
His background combined to make his early stories – he was clearly disaffected
by both his family’s poverty and his mother’s insistent religious opinions; he found hope,
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as Huxley did, in his scientific education and his belief in the power of science. Indeed,
he would later join the Fabians and give some lectures in their name, though he resigned
and then shortly after withdrew his resignation, but still commenting that he disliked the
society (Mackenzie 185-6). The Fabians would go on to call for eugenics programs with
some support from Wells (Paul 567). That could be considered one of the most extreme
examples of scientific attempts to solve social problems, by simply breeding them out
like a game master would a defect in a dog line.
Wells also kept abreast of the literary scene itself. As evidenced earlier in chapter
two, Wells became, later in life, a sort of father figure to young writers, notably Conrad
and James, who both, for different reasons, did eventually drift away somewhat from the
influence of their former master. What all these things mean is that when Wells decided to
try and write a novel dealing with the imperialist efforts of Britain in the world, science,
the resurgence of the Gothic in Victorian Britain, and an understanding of what it means
to be the put-upon and the trapped would combine.
The War of the Worlds was that book, that combination of the forces in Wells’ life.
In it a man like Wells himself – a journalist with a relatively new marriage – reports, after
the fact, the events both personal and public of an invasion of Earth by the denizens of a
resource-depleted Mars. Brian Aldiss sums up the rhetorical thrust of this novel quite
well. According to him it says to readers “Look, this is how it feels to be a primitive tribe,
and to have a Western nation arriving to civilize you with Maxim guns” (150). In The
War of the Worlds Martians invade the Earth, with their advanced science and weapons of
war. They easily conquer the strongholds of humanity, and are not beaten but survived –
the Martians did not evolve on Earth and are not proof against the microbes on the planet.
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They all catch simple infections and die. This novel expands the sort of idea found in
Heart of Darkness when Marlow speculates how different the behavior of the Africans is
from what the Britons’ would be if subjugated and enslaved by a superior force. Marlow
thinks of it while looking at wasted and ruined villages abandoned by their tenants – The
War of the Worlds is full of descriptions of wasted and ruined towns, including a long
description of what the invasion and exodus of citizens has done to London. The
Martians release a black smoke that chokes the life out of anything it reaches, both plant
and animal, right onto the top of London.
Wells uses the language of the Gothic grotesque in the novel to set the creatures
outside the experience of humanity even as his narrators make sense of them for the
reader, drawing on autopsies and studies done in the aftermath of the invasion. In some
ways Wells’ aliens are more familiar than Blackwood’s trees, since they are often clearly
meant to reflect the British military moving into a new colonial holding – but still Wells
layers over them the sort of grotesque otherness that makes both characters and readers
abject.
The description of the Martians that Wells offers is grotesque enough: they are
almost nothing but heads without noses, nearly four feet wide; they have beaks and a
“single tight tympanic surface” instead of ears; tentacles surround the mouth and take the
place of hands and feet. They are not strong enough to carry the Martians in Earth’s
higher gravity and the narrator calls the Martians with this body “the most unearthly
creatures it is possible to conceive” (1621). The Martian is an amalgam, making it
grotesque in that way – combining traits of humans with those of birds and sea creatures.
But it also imbues the Martians with the commonly-felt grotesqueness of the octopus or
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squid (tentacles), the frightfulness of the bird of prey (a beak on a powerful creature), and
the grotesqueness of a mutilated human. The Martian is nothing but head, reminding
readers both of where the actual personality of a person is – the brain – and that their
body is vulnerable both to danger and evolutionary pressure. There is no ear on the
Martian body, only that “tympanic surface” exposed on the back of the head. Imagine for
a moment your eardrum exposed on the back of your head. It is a frightening image,
particularly to anyone who has experienced a punctured eardrum. But the Martians are so
reliant on their devices, presumably, that the exposure of the membrane does not matter.
It is never exposed to the environment because of the shell of machinery the Martian
functions within.
Wells’ aliens are physical grotesqueries, but they also engage in practices
horrifying to readers. In John Rieder’s words, they are vampires “who descend on
mankind like a Biblical plague and are defeated by the micro-organisms which God, in
his infinite wisdom, has spread upon the Earth. They are like a disease; the world is an
organism and it finally rejects them” (30). Over the course of the novel readers learn that
they feed by draining blood from victims and inject it straight into their digestive
systems, atrophied as they are. They drain victims like doctors might, with IV systems,
and feed using similar mechanisms. They play with both the vampire trope and the
frightful doctor trope that Wells had already used to good effect in The Island of Doctor
Moreau (1896).
It is questionable if the story really suggests that God or Mother Nature intervenes
with the thoughtful placement of microorganisms, but Rieder’s comparisons to vampires
and disease are entirely apt. Both things horrify, both make readers abject by forcing
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them to consider the state of their own bodies – both threaten the sanctity, the healthful
unity of the human body. Vampires threaten one’s bodily fluids, the abject dross Kristeva
identifies (along with feces, urine, and other bodily productions) as things both of us and
not of us. The vampire makes his victim’s blood his own and sometimes his blood his
victim’s. Disease makes one abject by infecting in an uncontrollable way, through
breathing, eating, or drinking. Humans are powerless against disease itself, and can only
treat and mitigate the illnesses caused by it. Wells’ Martians are equally powerful,
widespread, and ineffable.
Aldiss suggests instead that the aliens are horrifying because they are like
humans. He focuses on the autopsy of a Martian, conducted after the invasion fails, and
the narrator’s assertion that Martians probably evolved from creatures very similar to
humans. Aldiss says
[i]t is this linking of the Martians with humanity, rather than separating
them from it, which shows Wells's superior creative powers. [. . .] Wells's
nonhumans, his Martians, Morlocks, Selenites, and Beast-People, are
creatures not of horror but terror; they spring from a sophisticated
acknowledgement that they are all part of us, of our flesh. (151)
Aldiss also takes time in this passage to complain about other writers of Wells’ day, who
wanted nothing but to frighten, and desperately tries to distinguish Wells from these
purported hacks. While making an excellent point Aldiss misses the point. He is right to
point out that the Martians are linked to humans by a tenuous but powerful thread. They
are apparently mammalian, apparently the result of evolution on a human-like species,
selecting over time for brain power and dropping away superfluous traits like physical
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power, like a species of cave frog losing its sight. But in his attempt to canonize Wells at
the expense of horror writers of his day, he exorcises War of the Worlds of its horror.
Darko Suvin is more careful than Aldiss. He says that Wells
masterfully translates some of the oldest terrors of man—the fear of
darkness, monstrous beasts, giants and ogres, creepy crawly insects and
Things outside the light of his campfire, outside tamed nature—into an
evolutionary perspective that is supposed to be validated by Darwinian
biology, evolutionary cosmology, and the fin-de-siècle sense of a historical
epoch ending. Wells, a student of T. H. Huxley, eagerly used alien and
powerful biological species as a rod to chastize Victorian man. . . (“Wells
as the Turning Point of the SF Tradition” 107).
Wells, then, transformed the grotesque into the alien using evolution. Their vampiric
nature, for instance, is not horrifying from the right point of view, which the narrator tries
to achieve in his account. He says “[t]he physiological advantages of the practice of
injection are undeniable, if one thinks of the tremendous waste of human time and energy
occasioned by eating and the digestive process. Our bodies are half made up of glands
and tubes and organs, occupied in turning heterogeneous food into blood” and one’s
mood can be affected by how well all these mechanisms work (1639). The narrator is
still frightened for his life; the Martians are still killing humans in an attempt to take over
the planet. But amid recounting these concerns the narrator also talks about how efficient
the Martian method of gaining sustenance is. He cannot help but see that they are, in
some way, more “advanced” than humans, who are still the subjects of their bodies rather
than the masters.
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That can horrify a reader by overturning his or her view of the world, and
supports Wells’ thesis that sympathy is necessary for people under colonial rule, as
British whites would feel as terrible and be as destitute if assaulted by superior military
might in their own homeland. The narrator says several times that he feels like a helpless
rabbit before the might of the Martians, both scaring the reader – since a middle class,
white British man could be made to feel that way, the Martians are extremely frightening
– and pointing out that colonial military force makes other humans feel like helpless
rabbits and no longer like humans at all.
The Martians also horrify because they remind readers that it is possible that
aliens such as the Martians could exist. With new planets being discovered and already
known planets being studied with higher powers of telescope, new worlds were opening
to the popular consciousness. And with evolutionary theory propagating so widely in late
Victorian society more people understood, or could at least be exposed to, the idea that
life on these worlds would be different than on Earth. Like Hodgson and the Sargasso, in
War of the Worlds Wells explores what life from another place would be like. He reminds
readers that one’s physical form is a result of the ecological circumstances surrounding
the history of its evolution. The Martian form, grotesque as it is, makes sense for the
Mars of Wells’ novel. The reader must accept that Mars could produce such grotesques as
the Martians in order to read the novel; accepting that implies acceptance of the idea that
the creatures are not truly grotesque – they do not violate a natural order, they are
products of a natural order, just as humans are. As Hodgson did on the sea Wells did in
space – both remind readers that nothing evolved is different from anything else that is
evolved. Humans are just as much products of evolutionary forces and ecological
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pressures as any other creature, including the Martian that has been driven to invade
Earth and try to kill all humanity. The Martian must do so because of its drive to live, as
its former home is completely depleted of the resources necessary for continued life.
One of the most frightening reminders of this truth the novel asserts is near the
end, when the narrator reports the speculation that the Martians also went to Venus. The
invasion “robbed [humanity] of that serene confidence in the future” since humans can no
longer assume they are alone or that they are on top of the food chain (2374). However,
the narrator hopes that will bring its positive effects as well, since it could dissipate the
“decadence” of his culture. However, it has not fixed all the problems in his culture. It is
as imperialistic as ever. Upon thinking that the Martians have made it to Venus, the
narrator remarks that “[i]f the Martians can reach venus, there is no reason to suppose
that the thing is impossible for men, and when the slow cooling of the sun makes this
earth uninhabitable, as at last it must do, it may be that the thread of life that has begun
here will have streamed out and caught our sister planet within its toils” (2383). He does
go on to think that perhaps it will be the Martians, and not Earthlings, spreading
throughout the universe. But in the narrator’s vision the humans will do precisely what
the Martians did – leave the planet that bore them but can no longer sustain them and
spread out to preserve their own lives. The narrator never wonders if there are native
Venusians, or what will happen if the Martians succeed on Venus before the humans
arrive. Even the narrator who felt like a helpless rabbit in the face of the Martians
maintains his own culture’s sense of right when it comes to spreading and seeking new
resources. In this novel Wells makes something to be afraid of – something alien,
grotesque, and dangerous – but by the end implies that humans are exactly the same as
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the Martians, excepting they have not continued as far along a line of evolutionary
progress and that they have not met the sort of global need that drove the Martians. Only
time and circumstance separates the conquerors from the nearly-conquered in any
meaningful way.
III.

The Alien as Totally unhuman in the Works of H. P. Lovecraft

Aldiss’s claims about the Martians are still somewhat valid. The Martians are still
inexplicably human-like, and the narrator does still suggest that they came from
progenitors very similar to current humans. Wells used evolution to produce aliens, and
grotesque aliens at that, but he started with a base of humanity that he altered through
millions of years of evolutionary change in harsh Martian conditions – in a way similar to
his production of the Morlocks and the Eloi of The Time Machine. So the horror of the
Martians is, in part, that humans could be like them if only Earth ended up duplicating
Mars’ conditions. War of the Worlds does remind the reader that human traits are due in
part to ecological circumstances, but it does not confront the reader with the entirely
alien.
That is what H. P. Lovecraft tried to do. His fiction has long been recognized as a
portrayal of a world that has no interest in humanity. The world behaves according to
fixed natural laws in the philosophy of both Lovecraft and his fiction, and human codes
of behavior, relations, even civilization itself, are ways to cope with the reality that the
world takes no notice of humans. Most of the attention paid to this theme in scholarship
in Lovecraft’s work has focused, rightly, on the cosmic scale and the philosophical
determinism in his work – the cosmic canvas he worked on and the deterministic monism
that influenced his thought. However, the alien appears in other ways within Lovecraft’s
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work. Several Lovecraft stories collapse morality into a single point contrasted against
nature itself. The whole of human morality, typically the binary between Good and Evil,
becomes a single spot on a larger spectrum with other creatures, evolved in different
paths than humanity, occupying the other spaces. These stories undermine the faith
placed in moral codes, which had already been weakened by the First World War.
Lovecraft had an early fascination with science. Before he was ten he read
treatises on anatomy, geology, and chemistry, and wrote his own treatises on the subject
of chemistry (Joshi Dreamer 28-9). A few years later, around the age of thirteen, he
produced his own hectograph magazines on astronomy (Joshi Dreamer 41). His early
interest in science stayed with him throughout his life, ensuring his biological horror
fiction would deal in some way with the theories of evolution so controversial just
decades before. He was likely drawn to such themes by his racism as well – China
Miéville calls him a “bilious lifelong racist” and points to his pronouncements about the
fundamental inferiority of “the Negro” as well as his early – pre-Holocaust –
endorsement of Hitler (xviii). He goes on to say that Lovecraft’s racism was not simply a
product of his time – but that it was also “a central engine for what we admire in
Lovecraft’s art” (xviii-xix). Finally, despite Lovecraft’s fascination with biology, Miéville
determines that Lovecraft’s racism was not biological, but cultural, given his belief that
some races or cultures at least – Jews, specifically, given his marriage to Sonia H.
Greene, a Jew – could be “well assimilated” (xviii).
Kenneth Hite, like Miéville, views Lovecraft’s racism as a powerful motivator of
Lovecraft’s fiction, and in writing on “The Horror at Red Hook” (1925) – Lovecraft’s
most overtly racist story – Hite says that “the racism is fully intentional [and not
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accidental. . .] that sheer drive, [sic] to indict his neighbors for the crime of inspiring his
hatred, [sic] makes the story just compelling reading” (52-3). Michel Houellebecq claims
his racism began in earnest in New York – around the time he wrote “Red Hook” – and
that
[i]t first appears in a most banal form: unemployed, threatened by poverty,
Lovecraft had more and more trouble tolerating the hard and aggressive
urban environment. Furthermore, he began to feel bitterness toward
immigrants of divers origins, who he saw blending easily into the swirling
melting pot that was America in the 1920’s, while he himself, in spite of
his pure Anglo-Saxon origins, was unable to find any work. (100)
Houellebecq locates Lovecraft’s racism in jealousy and an inability to fit in. It
actually started much earlier in Lovecraft’s life, but may have roughly those origins.
Joshi points out that Lovecraft’s family were all virulently racist – his father once had
hallucinations that a “negro” was “molesting his wife” and Lovecraft’s most hatefully
racist letters were reserved for family, rather than friends (Dreamer 55). But Lovecraft,
by his own account, was an “anti-Semite.” Those feelings flared to life apparently when
he entered high school, long before he moved to New York: Hope Street High School had
what he called “a considerable Jewish attendance.” He goes on to say that “[i]t was there
that I formed my ineradicable aversion to the Semitic race. The Jews were brilliant in
their classes – calculatingly and schemingly brilliant – but their ideals were sordid and
their manners coarse” (qtd. in Joshi, Dreamer 55). These are the old, traditional racist
assumptions about Jewish people, probably, as Houellebecq claims, driven in part by
jealousy. Lovecraft was a brilliant youth but could barely function in a public school,
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given his frequent nervous breakdowns. His racism, then, seems to come from the
confluence of his pride in his racial heritage and his inability to compete with the people
around him. So long as they stayed out of his way, then, he would be relatively accepting
– as he was with his own wife. Lovecraft’s racism made him fear cultural intermingling
and deterioration, similar to Haggard’s anxieties about the downfall of the British Empire
– Lovecraft was, in fact, a fan of Ernst Haeckel’s (SLII 160) and believed cultures could
and would fall because of too much mingling of disparate cultures, creating a mish-mash
with no distinct cultural identity.
In his exploration of the interplay of races and cultures, Lovecraft created
extrapolated entities and races to contrast with humanity. These figures abide by codes
they have built up in the same way humans build them up, but these codes are alien
because of their placement on another branch of evolution altogether. That helps to
illustrate Lovecraft’s idea of “cosmic indifferentism.”1 The stories considered in this
chapter are “The Shadow over Innsmouth” (written 1931; published 1936), “The Call of
Cthulhu” (written 1926; published 1928), and At the Mountains of Madness (written
1931; published 1936). In these stories, a group of aliens, the Deep Ones or the Old Ones
– are contrasted with humanity to illustrate human dependence on codes that have
nothing to do with the natural order of things, and to show the weak foundations of those
beliefs and how easily they could collapse. Morality, like behavior, is an artifact of
evolutionary history. Cultures value what they do for specific reasons, and not because
nature itself decrees those things to be good. Lovecraft’s aliens value different things, and

1

Simply that the universe does not and cannot care about humanity; belief that it does constitutes
an anthropomorphizing fallacy regarding nature and the universe. c.f. Joshi Decline 3, Joshi A Life 205,
Lovecraft SLII 150, Mariconda 188. Colavito speaks of it as “scientific materialism” (185).
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are opposed to the humans of his stories, but the reader cannot claim either group to be
evil. In Lovecraft’s fiction this always helps to highlight his “cosmic indifferentism.”
The cosmic canvas Lovecraft worked upon is widely recognized. His stories
reflect his view of an “indifferent and unknowable universe” which behaved like a “vast,
purposeless machine” (Mariconda 188). It is an atheist’s universe. Lovecraft described
his position as “mechanistic materialist,” deriving from “Leucippus, Democritus,
Epicurus, and Lucretius – and in modern times, Nietzsche and Haeckel” (SLII 160). This
particular strain of thought is centuries older than Darwin, of course, and Joshi has
pointed out that Lovecraft was hardly original in his philosophical stance (Decline 6). He
did not come up with his own ideas, or even his own interpretations of the ideas of others.
He synthesized these ideas into his fiction, creating monsters so alien and so much more
powerful than humanity that they drive home the point that humanity cannot affect the
cosmos in any real way. It clicks on without us, like that vast machine, and our lives play
out without any hope of intervention from a kind Nature or a benevolent God. Cthulhu,
Yog-Sothoth, and the other godlike creatures impress humanity so much that some people
worship them; they represent the nature humans misunderstand so badly as to layer their
own beliefs onto it – for instance, in “Call of Cthulhu” a band of cultists believe Cthulhu
will rise and teach them new ways to revel and fight (Cthulhu 105), while readers
understand Cthulhu has no interest in these people or any others. He lies dormant because
of an accident in tectonics.
These ideas of materialism preceded Darwinism, sometimes by centuries. They
define the way Lovecraft’s fiction portrays the relationship between humans and the
universe around them. But Lovecraft was not satisfied with focusing wholly on the
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universe at large, though most of his fiction does to some degree. He also wrote stories of
biological horror. Sometimes nothing comes from space at all in Lovecraft’s fiction; it
grows on Earth, but differently than humans. The Deep Ones of “The Shadow over
Innsmouth” are one example. The alteration, breeding, and evolution of these life forms
summons to mind the Darwinian and post-Darwinian conception of nature as either
morally neutral or morally evil, opposed to the ideal of nature as inherently good.
In the chapter of A Life dealing with Lovecraft’s materialism, Joshi points out that
“Darwin, Huxley, Haeckel and others who [. . .] brought more and more phenomena
under the realm of the known and the natural” (204) were some of the most important
writers and philosophers Lovecraft used to form his materialist worldview. Particularly,
he disavowed the presence of an immaterial soul, asking those who claim humans have
souls but animals do not “just how the evolving organism began to acquire ‘spirit’ after it
crossed the boundary betwixt advanced ape and primitive human? It is rather hard to
believe in ‘soul’ when one has not a jot of evidence for its existence” (qtd. in A Life 206).
This question, with its evolutionary scale in place between apes and humans, implies that
there is no significant difference, save possibly the level of development in intelligence –
something that, in the vast, cosmic view Lovecraft adopted, mattered little.
Lovecraft’s fiction usually hinted at his cosmic indifferentism, so it follows that
some would follow his twentieth century Darwinism. “Shadow over Innsmouth” certainly
does. In this story, an unnamed narrator, Robert Olmstead in Lovecraft’s notes (Joshi
“Notes” 410), goes on a trip to research his family tree. While stopping over in
Newburyport he hears about Innsmouth and the strange ways of its citizens – he even
sees some examples of the strange jewelry the women sometimes wear – and takes a bus
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into the town to make a connection into Arkham. While he is stuck for the night he
investigates the town’s history and learns, finally, that the patriarch Obed Marsh brought
back rites and rituals that could call from the ocean floors a race of fish-frog people,
called the Deep Ones, who help the Innsmouth fish-trade by increasing the fishing off the
coast. As payment the Deep Ones demand inter-marriage, the chance to continue their
race using Innsmouth people as breeding stock. The final shock of the story is that
Olmstead is descended from the hybrid Innsmouth people, and considers killing himself,
only to come to terms with his heritage and dream of returning to his people and his
ancient Deep One matriarch.
The common view of the story is that Olmstead’s submission and return to his
Deep One roots is a moment of supreme horror, especially for the famously-racist
Lovecraft. Maurice Lévy says that “[t]he monster is revolting not only because it escapes
logic and constitutes a disturbance for the reason, but also because it is propagated and,
little by little, corrupts the individuals of a healthy race” (57, emphasis added). Joshi has
said the story “is about the inexorable call of heredity” (“Notes” 411). In that light, he
leads his reader to the conclusion that one is to feel endangered by Olmstead’s giving in
to heredity – the risk, perhaps, is that anyone may. Everyone is at risk of reverting to an
older, hereditary type. Joshi has said elsewhere that “the narrator can certainly flee his
pursuers, but he cannot flee so easily from his own past [. . .] Lovecraft surely means us
to see his transition as an augmentation, not a diminution, of the horror – a seemingly
‘normal’ person [. . .] has become an alien!” (Weird Tale 224).
This view has its problems. Kenneth Hite has said that the story has Olmstead
“welcoming the kind of miscegenation that is supposedly one of HPL’s unbreakable
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taboos” though it could be that he expresses “empathy with Olmstead without sympathy”
(85). So it is true that Olmstead’s slipping into the waters of the Deep Ones is not a
moment of celebration; it also is not as intensely terrible as Lévy or Joshi imply.
Certainly some of a reader’s horror comes from the threat the protagonist suffers, and the
end of the story lightens Olmstead’s fear to almost nothing. How might the reader take
this transformation in him, if not as a threat that he or she could all succumb to biology
(which is true enough – what else might the story imply)?
“Shadow over Innsmouth” washes away human moral order by claiming it has
nothing to do with biology and the surrounding world. There is no morality, only biology.
Both cultures in the story, human and Deep One, have their own codes, equally artificial.
The Deep Ones are grotesque, as they are ancient fish people, but the hybrids are worse.
They are born looking mostly human and change over the course of their lives until they
can live under the water as well as their aquatic parents. Their faces change and anyone
nearly through the transfiguration must be hidden from any possibility of strangers seeing
them. Despite this grotesqueness the Deep Ones do nothing more than most species
would do – seek to propagate their race. Readers are forcefully reminded that the
grotesqueness lies in perception, particularly when Olmstead changes his mind and is no
longer horrified. It is perspective that makes the fish people awful, not some inherent
monstrosity.
The story opens not with a scene setting, or a philosophical musing on human
curiosity, or even anything regarding race and horror. Instead it begins with an almostnewspaper-like account of the results of Olmstead’s escape from Innsmouth.
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During the winter of 1927-28 officials of the Federal government made a
strange and secret investigation of certain conditions in the ancient
Massachusetts seaport of Innsmouth. The public first learned of it in
February, when a vast series of raids and arrests occurred, followed by the
deliberate burning and dynamiting – under suitable precautions – of an
enormous number of crumbling, worm-eaten, and supposedly empty
houses along the abandoned waterfront. Uninquiring souls let this
occurrence pass as one of the major clashes in a spasmodic war on liquor.
(Cthulhu 268).
Olmstead goes on to talk about those who inquired too much into the matter, mainly
reporters; these people were shown certain things captured from the town, and they
promptly stopped all inquiry. They were shown some of the Innsmouth residents too far
along in their transformation to appear human – perhaps the government even captured
some wholly transformed Deep Ones as well. This passage increases the suspense:
Olmstead implies it is not a G-Man raid on whiskey stills that led to the dynamiting. It
also begins the story’s appeal to rationality and civilization. The careful, news-worthy
reporting of the story distances readers from the events, allowing them to take in any
atrocity through the lens of what it means to the populace. The opening passage frames
the whole story as a rational and moral investigation: Olmstead appeals to the “Federal
government” as an authority. They, he might have said, felt the need to destroy part of the
town, in total secrecy, in the middle of winter. A higher authority has decided these things
are terrible. The rest of the story represents Olmstead’s narrative making-sense of things;
he is an antiquarian and a student of his genealogy (269-70). He is used to forming order
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out of chaos, something often useless for any Lovecraftian protagonist to try. His name
may even be a pun, though it does not appear in the story: Olmstead may be very steady
indeed. He is a calm person, and shrewd – one of the first interactions he has in the story
is with the man who tells him about the Innsmouth bus. Olmstead asks about it because
he is trying to save money by avoiding the expensive train (270). Not the most
compelling character trait, but it serves to get him into the town of Innsmouth as well as
show readers he carefully weighs every decision and chooses based on the greater good –
even if the best thing is just to save a little money.
The Innsmouth residents, on the other hand, are consistently characterized
through most of the story as evil and malevolent. It begins back in Newburyport, when
the ticket agent provides the first of several narratives about the Innsmouth people
delivered by someone from outside the town. He says, with the characteristic denial of
someone not at risk, that “[s]ome of the stories would make you laugh – about old
Captain Marsh driving bargains with the devil and bringing imps out of hell to live in
Innsmouth, or about some kind of devil-worship and awful sacrifices in some place near
the wharves” (271). He goes on to bring up Devil Reef. All these assertions are true,
though. Marsh did strike a bargain, he did bring up Deep Ones to live in Innsmouth, they
do worship a creature – Dagon – in the town, and there were terrible sacrifices back in
1846 when Marsh led his loyal followers and Deep One allies against those who balked
at the deal. It is not just a screen to hint at what Olmstead will learn later in the story – the
language is equally important. It starts connecting the Innsmouth residents, especially
those who mate with the Deep Ones and their hybrid children, with images of deviltry
and evil. The human town of Newburyport views Innsmouth as the devil’s place. This
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impression grows on Olmstead soon after he arrives in town, as he sees a figure he
assumes is the pastor, since it is in robes in the church. This figure burned “into [his]
brain a momentary conception of nightmare which was all the more maddening because
analysis could not shew a single nightmarish quality about it” (283-4). Olmstead points
out this is almost the first person he sees in town, and this nightmarish conception, tied to
the church’s pastor, heightens the devilish, evil quality of the town. If the church is so
evil, one might ask, what can the rest of the town be like?
They are creepy, too, which suits a group of people equated to devils. The ticket
agent also gives readers the first account of the famous Innsmouth look, the appearance
that the hybrids take on as they change from human to Deep One.
I do not know how to explain it, but it sort of makes you crawl [. . .] Some
of ‘em have queer narrow heads with flat noses and bulgy, stary eyes that
never seem to shut, and their skin ain’t quite right. Rough and scabby, and
the sides of their necks are all shriveled or creased up [. . .] Animals hate
‘em – they used to have lots of horse trouble before autos came in. (272-3)
Olmstead finds later that this, too, is accurate enough. It also hints at the oceanic origins
of the Innsmouth “look.” The references to the look making people “crawl” when they
see it, as well as animals hating them, cements in the readers’ minds the idea of the
Innsmouth people as unnatural, evil beings. As Bennett Lovett-Graff put it, this is the
“mythic image of animals as accurate indicators of what is ‘right’ in the natural order”
and it suggests “the profound wrongness of the inhabitants of Innsmouth.” The story’s
beginning uses many traditional mechanisms to associate the Innsmouth people with evil,
in Olmstead’s head and the reader’s.
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This association seems to bear out over the course of the story. Olmstead has an “evil
reaction” to Joe Sargent, the bus driver, so strange he has to observe him carefully to
make sense of it. The picture is disconcerting – Sargent is an unpleasant sight to the
narrator, especially his skin, which was “queerly irregular, as if peeling from some
cutaneous disease” (279). A result of the advance of his transformation into a Deep One.
To Olmstead it is merely repulsive. The town of Innsmouth itself, like Sargent, is an
unpleasant sight to Olmstead. The town is badly decayed, especially near the waterfront,
and the wharves are in ruins (281-2).2 Both Sargent and the town appear to hide a moral
failing within themselves. .
Zadok Allen, the old drunkard who reveals the true history of the town, begins by
calling Devil Reef a “gate o’ Hell” (295). Later he also tells Olmstead that the Deep Ones
like human sacrifices, too (296). Zadok is the person who reveals the whole terrible
history of the town to Olmstead: how Marsh found out how to summon the Deep Ones
from Kanakys natives; how no one wanted to mix with the Deep Ones, but did anyway,
because of Marsh; how Marsh’s family hid themselves away; that he was probably the
first to intermarry; and how Marsh led a revolt in town that ended up killing many of
those who rejected the Deep Ones, including Zadok’s father (297-303). Near the end of
Zadok’s story, he warns Olmstead that the Deep Ones have been bringing things up from
the ocean, and that Main Street is “full of ‘em – them devils an’ what they brung – an’
when they git ready . . . . I say, when they git ready . . . . ever hear tell of a shoggoth?
(306). Everything in this account builds up the image of the Deep Ones as evil. So far,
“Innsmouth” is a typical horror story.
2

Lovecraft’s architectural passion has been well-documented and analyzed by Timothy H. Evans,
who has looked both at Lovecraft’s travelogues and the role of architecture in his fiction. See his “A Last
Defense against the Dark” and “Tradition and Illusion.”
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That sense continues into Olmstead’s night in Innsmouth. He discovers Gilman
has trapped him in his hotel room, and has to flee a mass of townspeople in a famous
chase scene.3 Joshi, in writing on this scene, has said that he finds it “somewhat
ridiculous,” and that the townspeople pursuing Olmstead likely “recognized him and
merely wished to bring him back into the fold” (Weird Tale 223). Whether the scene is
ridiculous or not, Joshi brings up a valid concern: could the townspeople recognize
Olmstead? Nowhere does the story imply they can tell “one of their own” without the
visible signs of change. The end of the scene where Olmstead questions Zadok provides
another, possibly simpler reason for the pursuit: Olmstead knows too much of their story.
Zadok says, “[g]it aout o’ here! They seen us – git aout fer your life! Dun’t wait fer
nothing’ – they know naow – Run fer it – quick k—aout o’ this taown” (307). At this
point in the story Olmstead does not believe the Deep Ones and their progeny are real, so
he discounts Zadok’s warning, but Zadok has apparently seen a Deep One out in the
water, watching them speak. He does tell Olmstead that “them that lives here shoo off as
many strangers as they kin, an’ encourage the rest not to git very cur’ous, specially
raound night time” (305). It is at least possible that the simplest explanation is true, and
that the townsfolk, portrayed as evil throughout the story, want to capture Olmstead so he
cannot let anyone outside town know that an alien race of fish people have taken over
Innsmouth and appear to be mobilizing toward spreading through other cities as well.
What one might expect, as Olmstead escapes, is for him to make it out of town –
else how could anyone be reading his account? – tell the authorities about Innsmouth,
since he already said he did that, and probably worry about whether or not they are all
3

So well-known among Lovecraft fans, at least, that the video game adaptation, Call of Cthulhu:
Dark Corners of the Earth remakes it blow by blow. In fact, if players do not block up the doors in the
same order as Olmstead, with dressers and bookshelves, they will be killed.
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cleared out and if humanity is still endangered by them. And the story suggests all that.
But the final horror of the story is that Olmstead is really descended from the Deep Ones
as well. In his genealogical research he finds his grandmother and some other relatives
came from Innsmouth – his uncle Douglas killed himself, presumably after discovering
his heritage, and his grandmother disappeared soon afterwards (331). He also sees his
grandmother’s jewelry, made in the same style, from the same materials, as the
Innsmouth gold he saw on the priest and in the museum (332-3). These discoveries are all
horrible to him, but the story’s ending represents his coming to terms with his heritage.
He dreams of his grandmother, out in the ocean, and learns that “some day [. . .] they
would rise again for the tribute Great Cthulhu craved. It would be a city greater than
Innsmouth next time” (334). And Olmstead, the narrator who called down the Federal
government on Innsmouth, does nothing. He wakes with “exaltation instead of horror”
(335). He decides not to wait for his transformation to complete – he intends to rescue his
cousin, also transforming, from an asylum and for the two of them to go to “Cyclopean
and many-columned Y’ha-nthlei, and in that lair of the Deep Ones [they] shall dwell
amidst wonder and glory forever” (335). That is the final line of the story. Olmstead
accepts the Deep Ones as his own people, and looks forward to seeing them.
Some critics, such as Joshi, see this moment as the final push toward terror. If Olmstead
could fall prey to these things, if he could be one of them, then anyone could be. It is an
effective ending for a story. However, it hints at even more than that. Olmstead suddenly
revalues the Deep Ones. He thinks of them as family and runs to them, even though he
knows they will punish him for how he brought the government down on them (335). He
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chooses the Deep Ones over his human life and the terrible but still human end his Uncle
Douglas chose.
Is it possible that the implication of the story is that, even though the humans and
Deep Ones are at odds – the Deep Ones hoping to take over the surface world to some
extent – the Deep Ones are not evil? Despite the careful and consistent characterization of
them as devils and monsters, can they be a species, like any other? This idea would
undermine the reader’s sense of self, showing a world where humans are not the only
sentient and intelligent creatures. It would also show that the universe is indifferent – evil
cares about good and wants to destroy it, but indifferent creatures simply try to fulfill
their own needs in whatever way they think best – in the same way Huxley and other
Darwinists claimed that our ethics were, in part, reactions to or products of our
evolutionary history. The Deep Ones behave in the way they do because of their own
evolutionary history, which is almost (but not entirely) alien to humanity.
This distinction between evil and simply different shows up early in the story,
mainly through the descriptions of the Deep One jewelry. It is remarkably like the
goldwork from Machen’s “The Red Hand.” When Olmstead first sees examples of it, he
says,
It took no excessive sensitiveness to beauty to make me literally gasp at
the strange, unearthly splendour of the alien, opulent phantasy that rested
there on a purple velvet cushion. Even now I can hardly describe what I
saw, though it was clearly enough a sort of tiara [. . .] It was tall in front,
and with a very large and curiously irregular periphery, as if designed for a
head of almost freakishly elliptical outline. The material seemed to be
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predominantly gold, though a weird lighter lustrousness hinted at some
strange alloy with an equally beautiful and scarcely identifiable metal. [. .
.] The longer I looked, the more the thing fascinated me; and in this
fascination there was a curiously disturbing element hardly to be classified
or accounted for. At first I decided that it was the queer other-worldly
quality of the art which made me uneasy. All other art objects I had ever
seen either belonged to some known racial or national stream, or else were
consciously modernistic defiances of every recognised stream. This tiara
was neither. It clearly belonged to some settled technique of infinite
maturity and perfection, yet that technique was utterly remote from any –
Eastern or Western, ancient or modern – which I had ever heard of or seen
exemplified. It was as if the workmanship were that of another planet.
(276)
When Olmstead sees his grandmother’s jewelry he repeats some of these ideas, such as
the exquisite workmanship and that “no one seemed able to define their exact material or
assign them to any specific art tradition” (332). These descriptions highlight in art what
the story hints at with biology. The jewelry is well-made, and thus not strange because it
is bad; it is strange because it is different, from an artistic tradition wholly unknown to
Olmstead and any art historians who have examined the pieces. They are entirely alien,
and difficult to judge because of their removal from the histories and traditions of art;
They are not strange because they are modernist – rebelling against an artistic tradition.
That would require them to be aware of and related to the artistic traditions of humanity.
These works of art are not new, they are very old, and yet even more alien than the
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strangest creations of the avant-garde artists at work at the beginning of the twentieth
century.
What the jewelry and their artistic alienness reflect from the story in general is a
sense of things gone down divergent paths. These things are strange to each other when
they meet again. It is true of the art and the Deep Ones themselves. They appear to have
an entire society under water, and their own resources, including access to the fearsome
shoggoths, which appear again in Mountains. Humanity and the Deep Ones are the two
things diverging from a single historical point, unable to judge each other properly
because of their totally different evolutionary and social histories. Zadok Allen points to
this when he tells Olmstead that it “[s]eems that human folks has got a kind o’ relation to
sech water-beasts – that everything alive come aout o’ the water onct, an’ only needs a
little change to go back agin” (297). The two worlds that are so alien to each other,
human and Deep One, started in the same place long before the events of the story. The
mechanisms of evolution’s variation separated them, and it was so long ago that they
appear to be wholly alien. But they are not, not quite; they were originally one. Both
sides want to destroy the other – in the case of the humans involved, because the Deep
Ones seem so horrible. To the Deep Ones humans may look just as horrible. The story
never presents a reason the Deep Ones wish to spread across the land. The entire morality
and system of society for both cultures are deeply different, but they started as the same
species. Evolution separated them biologically, and from that separation stems the gulf
between cultures.
In depicting this gulf and the reasons for its presence between human and Deep
One, “The Shadow over Innsmouth” demonstrates the evolutionary idea that human
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cultures, ethics, and morals stem from changes in evolutionary history, even when morals
are meant to stop an instinctive habit. Just as the modernist artists Olmstead mentions
rebel against art history, so a moral may rebel against evolutionary history. But these
things that supposedly separate humans from nature stem from nature just as surely as
though they were biological themselves. The Deep Ones and humans were once the same,
and by the time of the story they want each other dead, and mixtures of the two races
horrify those who look on them. Olmstead’s acceptance of his heritage does support the
common idea that the story speaks to the horror of implacable lineage, but it also speaks
to the varied and different histories of every branch of evolution. Olmstead can accept the
Deep Ones because his branch stems from them as well as from human origins. The Deep
Ones are presented as so horrible as to be unacceptable, but they are literally as natural as
humans, since both humans and Deep Ones were once related.
“Call of Cthulhu” also has an underwater monster, but its presence is less marked
even than the Deep Ones, who are hidden behind closed doors for most of their story.
“Cthulhu” is a detective narrative of sorts; the narrator, Thurston, pieces together what
has happened from newspaper clippings, a relative’s notes, dream journals, and an
interview with a sailor. This combination of narratives allows the story to draw in
elements of traditional Gothic frame stories as well as the pursuit narrative of detective
stories. Thurston’s grand-uncle, Professor Angell, began to piece together the story, and
much of the narrative is directly or indirectly from his notes. An artist had terrible dreams
that turned out to replicate images found on an ancient sculpture that Angell, as an
archaeologist, had examined years earlier. He had examined it to help a police inspector
from Louisiana deal with the “Cthulhu Cult,” who appeared to be abducting people and
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sacrificing them in evil ceremonies in the woods. In fact they were giving the people to
creatures would come in the night and eat the sacrifice. The entire cult existed
independently of their “deity,” Cthulhu, a creature trapped in the Pacific Ocean by
accidents of tectonics. It came to Earth from space, making it a peculiar kind of alien
species. Its dreams affect the dreams of others – that is how the artist saw images of the
creature in his dreams, because Cthulhu’s dreams infected him. The sailor, Johansen, saw
the creature rise from the ocean only to sink again. The story ends with Thursgood saying
Cthulhu “must have been trapped by the sinking whilst within his black abyss, or the
world would by now be screaming with fright and frenzy [. . .] What has risen may sink,
and what has sunk may rise” (Call of Cthulhu 169). Thursgood insists that members of
the cult are likely looking for him because he has gotten too close to the truth, as Angell
did before him.
The language of the story is old-fashioned – not in narrative, but in the terms used
to deal with Cthulhu and his deluded followers. Even at the end, when Thursgood
understands somewhat the nature of the creature, he calls the cultists “his [Cthulhu’s]
ministers” (169). The language is not precisely mystical, but it is mystified – cults
dominate the story; Cthulhu rules a city, rather than being trapped in one, and his dreams
invade the minds of others, demonstrating his power even while asleep. The reality of the
story is that Cthulhu would probably be bad for humankind, but he is not actively trying
to destroy anyone. He is simply trying to escape his accidental confinement. Hite writes
of the story that “the threat to order is not villains, swarthy Catholics [. . .] but the actual
circumstances of reality. Lovecraft has taken all the core Gothic tropes [. . . a]nd brought
them out of the ‘shudder tale’ and into the world of science, and hence into science
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fiction. For Lovecraft, the Gothic ruin is the universe, and vice versa” (59). Hite keys into
the strong Gothic flavor of the story. It is that horrific Gothic element that underpins the
alien in “Call of Cthulhu.” Joshi writes that “[w]hen Cthulhu suddenly emerges from the
depths of the Pacific, he effects an unprecedented union of horror and science fiction.
Cthulhu is a real entity[. . .] It is also material [. . .] by manifesting itself in the real world
it embodies the quintessential phenomenon of the weird tale – the shattering of our
conception of the universe [. . .] Cthulhu’s existence means that humans have somehow
horribly misconstrued the nature of the cosmos and our place within it. . .” (Weird Tale
190-1). Like a Gothic monster Cthulhu frightens because he appears to go against nature,
to be supernatural or preternatural – but he is an entity from space, not a spirit or devil.
What breaks, then, is not nature, but the characters’ conceptions of nature.
Cthulhu is the familiar creature from Lovecraft’s fiction, and for good reason: it
represents that destruction of one’s conception of the universe. “Call of Cthulhu” was not
yet Lovecraft’s SF masterstroke, but he was already laying the groundwork for it. In a
letter he explained the creature Cthulhu’s name by saying it was meant to represent
sounds made by an alien race with wholly non-human language and physiology; he took
such care partly in “protest against the silly and childish habit of most weird and sciencefiction writers, of having utterly non-human entities use a nomenclature of thoroughly
human character; as if alien-organed beings could possibly have languages based on
human vocal organs” (qtd. in Straub 830). So Cthulhu is a wholly alien creature, outside
human standards of judgment, that horrifies because it violates entirely the common view
of nature through its mere existence. It has its own wants and needs that may conflict
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with humanity’s, and pursuing those wants and needs could destroy all humans, or even
all life on Earth.
But Cthulhu does appear to be malevolent. He does tries to pursue and attack the
boat Johansen and his companion use to escape the island. In this story and some others
there are hints that Cthulhu will destroy the world or the human race if ever awakened
permanently, though some of the hints imply that will be by accident, in the way a person
might kill an animal or an insect because it is in the way. Wells’ comparisons of the
Martians to hunters and humans to timid rabbits come to mind again. But the hint of evil
in Cthulhu prevents it from being wholly “alien.” It is grotesque – wings and tentacles
and reaching arms; it can coalesce together when smashed by a steamboat – and alien,
certainly, but possibly evil, or at least ill-disposed to humans. While it would be possible
for a science fiction work to have an alien with these traits, the story does not spend
enough time naturalizing these abilities and traits. Cthulhu may be an alien, and he
certainly represents a stride toward the frightening and grotesque alien entity, but he
retains some of the “shudder story” elements in his frame.
Lovecraft’s longest work actually has his best portrayal of the entirely alien and
its ramifications on human worldviews. At the Mountains of Madness features a
geological survey team, from the fictional Miskatonic University. They go to Antarctica
and find a series of strange things, beginning with shaped stones and going on to
buildings and the remains of alien creatures. The team dissects some of the creatures. The
remains are not dead, but only in suspended animation due to the cold; the freshly-woken
Old Ones (one of the team members dub them so) kill the humans they see as their
captors and killers, experiment on the bodies in the way the scientists did the supposed
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remains, and disappear to their city. Two of the surviving team members, Professor Dyer
and his assistant Danforth venture into the city, knowing nothing but that some of their
team members are dead. They examine the architecture and murals that depict the history
of the Old Ones on Earth, and eventually sympathize with them and their declining
civilization. The Old Ones are overthrown by their shoggoth slaves, and the scientists
loath the shoggoths for destroying such a great people. They find, deep in the city, a stillliving shoggoth and flee from it. Danforth goes insane. Dyer claims they had sworn to
keep their story a secret – he reveals it in the story only because another team, the
Starkweather-Moore expedition, plans to go to the same place and may discover the same
things, or things even worse. They will also be taking a drill powerful enough to possibly
release the shoggoths from their underground labyrinth.
One of the recurrent questions about Mountains is whether or not it is science
fiction. It was first published in Astounding Stories, after all (Joshi “Notes” 420).
Opinions differ. Lévy claims it is not science fiction; it is not because Lovecraft does not
portray space as positive, but as a “reversed abysm” (70). Kenneth Hite is just as sure it is
SF, saying the core idea is one of “alien contact” and that the story exists “at the realworld fringe of scientific exploration” (81). Chia Yi Lee describes the story as a marriage
of horror and science fiction, describing it as a horror story presented in the form of
science fiction, using the style of scientific realism (4-5; 1). Joshi actually coins a term to
describe Mountains and other Lovecraft works in a similar generic position. He calls
them “quasi science fiction,” and says this category features stories of supernatural horror
in which the supernatural elements are “rationalized in some way,” made to appear
natural (Joshi “Introduction” 7).
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The debate ranging around the classification is instructive. What it highlights is
that Mountains, perhaps more than any other Lovecraft story, is concerned with science
itself. It uses the style of a scientist’s report, delves deeply into the study of geology,
mentioning eras and terms without explaining them – it is so entrenched in the language
of science that Joshi helpfully includes a table of geological eras in his explanatory notes
for the story to help confused readers (423). This story explores nothing less than the
biological origin of humankind.
That origin comes from the Old Ones. In part vii of the narrative, Dyer tells of the
scientific abilities of the Old Ones when it comes to biology.
It was under the sea, at first for food and later for other purposes, that they
first created earth-life – using available substances according to longknown methods. [. . .] They had done the same thing on other planets;
having manufactured not only necessary foods, but certain multicellular
protoplasmic masses capable of moulding their tissues into all sorts of
temporary organs under the hypnotic influence and thereby forming idea
slaves to perform the heavy work of the community. These viscous masses
were without doubt what Abdul Alhazred whispered about as the
“shoggoths” in his frightful Necronomicon [. . .] When the star-headed Old
Ones on this planet had synthesised their simple food forms and bred a
good supply of shoggoths, they allowed other cell-groups to develop into
other forms of animal and vegetable life for sundry purposes. (299-300).
Shortly thereafter Dyer says that brute labor was performed by the shoggoths and, on
land, a species of vertebrate, and that
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[t]hese vertebrates, as well as an infinity of other life-forms – animal and
vegetable, marine, terrestrial, and aërial – were the products of unguided
evolution acting on life-cells made by the Old Ones but escaping beyond
their radius of attention. They had been suffered to develop unchecked
because they had not come into conflict with the dominant beings.
Bothersome forms, of course, were mechanically exterminated. It
interested us to see in some of the very last and most decadent sculptures a
shambling primitive mammal, used sometimes for food and sometimes as
an amusing buffoon by the land dwellers, whose vaguely simian and
human foreshadowings were unmistakable. (302-3)
Dyer will only hint around the issue, but these passages make clear that the Old Ones
made life on Earth, let it run free when it was not irritating, and the force of evolution
worked on some of the vertebrates, eventually creating humans. The Old Ones used the
creatures ancestral to humans as circus animals and food. This fact is buried amid all the
other revelations, and is not necessary to deal with most of the story – scientists discover
aliens frozen in the ice and their terrible creations, the creations have taken over, and they
can never be allowed free of the Antarctic.
But strange parts of the narrative are clear, or clearer, when read in the light of
humans originating as by-products of the Old Ones. Dyer’s attitude towards the Old Ones
changes over time. Dyer’s teammate Lake is the one who discovers the bodies of the Old
Ones frozen in the ice. He makes detailed reports and vivisects a few of them. He cannot
even determine if they are animal or vegetable (263). Lake never passes judgment on
them. They are specimens to him. So Dyer’s emotional reactions are contrasted with the
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calm, objective reports of his colleagues. When he discovers the dead bodies in Lake’s
camp Dyer describes them as “loathsome,” and points out that not only were the bodies
mangled, but “some were incised and subtracted from in the most curious, cold-blooded,
and inhuman fashion. It was the same with dogs and men” (277). He goes on to say many
were missing organs. He is describing the vivisection, but cannot draw back from his
personal perspective enough to see it in that light; instead he views it as “cold-blooded”
and “inhuman.” Of course the entities that have done this are inhuman, or unhuman at
any rate, but Dyer is passing judgment on them, saying they are not as good as humans,
who would never do these things. The reader can see the irony, in that humans did exactly
the same things to the Old Ones. Dyer ends his description with the finding of the Old
One corpse, buried, and says of it that it had a “peculiarly hateful odour” (278). Similar to
the way horses react badly to Deep Ones, dogs and men alike experience the smell of the
Old Ones as hateful.
Dyer first describes the city of the Old Ones he explores as “monstrous” and is reminded
of the “daemoniac plateau of Leng, of the Mi-Go, or Abominable Snow-Men” (283; 284).
The Old Ones and their city are terrible to Dyer, and exist as things that disprove his
vision of the world. In disrupting the universe, from Dyer’s point of view, the Old Ones
act as monsters, threatening him as though they were trying to kill him. They are
grotesque because intelligent animal/plant hybrids with tentacle limbs fall entirely outside
his discriminatory grid. And though he later realizes the misunderstanding that has caused
the Old Ones to kill the men in Lake’s camp, at this early stage in the story Dyer does feel
threatened by the presence of the Old Ones.
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Dyer does not always feel this way about the Old Ones. He is fascinated by their
history and in awe of their physical properties (301). In speaking of their scientific
prowess he can only marvel at what they accomplished and hope humans, too, could
someday aspire to such heights. He points out that humans have yet to understand the
physical principles that allowed the Old Ones to build their cities and architecture in the
way they did (294). The Old Ones had counters used as money, and their government
“was evidently complex and probably socialistic” (302). Given Lovecraft’s changing
view of politics, the Old Ones’ socialist state would be the best possible, increasing the
goodness of the Old Ones.
Dyer spends a great deal of time discussing the art of the Old Ones. It is
appropriate that he does so, as all the history he divines comes from their murals, but it
illustrates his growing fascination and love of the Old Ones. Their technique “was
mature, accomplished, and aesthetically evolved to the highest degree of civilised
mastery; though utterly alien in every detail to any known art tradition of the human race.
In delicacy of execution no sculpture I have ever seen could approach it” (294). Like the
Deep Ones, then, the Old Ones are superb artists, but alien to humanity in a similar but
presumably more extreme way, as the Old Ones are genuine aliens from outer space.
Dyer approves of this alienness in a way Olmstead does not. It is indicative of their
superiority. They are not evil. Joshi has noted this as well, speaking particularly of their
vivisection of humans as mirroring the human vivisection of aliens; he points out both
groups perform the same act, but Dyer attributes evil to the Old Ones until he begins to
identify with them (Weird Tale 201).
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Eventually Dyer is so enthused about them that he says they were “the beings
whose substance an alien evolution had shaped, and whose powers were such as this
planet had never bred. And to think that only the day before Danforth and I had actually
looked upon fragments of their millennially fossilised substance. . . and that poor Lake
and his party had seen their complete outlines” (297). Far from being monstrous and
hateful, now even the physical forms of the Old Ones are limned with respectful and
reverent language.
Dyer’s final opinion of the Old Ones comes when he realizes the survivors who
destroyed Lake’s camp and killed the team there have in turn died at the amorphous
hands of the shoggoths. He says,
[p]oor devils! After all, they were not evil things of their kind. They were
the men of another age and another order of being. Nature had played a
hellish jest on them – as it will on any others that human madness,
callousness, or cruelty may hereafter drag up in that hideously dead or
sleeping polar waste [. . .] They had not been even savages – for what
indeed had they done? That awful awakening in the cold of an unknown
epoch – perhaps an attack by the furry, frantically barking quadrupeds, and
a dazed defence against them and the equally frantic white simians with
the queer wrappings and paraphernalia . . . poor Lake, poor Gedney . . .
and poor Old Ones! Scientists to the last – what had they done that we
would not have done in their place? God, what intelligence and
persistence! [. . .] Radiates, vegetables, monstrosities, star-spawn –
whatever they had been, they were men! (330)
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The language here portrays Dyer’s sympathies with the Old Ones. But his sympathetic
feeling goes past feeling bad for them; he identifies with them. He slips into the objective
language of science to describe things intimately familiar – dogs and humans – because it
is the only point of view the Old Ones might have been able to adopt. They would not
have known what dogs or men were, and could only have conceived of them in terms
such as “quadruped” and “simian.” Finally, Dyer declares that the Old Ones were
scientists and men. The identification is complete; Dyer relates better to the scientific but
totally alien Old Ones than he does other human beings. He even lets slip at this point
that one of the reasons he does not want people going to the Antarctic is that they may
thoughtlessly and callously disturb more Old Ones in their sleep and play on them a
“hellish trick.”
The thing Dyer is missing is that he is more related to the shoggoths than the Old
Ones. Both humans and shoggoths derive originally from the experiments and scientific
procedures that the Old Ones used to make life from inanimate matter. Joshi describes
this common origin as “the utter decimation of human self-importance by the attribution
of a grotesque or contemptible origin of our species” (Weird Tale 197). He even points
out that the Old Ones are simply superior to humans, and that humans could likely never
attain the heights they reached (Weird Tale 227). Humans are more akin to the shoggoths
than the Old Ones, and Dyer never sympathizes with the shoggoths. He is more and more
disgusted by them as the story progresses.
The shoggoths are described as slaves several times, but Dyer never feels they
were justified in their attempts to gain freedom. He says that they acquired “a dangerous
degree of accidental intelligence” and that eventually they outgrew total hypnotic control
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and had “developed a semi-stable brain whose separate and occasionally stubborn
volition echoed the will of the Old Ones without always obeying it. He goes on to
describe the ruthless “war of re-subjugation” while still wholly on the side of the Old
Ones, pausing over the carnage only to comment on the “headless, slime-coated fashion
in which the shoggoths typically left their slain victims” which still “held a marvelously
fearsome quality despite the intervening abyss of untold ages” (304).
In the same passage he says even the [s]culptured images of these shoggoths filled
Danforth and me with horror and loathing.” This description is repeated several times.
The shoggoths are squamous creatures with no fixed form. They are disgusting, slimy,
and Dyer never brings himself to view them in any other way, despite the reverential way
he sees the dismembered bodies of the Old Ones by the end of the story. Lévy says that
the Lovecraftian monster [. . .] is less frightening than . . . repugnant [. . .]
The extreme panic [. . .] that seizes the characters is less explained by their
fear of death than by their instinctive refusal of all contact with the
monster. It is much more terrible to see it, to sense it, to smell it – touching
it being at any rate out of the question – than to actually face death. (60).
This repugnance and revulsion is the whole of Dyer’s feeling toward the shoggoth. He
and Danforth flee almost mindlessly near the story’s end from a shoggoth. They figure
out, over the course of their explorations, that the Old Ones Lake dug up must be alive.
Even after finding the Old Ones’ camp site, scattered with goods taken from Lake’s
camp, they do not turn back. They believe they may meet the Old Ones but do not flee.
Even as they do run back, Dyer thinks the Old Ones may spare him and Danforth out of
scientific curiosity if for no other reason (Lovecraft Thing 332). They are not repulsed by
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the Old Ones as they are the shoggoths. The shoggoths are apparently evil and the Old
Ones are good, at least according to Dyer’s awe of the Old Ones and his disgust with the
shoggoths.
This feeling of his is strange because he is disgusted by something that is closer to
human than the Old Ones. The shoggoths are not human, but they emerged from the same
evolutionary starting point as humans did. Dyer feels no sympathy at all for them because
of this shared ancestry; he is more concerned with the pursuits of the Old Ones – he loves
them because they were great artists and thinkers. The shoggoths, in Dyer’s mind, simply
supplanted the Old Ones and lived a crude imitation of their betters’ lives.
Dyer should not necessarily have felt for the shoggoths, though the hints of
slavery might lead one to at least some sympathy. It is more important that Dyer, his
objectivity gone but his love of science intact, sides with the Old Ones, who were great
scientists. His slow conversion to this point of view moves him away from sympathy
with humanity. It would not be entirely inappropriate to think he views everything
resulting from the accidental evolution on Earth as bad and foul, and the shoggoths are
the epitome of awfulness. He can sympathize with humans insofar as they strive for
science and understanding, but in the end humans can never measure up to the Old Ones.
In this case humans share no commonality with the totally alien species. Humans
are not linked in any genetic way to the Old Ones as they are, in “Shadow over
Innsmouth,” with the Deep Ones. And that thing humans are not connected to at all is
great. One should aspire towards its achievements and lament its passing. One should
also hate those who usurp their position, and humankind certainly does, having spread
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across the planet as the Old Ones once did before the glaciation. That, at least, is how
Dyer feels.
The shoggoths, on the other hand, are totally vile, not just as usurpers, but also
because of their physical properties. They are disgusting. But they share their origins with
humanity. Readers cannot look to any genetic markers to orient themselves in this story.
Certain actions and attitudes are held up as good, but they have nothing to do with nature
– only with how one behaves and perceives. The same evolutionary system that produced
humans produced the shoggoths as well, while the beings that emerged from an entirely
alien evolution are paragons of goodness in the minds of Dyer and Danforth. Morality,
goodness and badness, cannot be located in nature. They are located, if they exist at all
and are not simply relative, in behaviors.
In “The Shadow over Innsmouth,” “The Call of Cthulhu,” and At the Mountains
of Madness, Lovecraft portrays beings who are products of evolutionary branches
different from humanity’s own. In “Shadow over Innsmouth” the beings are related to
humans, distantly, but viewed as evil until the narrator finds he is like them and their life
has certain lures. In “The Call of Cthulhu” the alien is assumed to be a mystic creature
but is really just an alien, malevolent by accident and without any evil intent; it is a nearly
perfect horrific depiction of an alien shattering human views of nature. In At the
Mountains of Madness one race of beings is totally separated from humanity, having
evolved on another planet, and the narrator views them as supermen and geniuses, while
the beings evolved on Earth from similar stock to his own simply revolt him with their
bodies and their behavior. Lovecraft portrays a collapsing morality that juxtaposes good
and evil to something else, something other. This device allows him to portray the
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anthropocentric, human-invented nature of moral systems by taking natural morality to its
farthest extremes and questioning them with narrators who, in some cases, side against
the human race.
Wells hinted at such possibilities in his work on aliens, but tied them to humanity
in ways that would buttress his rhetorical purposes. But he, too, added layers of
grotesqueness to the alien while divorcing it still further from the evil creatures of the
Gothic that came before. Wells and Lovecraft produced the entirely alien, the Science
Fictional alien, no longer figurative but literal. Grotesque creatures come from space, or
the oceans, and they are not animals or animal-like, but entirely new sentient and
intelligent species. Their grotesqueness highlights their alienness, illustrates how the
characters must react to something so different, and in the end underscores the lack of
monstrosity in these creatures. They are merely built for their original conditions. They
are as grotesque as we. And in that way the horror can cut both ways.
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Conclusion
The topic of this dissertation is the alien in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century. In Britain the alien could mean many things: the poor, the rich, foreigners,
aboriginals, or criminals. But by the early twentieth century and its profusion of science
fiction narratives, the “alien” changed and gained a new definition of “creature from
another world” while still retaining all its old meanings. This dissertation is a selected
history of the alien in its many forms and it shows that the alien in all its forms was
shaped and changed by two things: evolutionary theory and the Gothic grotesque.
The alien was anything different, as it is now; as evolutionary theory gained
support, more people felt alienated from more things. Foreigners and distant places were
alien to people, as they always had been, but suddenly so was nature itself, along with its
products and the vast reaches of the past and the future. Everything that had appeared
familiar to the early Victorians – even the comfortable concept of the foreigner –
appeared to be transformed as people speculated more and more about the implications of
evolutionary theory. Anxieties about the alienness of once-familiar things coupled the
grotesque with the things made strange by evolution.
Changing foreigners
The foreigner had been changed by evolutionary theory. It was certainly still an
“alien” concept – the word simply meant foreigner for most of its time in the English
language – but evolutionary theory made a paradox that would be mirrored in later
iterations of the alien. Because all humans had evolved into their present states from
common ancestors, they were all the same. Differences could be explained by local
adaptations, meaning that the very concept of “foreigner” was called into question as
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Britain created one of the largest exploitative empires in history. At the same time – this
is the other side of the paradox – theories of evolution seeped into the social sphere,
mostly through the works of writers such as Spencer. Spencer claimed societies evolve as
well as individuals, and thus some could be better adapted or more advanced than others
– “fitter.” Evolutionary theory could be used to support the very differences in people that
it seemed to erase. The anxieties surrounding the foreigner were integrated into new
anxieties about the status of the human in nature.
The Distant Past
Geology and evolution distanced the past from people just as it seemed to
distance people from one another; it was no longer familiar if slightly different. The past
was not last century, when fashions were different and political treaties might be changed
– the past was millennia ago, when dinosaurs and the “caveman” roamed an Earth that
would have looked very strange to a Victorian. The grotesque in stories about the past
served as a way to symbolize or prey upon the abjectness of a person considering the
amount of life that must have lived and died before the human race was recognizable on
the planet. If humans had been evolving for millions – not thousands – of years, why had
their “progress” been so slow? If Spencer – and later, Julian Huxley, T. H. Huxley’s
grandson – were right and evolution were improving people and evolving away antisocial
behaviors and impulses, then how could senseless murders still happen? What was Jack
the Ripper’s status in the evolutionary progression of humankind?
Animals Toothed and Clawed
Animals were also suspect and contributed to the feeling of abjection growing in
Victorian culture. If they were not products of God’s creation – put in place to be used by
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humans as resources, companions, or reminders of God’s grandeur, like Blake argued the
tiger had been – then they were evidence that nature as creator could make anything, in
any conditions. Like time and other human beings, nature itself had been alienated from
the Arnoldian Victorian by evolution. In this case, nature appeared strange because of the
endless bounty of is creativity. There was no norm in nature’s processes of making life –
it could make anything, through the slow process of adaptation to the organism’s
surroundings.
Creatures from Outer Space
The grotesqueness layered on literary representations of Victorian anxieties – such
as the foreigner/savage as animal or child – helped to create what we would recognize
today as the extraterrestrial. Not every space alien is grotesque or has something in
common with nineteenth or early twentieth century depictions of evolutionary anxiety,
but the alien as “dumping ground” for the evolution-driven anxieties of one’s culture
survives to this day as an important part of feelings about the extraterrestrial in literature,
but also in people (many of whom, now, might claim to have been abducted by
extraterrestrials). The extraterrestrial was an almost inevitable outgrowth of the literary
history of the alien after the advent of evolutionary theory. It is by definition unknowable
through conventional means, as it originates from a place that never had or influenced the
development of humans. If Hodgson’s creatures were alien because they were from
regions of Earth never touched by humankind, then creatures from Mars would seem to
be totally inexplicable.
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The Literary Uses of the Alien
People, writers particularly, did not always connect evolution and the grotesque,
even when dealing with the alien. Middlemarch may be the best example: evolution is
one of the many things George Eliot deals with in that novel, but rarely does the novel
verge into the grotesque. But throughout British culture around the end of the Victorian
era and beginning of the modernist era more and more writers connected the two; more
and more people began to imagine monstrous things when they imagined the results of
evolution. That disconcerted many of them, as more and more evidence appeared
claiming humans were products of evolution just as much as a tree or an octopus was.
That feeling of concern and anxiety expressed itself through horror writing, through
stories using Gothic tropes to make anxieties into monsters. So the alien became, in much
of the time’s fiction, a grotesque monster that was made by evolution rather than by sin or
the supernatural. Even in stories about cultural aliens or the simple unknown the
grotesque began to bleed over.
The history of the alien in this dissertation serves to prove that the alien as a
literary and cultural figure came from the anxiety of alienation felt by many as evolution
explained more and more of the world around them. From Heart of Darkness in chapter
one to At the Mountains of Madness in chapter five, this dissertation presents a partial
history of the alien and argues that every one of them used not only evolution but also the
grotesque to create their aliens and say something about the state of the alien in British –
and sometimes American – culture. This study does not claim there is a single statement
about the alien shared by these texts. They are linked by their methods. To look at a
person and think of their evolutionary history was to look at a monster – as students and
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sightseers felt they did when they looked at Holly in She. These apparent monsters are
driven by bestial desires and needs rather than civilization and morality. Many scientists
and thinkers did not believe this linkage, or tried to ameliorate it when they came across
it, but more and more in their culture people saw a terrible, animalistic monster behind
anything that was a product of evolution. Before Darwin published his evolutionary
theories Tennyson, reacting to the earlier evolutionary work Vestiges of the Natural
History of Creation, wrote “Nature, red in tooth and claw / With ravine, shriek’d against
[God’s] creed” (66).Tennyson had articulated the view of many others: nature appeared
suddenly to be chaotic and cruel rather than harmonious and carefully-orchestrated.
Tennyson eventually have found peace with the issue of evolution crying in the face of
God’s creed, but others could not do so and the line of Tennyson’s poem became one of
the most famous descriptors for the violent and animal in nature apparently revealed by
evolutionary theory.
This study situates the grotesque – in literature and in evolutionary theory – as a
response to and method of dealing with the anxiety produced by that new violent and
chaotic nature. Each chapter – aside from the first – groups together similar “alien”
narratives, from the colonial to the geological, animal, and extraterrestrial. All these
narratives use the grotesque as well as evolutionary theory; the theory explains the alien
or, in some cases like Heart of Darkness, fails to explain it adequately, In these works the
grotesque is nearly always used as the measure of alienness – the more grotesque, the
more alien from the characters and the reader.
But as the literary experimentation continues – as writers explore what it really
means for something to be “alien,” to be what it is as a result of evolution, the creatures
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become less monstrous even as they continue to be grotesque. Grotesquerie fails to index
monstrousness – it can only index alienness in some of these stories. At that point, to
simplify a complicated literary history, the alien as we know it formed around these
fictions and these creatures. Monsters such as Dracula were explained by evolution in
their fictions, but also by supernaturalism. They are grotesque because they are alien but
also because they are unnatural. Dracula has more to do with Lombroso than with
Darwin. But the Martians of H. G. Wells’ The War of the Worlds are not really evil – in
fact, as allegorical characters they are precisely as evil as the reader. That is, they show
British readers what it would be like to be a subject of colonial invasion and rule rather
than the perpetrators of such rule. But they retain their grotesqueness because they are so
drastically different. They get their nutrients through vampirism just as Dracula does, but
they are no longer evil. They are simply products of their evolutionary history, like any
animal – and like any human. They can no more be blamed for their vampirism than you
or I could be blamed for our chewing and breathing. It is the only way they can stay alive,
and they do so without remorse because it is necessary. The narrator of the novel is
disgusted by their actions but recognizes, while he observes them and records his
observations, that they do no more or less than what they need – even the invasion itself
is ultimately explained by the loss of natural resources on Mars. They are alien in the
post-Darwinian sense: they are even more different than an alien was before, but in some
sense are no longer coded as “bad” even as they are more repulsive. They contain the
anxiety of a people over their own imperialism and the risk of “reverse colonization” or
of a culture climbing “higher” on the evolutionary ladder and taking from the British as
the British felt they could take from the “lower cultures.” The alien became something
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not just strange or dangerous – it became a marker for how estranged people felt from
everything and anything in the world around them.
The alien is something that is different from one’s normal experience – and often
horribly so – but in some way free of judgment. One cannot judge the alien, one can only
experience it. It is independent of the norms and mores of one’s own culture, one’s own
assumptions, because it was not a product of those things. The encounter with the alien
may leave the character or the reader questioning his or her own place in the world, but
the creature’s is evident – whatever makes it grotesque also proves its ecological niche.
The creatures in Hodgson’s Boats of the “Glen Carrig” have tentacle limbs, beaks, and
the general shape of a human – they are the apex predators of the Sargasso, able to swim
in water and clutch prey like an octopus and also climb out of the water and walk like a
human, seeking prey there as well. Lovecraft’s Great Old Ones – also tentacled on arms
and feet – are unfathomable to Dyer because they are so alien, even though he can
appreciate and respect their more evident accomplishments in architecture and biology.
Just as the narrator of War of the Worlds can appreciate the streamlined digestive system
of the Martians for being so efficient – a product of narrowing resources on their home
planet – even as he recognizes it forces them to prey on humans in order to survive.
That is the commonality of all the “aliens” in this study. In some way the
characters and the readers cannot quite understand them the way they could understand
their next door neighbor or a Dickens character (and Dickens, too, was a master of the
grotesque), even though the things that make them strange are results of a commonality –
being the products of evolution. Heart of Darkness makes the point that the Africans are
not as different from the Europeans as the Europeans believe – but even then there is
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something that makes each alien to the other. Conrad claims it is the intervention of
evolutionary theory and commercialism, but still something makes each appear grotesque
and alien to the other. Haggard recapitulates the distinction between black and white in
his novels, but questions whether the distinction is one of kind or of degree – implying
that his white readers have all the same elements in them as the black “savages” do, they
simply have a one-twentieth veneer of civilization over top. Like Tennyson’s vision of an
animal in every view of nature, Haggard’s implication forces readers to consider their
own grotesqueness – the evolutionary and savage motives behind their pretty necklaces
and senses of honor.
The alien is something difficult – if not impossible – to understand using the same
systems, the same discriminatory grid, one uses for oneself and one’s surroundings. But it
is not necessarily grotesque. Certainly experimental science fiction authors of the
twentieth century found ways to make aliens totally other without making them grotesque
– the work of Ursula K. Le Guin and Stanislaw Lem offer examples. But the thread
remains, with bug eyed monsters coming to Earth in everything from The X-Files to
personal alien encounter narratives. The grotesque alien makes one shudder, as Asa Gray
did; it confronts the reader or audience member with the anthropocentric view of the
world he or she might use, and insists that nature is not constrained in that way. Nature is
not tending toward making humans. The Sun does not rise and set for humans, and
evolutionary pressure does not perform in an attempt to make humans, only to make life
of all kinds better suited to its ecological niches. That is why these stories are still
horrifying as they take pains to explain that the creatures are perfectly natural. Even if
they are, they force upon characters and readers alike the realization that the entire world,
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seen as it is through an anthropocentric filter – is entirely different than people expect. It
can and will create whatever sort of life makes the most sense. Nature itself is alien to the
reader or subject and it is so because it is unknowable and – as images such as the slugsquid-people illustrate – grotesque.
That is important for understanding the alien. As a concept that began as a
foreigner or a stranger, the “alien” took on layers of grotesqueness and abjectness through
these stories and ideas propagating throughout British culture. The alien became
something unfathomable – for a human to be alien it must become, not just a foreigner,
but something like Haggard’s Ayesha: perilous, frightening, and grotesque, as when she
withers into a monkey shape. The alien became something so different from one’s
expectations that the grotesqueness became a literary tool more useful for creating
distance than for horrifying readers. The distance is the horrible thing, not the creature
itself. The Great Old Ones of Lovecraft’s story horrify less than the shoggoths, despite
humankind’s relation to the shoggoths and the cold vivisection of the scientists by the few
remaining Great Old Ones. They are entirely grotesque, with their plant-like
physiognomy, but that grotesqueness marks them as different, separate from humanity
and life on Earth, not as horrifying monsters. The grotesqueness becomes almost a neutral
feature. It is possible this idea of the grotesque alien influenced works outside the
purview of this study, through the propagation of the grotesque alien came through these
works. Winesburg, Ohio certainly uses grotesques, but in a familiar neighborly way;
never are the people anything but familiar, even when at their most grotesque.
Monstrousness changed with the advent of the alien separate from anthropocentric
morality.
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We gained a literary trope from this combination of literary grotesque and
evolutionary theory: the extraterrestrial alien, complete with its horrifying visage and
narrative reminders of separateness, strangeness. But the grotesque itself was altered
slightly as well, becoming first a marker of distance rather than a sign of evil or the
supernatural. The alien became something that could be opposed to all of humanity – and
all because it reminded readers that all human beings were closer in origin and behavior
than a simple crab or octopus, never mind a ravening Martian or Great Old One.
In the study of late nineteenth and early twentieth century literature one can see
that the grotesque gained new prominence as the neo-Gothic grew in popularity. The
grotesque was used in many ways, such as defining the abject body or frightening and
apparently new sexualities. It would find a use in describing the World Wars as well. A
small but significant strain of grotesque fiction dealt with evolutionary horrors that were,
in some way, alien; they were unknowable by the subject characters and, by extension,
unknowable to the reader as well. Their strangeness was grotesque, but the product of
something they could not help: their evolutionary history and heritage. As people began
to associate the grotesque with evolution these stories, through their methods of monster
creation, they encountered a problem: what does it mean to think something or someone
is grotesque because of their evolutionary history? The answer is the implication in the
sense of the alien building up through these stories – the reader is just as grotesque as the
monster, since the monster is only grotesque in so far as it is different than the reader’s
expectations. If something is grotesque because of its evolutionary history and its
possession of biologically-driven needs and urges, then everything must be grotesque.
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If everything is grotesque, then the reader is deeply alienated from the world
around him or her – and his or her own self. If nothing – not nature, not time – can be
trusted, then everything is frightening. This sort of story, that began to appear shortly
before the Modernist era, questioned the appropriateness of a unified worldview that
assumed constancy and rejected relativity. If Huxley could prove through strong
circumstantial evidence that humans and apes were close relations in the mammal class,
then it was not just true that humans were animals – it was also true that all life was
similar and none of it was more or less grotesque than any other. These stories used
grotesque evolutionary creatures but proved that they were no less grotesque than any
other form of life. Just as Olmstead realizes the Deep Ones are living creatures like him
with lives to lead and the narrator of “The Willows” finds that the creatures pursuing him
are simply curious as to why intruders have come among them, the reader of these stories
found and still finds that all life can be dangerous but none of it is evil. The morality was
drained out of nature by these stories and the scientific theories that they used. The aliens
prove that life flourishes wherever it can find a way. Historically, this sort of anxiety was
the precursor to the Modernist obsession with what selfhood was and what one’s place
could be in a world that made no sense. In this case, the fantasists and early science
fiction writers appear to have anticipated the more highbrow literary examples of
Hemingway, Faulkner, or Eliot in their portrayal of humans struggling to find meaning in
a world that appears to lack it.
Futures of Grotesqueness
Most of the narratives in this study have not contained aliens from other worlds,
aliens in the science fictional sense of extraterrestrials or beings from other planes of
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existence. Wells, Lovecraft, and possibly Blackwood (depending on one’s interpretation
of “The Willows”) were the only writers in this study to deal with creatures not of Earth.
But now extraterrestrials are commonplace in literature, film, and all sorts of media. They
have, appropriately, evolved as well. Early science fiction featured bug-eyed monsters
from other planets just as culpable for their actions as Dracula or Frankenstein’s creature
– they were different from humans but also made decisions to kill or abduct innocent
people. One thinks of the Klingons, an entire race of aliens in Star Trek who were
essentially evil; violent and looking for a fight with everyone. Later iterations of the show
and its movie spin-offs deepened the characterization of the Klingons until it was no
longer true that they were simply evil, and then writers began to explore stories in which
the aliens were abject or grotesque but just as complicated as the humans encountering
them.
That is not to suggest the increased complexity in science fiction has been linear.
War of the Worlds already indirectly suggested the aliens were not any more evil than the
humans they invaded, even though there the import was that the act of invasion was evil
and the English engaged in it all the time. Meanwhile aliens who are simply evil arrive in
their flying saucers in stories to this day, such as the hydrophobic invaders from M. Night
Shymalan’s Signs (2002). Game series such as Mass Effect (2007; 2010; 2012) begin with
simple depictions of evil aliens – and evil alien robots – and attempt to complicate the
player’s interactions with them, even while leaving the player the option to consider the
antagonists as simple, evil villains or complex life forms with their own needs and ideals.
Authors like Ursula K. Le Guin and Stanislaw Lem have created aliens entirely outside
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the rubrics of humanity, allowing any grotesqueness that appears alongside the creatures
to be entirely on the reader’s part.
The alien – stitched together as it is from the elements of science and literary
grotesquerie – plays an important role in our culture that perhaps no one in the nineteenth
century could foresee: people believe they have been abducted by aliens. Media even
shaped itself around the phenomenon – The X-Files (1993-2002) was as popular as it was
in part because it chronicled abduction stories in a culture suddenly awash in them. Some
say the alien encounter story is a new version of a ghostly, demonic, or angelic visitation.
The imagery, though, has become more grotesque, not less – demons were of course
always grotesque, but aliens that are not products of sin or evil retain the misshapen
bodies and tendency to torture victims.
Understanding the alien’s origin in the grotesque and in the evolutionary theory
that both fomented the idea and shaped the form is more important now than ever. It is
not confined any longer to literary worlds: our world becomes more enmeshed in the
problems than it ever was. Radiation in the twentieth century could create The Incredible
Hulk, releasing the atavistic brute inside a calm, timid scientist; now genetic engineering
serves the same purpose in fiction – but also in the zero world. The debate around actual
uses of genetic engineering and related fields such as stem cell research is filled with
images of the grotesque despite very little in the science leading in that direction. Many
people react to the idea of a genetically engineered child – even one that would
hypothetically look the same as a child not “tampered with” – in the same way a
Victorian might have reacted to a vision of a person as an evolved ape. In early 2013 a
Harvard professor horrified people by apparently claiming to want to clone a Neanderthal
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– subsequent interviews showed he was not advocating for it, merely trying to call
attention to the hypothetical possibility (Weinstock). The professor was the victim of a
poor translation from a German interview, but the huge uproar shows how strong the
feeling of abjection is to this day when contemplating the contiguity of species people
want to view as different or ancient. The grotesque stays with evolutionary science in all
its forms in and out of the realm of fiction. That engineered child is an alien in the same
way that the African or the Martian was in the texts considered here. The child would be
of us and not of us – abject and the cause of abjection – grotesque, despite having no
outward, visual signs. It horrifies those it does because of its sense of strangeness and the
uncanny; it is a manipulation of nature, something supposedly untouchable. But it is not
simply Frankenstein’s creature in a new form: the manipulation was done genetically,
using the very building tools that explained evolution’s mechanisms upon the rediscovery of Mendel’s work.
The door is opening wider for the study of these literary tropes and patterns. The
alien as a combination of evolutionary theory and grotesque proliferated after the period
this study has focused on. But they also shaped their culture in turn. For some the word
“alien” can and does mean “foreigner” before anything else – immigration debates
regularly talk about “illegal aliens.” But for others it means, before anything else, an
extraterrestrial, and that has altered the connotative meaning of that word in all its uses.
For a person to be labeled an alien now, in the twenty-first century – decades after Ripley
Scott could make a film about extraterrestrials titled simply Alien – means they are
completely unfamiliar. Just as in the nineteenth century, the alien is whatever seems
foreign to the subject. Sometimes it is the same thing, like a person from another country.
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Sometimes it is a new thing altogether, like the images that come back to victims in
dreams of being abducted in the night.
After Darwin’s theories caught on the context of the alien changed. It was no
longer simply different – it was evolved differently, it was separate, completely removed
from the experience of the subject. That literary shift affected the culture around it – it
reinforced the confusion of different with separate. It reinforced the idea that people are
different because of their evolutionary backgrounds, now including ideas that women
seek men for their smell, men seek women for their widely-spaced hips; these differences
appear to create separation, to make each strange to the other. Biological differences lead
to the perception of strangeness because now the biological difference seems grotesque,
rather than what happened first – grotesque things were explained through biological
difference. This inversion has made biology appear to many as far more monstrous than
astronomy, chemistry, or geology, despite the strong associations each has had in its own
time to horror stories – such as the chemistry in The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr.
Hyde or Frankenstein or the geological horrors of Lyell’s own scientific theories, proving
species had gone extinct and literary works such as Doyle’s “Terror of Blue John Gap.”
Biology stands as the standard of science in horror because of evolution’s early linkage to
the grotesque.
The linking of horror, grotesque, and evolution in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century continues to some extent today. Cultural and literary phenomena can be
explained through that linkage; reveling in body modification – found in both the zero
world and works such as William Gibson’s Sprawl trilogy – is one of many active
rebellions against such biological, grotesque horror. The rise of trans-human or post-
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human fiction and imagery is another. Literature and culture were indelibly shaped by the
late Victorian tendency to see a monster in anything that had evolved, and to use
evolution to explain horrible things, fictional and real. Works such as Lombroso’s
guaranteed that evolution would hold in suspension the contrary ideas of badness and
neutrality – the man with the criminal brain cannot help his affliction, but is still labeled a
“criminal” – Lombroso did not come up with another word for the condition, allowing
societal judgment to remain unchanged even as he attempted to alter the core explanation
of what was to be judged at all. This study examines works that support and that
interrogate the assumption that evolution produced monsters, and the body of work, both
during the time of this study and afterwards, has combined to produce the alien, a
creature that embodies many of the things a culture fears or hates, but with a grotesque
evolutionary explanation that prevents the alien from being evil, only different. George E.
Slusser and Eric S. Rabkin have claimed that literary aliens serve as a kind of
anthropological symbol of humankind, embodying the other in a form less recognizably
human (6-7). This dissertation has dealt with the method of embodying that
anthropological symbol in its early gestation. Not every science fiction story uses
elements of horror,1 but many do, and often it comes from the early proto-science fiction
stories that linked the alien with the grotesque.

1

Note the aliens in the original Star Trek that were not antagonists but merely misunderstood; they
were typically human with simple cosmetic differences, like the aliens that were black on one side and
white on another. They were a satire on racism, and their grotesqueness does not alter how human they
look.
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